30 April 2018
Dissertation

India Japan Vistas of Economic - Strategic Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific

A perceived United States created void and its seemingly declining presence is changing the security template of the IOR. The emerging maritime narrative favours the forces of power transition which in consequence invites new strategic prospects. An inevitable change in this direction would be the rise of multipolar power centres that would work against the ‘superpower conundrum’. The advent of middle powers like India and China into the IOR power play substantiates this forecast with adequate factual premises. Nonetheless, the unstable balance of power arising out of the huge asymmetry that defines the maritime reality calls for better equations among the stakeholders.

Clearly, India cannot equate itself with Beijing’s economic and military capabilities. The increasing fear of retaliation from an emerging China due to the territorial border disputes and its own lack of a strong defence facility are forcing India to look for equal powers and trusted allies in the region. Japan comes as a natural option here especially with shared regional apprehensions and common aspirations.

Though a rugged past has stalled ties at some points, largely, a likeminded approach towards almost every aspect of growth has strengthened the Indo-Japan relation through ages, particularly, in the maritime domain. The two countries are part of an agreement which seeks to combat piracy and armed robbery in the waters of Asia. Significant instances have proved the worth of combined exercises in the region like the 1999 rescue of a Japanese tanker by the Indian Coast Guard and the Indian Navy. The two nations have conducted combined exercises with several other navies of littoral states independently to enhance and self equip marine dependent economies against illicit practices in the sea.

China’s establishment of port infrastructures and an innovative revival of the ancient Maritime Silk Routes to fasten commerce could be understood as a counter to Washington’s continued presence in the Indo-Pacific and its inclusive dual cover approach combining security and commerce known as the ‘Rebalance to Asia Policy’. The Chinese agenda of a win-win globalisation through its ‘debt-trap diplomacy’ has paved way for major twists in the strategic dynamics of the Indo-Pacific. Through its soft power capital, Beijing has managed to garner a considerable level of trust, influence and goodwill among the nations across the ocean. The region faces escalated threats from the evils of piracy and also from the issue of maritime terrorism. This is also one of the primary factors which describe the reasons for chief players like China in seeking alternative sea ways other than the piracy-prone Straits of Malacca and Hormuz for a safe transfer of goods. On the other hand, as maritime democracies, India and Japan look for a peaceful international law abiding atmosphere in the high seas, as much of the trade pertaining to the two countries is driven by the waters.

The growing Chinese footprint in the region might come as a sign of relief to many of the littoral states due to ensured assistance in the regional level, thereby leading to little dependence on western powers. The Chinese rise is often portrayed as purely economic. But China’s disproportionate naval responses and increased nuclear submarine patrol in the IOR affirms a strong scope for concern. These patterns of imperialistic tendencies might lead to hindered growth and a hit to the already strained regional ties. This questionable growth of the Chinese factor calls for an external balance in the Indo-Pacific.

Being an energy dependent country where much of its oil supplies is transported though the seas, Japan aims at reviving its economy through engagement in the regional front. Apart from this, most importantly, it is the Sino-Japanese rivalry which is embedded in history that is bringing Tokyo into the race for hegemony in the IOR. India, with its well placed geographic position and an aspiration to dominate her strategic backyards, and coherence in interests with Japan is being seen as a strategic partner in bringing a balance to the region. Japan is a permanent participant in the Malabar exercise, a bilateral US-Indian naval cooperation expanding it into a more complex trilateral exercise. The 2007 edition of the exercise hosted in the Bay of Bengal saw participation from Australia apart from India, US and Japan leaving a strong message to the increasing Chinese fleets. Apart from the covert agenda of containing China at the North Eastern borders of India, memories of wartime aggression towards the North East is also making Tokyo keen about improving the strategic climate along the coast of the Bay on sympathetic ground. A maritime connectivity project linking Dawei and the Chennai port in order to improve relations with ASEAN thereby reducing dependence on the Malaccan strait would rightly portray this Bay-centric move. A milestone agreement in the Indo-Japan engagement maritime relations has been the ‘JIMEX 12’, which coincided with sixty years of the bilateral relation between the two. Further down, Indian and Japan are essentially looking at the Andaman and Nicobar Islands as a potential strategic tool to counter ports in Hambantota in Sri Lanka and Gwadar in Pakistan with nuclear submarine docking facility especially due to the location of the islands in the Bay.

Indian naval establishments view the IOR as its own backwaters. The nation shares her border with a number of countries but the extent of control and power it enjoys on land is far less when compared to the strategic leverage and opportunities the ocean promises. Being a giant in the region with a comparatively stable economy and vast territory makes India consider itself as a net security provider to all the nations along the IOR. However, this extensive thrust towards a comprehensive policy for maritime relations has been a relatively newer phenomenon from the capital which came about only since the 1990s. The most obvious reason to quote might be the emphasis on the need to engage in commerce across boundaries and the desire to mark its presence in the Indo-Pacific. But, covertly it could be attributed to the realisation that India’s own coastline and its national interest are being challenged in what was once regarded as the Indian domain or the Indian sphere of influence. The threat to its ideology of Non-alignment when the US and USSR staged their troops in the waters of the Indian Ocean during Cold war, the 2008 Mumbai attacks which saw perpetration through the sea lines into its territory and the growing China factor are significant events which has made India rethink her maritime policy. It is drifting towards a more intensive cooperation along with partner nations in the naval front to reassure its supreme position in the region.

