Strategic Forecast 2020

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CWA # 225, 25 February 2020
Strategic Forecast 2020
Middle East: The Return of Russia in 2020

  Padmini Anilkumar

CWA Brief, February 2020

With Russia-Middle East ties growing in strength, there is no reason why it shouldn’t move on to relatively newer grounds of cooperation

Background

Vladimir Putin’s strategy in the Middle East can be summed up to be ‘Partner to all, Ally to none’. The President of Russia has made it clear on multiple instances in 2019 that he refuses to distance his state from any actor in the Middle East. They key here is to be on everybody’s good side, an approach different from that of the United States, which has more often than not divided the region into friends and foes. This undoubtedly widens Russia’s operational space in this region. It is employing a great deal of effort to emerge a successful mediator in the Middle East and the path to achieve this relies heavily on this fresh, seemingly wise strategy. 

Major Trends in 2019

Increasing involvement in regional conflict resolution and security matters

In the Middle East, Russia understands that it can neither have a formidable military presence like the US nor become an economic giant like China. Therefore, it has sought to carve a niche for itself with the help of what this region has in plenty – conflicts.  With the Astana process and mediation attempts in Southern Yemen that gained a large amount of attention in 2019, it is clear that Russia is not holding back on using regional crises to establish itself as a soft power wielding mediator. It is also working to establish a Russia-led security concept in the Persian Gulf, where the only state that has previously created a set up along the same lines has been the United States. Therefore, the pattern identifies Russia is most interested to put in place its sway in the security sector. 

Modus operandi that focuses on ‘Minimal Loss, Maximum Results’

Russia is not keen to ‘dump’ its military resources (money or men) in a bid to strengthen regional presence in the Middle East. It sent its forces to Syria in 2015 only when it was absolutely necessary to protect the Assad regime. So far, this motto of ‘Minimal Loss, Maximal Results’ is working well. 

Weakening US will strengthen Russian influence in the Middle East

Middle East policies of the US have been less engaging and more erratic than ever in the past. Throughout 2019, President Donald Trump has proved that the disengagement is not about USA’s inability but about its unwillingness to get involved deeper and continuously in this part of the world. Every vital act indicating the American disengagement has benefitted Russia, be it the scrapping of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or the withdrawal of American troops from Syria. While the US seeks to keep up its presence with additional deployments of troops or weapons, it now threatens to tip the little balance there is. Faulty American Middle East policies have been the best lubricant for Russia’s re-entry into the Middle East. 

Arab world’s positive response to Russia’s outreach

Owing to the US’s unpredictability, Arab leaders are learning to imagine a time when American withdrawal becomes more strongly felt. This is a notable departure from the political behaviour that existed half a decade ago. Gulf monarchies and other authoritarian governments have made visible their aversion to America’s so-called democratization campaigns in the Arab world. On the other hand, there are several governing features that these governments could find in common with and agree with, in Russia. 2019 was a year of several important state visits. Israeli Prime Minister visited Moscow thrice, Putin met with Turkey’s Erdogan and formulated an alternative plan to USA’s failing plan in the Syrian matter. He also visited Saudi and UAE for the first time in more than a decade. Every one of these visits had concluded with trade deals, promises to ensure stronger bilateral ties, and scope for meets to discuss more agendas regarding Middle East’s stability and prosperity. It is almost as if the US stepping back from its commitments in the region is being used by local and regional leaders to explore more power balancing options, while still holding on to their end of friendship with the US. Thus, it is safe to say that the Middle East’s response to Russia’s diplomatic and security outreach has been remarkably positive. 

Increase in the US allies taking their woes to Russia   

Some of the strongest US allies in the region have also begun to turn to Russia in times of need. Israel is the best example to be cited here, who did not succumb to American pressure to back sanctions on Russia, in the hope that the latter would reciprocate this consideration when it comes to matters in the Middle East. It even reached out openly to Russia for “help” with regional matters. With the US troop withdrawal in Syria, both the Kurds as well as the Turks turned immediately to Russia to help manage the volatile situation. How Russia handled the matter is a whole different debate, but the point to be noted is the increasingly evident mentality of “if not the United States, it is Russia who can help”. 

The Middle East is helping Putin win the sanctions game against the West

2019 saw Turkey purchasing the S-400 Air Defence Missile System from Russia. At least three other Arab states are in talks with Moscow for a similar purchase deal. The Middle East has started playing a vital role in Russia’s defiance of the US-led sanctions imposed on it in 2014 for aggression in Ukraine. Among others, a major target of these sanctions was to cripple Russia’s defence industry exports. Putin has pursued a conscious campaign to overcome these constraints imposed by the West, and is reaping great results. This is pointed out by military trade ties and deals in the Middle East that are only getting stronger despite years of sanctions, Russia has been facing.   

Forecasts for 2020

On US presidential elections 2020

The US presidential elections and Russia have been linked for several wrong reasons since Donald Trump took office. Owing to his overall friendliness towards Russia, Trump was one of Moscow’s favourite candidates during his first elections. In this regard, little has changed in the upcoming 2020 elections. Russia would want Trump to continue in office with a second term, as it will then be promised several benefits in different forms. Even though the process of disengagement in the Middle East was in a way set about by his predecessor President Obama, Trump is the only President who has fulfilled campaign promises of real withdrawal. 

During the Cold War years, USA made sure that the Soviet Union would be pushed out of Middle East’s power sphere. Russia would not have to do the same to the US because it is pulling away itself. In the event of Trump winning another term, this pull-out would continue, and most likely on a larger scale. The extent of this would be inversely proportional to Russia’s chances for playing the “new trustable power in the region” card. 

