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Global Politics Explainer
Ethiopia bans the TPLF

  R Preetha

On 14 May, the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) revoked the legal status of the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), effectively banning the party.  The TPLF condemned it, and accused the ban of posing a "serious threat" to the 2022 Pretoria agreement, which ended two years of conflict in the northern Tigray region. TPLF leaders have called for mediation by the African Union on the matter. 

What is the background?
First, a note on Tigray and Ethiopia. Tigray is Ethiopia’s northernmost state and the fifth largest region in the country. It borders Eritrea to the north, Sudan to the west, the Amhara Region to the south, and the Afar Region to the east. Tigray is primarily home to ethnic Tigrayans, Kunama, and Irob, among other ethnic communities. The region is predominantly inhabited by the Tigrayans, who constitute about 6 per cent (around five to seven million) of Ethiopia’s population.

Second, the rise and fall of TPLF. Founded in 1975, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) fought for autonomy and self-determination for the Tigrayans. The TPLF led the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), which is a coalition of four ethnically-based parties. The coalition overthrew the Government in 1991 and ruled Ethiopia till 2018. During this period, the TPLF was accused of marginalising ethnic groups, which led to widespread protests in 2018. The protests, mainly led by the Oromo population, ousted the TPLF, resulting in Abiy Ahmed Ali becoming the prime minister.

Third, the rise of Abiy Ahmed and the rift with the TPLF. Abiy Ahmed’s reforms angered the TPLF. He set up a new party, the Prosperity Party (which the TPLF refused to join) and removed key Tigrayan government leaders. TPLF viewed this as an attempt to centralise power, weakening Ethiopia’s Federal system. The tensions grew in 2020 after a series of events. There were repeated delays of national elections, Abiy’s first term was extended, and Tigray State Council decided to conduct its own local elections despite federal orders. In November 2020, the federal government accused Tigrayan troops of attacking its military camp in the Tigrayan capital and ordered for the intervention of Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) troops, which escalated into the Tigray war. 

What is the Pretoria Agreement 2022?
The TPLF and the Ethiopian central government signed a cessation of hostilities agreement on 2 November 2022, in Pretoria, South Africa, marking the formal end of the civil war between the two.  The Tigray war lasted from 2020 to 2022, with Eritrea, militants from Amhara and Afar, and regions bordering Tigray siding with the federal forces. The Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) took the TPLF's side. It was widely regarded as one of the deadliest wars in recent history and drew global concern for alleged war crimes, human rights abuses, and ethnic cleansing. The UN and civil society raised concerns over ethnic cleansing against Tigrayans.  The Pretoria agreement, signed with the African Union (AU) mediation, concluded the brutal war. It called for ending the military campaign of the ENDF, handing over control of Tigray region to the Federal government, disarming Tigrayan troops, and permitting complete humanitarian access to the region. It does not refer to Eritrea, its representatives were not present during the Pretoria talks as well

Why has Ethiopia banned the TPLF now?
According to the NEBE, the decision to ban TPLF on 14 May 2025 was due to the party’s failure to conduct a mandatory general assembly, a legal requirement for political parties under Ethiopian electoral law, it said. There are other reasons as well. First, the longstanding TPLF-federal tensions. TPLF and Abiy Ahmed’s relationship has been rift since he took power in 2018, sidelining the once dominant TPLF. The Tigray War intensified this. The TPLF views the federal Government as a threat to Ethiopia’s federal system, likewise, the federal government sees TPLF as a hindrance to its centralised authority, particularly in Tigray. 

Second, TPLF’s internal divisions within the TPLF. In 2024, the TPLF expelled the President of the Tigray Interim Regional Administration (TIRA), Getachew Reda, and nearly 15 party members. The TIRA was established as part of the Pretoria Agreement. Media reports state that this internal faction is in the interest of the government to keep Tigray politically weak. Fourth, the ban comes right ahead of national elections scheduled for June 2026.

What does it mean?
First, it threatens the fragile foundations of the Pretoria Agreement. There already exists a gap in terms of implementation delays of the agreement provisions, the ban could widen this. Second, it risks reigniting conflict in Tigray. The party’s exclusion from the 2026 elections risks further collapse of trust and escalation by TPLF, undermining any post-war progress made in Ethiopia so far. Third, the ban could impact regional stability. The Horn of Africa is already strained by conflicts in Sudan, South Sudan, and Somalia, any further tensions will add to this. Underneath the recent tensions lie the fear of escalation into a regional war if Eritrea intervenes. 

References 
Wycliffe Muia, “Tigray party says ban threatens Ethiopia peace deal,” BBC, 18 May 2025 
Kalkidan Yibeltal, “Tigrayans fear fresh Ethiopian conflict,” BBC, 18 March 2025
“Ethiopia’s Tigray war: The short, medium and long story,” BBC, 19 June 2021
“Conflict in Ethiopia,” Council on Foreign Relations, 20 March 2025
“Rising Tensions in Tigray Risk Regional Conflict,” Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 24 March 2025
Antonio Cascais, “Is Ethiopia's Tigray on the brink of a fresh conflict?,” Deutsche Welle, 06 February 2025

About the author
R Preetha is pursuing post-graduation at the Department of International Studies, Stella Maris. She is currently a research intern at the Science Technology and International Relations (STIR) Programme at NIAS.

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