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CWA # 1598, 19 February 2025
NIAS Africa Studies
Saudi Arabia in Africa: Economic and Strategic Engagements

  Ayan Datta

Behind established players like the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia was a late entrant in Africa. Despite its late arrival, Riyadh has recently announced multiple flagship economic and strategic efforts to grow the intensity and extent of its presence in Africa. In November 2023, Riyadh announced multiple economic programmes for the continent at the inaugural Saudi-Africa Summit, which amounted to over USD 50 Billion. Although economic outreach constitutes the bulk of Saudi Arabia’s role in the continent, the Kingdom has also intensified its strategic presence in Africa, primarily because of the ongoing civil war in Sudan. Despite its tacit preference for the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), Saudi Arabia has refrained from directly supporting either side. Instead, Riyadh chose to mediate between the al-Burhan’s Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Hamdan Dagalo’s (“Hemedti”) Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Since the war’s outbreak in April 2023, Riyadh has been leading the Jeddah Peace Process to end the conflict, albeit with little success.

Saudi Arabia’s economic engagements in Africa 
First, convergence between Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 and the African Union’s Agenda 2063. Riyadh’s economic diplomacy in Africa is rooted in its Vision 2030, which aims to diversify the Kingdom’s economy from its oil dependency. The focus on diversification led Riyadh to explore areas of converging economic interest with African countries in the agriculture, infrastructure, renewable energy and logistics domains. Saudi Arabia’s economic push aligns with African countries’ developmental aspirations, as expressed in the African Union’s Agenda 2063. Rooted in African countries’ ambitions to achieve internal economic progress using (among other means) external cooperation, the policy document reflected their aspirations for high living standards and world-class infrastructure — domains where Saudi Arabia is a global leader. Riyadh’s economic diplomacy in Africa has reflected this convergence of interests. To take a few examples, Saudi Arabia is in the process of buying USD 15 billion worth of critical minerals from poverty-ridden African countries, especially, Namibia, Guinea, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, to fulfil its Vision 2030 goal of producing 500,000 electric vehicles. The investments came at a time when private players were scaling back investments because of the political instability in these countries. Additionally, in 2023, the Kingdom committed USD ten billion in export insurance for 50 African countries, aimed at shielding their emerging export businesses from losses. This was coupled with USD five billion in development financing and USD one billion for water projects, reflecting Riyadh’s commitment to Africa’s infrastructural and human development gaps. 

Second, the COVID-19 pandemic and Africa’s debt crisis. The COVID-19 pandemic pushed numerous fragile African economies, especially Zimbabwe, Ghana, Nigeria, and Comoros, into debt distress. These countries’ public debt amounted to around USD one trillion combined. From 2020 onwards, Saudi Arabia used its position on multilateral platforms to advocate debt suspension and restructuring for these countries, reflecting its benign posture towards their issues. Subsequently, Riyadh used its G20 Presidency to launch the Common Framework for Debt Treatment, an initiative aiming to relieve the fragile African economies. These efforts were complemented by bilateral arrangements with debt-ridden countries, such as Finance Minister Mohammed Al-Jadaan’s USD 533 million debt-relief allocation to Ghana and other ailing members of the continent. 

Third, the Russia-Ukraine war and grain shortages. The Russia-Ukraine war has been another enabling factor behind the emerging Saudi-African partnerships. By disrupting global supply chains, the war raised global wheat prices by over 50 per cent at its peak. North African countries were deeply impacted by extreme weather conditions and had to reduce their wheat imports to avoid runaway inflation. Again, Riyadh sensed an opportunity in this potential crisis and began a series of investments in Africa’s agriculture and food transport infrastructure sectors. Africa contains 60 per cent of the world’s arable land, most of which is under subsistence agriculture. The continent emerged as a viable investment destination for Saudi Arabia, which imports most of its food. This convergence of interests led to extensive economic diplomacy efforts from Riyadh, which sent its Minister of Environment, Abdulrahman Alfadley, to Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal to explore opportunities for agro-investment. Furthermore, the Kingdom’s Public Investment Fund (PIF) launched efforts to establish new ports in the country, alongside developing port infrastructure in the Horn of Africa to facilitate easy export of African products into Saudi Arabia. These new agro-investments can also be viewed as Riyadh’s moves to diversify from Sudan, where the Kingdom’s earlier investments, amounting to around USD 400 million, have been endangered by the ongoing civil war.

Why is Saudi Arabia mediating in the Sudanese Civil War?
First, Saudi Arabia’s differences with the UAE. Although Saudi and Emirati strategic interests in Sudan were aligned before the civil war, both sides backed the Transitional Military Council (TMC). However, the conflict revealed the rifts between the two Gulf Countries. While Saudi Arabia tacitly backed al-Burhan and the SAF, by recognising them as the country’s official government, the UAE began militarily assisting Hemedti’s RSF. Riyadh and Abu Dhabi’s varying preferences were rooted in their differing priorities. While MBS preferred al-Burhan, assessing him to be a leader who could stabilize Sudan with his forces, the UAE was suspicious of his links with Sudan’s former Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated leader, Omar al-Bashir. Accordingly, Abu Dhabi preferred Hemedti, a self-interested leader with no rigid political affiliation. With its pro-SAF position, Riyadh wants a stable Sudan to safeguard its investments. Therefore, the Kingdom is sponsoring peace talks between the belligerents, hoping to return Sudan to its pre-civil war state by brokering coexistence between the two generals. However, Abu Dhabi is backing Hemedti in hopes of a Red Sea port under an RSF-ruled Sudan. Unlike Saudi Arabia, the UAE wants to expand its strategic influence in the country, and it's willing to prolong the conflict to have its way.  

Second, Saudi Arabia’s pursuit of status transformation under MBS. Saudi Arabia’s efforts at mediation are also rooted in MBS’ quest to elevate the Kingdom’s political status and be recognised as a peacemaker in the greater Middle East. MBS’ is pushing for an independent foreign policy aimed at transforming Saudi Arabia’s image and global role beyond an oil supplier to a political and diplomatic powerhouse. However, the fight between the RSF and the SAF appears to have reached a stalemate, meaning both Saudi Arabia and the UAE's objectives are far from realisation. 

Saudi Arabia’s investments and financing efforts in the continent are fairly long-term, and it is too soon to predict whether they will prove successful. Nevertheless, Riyadh’s efforts have inaugurated the Kingdom as a major player in the continent’s geoeconomics. The prospects of Saudi Arabia’s political and strategic efforts, however, appear positively bleak. Saudi efforts at a political status transformation will face strong headwinds against the UAE, which is an established actor in the Maghreb and enjoys a more militarised presence in the region.  

About the author
Ayan Datta is a postgraduate student at the University of Hyderabad.

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