NIAS Area Studies


AFRICA MONITOR

Africa Comment

Photo Source: Reuters
   NIAS Course on Global Politics
National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS)
Indian Institute of Science Campus, Bangalore
For any further information or to subscribe to GP alerts send an email to subachandran@nias.res.in

CWA # 1674, 15 May 2025
CW Note
Sudan: RSF’s offensive in Port Sudan and the battlefield shifts 

  Anu Maria Joseph

Conflict Weekly # 280-81, 15 May 2025, Vol 6, No.s 19 & 20

In the news
On 11 May, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) claimed that at least nine people were killed in an artillery shelling by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in el-Fasher, the capital of North Darfur. The SAF added that it killed six members of the RSF in response.

On 9 May, at least 14 people were killed in an RSF air strike in Darfur and on 10 May, 19 people were killed in el-Obeid. 

On 5 May, the RSF drones hit multiple locations in Port Sudan, a Red Sea port city. The targets included a fuel depot, Port Sudan International Airport, and a power station. 

On the same day, Sudan's SAF-led government cut diplomatic ties with the UAE, accusing it of supplying weapons to the RSF. Sudan's Defence Minister Yassin Ibrahim described the UAE as an "aggressor state" and violating the country's sovereignty through its "proxy." The UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs dismissed the decision, stating: “Port Sudan Authority does not represent the legitimate government of Sudan and its honourable people.”

Issues at large
First, a brief background on the war. The war between the SAF and the RSF started as a military rivalry between the heads of the two forces, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Hamdan Dagalo. Together, both forces toppled Omar al-Bashir in 2019 and established a transitional military rule. While the SAF is considered the formal military of the country, the RSF is a paramilitary force formed in 2013, which has its origins in the Janjaweed militia that carried out the Darfur genocide in 2004. The rivalry between the forces was over disagreements on the civilian transition, the RSF integrating into the SAF, and if so, who would lead the new force. Two years into the war, more than 20,000 people have been killed, and 13 million have been displaced. 

Second, the new shifts on the battlefield. In April, the SAF recaptured the capital Khartoum from the RSF (Khartoum had been under the control of the RSF since the war began). Although recapturing Khartoum was a major victory for the SAF, defeating the RSF was nowhere near. The RSF formally declared a parallel "Government of Peace and Unity" on 15 April in areas under its control. In the west, except for North Darfur, RSF has a major advantage over the Darfur and Kordofan states. Additionally, several strategic points in Khartoum, including the vicinity of the Presidential Palace, several government buildings in the University of Khartoum and the Martyrs Mosque in the Al Muqrin area, remain under the control of the RSF. Meanwhile, central Khartoum, parts of western Omdurman, Bahri, East Nile, Kardo, Wad Madani, Port Sudan and the states of Gezira and parts of Sennar are under the SAF. On geographic and military advantage, both forces are on par. The RSF’s attack on Port Sudan came in response to the SAF's attack on the RSF's aircraft and weapons depot in Nyala airport in Darfur. 

Third, the significance of Port Sudan. Port Sudan has been the de facto capital for the SAF-led government since the RSF took control of Khartoum in April 2023. The city was never a violent zone and was regarded as one of the safest places in the country. Port Sudan and its infrastructure have been crucial for the SAF’s war efforts. The city hosts Sudan's only functioning international airport, a major power station, import and storage fuel depots, supplying fuel countrywide. Several foreign diplomatic missions and aid agencies have been functioning from the city since Khartoum came under the RSF. Its geographic location in the Red Sea is a major entry point for aid and trade. 

Fourth, tensions with the UAE. In January 2024, the UN verified the reports on the UAE supplying weapons to the RSF through Chad despite the arms embargo. In April, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) dismissed the SAF’s case against the UAE for being complicit in the RSF’s genocide in Darfur, stating that the court lacked jurisdiction to enact a provision against the UAE. For the SAF, severing diplomatic ties with the UAE implies many losses. The UAE-backed company, Emiral Resources, owns the majority share in Sudan's Kush mine, administered by the SAF. According to the Central Bank of Sudan, 97 per cent of gold exported from SAF-controlled regions is to the UAE. 
 
In perspective
First, the RSF's attempt to weaken the SAF. The attack on Port Sudan, a major stronghold of the SAF, was likely an attempt by the RSF to weaken the SAF. Parts of Khartoum remain with the RSF. While SAF re-focused towards Port Sudan from Khartoum, the paramilitary would potentially intensify its offensive to recapture Khartoum. Besides, the fight for el-Fasher has been ongoing for months. The city in North Darfur connects the western states with Khartoum and the eastern states. It is the only major city in the Darfur region under the control of the SAF.  If the RSF manages to capture el-Fasher and recaptures Khartoum, it would bring the western parts of the country and Khartoum as its centre under the RSF-led government. 

Second, the escalation of the war. While the SAF focus on its defensive posture in Port Sudan, it continues its offensive in Nyala and el-Fasher. Continuing offensives, an abundant weapon supply, and the RSF's announcement of the new government imply that the war is unlikely to end until one side is defeated. Or, the war will divide the country in the east and the west. Several international actors have prioritised their economic interests in Sudan by supplying weapons and continuing mineral trade with the warring parties. In 2024, Sudan generated USD 1.5 billion from gold exports, a major financial source for the RSF and the SAF. After a series of failed ceasefires mediated by the US and Saudi Arabia, the international actors have shown limited interest in mediating peace talks in Sudan. Abundant weapon supply, financial support and ignorance have given the incentive for the RSF and the SAF to continue the war.  

Print Bookmark

Previous Africa Comments