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CWA # 1809, 18 September 2025
CW Note
DR Congo: M23 reorganising for a renewed offensive; no sign of peace

  Anu Maria Joseph

In the news
On 18 September, Reuters and Africanews reported that the Congolese army and the Rwanda-backed M23 rebels are remobilising troops and reinforcing their military positions in North and South Kivu provinces. The new development came after the warring sides accused each other of violating the terms of the US and Qatari-led peace and ceasefire accords. 

On 14 September, M23 rebels paraded over 7,000 recruits in Goma. The group said that the new recruits included surrendered Congolese soldiers. 

On the same day, Amnesty International representative, Christian Rumu, stated: "We are still concerned about forced recruitment that we have documented since the takeover of the M23 in North Kivu and South Kivu. This might affect the peaceful process that both the DRC, Rwanda, and M23 are trying to reach through the Doha and Washington processes."

Issues at large
First, M23's motivations to continue violence. M23, a Tutsi-led and Rwanda-backed rebel group, seized and has been in control of Goma and Bukavu, the regional capitals of North and South Kivu, since January 2025. The group currently has nearly 14,000 troops across eastern DRC, according to the UN. M23 has security and economic motivations in the region. The security objective is to protect the minority ethnic Tutsis, whether it's in Rwanda, DRC or Uganda, and fight against their historical rivals—the Hutu-led Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) armed group in DRC. The group has been forcefully recruiting from the captured regions. The economic objective is to control the eastern DRC's vast mineral towns, illicit mineral trade and network. With an advantage in achieving both objectives, the group seem to have no interest in adhering to any peace efforts.

Second, the Doha and Washington peace accords and their limitations. Over the past two months, the US and Qatar have mediated two important deals between the warring parties: a US-led peace deal between Rwanda and DRC and a Qatari-led direct ceasefire deal between DRC and M23. The US-led peace deal conveyed an impression of a return to peace in the DRC. However, the deal rarely discussed a resolution; rather brought a political settlement between Rwanda and DRC, ignoring the underlying issues behind the conflict. Moreover, the deal was criticised for being transactional after the US linked its economic interests. The Qatari-led ceasefire was supposed to set the stage for comprehensive peace talks between the DRC and M23 rebels. According to the deal, M23 agreed to withdraw from the regions it seized, and the DRC agreed to release M23 prisoners. However, the violence resumed immediately after DRC and M23 failed to adhere to the terms of the agreement. 

Third, mistrust between DRC and Rwanda. The US-led peace deal was built on a fragile trust between the DRC and Rwanda. The conflict in eastern DRC involves a decades-long hostilities between Rwanda and DRC over historical grievances and rivalries, ethnic issues, the Rwandan genocide, two Congo wars, and territorial disputes. For DRC, more than resolving the conflict, the deal meant the entry of the US and an end to the illicit mineral trade in the region. For Rwanda, M23 has been a major source of accessing mineral reserves in eastern DRC. Still, Kigali caved into the international pressure to sign the deal, calculatedly that it can always adopt a strategy of denying its support to M23, thereby protecting its strategic ambiguity.

In perspective
The remobilisation and recruitment imply that the region shall anticipate another wave of violence soon. Many fear that M23 is aiming for Kinshasa and the fall of the government. Immediate developments following the peace deal and the ceasefire deal imply that neither side had the intention to comply with any commitments of the deals. There is no sign of peace. Once again, a rushed and exclusive peace deal and ceasefire have failed, and added to the list of failed peace efforts in eastern DRC. While underlying issues remain ignored, peace efforts turn transactional, and commitment and compliance remain elusive, a sustainable peace in eastern DRC appears to be challenging.

About the author
Anu Maria Joseph is a Project Associate at NIAS.

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