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CWA # 181, 1 November 2019
Middle East
Syria: Who wants what?

  GP Team

Nidhi Dalal, Rashmi Ramesh, Sukanya Bali, Harini Madhusudan, Seetha Lakshmi Dinesh and Parikshith Pradeep

 

What does Turkey want in Syria?

Turkey has launched a military assault against the Kurdish population in Northern Syria. A marginal ethnic group concentrated in Turkey, Iraq and Syria, the Kurds were instrumental in the war against ISIS led by the Syria led coalition forces and the US.

The Turkish assault has followed the US decision to withdraw from the coalition leaving the Kurds to face the opposing Turkish forces. Fighter jets and tanks have bombarded the region in the Syrian part of Kurdish territory in an operation deemed to be a war against terrorism and ‘terrorists’. The move has been condemned across the globe and Turkey has launched the assault at a critical juncture in the ongoing conflict.

Turkey has long viewed the Kurdish separatist movement as violent acts of terror in its soil especially after the Kurdish-terrorist launched attacks in Ankara and Istanbul. The toppling of the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein and the subsequent instability under the government of Bashar al-Assad has given the much-needed space to the Kurds to gain a degree of self-government. This has increased the scepticism and concern of the Turkish government against the Turkish Kurds in its territory. In addition, alleged cross border links between the Kurds have made Turkey weary of opposition and repression against its government.

Violent attempts by the military to thwart dissent among its 20 million Kurdish population in the Eastern Anatolia and South-eastern Anatolia region have been widely reported by various human rights agencies. . An attack against the Syrian Kurds would now send a strong message to the Turkish Kurds closer to home off Turkey’s iron fist actions. Turkey also aims to create a ‘safe zone’ in the region so as to push the concentration of the Kurdish opposition in the least amount of territory and possibly out of its sovereign boundaries.

Another goal that Turkey aims to achieve is to increase its role as a key actor in the Middle East. With countries such as the US, UK, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Russia playing a decisive role in the region, Turkey aims to achieve a strong position and say in the decisions played amongst these actors. Most importantly, the assault against the Kurds would drive a political message back to EU who has resisted the entry of Turkey into the bloc and have seen Turkey merely as a buffer containing the conflict within the region and not spiralling to its borders. Well aware of this strategic role, Turkey has launched the attack at a time when it aims for a more substantial role in the trade policies with the EU.

Where does Syria stand?

On 9 October, Turkey launched the Operation Peace Spring in the Kurdish controlled northern Syria, soon after the United States announced a withdrawal from the area. President Erdogan termed the offensive as a counter-terrorist operation, aimed at cleansing the Turkey-Syrian border off militants. Ankara aims to weed out these militant who has converted the northern Syria into a launching pad for carrying out terrorist attacks in the Turkish territory. The creation of the safe zone by Turkey would invariably foresee the return of the Syrian refugees to their homeland.

What does the Assad regime want?

The Syrian government has condemned Turkey for carrying out operations inside its territory. However, Assad’s forces came to the limelight only when Russia negotiated an agreement between the Syrian Kurds and the regime. The agreement secured the movement of the Syrian army into the northern borders, the first time since 2012. Assad’s forces were diverted elsewhere for fighting the rebels and as a result, the area was virtually under the control of the Kurds. According to the latest reports, Syria’s army has moved into the north-eastern towns, which could result in a confrontation with the Turkish forces.

The strategic agreement between Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Force (SDF) and the Syrian government is a major boost for Assad’s regime. The agreement has naturally made the SDF weak and dependent on the Syrian Army and Russia. Pro-Syrian citizens were seen celebrating the army’s entry into the northeastern towns after more than seven years. Certainly, the withdrawal of the United States comes as a huge relief for Assad. The government would want to push Turkey out of Syrian territory and handle the issues between Kurds and the regime internally.

Where do the Syrian Kurds stand?

The Kurdish forces along with the United States fought the Islamic State in Syria and defeated the Caliphate. With the Syrian government’s focus on the civil war, Kurds were successful in controlling the northern and northeastern portions of the country.

The Syrian Kurds now stand against Turkey, who views them as terrorists instrumental for instability in the region. The United States’ withdrawal has ensured that they become more vulnerable to Turkey’s actions. Russia, on the other hand, has made swift moves and has emerged as a major player in the region. By negotiating the strategic agreement, with one stroke, it has turned its foe SDF, as its friend. As a result, SDF stands more vulnerable to the Syrian regime and Russia. Mazloum Abdi, SDF’s commander-in-chief saw no option with the Kurds but to align with Russia and Assad. He blamed the United States for abandoning the Kurds to the Turkish assault. In the current situation, aligning with them will hopefully prevent a possible Kurdish genocide.

