Strategic Forecast 2020

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CWA # 226, 25 February 2020
Strategic Forecast 2020
The US in the Middle East: Flux or Status Quo in 2020?

  Aswathy K

CWA Brief, February 2020 

In analysing the trends in American foreign policy in the Middle East, one witness both continuations and differences, especially with the previous presidency

Background

In the United States, the 116th Congress convened in January 2019 with the Democrats having a clear majority. In April, Trump vetoed a move by Congress to end military assistance to Saudi Arabia in context of the civil war in Yemen (Landler and Baker, 2019). Israel banned Congresswomen Rashida Tlaib and Ilhan Omar from visiting Palestine in August. Formal impeachment inquiry was launched in September. In October, a house vote of 560 opposed withdrawal of US forces in Syria. In reaction to Turkey’s actions in Syria, the Congress recognized the Armenian genocide. Congress approved military aid has been withheld from Lebanon by the White House (Berger, 2019).

As the proposed Iran nuclear deal became ineffective after American withdrawal in 2018, Iran started increasing its nuclear enrichment facing American sanctions. Since then, there have been a series of attacks by one side against the other, including Tehran shooting down an American drone and an Iranian oil tanker being held by the British (Britton, 2019).The development of Iran’s nuclear programme has put on edge its perceived rivals in the region, Saudi Arabia and Israel. Saudi Arabia allege that the attack on its oil processing facilities in September were carried out by Iran despite the Houthis claiming responsibility (“Saudi Arabia oil attacks: US to deploy thousands of extra troops”, 2019). 

Even if the attack on Saudi oil facilities was by the Houthis, the matter remains that they have Iranian backing. In a way, Iran is carrying out a proxy war against its rivals through mediums such as the Houthis, Hezbollah and the Hamas (Tabatabai and Clarke, 2019). ISIS chief Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was killed but the organization doesn’t seem to have been fully eradicated. 

Israel has dialled up its response with direct attacks on Iran-backed factions in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and the Gaza Strip, threatening their shadow war to become an all-out war (Aboudouh, 2019; Hincks, 2019). In relation to Israel, Kushner’s Israel-Palestine peace plan hopes to end the decade long conflict (Araud, 2019). The political plan has not been released yet, while the economic plan was found unsatisfactory by the Palestinians (Spetalnick, 2019). The US has cut all aid to Palestinians in West Bank and Gaza and, in November, declared that Israeli settlements in occupied Palestine are not illegal. In October, Trump announced the withdrawal of American troops from Syria, leaving northern Kurdish areas vulnerable to Turkish attacks. Due to international backlash and the possibility of ISIS regaining foothold, some US personnel will remain to guard the oil fields while the rest will relocate to Iraq (Ali, 2019).

 Major Trends in 2019

Regional Polarisation

What is evident from the developments this year is the clear regional polarization. As the US backed Israel and Saudi Arabia at the expense of being hostile towards Iran, it has accentuated regional rivalries. The diplomatic isolation and pressure on Iran has been extended to its allies, such as Qatar and Lebanon. The travel ban issued by the Trump administration (infamously called the Muslim Ban), targets citizens from Iran and its allied countries, such as Syria more than those from other Islamic nations. The pre-existing Sunni-Shia divide has further been emphasized by American actions. Obama used to diplomatically deal with regional powers to reach a compromise. Trump’s decision to back the Sunni horse has dissolved the Gulf countries of their responsibility to promote political reforms.  

 American Interests and Policies

It is generally said that American interests in the Middle East concentrate in three areas- oil, defense and terrorism. Many claim that the Iraq War was declared to boost American economy. Whether conspiracy or fact, it is true that the US has stakes in the area. But these stakes seem to be lowering recently. The US fracking might increase crude oil production to an extent that may eclipse OPEC counties’ domestic production by 2024. The recent killing of the ISIS chief has put the US into a sense of false security. Also if one looks at the election of Trump, one could witness the force of populism. One of the main aspects of the movement was anti-globalisation which views activities in foreign soil as benefiting others at the expense of America’s interests. People want their loved ones to come back from directionless battles (“Why are happy people voting for angry parties?” 2019). These domestic factors have influenced the tide in the favour of withdrawing.  

Every leader wants a legacy, a thing they are remembered when they are long gone, Trump is not different. The Middle East, a thorn by America’s side, offers several opportunities for the President to work through. The proposed peace deal between Israel and Palestine should be understood in this context. Though Trump’s migration restrictions, especially on selective Middle Eastern citizens, have a racist element, his economic policies needed to be understood within the context domestic concerns. His catchy slogan “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) hints at recovering American Exceptionalism, a concept Obama has previously criticised (Kirchick, 2019). “America First” also points at reversing Obama’s policies which were comparatively pacifying and compromising, to reflect America’s self-interests more overtly. But Trump’s inability to cope with minor compromises, especially in the Middle East, will hurt American interests in the long run. 

