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CWA # 1566, 31 December 2024
NIAS Africa Studies
Post-poll Violence in Mozambique: Factors, Implications and the Way Forward

  Ayan Datta

On 9 October, Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frelimo) successfully continued its 49-year-long reign, with its candidate, Daniel Chapo, winning 71 per cent of the popular vote in the Presidential elections. The ruling party further consolidated its influence over the country’s post-civil war landscape, growing its absolute majority in the central legislature, the Assembly of the Republic, by securing 195 out of 250 seats. Apart from the presidency and the central legislature, it retained its governors in the country’s 11 provinces. Venacio Mondlane, a breakaway Frelimo leader with an anti-establishment platform, was the surprise runner-up of the polls. Backed by the nascent Podemos party and Mozambique’s vast young population, Mondlane secured over 20 per cent of the popular vote and 31 Assembly seats, reflecting a rising anti-incumbency wave against Frelimo domination. 

Chapo and Frelimo’s victory plunged the country into an ongoing cycle of protests and violence, with Mondlane disputing the results, alleging fraudulent practices by Frelimo-aligned election officials, and calling for nationwide strikes. Matters reached an inflexion point when unknown gunmen shot two Mondlane aides dead while they were going to contest the results in the Constitutional Council. With broad participation from several opposition forces, including Podemos, the non-violent demonstrations aimed to undermine and erode Frelimo’s legitimacy, eventually leading to a recount in Mondlane’s favour, which he called “electoral justice.” However, the police attempted to suppress the protests violently. 
 
Factors behind election-related protests
First, the rigging allegations. Multiple foreign and domestic observers flagged irregularities in the election process, exacerbating the public's dissatisfaction with Frelimo. The EU observers noted the “irregularities during counting” and “unjustified alteration of election results at the polling station and district level” and demanded the authorities to use transparent, credible and traceable tabulating practices, the US-based International Republican Institute (IRI) accused Frelimo and Chapo of vote buying, voter intimidation and inflating the voter rolls in its strongholds in southern and central Mozambique. The country's Catholic Church, which represents the country's Christian majority (56 per cent), joined the opposition forces in criticising Frelimo by calling the elections a betrayal of the country, lending further credibility to the protesters. Since three elections for the Presidency, Assembly, and Provincial leadership were held simultaneously, each voter was given three ballots, one for each election. However, according to the CNE, around 56,000 voters in Inhambane and over 55,000 in the Zambezia province submitted their ballot for the Assembly but not for the President. Given that these 111,000 extra votes went to Frelimo, the CNE data indicated that Frelimo colluded with the local bureaucracy to stuff ballot boxes. However, no CNE official publicly acknowledged the discrepancies, prompting opposition forces to question the Election Commission’s independence and credibility.

Second, the disproportionate state response. The Frelimo government and police have resorted to disproportionate force and securitising rhetoric against the protesters, framing them as dangers to the State’s security and stability instead of addressing their democratic and political grievances. Mozambique police used tear gas, live ammunition, and police dogs, killing 40 people before resorting to a blanket ban on the demonstrations on 15 November. Although Mondlane called for peaceful protests, the Frelimo government applied a self-serving interpretation to Mondlane’s call to occupy critical infrastructure, including ports, labelling the protesters “terrorists” and “drugged” youth aiming to destabilise the country. Despite the state’s repression, demonstrations and strikes continued with vast participation until 15 November when Mondlane called for a pause, indicating the opposition leader’s rising popularity. Although the state cut off internet connections several times since the protests began, especially in Maputo, the decision has proved counterproductive as it inflicted losses on small businesses that relied on online services. When asked about the controversial blackouts, the Minister of Communications continued the securitisation rhetoric, stating that shutdowns were necessary to avert the “destruction of the country.”

Third, economic division and the youth factor. The election results exposed the long-concealed conflict of interest between Mozambique’s Frelimo-affiliated elites, who reside primarily in the country’s prosperous southern and western regions and benefit from its natural gas and precious stone-based resource economy, and its impoverished masses. Given Mozambique's stagnant and conflict-ridden economy (because of the Islamist insurgency in the north), the country’s vast young population (Mozambique’s median age is only 17 years) has long suffered from high unemployment, state absence in peripheral areas, low investment in public services. Consequently, when Mondlane decided to contest independently of Frelimo, the disillusioned youth became his core support base and have been at the forefront of the ongoing protests. Mondlane represents an alternative to the Frelimo and Renamo, both of which are seen by the youth as indifferent towards the people’s concerns. Like the youth in several African countries, young Mozambicans are growing immune to Frelimo’s ‘freedom fighter card’ and want to see tangible governance improvements. 

Implications and The Way Forward
Mozambique’s protests demonstrate that democratic consolidation and political stability can become increasingly difficult in the absence of equitable development, free and fair elections and inclusive institutions. 

First, although Frelimo assumed power in 1992 with the promise of generating prosperity for all Mozambicans, its vision of equitable development was soon overshadowed by the corrupt bureaucracy, which engaged rampantly in graft and fraud. The resulting unemployment and underdevelopment fueled the Islamist insurgency and the ongoing protests. 
Secondly, the country’s election management institutions were designed, as part of the 1992 peace treaty, to be dominated by the ruling party. The pro-Frelimo bias in the CNE resulted in rampant election fraud throughout the country’s post-1992 politics, leading to a gradual alienation of disaffected sections. 

Third, given the Renomo’s domination of the state apparatus, party elites developed business interests and siphoned off most of the revenues from the natural resource economy, leading to massive youth unrest and distrust in established parties.   

Despite the wide participation in the protests, Frelimo’s clear message that future protests will be treated as treasonous and met with violence has ensured that Mondlane will find it increasingly difficult to hold large-scale demonstrations. Mozambique’s state institutions are not impartial or impersonal but staffed at the higher levels by Frelimo loyalists and members, who know that a Mondlane victory will endanger their entrenched positions. Recent evidence shows that although Africa has a long tradition of youth-led protests, such protests are seldom successful in their aims and fizzle out in the medium-to-long term because police brutality, applied with sufficient intensity and frequency on impoverished populations, can end protest movements. Although the protests reflect the genuine aspirations of impoverished Mozambicans, if they continue, they are likely to join the ranks of Nigeria’s failed Anti-SARS protests and Kenya’s Anti-Finance Bill demonstrations, both of which were dispersed primarily by the strength of police and armed forces.   

About the author
Ayan Datta is a postgraduate student at the University of Hyderabad.

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