On Russia’s increased involvement in regional security 

Russia, along with China, has signed an agreement with Iran to hold joint Naval exercises in the Persian Gulf. Starting in December, 2019, the agreement will headstrong into 2020. 

This must be read alongside Trump’s July 2019 comments about American interests in the Persian Gulf and other straits like Bab-Al-Mandeb. Trump stated that the US now buys a very small percentage of the oil that the Middle East sends out through its straits, and that states like China and Japan have higher stakes than the US when it comes to ensuring undisrupted passage of oil through these waters. Therefore he meant to say that policing these straits is no longer a lucrative act for the US. The attitude contained in this statement flies in the face of traditional US foreign policy norms regarding the Middle East, where the US has always been the prime advocate and guard for freedom of navigation. 

Of course these statements do not imply that the US in any way is going to dial down its presence in the Persian Gulf. They offer no evidence that there will be reduced American intelligence and military resources in these waters from 2020, even if Trump continues in office for a second term. However, the attitude they contain is noteworthy and something that could offer one more space of influence for Russia to explore in 2020. 

On more involvement in extended security realm

With Russia-Middle East ties growing in strength, there is no reason why it shouldn’t move on to relatively newer grounds of cooperation. Russian as well as Middle Eastern governments, especially the Gulf monarchies, view Sunni Jihadist forces as potentially detrimental to their domestic stability and security. Both have clearly viewed organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood with great suspicion. Their ties to actors within their respective state boundaries (like the Muslim Brotherhood-Northern Caucasus Islamist groups ties) have been spotted as sources of political intimidation across Russia as well as the Gulf. Russia has also aligned in thought with Middle Eastern governments on important matters like the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Most recently, Saudi Arabia invited Russia to be a part of the expert team investigating the Abqaiq attack, allegedly purported by Iran. With all of these pointers falling under a single umbrella, 2020 could be the year Russia and the Middle East start working more collaboratively on all matters of security, including counter-terrorism. 

On more defence deals and defying sanctions with the help of the Middle East

The European Union has once again extended the 2014 sanctions placed on Russia until 15 March, 2020. If Putin’s efforts in the Middle East begin bearing equivalent results, it is possible that he would get several states in the region to side with Moscow in this on-going sanction war. Even if this exact scenario does not materialise, Russia will continue to successfully defy the sanctions with more defence sales in the Middle East in 2020, like those of the S-400s being negotiated with Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Iraq. Nevertheless, it is baseless to argue that 2020 will witness any switches in Middle East’s military alliance status quo. States that are already aligned to the United States in this manner have given no reason to predict strong changes in military alliance from the US to Russia. 

 On opportunities the threat of Iran could bring

A great threat that looms over the Middle East today is Iran’s wayward actions. If Iran’s behaviour grows more hostile in 2020, it is more than likely that concerned Arab states would dial Moscow, and not Washington to sort matters out. This would be a marked difference from what has been the case since the Cold War era. 

The 2019 attack on Abqaiq oil fields in Saudi Arabia threatened the guarded citadels of Arab oil strength everywhere. By taking no appropriate action against this attack, the United States seems to have rendered its power position almost pointless. Arab leaders now believe that the US has no intention to act on Iran for its unruly behaviour. USA is also currently not in a position to amicably sit down with Iran and review its actions. This is exactly where Russia’s potential as a mediator who stands in good faith with all concerned parties would help its peace broker ambitions. This factor alone is capable of encouraging unprecedented strategic relations between Russia and the whole of Middle East in 2020. 

On the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

The JCPOA is another matter of consideration. Russia extended unconditional support for the deal when it was first initiated, and then later on when Trump decided to withdraw from it. This was another mode for Russia to maintain positive relations with Iran, whose support it is absolutely crucial for the former’s interests in Syria.

Scrapping this deal and restricting countries worldwide in purchasing Iranian oil has led more of these desperate consumer states to knock on Russia’s doors for oil. In this regard, Russia is expected to benefit handsomely in 2020 and further, as long as constraints on Iranian oil exports continue to be maintained. However, a majority of the candidates (Democratic as well as Republican) running for US elections in 2020 have voiced their interest and intention to recommit the United States to JCPOA, if they take office. Even if technicalities do not allow the same deal to be rebooted, a new one that fulfils the objectives of the first is undoubtedly a possibility. In such a scenario, Russia will definitely support this cause. It can even be expected to take an active leadership role in the initiations after 2020, alongside the European Union, as this is a rare pointer of agreement for both these actors. 

From a strategic point of view, the additional oil revenue it might earn at Iran’s expense does not compare to the political mileage such a successful initiative will bring Russia regionally in the Middle East and even globally. 

References

  1. European Parliament. (2018, November). Russia in the Middle East. Retrieved from www.europarl.europa.eu: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/630293/EPRS_BRI(2018)630293_EN.pdf
  2. Groll, E. (2019). Russian-Turkish Patrol Begins. Retrieved from www.foreignpolicy.com: https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/11/04/security-brief-no-cease-fire-in-syria-as-joint-russian-turkish-patrols-begin/
  3. Tehran Times. (2019, July). Iran expresses positive view toward Russia’s Persian Gulf security proposal. Retrieved from www.tehrantimes.com: https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/438811/Iran-expresses-positive-view-toward-Russia-s-Persian-Gulf-security

Padmini Anilkumar is a PhD Scholar at the Department of International Studies and History, CHRIST (Deemed to be University), Bengaluru 

This essay was published at the NIAS Quarterly on Contemporary World Affairs, Vol 2, Issue 1, January-March 2020  

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