Operation Peace Spring has sent a larger message to the Kurds across Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran that Kurdistan will not come into existence. Kurds in Turkey already face backlash and Ankara is now targeting the Syrian Kurds. This has weakened the community in Iraq and Iran. The regional forces that do not want a Kurdistan to have grown stronger will continue to remain so.

For Kurds, a fight against all odds

The 9 October cross border military offensive on the Kurds or the Kurdish People Protection Units (YPG) have been seen as a betrayal by the US who has now stepped away from its fight against ISIS on the ground.. The Operation Peace Springs’ in Syria is aimed at creating a ‘safe zone’ for the Syrian refugees would not only control the Kurdish autonomy but also create a possible escape route for the thousands of ISIS prisoners.

In the Middle East, the Kurdish population is over 30 million and is spread across five different states namely Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Armenia, and Iran. Presently,  the Kurds are minorities in their respective countries with minimal political representation and armed groups of its own to fight for  their autonomous land.

Across history, the promises made to the ethnic Kurds remain unfulfilled. Being a minority, demanding self-determination, the Kurds have endured persecution and humiliation at the hands of several governments. A classic case would be the plight of Kurds under Saddam Hussein that drew much international attention.

The Kurds has allied with and supported US operations in the Middle East. In the 2003 Iraq invasion, the Kurds in Iraq supported the US and since 2014 the Kurdish fighters fought alongside them and forces of Iraq and Syria to defeat the ISIS. American backed, YPG and SDF, primarily Kurdish, lost over 11,000 men in their fight to get back territories from ISIS and have now established self-rule with a federal structure in territories recaptured by them.

The SDF, YGP, PKK and Peshmerga forces led by Kurds had played a major role in defeating the ISISTurkey identifies PKK, an armed Kurdish militia in south Turkey, as a terrorist outfit and YPG in Syria as an extension of it.

Not surprising, the presence of Kurdish militias along its border with Syria is deemed a threat by Turkey. Turkish government intends to create a ‘safe buffer zone’ between Syria and Turkey, evidently to weaken the Kurdish militias and prevent Kurdish-separatist movements across borders from gaining strength. The presence of American troops had so far deterred offensive moves by Turkey, but the abrupt withdrawal of US forces has caught the Kurds off guard.

Gains made by Kurds over the years by fighting ISIS would now be overturned as they are left isolated by their allies. The territorial gains could become an independent Kurdistan at some later point, would now be quelled in the Turkish offensive. Torture, war crimes and extortion of Kurds are clearly possibilities. Kurdish would need both military and diplomatic support of the United States to hold their positions, in case they will be annihilated. Recently, it was reported that the Kurds have brokered a deal with Syria to fight the Turks. However this is likely to be a fragile deal considering the different strategic priorities of the parties.

The Kurdish movement being a separatist movement is not likely to find strategic partners in the region. They would need support from powers outside the Middle East. Further, it is important to understand that the ISIS ideology and sleeper cells are still widespread in the region. The Kurdish fighters, who know the terrain and culture of the region, will be needed to prevent the recapitulation of ISIS.

For Russia, it is the mess left behind

Russia has played the role of a major balancer in the Syrian conflict. It has invested its resources into its Syrian intervention. In the past, Moscow has demanded the withdrawal of the US forces and now that it is finally happening, Russia sees the value of its assets in Syria diminished. Quarrels within the NATO have always been a boon to Russia. However, Erdogan’s unilateral decision of invading Syria has put Russia in a tough spot. Only recently, Russia offered Su35 Fighters as a substitute for the cancelled US F35 program. Russia is left with an option to see how to try and exploit this confusion in the Middle-East, leaving them enough space for a bitter discord.

Russia does not have sufficient resources to invest on a post-war reconstruction of the region. The public opinion within Russia is not for the continued intervention in Syria but politically Russia seeks to retain its influence in Syria. It has attempted to transform Syria, in cooperation with Turkey and Iran, infamously called the Astana Format. Hence, what is seen as a gain for Assad is not necessarily a gain for Russia. Turkey will not accept Kurdish representation and Iran will insist on an “Islamic Republic” model of negotiation; or the absence of Russia.

Though the presently stalled operation of Turkey will not manage to establish a Turkey-occupied ‘autonomous zone,’ this aggression has altered the multi-party balance in the Northern Syria. Russia’s main goals in Syria for the past two years have been to try and eliminate the rebel control over the Idlib province which is close to the Russian Khmeimim airbase. The Syrian army deployed along this contested border with Turkey will not be able to gather sufficient forces despite the airstrikes from Russia, to conquer Idlib. Russia has a limited number of special forces.

The Kurds see Trump's withdrawal as a betrayal. In his desire to end America’s involvement in the “endless wars” the White House has unleashed chaos in the region. The 120-hour ceasefire is set to give an advantage to Ankara, it has already got what it sought: the occupation of swathes of land along its border that would strategically separate a Kurdish enclave in Syria for Kurds where PKK terrorists for decades have waged a war against Ankara. Russia and Iran have been staunch allies of the Syrian government and in-a-way Moscow has filled the void of the US troops by deploying its military to act as a buffer, while the newly formed alliance between the Syrian government forces and the Syrian Kurdish forces moved north.