 A House Divided

The fluctuation in foreign policy needs consideration in the context of the friction between a Republican headed White House and Democrat majority House of Representatives. While the latter had approved military aid to Lebanon, Trump stopped the package due to Israel’s concerns with Hezbollah’s influence on the Lebanese government. Similarly, the Trump ended Congress’s move to end American funding of the Yemen crisis. Trump also agreed with Israel’s decision to ban Congresswomen Ilhan Omar and Rashida Tlaib from visiting the conflict area in Palestine due to their involvement in Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement against Israel (“Israel bars Ilhan Omar and Rashida Tlaib from visiting”, 2019).

It is interesting to note that Trump’s actions, especially the decision to pull out of Syria, has generated criticism from within the Republican Party. Mitch McConnell and Lindsey Graham, staunch Trump defenders, have condemned this move by Trump (“Institutional conservatives would condemn Donald Trump”, 2019). Republicans voted against Trump 2-1 in a resolution condemning Trump’s decision to abruptly withdraw from Syria (Benen, 2019). One could wonder whether Trump took such radical steps within the Middle East to take attention away from the impeachment hearings.

 The Trust Factor

Volatile actions by the global hegemon which abandons its friends at the time of need will definitely lower the trust of any current and future American allies. A country’s foreign policy is generally considered to be based on a consensus no matter how brutal the domestic rivalry is. Even if there are changes, the modifications are developed gradually to create a single narrative for diplomatic purposes. Trump’s actions make it seem like that American backing is fickle and dependent on the current President. Thus a deal agreed upon in the past will not hold sway in future. This will make the current partners insecure and future allies hesitant.  

 Russian Inroads

A lesson that Trump is yet to learn is that economic sanction cannot hold out forever. He is using that against Iran and lately used it as threat against Turkey if it decides to invade the Kurdish region in Syria. Similarly, the EU has also imposed sanctions. At the same time, Russia is trying to be friendly towards both nations. This gives Russia stakes in the region and the ability to influence policy. Russia has also started becoming friendly towards the Gulf countries and bridging gap between them and Syria (Rumer, 2019). Russia has kept all its promises, such as supporting Syria. In contrast, American allies have been disheartened that Trump has not followed through with his promised tough actions against Iran, especially after the attack on the Saudi Arabian oil facilities.

 Differences, Continuities and Trump

Thus, in analysing the trends in American foreign policy in the Middle East, one witnesses both continuations and differences, especially with the previous presidency. Aspects of continuity, which can be traced back to Obama’s presidency, can be witnessed in the way America still prioritizes combating ISIS in the region (even though there is a chance that might change in the future) and works its regional allies. Previously, Obama tried to de-escalate the situation in the Middle East to create a gradual withdrawal. The differences are stark in the way the US has gradually strengthened the Israel-Saudi axis while increasing hostility towards Iran. These measures favours Trump’s political base while undermining Obama’s efforts in the region. In comparing continuities and differences to last year, there are more continuities. Trump had announced sudden withdrawal of troops from Syria in December 2018 but had to reverse on the policy after consultation with advisors. The advisors were not able to coax him (Syria conflict: Trump slows down troop withdrawal, 2019). Similarly, recognition of Israel at the expense of Palestine has been strengthened. The announcement of the shift of the US embassy in Israel to Jerusalem was announced in 2017 and acted on by 2018 (Halbfinger, D. M., I. Kershner & D. Walsh, 2018).

There is no indication of a clear foreign policy concerning the Middle East. This might be due to the unstable cabinet surrounding Trump, whose presidency saw three National Security Advisors and one Secretary of State resigning. Despite hiccups, Trump went against consultation by his advisors. He refused tough stance against Iran, the way John Bolton wanted him to. The amount of power Trump holds and the way he wields it, has numerous implications. As the paper focuses largely on the period 2019-20, it focuses on Trump’s policies. Thus, American foreign policy in many areas, in the form it exists currently has been equated to Trump’s actions.

 Forecasts for 2020 

 Selective Withdrawal

Based on the analysis that American foreign policy in the Middle East is both in flux and consistency, what could be visible is a selective withdrawal. The US might physically leave the Middle East in 2020 or least reduce its visible presence drastically if Trump has his way. But that doesn’t translate to ending US’s influence over the area. This is evident in the present scenario where American troops are still stationed around oil facilities in Syria (Friedman, 2019). The US would continue to fund the various wars through sale of weapons and military aid to allies. For some time now, the US has been a moderator in the Middle East, but its decision to back some players at the expense of others will put the region in disarray.