It is interesting to note that the Japanese government has been reworking on their military framework in similar lines. Until now, the Japanese security architecture, according to their present constitutional framework laid weight on self defence and formidable defensive operations for state protection. Article 9 in the Japanese constitution outlaws war as a means to the settlement of conflicts. This has been strictly adhered to ever since the end of the second world war and its devastating repercussions. With the changing trends in geopolitics today, the Abe government has been apprehensive about their existing Pacifist constitution. The rising need for a strategic approach to power projection is pushing nations like Japan to expand its scope in including the possibilities of offensive counter reactions. This entire game of equals could be understood through the lens of a realist. Realism or rather political realism in international politics stresses on the idea of conflict and competition to be the primary drivers in the struggle for power. The concept of realism critically deals with the institution of state at the focus and how protecting ones’ national interest and survival becomes the only motive which rules the realm of geopolitics.

Now, this inclination towards building defence capabilities as a catalyst for deepening stronghold could be viewed as a stance completely against the 1971 United Nations declaration which categorizes Indian Ocean as a ‘Zone Of Peace’. The resolution 2832 initiated by Sri Lanka in the 26th session of the United Nations General Assembly and adopted on 16 December, 1971 calls for the elimination of foreign military activity or establishment of foreign bases in the region. But, the United States with its established presence in the region, strategically empowering littoral states and the threat due to the rising interests of China in the Indian Ocean calls for an external balance in the region. This has pulled in more players into the domain making ZOP declaration almost impossible to achieve. It is important to note that China is undoubtedly the uniting factor in the Indo-Japan partnership, particularly when Japan strongly sees China as an archrival and a persistent threat. Japan’s interest not just lies in strategic engagement but also in the peaceful economic rise of the bay in-keeping with the concept of blue economy. The improved Indo-US naval cooperation is also a favourable sign for Japan to stress on its role in the Indian Ocean. Thus, the ascending trajectory of Japanese presence in the Indian Ocean seems to be affirmatively welcomed by India due to the universal values they share and the maritime commons they seek to pursue.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The study uses three major theories to analyse the evolving strategic template. The first level of enquiry uses the concept of neo-realism which highlights the idea that power is the most important entity in international relations. The theory is an outgrowth of the traditional realist thought which claims that international relations is driven by human nature and therefore thrives on the ego and emotions of popular players. Neo-realistic principle, by Kenneth Waltz, would help us to understand that the distribution of capabilities, the emergence of great powers and the idea of balance of power are the factors that are driving the competition in the Indo-Pacific today. This race for securing power is described by neo-realists as a result of a security dilemma which prevails among nations in an anarchic system. Security dilemma develops in a situation of anarchy when states constantly fear a war outbreak and the quest for self preservation heightens. This leads to internal and external capacity building in terms of economic and military advancements and alliances due to a lack of trust among nations.  Depending on the material capability, some nations with superior resources would emerge as superpowers towards which other smaller nations may gravitate to ensure its own safety, resulting in a new international order.

The second level of theoretical analysis uses the concept of the “theory of rising powers.” This theory is often understood in the light of a realist analysis, it considers power as the currency of international politics. The rise and fall of prominent powers is the innate character of international system which is almost a cyclical phenomenon. This is evident in the evolving geopolitical and geostrategic landscape of the Indo-Pacific where a rapidly rising China is posing a serious threat and concern to the regional order. Conflict is an unavoidable outcome of the emergence of rising powers at a point when they reach an equivalence in terms of the international power spectrum.

The third and final level of analysis uses the concept of neo-liberalism to study the common goals around which the Indo-Japan convergence thrives. A resurgence of classical liberalism, it tries to propagates a market centric approach where the state is driven entirely by capitalistic goals. The free trade agreements and prospective economic corridors sprouting out of the growing India-Japan proximity as a rival to China’s assertive “infrastructure diplomacy” shows an increasing inclination towards a strategy that works at the behest of markets.

HYPOTHESES

·      The Indo-Japan relation is only driven by the US factor.

·      India-Japan convergence aims at containing the growing Chinese assertion in the Indo-Pacific.

CHAPTERS

This work contains an introduction, three main chapters and a conclusion.

Chapter one is a descriptive study titled “Indo-Japan relations: An overview” would trace the various facets of the convergence and would shed light on the policies of India and Japan in building a strategic leverage in the IOR (IOR). It also seeks to understand the increasing strategic interest of Japan in the IOR.

Chapter two is titled “Japan and the Indo- Pacific” would assess the Significance of the United States in the Indo-Pacific strategy and the role of the role of the American factor in an Indo-Japanese strategic convergence. It further, goes on to investigate the reasons for a rising China in the Indo Pacific and the extent of impact it holds over the duo’s relation.

Chapter three is an analytical study titled “Japan in the IOR: Maritime prospects and limitations for India.” The chapter would try to throw light on the aspect of how Japan would work as a regional power centre. It tries to understand how India would ensure her strategic stronghold and autonomy through the special partnership. The chapter finally tries to trace the strategic possibilities and limitations of the Indo-Japan cooperation in the maritime domain.  It is succeeded by a conclusion.

Department of Political Science, MCC, Chennai