Russia is logically portrayed as the party that benefits the most from this scramble. But Russia may have also placed itself in a corner. There are very little strategic and political gains for Russia in this situation and the obligations that it is held against are huge. However, it is important to see what comes out of the ceasefire deal. The truth remains, that Turkey’s aggression has in a way helped Damascus restore its control over Syria.

For Trump, Syria is too far

On 16 October, US President Donald Trump decided to pull off from Syria deeming that the tensions weren’t the US’ problem. This came just before a Turkish offensive took place in the US-stationed area. The act has not just shattered an on-setting peace in the region but has questioned Trump’s decision. He has been blamed for abandoning the Kurdish forces who have been a strong aide towards Washington’s fight to curb the Islamic State (IS).

With Trump’s America First policy intact, he has yet again proven to be impulsive. Much of his most trusted Republican allies have expressed strong concern over the decision as it stands against US’s policies and democratic morale. In addition, Trump was reportedly seen to be largely unconcerned about a five-years-long ally being put at gun point by the Turkish forces. While the State Department shoved the possibility of convincing Turkey over the invasion, the move has been justified as part of the initiative to bring back Americans fighting the “endless wars” home. This becomes part of the plan to reduce defense expenditure in order to manage America’s ongoing economic crisis. Much could have been contained if the US had a lucid strategy to withdraw troops without pushing the political situation into an extended turmoil.

At this point, there have also been contemplations pertaining to the possibility of other Western allies in particular NATO members taking up the USA withdrawn position. Though, the possibility remains, it is important to note that none of the allies have the military might to enter into once US-dominated domain and now taken over by a substantially powerful Russia. Moreover, for the longest-time, USA and its NATO counterparts had only been affirmative towards loyal moral support with no military to whom they identified as legitimate rebels. Now, it is not in their faintest of national interest to support a war-torn territory. It is significant that no power less than the US can handle the situation alongside Russia.

On the other hand, Washington’s warning followed by the imposition of sanctions on trade and tariffs against Turkey is being criticized to be too ineffective. This comes after the Trump administration’s recent strategy of maximum economic pressure has been proving wrong in most of the international scenarios including Iran and North Korea. Besides, there is also pressure for a complete suspension of Turkey from NATO. There is heightened fear associated with this as any action from Turkey in the disputed territory might lead to the reemergence of the ISIS and further deem US’ sudden withdrawal as a grave mistake of catastrophic proportion.  

For Iraq, it is the Kurds conundrum

A large number of Syrian Kurds are moving to Northern Iraq which hosts a sizeable Kurdish population. Erdogan’s ‘Operation Peace Spring’, the Turkish military intervention in Northern Syria has placed Iraq at the receiving end of the Syrian Kurds. This is a direct consequence of Ankara’s offensive in Syria which aims to create a buffer zone for the Syrian refugees stationed in Turkey.

First, Iraq prefers to retain the pre-US stance on Kurds rather than invite more conflict. Unfortunately, Turkey’s actions have led to the escape of ISIS prisoners held by the Kurdish forces in Syria. It is unsettling for Baghdad as these factions may move into Iraqi borders causing local unrest and generate fresh problems potentially reversing the victories witnessed in Mosul. The withdrawal of the US support to the Kurdish forces and Turkey’s arbitrary actions could once again shape the presence of ISIS along the Syrian-Iraqi borders.

Second, Iraq’s attempt to contain political relations with the autonomous region of Kurds has been jittery. While the Peshmerga, the security establishment from Iraq’s autonomous Kurd region, along with the Iraqi army has been successful in fighting ISIS, the former’s demand for an independent Kurdish nation hasn’t materialized. The mobilization of Kurds in Northern Iraq may lead to domestic political uprisings. Undesired by the Iraqi leadership, Baghdad may not welcome any more support from Kurdish forces in their already existing Kurdish population.

Third, the movement of Kurds to the Northern Border could weaken Iraq’s quest for better ties with Turkey. Erdogan’s vow for filtered borders could add to the mounting problem of refugees in Iraq, allowing a way for open borders with Syria in the western front. One could also speculate the rise of military actions on the North-western Turkish Border, considering the history of Turkish military attacks on Kurdish settlements in Iraq. Ankara’s isolationist policy towards the minority community could be at the cost of bilateral cooperation with Iraq. Further, Turkey’s actions may push its Kurdish population off Iraqi borders.

While the Kurds could draw multiple possibilities from this development, it is unlikely for governments to share similar views. Turkey's experiments and Kurdish engagements have brewed a vacuum of uncertainty bringing into fore new narratives in this region.

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