Higher risks of open conflicts

With the US withdrawing not only physically but also as a mediating force, there will be a high chance of regional wars. The volatile nature of Iran’s proxies might just be the match which lights the flame. One is reminded in this instance of the role of the Serbian Black Hand in starting the First World War. In such a situation, the cold wars in the region could transform to hot wars which means that Iran against Saudi and Israel will have to physically fight each other. Areas like Syria, Iraq and Yemen will become extended centers of conflict. Another way a war could possibly break out is if Iran feels boxed into a corner and feel that the only way out of economic sanctions is an all-out war. This might push Iran seek support from Russia, the other great power in the region, to even out the playing field. 

Increase in Russian influence

With foothold in Syria, this could create further inroads into the region for Russia. Russia could increase its influence in the region by filling the American vacuum. Russia’s relations within the neighbourhood will increase at the expense of the US. Turkey, if pushed enough, could turn towards Russia. In addition, it faces isolation even within NATO, it faces isolation. This will be harmful the EU, an American ally, as Turkey is the one preventing further refugee crisis. If it is not provided a “safe space” as it has proposed in Syria, it might stop holding back Syrian refugees. This will create another round of Refugee Crisis. 

 Arab Spring 2.0

Another avenue that could follow is that of a Second Arab Spring. The civilian rebellions in Iraq, Iran and Lebanon have started being called the Arab Spring 2.0 (Muasher, 2019). These countries, are areas with considerable Iranian influence, that provide avenues for the US to fund the conflict and create disharmony in the region, as some claim it is doing in Hong Kong. But with the Americans backing out, this won’t be the case. It has been in the American interests to maintain status quo in the Middle East so to not upset the global oil production. Thus it has always given tacit support to the dictatorial regimes who function in American interests. So in a void of American power, another round of democratic struggles might actually get chance as America loses its self-gifted voice for implementing democracy.

 Loss of Confidence in America

As Americans show that they do not hesitate to abandon allies, the latter will have to forge new ties. The Kurds will have to turn to Bashar al-Assad for protection against Turkey that will weaken their claim for autonomy. It also means they might be hesitant to ally with the US again if the latter decides to come back to the Middle East. The issue of distrust will factor in future alliance the US might try to build up in this region. If the US decides to leave the region in entirety, the previously blocked links between Iran and Hezbollah will be functional again. This will be the ultimate betrayal of the strongest American ally in the region, Israel. But due to the strength of the Jewish lobby, such a situation will not come to pass. Additionally, one cannot guarantee that Israel will not lose confidence in American competency in the region.

 Return of the ISIS

There are chances for the resurgence of the ISIS in the region. Earlier, the US’s involvement in the Middle East was to counter ISIS. American retreat in Syria might lead to ISIS regaining its foothold in the regions it had earlier lost. Yet another font may open if Iran decides to wage war on Israel and Saudi Arabia. Subsequent chaos will accelerate ISIS’s regrowth as its enemies attack each other. Its sudden rise in 2014 was possible due to massive jailbreaks and a repeat is possible in 2020. As the US cleans its resources from the area, it will be ill-equipped to deal with ISIS again. There are chances of renewal of ties between ISIS and Al-Qaeda which will spell doom for the region. 

 Republican backlash

Many hardliner Republicans have generally backed Trump through some questionable policy decisions. But it was on the issue of sudden withdrawal, leading to abandonment of allies while inadvertently benefitting rivals, that many Republicans draw the line. Though Trump has about 90 per cent approval ratings within the party (“Presidential Approval Ratings -- Donald Trump”, 2019), the impeachment proceedings might turn the tide. It is highly likely that the House of Representatives will impeach the President that will be up to the Senate to vote. The general prediction is that due to the Republican majority in the Senate, Trump’s presidency is secure. But there is a chance that Trump’s decisions regarding the Middle East and other scandals that may arise during the impeachment just to tip the scale against Trump within the GOP. In such a case, Mike Pence will become the President and the Republicans will have to rally behind another candidate for the Presidential elections.  

 End of Manifest Destiny 

American actions seem to state an end to the one and a half centuries long ideal of Manifest Destiny. Though originally, it was used in the context of westward expansion, it later fit well in the narrative of American imperialism and interventionism. The US, for a long time, justified interference in foreign land for the cause of freedom as the self-appointed leader of the world. Now, Trump states that the Middle East is “7000 miles away.” There might be a shift on how the US views itself and its mission. Though this might seem to extend predictions, but if seen in the light of the Long Cycle Theory, it might herald the beginning of the end of the American hegemony, replacing itself by another power.

