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CWA # 1639, 31 March 2025
NIAS Africa Studies
DR Congo: M23’s Control in Kivu

  Anu Maria Joseph

This quarter saw, once again, eastern DRC becoming a major conflict hotspot with M23’s advancements in the North and South Kivu regions. A systemic state failure in DRC, attributed to the military and political elites prioritising the survival of the regimes over the welfare of society, has triggered another wave of violence. The M23 violence in Congo seems to be taking new shifts after the group gained absolute control of Goma and Bukavu.

I
Major Developments during January- March 2025

The following were the major developments in Congo this quarter. 

M23’s absolute control in Goma and Bukavu
In the Democratic Republic of Congo, M23 carried out its major advancement on 27 January (since its formation) by capturing Goma, the provincial capital of North Kivu.  Later, on 16 February, the group captured Bukavu, the second strategic city and regional capital of South Kivu. Bukavu, Goma and several other mining towns in eastern DRC are currently under the control of the Rwanda-backed M23 group. The UN and DRC have continuously accused Rwanda of supporting the rebels and the presence of Rwandan forces fighting alongside the M23 rebels. Rwanda denies it and claims that its forces are defending against the Hutu-led rebels in the region. According to the UN, the renewed conflict has killed more than 7000 people and displaced more than 350,000. The group is continuing its advances in the mining towns around Goma and Bukavu.

Failed mediations
On 18 March, DRC's President Félix Tshisekedi and his Rwandan counterpart Paul Kagame held direct talks in Doha, Qatar. The joint statement following the talks called for an “immediate and conditional” ceasefire in eastern DRC. The ceasefire talks came after M23 withdrew from Angola-led direct talks with the DRC over the EU sanctions. It was supposed to be the first direct talks between the warring parties, ending DRC President Felix Tshisikedi’s long disagreement to engage directly with the rebels. 

II
Issues

The following are the major issues behind the ongoing conflict in eastern DRC.

DRC’s M23 problem
M23 is one among the hundreds of rebel groups in eastern DRC. M23, or March 23, an ethnic Tutsi-led group in eastern DRC, was formed in 2012 to fight for the rights of minority Tutsis in the eastern DRC after the Rwandan genocide and two Congo wars that followed. The group took its name from the peace agreement, which was signed on 23 March 2009. M23 claims that the promises of the 2009 peace agreement were never met. Rwanda-backed M23 rebels have been fighting Congo-backed FDLR ever since. FDLR is a militant group of ethnic Hutus who fled Rwanda to eastern DRC after carrying out the Rwandan genocide. In 2012, M23 was contained by the UN and Congolese forces, but it reemerged in 2021.

M23’s control in eastern DRC and its endgame
In January, the group escalated its offensives and captured Goma and Bukavu. The two capital cities are strategically important because of their connectivity to trade networks and mining towns in the provinces. The group is in absolute control of two cities and mining towns across South and North Kivu. The group seems to have come closer to achieving its objectives of territorial control, access to minerals, regional and political influence, and protection of Tutsi minorities. Congolese forces and their allies have withdrawn from the regions. Besides, several militias like Kabido, which were previously aligned with Congolese forces, have joined M23 due to its failure in addressing the insecurity issues in the region, strengthening M23’s control over the region.

Rwanda’s end game
The link between the M23 rebels and Rwanda is the Tutsi kinship. The minority Tutsi community in eastern DRC, who migrated from Rwanda to the region over centuries, has always been considered "foreigners" by other communities. However, the Tutsi-led government in Rwanda, formed after the genocide in 1994, has been supporting its DRC kin ever since, for two reasons: To use the group to fight and stop the FDLR from expanding and returning and accessing the mineral deposits in eastern DRC. 

State failure
Since independence, different regimes in DRC under Mobutu, Kabila and his son, and currently under Tshisekidi, have been ascribed to a patrimonial system. The regimes survived on a patron-client relationship with the political and military elites, while the grievances of the public were never addressed. The state resources and funds reached the elites and never the grassroots. Moreover, the central government always had little incentive to ensure the functioning of the state institutions and structures in the peripheries. This ignorance was also intentional to keep the peripheries divided, leave administration to ethnic chiefdoms or elite clients and thereby avoid a collective opposition. This systemic state failure, especially in eastern DRC, has played a significant role in strengthening rebel groups like M23 in the region (politically and economically). 

Ineffective mediations
The latest escalation this quarter came after a failed mediation by Angola in December 2024. Angola put forward the "Luanda Roadmap,” supported by the SADC, the AU, the US and the EU. However, it failed after DRC President Tshisekedi disagreed to hold talks with the rebel group directly. Another effort by Angola to mediate direct talks between M23 and the DRC in March was unsuccessful when M23 withdrew at the last moment. Qatar successfully hosted ceasefire talks between President Tshisekedi and President Kagame. However, the agreed ceasefire remains redundant as the violence had already come down, M23 was not involved in the discussions, the ceasefire conditions remain unclear, and M23 seems to have less incentive to withdraw from Goma and Bukavu.

III
Implications

In the DRC, M23 is one factor in the crisis. With more than a hundred rebel groups, several regional stakeholders and multiple issues, an end to the crisis in the region is too far from happening. Additionally, the Congolese state and its forces are incapacitated to address the insecurity issues in eastern DRC. The latest wave of M23 violence in eastern DRC is an example of how, in the absence of functioning state institutions and military, external actors take advantage of instability for their interests. 

Besides sanctions, to justify a non-supportive stance against the rebels, several international actors have refrained from being involved directly in the conflict. For many international actors, including France, Belgium, Germany, the US and the UK, the conflicts have become a major challenge in accessing the mining towns. Beyond stability, their priority has always been the region's mineral deposits. 

Regional efforts have so far failed. Unlike international actors, African regional organisations are capable of understanding the root causes of the conflicts better, due to their proximity to similar social issues and shared history. Despite consistently emphasising “African solutions to African problems,” no efforts have been made to make it come true. While international mediators focus on an immediate cessation of hostilities, decades of deep socio-political issues behind the crises are sidelined by an over-emphasis on immediate issues and actors. Unless the root causes are discussed and resolved, the rebel problem in the DRC will recur, and peace agreements will keep failing. 

About the author
Anu Maria Joseph is a Project Associate at NIAS.

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