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NIAS China Reader
The return of the South China Sea
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Femy Francis
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What Happened?
On 28 August, the Chinese Ministry of Natural Resources released a new ‘standard map’ that included contesting regions of Arunachal Pradesh, Aksai Chin, Taiwan and the South China Sea. The map outlines their infamous U-shaped “10-dash” line which covers 90 per cent of the South China Sea overriding many disputed regions, with some of the most tussled waterways aggregating USD 3 trillion worth of trade route passage every year. The “10-dash” line loop cuts into the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, Brunie and Indonesia.
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin asserted the claims stating: “China's position on the South China Sea issue has always been clear... and We hope that relevant parties can view this in an objective and rational manner.”
Countries response
The map garnered regional outrage refuting China’s claims with the Philippines Foreign Ministry stating that the: “latest attempt to legitimise China’s purported sovereignty and jurisdiction over Philippine features and maritime zones has no basis under international law,” and to “act responsibly and abide by its obligations under UNCLOS and the final and binding 2016 Arbitral Award.” Vietnam’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Pham Thu Hang expressed that Vietnam: “resolutely rejects any claims in the East Sea by China that are based on the dashed line, and Vietnam opposes the use of force against Vietnamese fishing boats operating normally at sea.” Malaysian Foreign Ministry refuting the claims said: “Malaysia does not recognize China’s claims in the South China Sea as outlined in the ‘2023 edition of the standard map of China’ which extends into the Malaysian maritime area.” Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi questioned the standard map and urged China to release the map in accordance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
The U-shaped loop also extended its line to Taiwan which was vehemently discredited by the Taiwanese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Jeff Liu stating: “No matter how the Chinese government twists its position on Taiwan's sovereignty, it cannot change the objective fact of our country's existence.” India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar relegated that: “Just by putting out maps with parts of India... this doesn’t change in anything. Our government is very clear about what our territory is. Making absurd claims does not make other people’s territories yours.”
What is the Background?
First, a brief background to the 10-dash line claim. Previously known as the “9 Dash line” was adopted in Chinese maps since the 1940s with Beijing claiming their indisputable sovereignty over the regions within. The Chinese officials referred to the area as ‘blue national soil’ and can be traced back to the maps made by the Nationalist Kuomintang or the Chinese National Party before World War Two. In 1947 Chinese geographer Yang Huairen came out with the U-shaped loop with a “11-dash line.” A Chinese Marine geographer Wang Ying stated that the lines mean that all ocean, island and coral reefs belong to Beijing, but the discontinuous line portrays that other countries can pass through it.
Second, claims and opportunities in the South China Sea. The region has a thriving marine life with an abundance of fish which the regional countries are dependent on for fulfilling their major dietary requirements. Additionally, large reserves of natural gases and oil have been found on the floor of the South China Sea. The most significant is that the South China Sea has one of the world’s busiest and most important shipping lanes with trillions of dollars’ worth of trade and business opportunities. Philippines and Vietnam claim their historical right over the South China Sea whereas Indonesia and Brunei claim the right over their Exclusive Economic Zones as outlined by the UNCLOS.
Third, external interest in the South China Sea. There has been a significant external and especially US presence in the Southeast and East Asian region that has met with criticism by China as an unwarranted incursion. In the context of Southeast Asia, the Philippines and the US revied the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) which provides access to nine Philippines military bases that are of strategic significance as they are in close proximity to both Taiwan and the South China Sea. In 2023, Manila and Washington held an annual Balikatn military exercise and resumed joint military patrols in the region.
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning called it a “zero-sum endeavour” by the US and warned regional players to be more responsible as it might lead to more competition than cooperation.
Fourth, the timing of the release of the “standard map.” The release of the map comes right before the G-20 summit where China wants to reassert its claims over the territories and is well aware that this would become aa a major focus of discussion. Additionally, the publishing of the 10-dash line after the 9-dash line was rejected by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 2016, relegates that Beijing refutes the ruling. This reassertion before the summit showcases their binding determination over its claims and the rumour of President Xi Jinping’s plans to not attend the G20 summit showcases no space for negotiations and discussion.
What does it mean?
There has been a revival of tensions within the South China Sea, which saw a lull in diplomatic confrontation but was frequent by Chinese aggression in the waterways. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have been conducting anti-submarine exercise and patrol in the South China Sea stating that the region has been infested with foreign actors that threaten China’s national defence. In early August, Philippines accused Chinese coast guards of targeting Filipino vessels with water cannons and several local Philippines fishermen have faced harassment by Chinese coast guards. Within the span of a few years China has amped up its efforts to reclaim the region by either increasing the size of the islands or creating new islands. Additionally, they have been militarizing and weaponizing the Paracel, Woody and Spratly Islands by deploying fighter jets, cruise missile and radar systems. There is a collective fear of counterproductive results from the increased US and external involvement in the region that might further antagonize China. Additionally, the regional actors fear that the external interest might dilute the regional interests of the countries involved as the region might become of strategic dispute between China against US/ West allies and not China against Vietnam, Philippines, Indonesia, Brunie and Malaysia.
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