 Wildcards

The most visible wildcards in this scenario is the 2020 Presidential Election. As one questions whether domestic reasons exist for foreign policy initiatives, one thing is sure- Donald Trump could undertake fancy steps for appeasement to win over the swing votes. The drastic pull-out in Syria seemed Trump was keeping up on his electoral promises which could extend to Afghanistan. In the case of withdrawal from Syria and Afghanistan, it is unsure whether the next President will try to reverse Trump’s decision to close what can be considered the sore on America’s side for a long time. But a Democratic win in 2020 might lead to reversal of foreign policies in the Middle East and is less likely to back Israel and Saudi Arabia thoroughly. 

References

  1. Landler, M and P. Baker. (2019). Trump Vetoes Measure to Force End to US Involvement in Yemen War. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/16/us/politics/trump-veto-yemen.html
  2.  Berger, M. (2019). The US uses aid to lean on foreign states — but not always with the same intentions or results. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/11/02/us-uses-aid-lean-foreign-states-not-always-with-same-intentions-or-results/
  3. Britton, B. (2019). Here's what you need to know about the US-Iran crisis. Retrieved 23 December, 2019 from https://edition.cnn.com/2019/06/21/politics/iran-us-brink-of-war-explainer-intl/index.html
  4. Saudi Arabia oil attacks: US to deploy thousands of extra troops. (2019). Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-50021138
  5. Tabatabai, A. and C.P. Clarke. (2019). Iran’s Proxies Are More Powerful Than Ever. Retrieved from https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/16/irans-proxies-hezbollah-houthis-trump-maximum-pressure/
  6. Aboudouh, A. (2019). Middle East Explained: Why are Iran and Israel on the brink of war? Retrieved from https://www.independent.co.uk/independentpremium/iran-israel-war-airstrikes-syria-middle-east-a9085316.html
  7. Hincks, J. (2019). Israel Is Escalating Its Shadow War With Iran. Here's What to Know. Retrieved from https://time.com/5664654/israel-iran-shadow-war/
  8. Araud, G. (2019). Is Trump Right About Middle-East Peace? Retrieved from https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/israel-palestine-peace-process-donald-trump-by-gerard-araud-2019-10
  9. Spetalnick, M. (2019). US opens debate on Mideast economic plan shunned by Palestinians. Retrieved 31 December, 2019 from https://af.reuters.com/article/egyptNews/idAFL8N23X16I?feedType=RSS&feedName=egyptNews
  10. Ali, I. (2019). All US troops withdrawing from Syria expected to go to western Iraq: Pentagon chief. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-security-usa/all-us-troops-withdrawing-from-syria-expected-to-go-to-western-iraq-pentagon-chief-idUSKBN1WZ01S
  11. Why are happy people voting for angry parties? 2019. Retrieved from https://www.economist.com/international/2019/07/11/why-are-happy-people-voting-for-angry-parties
  12.  Kirchick, J. (2019). Squanderer in chief. Retrieved from https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2009-apr-28-oe-kirchick28-story.html
  13. Israel bars Ilhan Omar and Rashida Tlaib from visiting. (2019). Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-49363041
  14. Institutional conservatives would condemn Donald Trump. (2019). Retrieved from https://www.economist.com/united-states/2019/10/10/institutional-conservatives-would-condemn-donald-trump
  15. Benen, S. (2019). House delivers the most bipartisan rebuke of Trump’s presidency. Retrieved from http://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/house-delivers-the-most-bipartisan-rebuke-trumps-presidency
  16. Rumer, E. (2019). Russia in the Middle East: Jack of All Trades, Master of None. Retrieved from https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/10/31/russia-in-middle-east-jack-of-all-trades-master-of-none-pub-80233
  17. Syria conflict: Trump slows down troop withdrawal. (2019). Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-46723603
  18. Halbfinger, D. M.; I. Kershner & D. Walsh. (2018). Retreived from https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/14/world/middleeast/gaza-protests-palestinians-us-embassy.html
  19. Friedman, U. (2019). The Consequences of Donald Trump Washing His Hands of the Middle East. Retrieved from https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/10/donald-trump-middle-east-consequences/600610/
  20. Muasher, M. (2019). Is This the Arab Spring 2.0? Retrieved from https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/10/30/is-this-arab-spring-2.0-pub-80220
  21. Presidential Approval Ratings -- Donald Trump. (2019). Retrieved from https://news.gallup.com/poll/203198/presidential-approval-ratings-donald-trump.aspx

Aswathy K is pursuing her Masters in International Studies from CHRIST (Deemed to be University), Bengaluru 

This essay was published at the NIAS Quarterly on Contemporary World Affairs, Vol 2, Issue 1, January-March 2020  

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