AFRICA MONITOR

Anu Maria Joseph

Sudan is currently one of the major hotspots of conflict in Africa. The war has lasted more than a year. While the Wars in Gaza and Ukraine are receiving much attention, the war in Sudan is a forgotten war, despite the fact that the human cost of the war surpasses Gaza and Ukraine. The war has impacted not only the Horn of Africa and North Africa regions but also outside the continent in multiple ways. Besides, the involvement of several external actors has made the war complex.

The state of war
The civil war in Sudan between two military factions, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has crossed 18 months. Initially, it was solely a power rivalry between the heads of the SAF and the RSF, Abdel Fattah al Burhan and Hamdan Dagalo. But, currently, it has evolved into a civil war, ethnic conflict and a regional crisis. Beyond the capital Khartoum, it has spread to Omdurman, Bahri, El Fasher and Port Sudan cities, and Darfur and Kordofan states. The majority of the war zones are RSF-controlled. But, since August, the SAF began a major offensive and recaptured pocket regions around Khartoum. According to the UN, nearly 20,000 people have been killed in the war. 

Both sides are accused of carrying out war crimes and sexual violence against civilians, especially in Darfur states. Limited and restricted access to aid has caused a humanitarian disaster. A famine was declared in the Zamzam IDP camp in North Darfur state by the UN in August. According to the UN-IPC Famine Review Committee, 14 regions in the Greater Darfur, South and North Kordofan, and Jazeera states deal with conditions similar to Zamzam. Meanwhile, heavy rains and floods have worsened the humanitarian crisis, with 242 people killed in a cholera outbreak. Most recently, the previous week, the SAF carried out a major offensive in Khartoum against the RSF. There was also an alleged attack by the SAF on the UAE’s ambassador’s residence in Khartoum.

Major issues
First, power rivalry between military factions and now a prolonged civil war. The war started as a military power rivalry over the civilian transition. The beginning of the contention was on who would lead the Sudanese military after a civilian transition. In 2019, both military factions together toppled Omar al Bashir. Both warring military groups are adamant about gaining ground and legitimising their power. One year into the war, the demands of both sides are adamant and an end seems elusive. The SAF claims to be the legitimate government and the UN has almost consented to the claims, although it came to power through a coup in 2021. However, the RSF has territorial gains around the capital and other war zones. It opposes any efforts by the SAF to represent Sudan internationally. The RSF has been seeking alliances from several Arab countries to support its legitimacy claims. 

Second, access to weapons. Since the 2004 Darfur crisis, Sudan has been under a UN arms embargo. Recently, it was extended for another year. Despite the embargo, the flow of weapons to the country never stopped. In July, Human Rights Watch released a report which claimed that the RSF and the SAF have been using armed drones, drone jammers, anti-tank guided missiles, truck-mounted multi-barrel rocket launchers, and mortar munitions produced by companies registered in China, Iran, Russia, Serbia, and the UAE. 

Third, the role of multiple actors. What started as a military rivalry between the SAF and RSF has expanded with the involvement of multiple ethnic militias. The SAF and the RSF have aligned with non-Arab and Arab militias respectively. RSF has been carrying out war crimes against the Masalit community in the Darfur region. SPLM-N, a rebel group, has aligned with SAF in the war. The number of actors has increased now, making the war complex. 

Fourth, conflict expansion in terms of geography and intensity. Geographically, what began in the capital Khartoum has now expanded to its twin cities of Omdurman and Bahri and the cities of Wad Madani and Port Sudan as well as the states of Darfur and Kordofan. International media access to the war on the ground is limited. It is not merely a military rivalry anymore; it has evolved into ethnic atrocities in many states. The violence has increased, the human cost has worsened, and the gap between the warring parties has increased. None of the warring parties are in a position to bargain for a ceasefire or peace talks. 

Fifth, failed ceasefires and peace talks. Nine rounds of ceasefires, mostly led by the US and Saudi Arabia, failed at their initial phase. In August, the latest US-led peace talks were held in Geneva. However, neither of the warring sides appeared. During the previous stages of negotiations, the RSF and the SAF had committed to several efforts, although never complied. The current scenario implies that the mediators are not able to negotiate between the SAF and RSF.

Sixth, the role of external actors. The SAF accuses the UAE of directly supporting the RSF. Although the UAE has denied it, along with Russia's Wagner Group, it is allegedly supplying weapons through the smuggling routes in the Central African Republic. Meanwhile, the Russian state has supported the SAF with weapons. The role of external actors and abundant supply of weapons have encouraged the warring sides to continue their fight.

Implications
First, absence of state. With the war continuing and worsening the state institutions have slowly vanished. Sudan has already been facing a longstanding political crisis since the end of Omar al Bashir’s regime. Although the military promised a civilian transition 18 months after the coup, it never happened. The achievements of the Sudanese revolution have died. With the war, the military government has failed to run the state institutions. Legislative, judiciary and executive are absent. Insecurity and an economic collapse prevail, and the health and education sectors have collapsed. The Sudan state has collapsed.  

Second, the worsening humanitarian crisis. A famine was declared in the Zamzam camp. Besides, 14 regions in the states of Greater Darfur, South and North Kordofan, and Jazeera face conditions similar to those in Zamzam. According to the UN, 25.6 million people, which is more than half of Sudan's population, face "crisis or worse" humanitarian conditions. Around 755,000 face phase five “catastrophic” conditions. The reach of humanitarian access to these regions is being disrupted and blocked by the warring sides. The humanitarian crisis has turned into a humanitarian disaster.

Third, regional implications. Neighbouring countries including South Sudan, Chad, and Ethiopia are facing a refugee surge, with around two million fleeing the war in Sudan. The overflown refugee camps have additionally raised concerns in Europe of an exodus. Incidents of refugees on overcrowded boats dying while crossing the Tunisia-Italy route are common and the majority are Sudanese fleeing the conflict. Meanwhile, the ethnic clashes along the South Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea borders have left the region unstable. The Abiey region along the Sudan-South Sudan border and the El Fashaga region between Ethiopia and Sudan are the focal points of ethnic and communal clashes. 

Trajectories
First, the war will likely be prolonged. At this point, a compromise between the RSF and the SAF is highly unlikely. Both parties have similar intentions to legitimize power. Additionally, taking ethnic sides and involving militias have made the war complex. It has increased the number of actors and demands. Currently, it is a major challenge for international actors to mediate a ceasefire. Besides, Sudanese have begun to live with the war, implying that the war will prolong. 

Second, a fear of division in the country. Although SAF enjoys UN recognition and began a major offensive to recapture the capital, defeating the RSF is a long road. While the state institutions have collapsed, a new fear of the military rivals dividing the country similar to Libya, has surfaced. 

Third, the humanitarian crisis would worsen and spill over. Restricted international aid access has left the country on the verge of a humanitarian disaster. And, it will not be limited to Sudan. The famine would likely spill over to the refugee camps in Chad and South Sudan. It would potentially worsen the tensions along the border, triggering inter and intra-ethnic and resource violence and implying an unstable Horn of Africa.

This commentary was originally published as part of NIAS-IPRI Conflict Weekly 250th Issue Special Edition. 

About the author
Anu Maria Joseph is a Project Associate at NIAS.

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