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CWA # 1594, 31 January 2025
NIAS Africa Studies
What is behind the end of Chad’s military cooperation with France?

  Ayan Datta

On 29 December, Chad, led by President Mahamat Deby, unilaterally announced that it was ending its defence cooperation agreement with France. The decision shocked Paris, with President Emmanuel Macron holding talks with Nigeria’s Bola Tinubu. Deby couched his announcement in the language of postcolonialism, asserting that the French military presence was incompatible with the sovereignty of Chad, which, after decades of relying on its former colonial master, was finally mature enough to safeguard itself. Deby’s decision coincided with his growing closeness towards Russia, which has established a military presence in the Sahel States since 2022, leading to speculations that Russia would take over France’s role as security guarantor. However, previous analyses overemphasised Deby’s postcolonial rhetoric and overestimated Russia’s ability to provide a credible security guarantee, neglecting the domestic political considerations and multipolar regional setting that influenced the decision. 

France’s drawdown and Deby’s political opportunism
Chad’s request to withdraw French troops followed a 26 December report by President Emmanuel Macron, which sought to reduce France’s presence in Chad to a mere 300 troops following setbacks in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Although Macron simply sought to rebalance his military commitments amidst budgetary constraints and the rising Russia threat, Deby reportedly interpreted the drawdown of French troops as a snub that violated Paris’ commitment to ensuring the survival of his government. Deby loyalists within the government and security services, were similarly disaffected, feeling Paris had left them vulnerable to rebels and potential coup plotters, who would be emboldened by the reduced French presence. The possible final straw came on 11 December, when the resident French troops failed to assist or warn the government about a Boko Haram attack, resulting in the deaths of 40 Chadian soldiers. More importantly, the attack enabled Deby, who had assumed the office of President following an election that observers had decried as unfree and fraudulent, a political image makeover. With the utility of French troops dwindling and parliamentary elections scheduled in late December, Deby made France a scapegoat in his election bid, timing his demand for complete withdrawal to coincide with the wave of anti-French sentiment sweeping the country. By presenting himself as an anti-French patriot, Deby expanded his appeal to civil society activists who were already critical of France while virtually ensuring that the upcoming polls would give his government the stamp of legitimacy.

Deby’s regime survival considerations and the Zaghawa and Sudan factors
Another factor behind Deby’s rejection of France and his increasing openness to Russia’s overtures is his dire need for regime security, a service that Russia’s Africa Corps has recently provided through its cooperation agreements with the region’s fragile military regimes in Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and the Central African Republic. While appearing well-consolidated from the outside, Deby and his confidants in government are facing mounting internal tensions. Chad’s elites, who mostly belong to the minority Arab Zaghawa tribe that has dominated the country’s political and security establishment since the 1990s (the Deby family are Zaghawa, too), have been increasingly dissatisfied with Deby’s handling of civil war in neighbouring Sudan, to the extent that regime insiders are floating the possibilities of a palace coup against him. Deby’s decision to allow the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to use Amdjarass in northeastern Chad — a city with deep ties to Zaghawa power, even housing the grave of Deby’s late father, the former President Idriss Déby Itno— as a concealed military base to transfer weapons to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in neighbouring Sudan, has drawn the ire of influential Zaghawa generals, who view the RSF’s leader Hamdan Dagalo (“Hemedti”) as a threat. The Zaghawa elites, both in Ndjamena and traditional leaders in Amdjarass, fear that if the Sudanese Army were to push Hemedti out, he would certainly retreat to Chad, like the over 400,000 Sudanese refugees who fled to the country. Once in Chad, Hemedti, with its political ambition and partial Chadian heritage, would be in a position to mobilise these refugees and mount a political challenge against Chad’s Zaghawa establishment. Additionally, the tribal chiefs feel threatened by Hemedti’s massacre of the Sudan’s non-Arab Masalit community. Apart from sharing cultural and familial ties and therefore, sympathies towards the Masalits, Zaghawa leaders fear that since they too are a minuscule section of the population (less than three per cent), they might share the same fate if Hemedti or his Janjaweed gain influence in Chad.

Deby’s shortcomings in managing relations with the military have been another factor in his struggle to consolidate his rule and subsequent outreach to Russia. Hemedti’s recent efforts to recruit Chadian Zaghawa tribesmen into the RSF confirmed the fears of Chad’s army generals about Hemedti’s cross-border influence, exacerbating their sense of alarm at Deby’s support for the RSF. The Interim President’s under-the-table discussions with Russia about allowing Moscow’s PMCs to exploit gold reserves in Chad’s Tibesti Mountain range in exchange for their assistance in subduing rebels in the country’s north has further offended army officers, who would prefer to capture those resources for themselves. Furthermore, Deby’s decision to invite around 200 Hungarian troops to counter-terrorism and cross-border migration from Sudan has led to speculation in the military brass that the Interim President was building a personal guard to protect himself from a possible military coup, further eroding his support in the army. With both civilian and military insiders questioning his rule, Russia, which was helping to preserve the military governments in the region, presented a lucrative option.

Sahel’s new multipolar realities
Although Deby has sought Russian assistance for his survival, he has not limited Chad’s military engagements to Moscow, thereby recognising the Sahel’s multipolar realities. Formerly a zone of French influence, the Sahel has recently witnessed inroads by multiple regional powers, including the UAE, Turkey and Israel, providing Deby with a wide range of collaborators when French assistance proved inadequate. While Deby has sought Moscow’s help in preserving his government, his newfound disaffection towards France will not necessarily lead to Chad joining Russia's expanding list of regional military partners in the Sahel. But, Deby’s decision to normalise ties with Russia coincides with Chad’s army receiving military equipment from the UAE, weapons from Israel, Turkish aircraft and drones, and US counterinsurgency assistance. Chad's fallout with France reflects not a replacement of French bases with Russian ones but a new foreign policy approach in Ndjamena. After decades of aligning with a single security partner, Deby, with his grip on power in danger, is switching to a diversified portfolio of external partnerships, aiming to give himself more manoeuvring room and avoid the pitfalls of depending on a France that no longer caters to his needs or a Russia that is overstretched in Ukraine and the Middle East.

About the author
Ayan Datta is a postgraduate student at the University of Hyderabad.

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