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CWA # 1544, 27 November 2024
NIAS Africa Studies
Sudan’s civil war: Failed Ceasefires and Peace Negotiations

  Ayan Datta

The civil war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the Rapid Support Forced (RSF) led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, crossed one-year in August. What began as an interpersonal power struggle between the two leaders of post-coup Sudan has escalated into an intractable polycrisis of ethnic cleansing, famine and starvation, war crimes, and mass displacement. Ethnic alignments and external actors have added to the complex situation, making Sudan a multi-layered conflict with no end in sight.

Beginning with the Treaty of Jeddah (May 2023), the US and Saudi Arabia have facilitated nine rounds of ceasefire negotiations, with the latest round being held on 14 August in Switzerland’s Geneva. However, both sides have refused to attend, reflecting their mutual mistrust and inability to arrive at common denominators for bargaining. Despite Egypt, the UN, the African Union, the African Intergovernmental Authority on Development and the European Union urging a cessation of hostilities, efforts for a long-term ceasefire have seen no conducive response from the warring leaders, indicating that both Burhan and Dagalo are holding out for a battlefield victory. As Sudan expert Cameron Hudson states, although “neither side looks capable of delivering a knockout blow,” both leaders are hopeful of achieving decisive military advantages in the foreseeable future and have secure economic bases, preventing the ceasefire negotiations from succeeding.

Why did ceasefires and negotiations fail? 
First, Burhan and Dagalo’s illicit personal and institutional wealth. From its independence, Sudan’s people have suffered from kleptocratic and patronage-based elite politics, which contributed to the war’s outbreak and its continuation despite humanitarian and diplomatic efforts. Since Omar al-Bashir’s 1989 coup, Sudan’s leaders exercised power using the “tamkeen” system of political patronage, which enriched Burhan and Dagalo, giving them the resources to continue the war and neglect international calls for ceasefires. While Burhan and the SAF covertly control Sudan’s major banks, telecommunication, oil production and construction, Hemedti and his family own multiple gold mines in El-Fasher, which he, too, had acquired as patronage from Omar al-Bashir. These assets function as both sides’ war chests, enabling their leaders to neglect calls for ceasefires and negotiations. Moreover, during the war, both sides followed an unspoken pact, refraining from attacking each other’s personal, familial and institutional assets, reflecting a tacit agreement among the warring elites to insulate their war chests from the financial costs of the war.  As the think-tank Centre for Advanced Defence Studies reported, “Until the deep state’s economic structures are dismantled, the military will continue to hold all the cards, leaving them no incentive to come to the table and negotiate.”

Second, external actors’ involvement. Rather than incentivising the belligerents to end the fighting, multiple external actors have enabled both sides to continue their efforts in pursuit of economic and strategic gains. Driven by financial interests of safeguarding Emirati investments in Sudan’s agriculture, mineral and port sectors, the UAE has supported the RSF since the beginning of the war, using its aid-bearing flights to smuggle weapons to Hemedti’s forces. With upgraded equipment (mostly Russian-origin) from Abu Dhabi, RSF troops are continuously replenished and have no incentive to commit to a ceasefire. 

Furthermore, Russian PMCs allegedly supplies the RSF with large quantities of fuel smuggled from eastern Libya. Since Hemedti’s forces rely heavily on automobile fuel for its combat vehicles, mostly 4X4 pickup trucks, continuing Russian PMCs assistance has become the RSF’s lifeblood. With these sources of economic and military replenishment, Hemedti can afford to play the long game, waiting for the SAF’s resources to exhaust first. 

Following the UAE and Russia, Iran began supplying weapons, especially drones, to the SAF via Port Sudan from January 2024, reflecting its strategy of countering Abu Dhabi and building anti-western partnerships with African states. Iranian drones were crucial to the SAF’s regained momentum, helping Burhan’s troops break the siege of Ombdurman, a strategically invaluable city located only ten kilometres from the RSF-controlled capital, Khartoum. The recent SAF victory restored Burhan’s will to carry on the fight, making a ceasefire unlikely.

Third, failures and weaknesses of the civilian forces. When the RSF was gaining momentum after October 2023, deposed civilian President Amballa Hamdok signed a declaration with Hemedti’s forces, charting a roadmap to peace and reached out to the SAF for a multi-lateral post-war plan. However, with the SAF’s recent battlefield victories, Hamdok’s efforts became redundant. Hamdok’s support among Sudan’s population suffered after he aligned with the RSF, which was accused of ethnic cleansing, genocide and other war crimes. With no military of his own, economic resources split between the two factions and no significant international support, Hamdok is powerless to affect the course of the war, although he is the only Sudanese player to support a ceasefire and civilian-led endgame.  

Fourth, lack of media attention on the war. The lack of media attention on the war minimises global civil society and public opinion pressures on both factions, freeing them up to pursue their personal and factional interests with minimum global scrutiny. Although the Biden administration has sanctioned certain RSF leaders, the lack of public awareness of the war resulting from the minimal media coverage further disincentivises the US and European powers from imposing costs on Burhan and Dagalo for not complying with the ceasefire efforts. For instance, despite their role in orchestrating a coup against Sudan’s al-Bashir government, neither leader has been sanctioned. 

What are the implications? 
According to the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Sudan might collapse into a “Libya Scenario” if the war continues, with the SAF taking back major population centres, including Khartoum, and RSF retaining its strongholds over Darfur, and its agricultural and mineral resources. Such a scenario would plunge Sudan into an era of incessant internal warfare, with Islamist and militant groups exploiting the power vacuum left by the absence of state capacity produced by the war-battered SAF and RSF, and lead to a mass refugee exodus from the country like was the case in Libya. Already, aspects of the Libya scenario are beginning to unfold, with neighbouring Chad, South Sudan and the Central African Republic (CAF) being overwhelmed by the over 2.2 million refugees. Militant rebel groups, including the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (North), have begun to reassert their presence. Furthermore, given South Sudan’s dependency on its oil pipelines passing through Sudan and the persistent threats to the pipeline amid the ongoing war, military invention by South Sudan remains a possibility.

Despite mediation efforts by Saudi Arabia and the US,  all negotiations have failed in the primary stages. Both factions want to use the negotiations as cover to gain advantages on the battlefield, with  SAF’s Assistant Commander-in-Chief, Lieutenant General Ibrahim Gabir, stating, “Peace talks can go on, but the army will not stop for that.” Moreover, both sides have presented uncompromising conditions for a ceasefire. The SAF has stated that Hemedti’s troops would have to withdraw from all RSF-controlled territories before any negotiations and called the latter “militias” and “outlaws,” reflecting their claim of being the sole armed forces of Sudan. On the other hand, RSF, wanting to consolidate their gains so far, has emphasised an immediate cessation of hostilities. The contradictory demands leave no space for negotiations, making a continuation of hostilities the most likely future trajectory of the conflict. Moreover, regional actors with substantial influence over the warring parties, including Russia, UAE and Iran, have chosen to aid the fighting factions instead of advocating a peace process. Unlike the RSF and SAF, who believe they can achieve a decisive victory in the near future. The absence of a ceasefire also makes humanitarian assistance difficult, with the RSF looting humanitarian supplies and the SAF restricting visas for aid workers. For all these reasons, the conflict and its accompanying polycrisis is likely to continue. 

About the author
Ayan Datta is a Postgraduate Student at the University of Hyderabad.

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