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CWA # 1489, 21 October 2024
NIAS Polar and Ocean Studies
Russia's Arctic Policy: Objectives, Priorities and Tools

  Padmashree Anandhan

The Arctic zone of the Russian Federation includes the territory of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), Murmansk and Arkhangelsk regions, Krasnoyarsk Krai, Nenets, Yamalo-Nenets and Chukotka Autonomous Okrugs. This was determined following the decision of the State Commission under the Council of Ministers of the USSR in April 1989. This helped in bordering the lands, islands, sea waters, territorial sea, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of Russia. Since 2008, Russia has released several policies and strategy to define its priorities in the Arctic. The first policy released in 2008 was known as “Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the Period up to 2020 and Beyond.” Following this, there were four more released during 2020 and 2023 focusing on Russia’s national security, socioeconomic development and foreign policy in the Arctic.

What are the Russian objectives in the Arctic?

  1. Expansion of resource base to supply hydrocarbon resources, aquatic biological resources and strategic raw materials. This is aimed at developing its socio-economic sector.
  2. Ensuring maintenance of necessary combat capabilities of the “general-purpose troops” for military security and protection of Russian borders in the Arctic zone. 
  3. Eradicating environmental damage from economic activity and promoting the protection of natural environment.
  4. To create a single “information space” to monitor the natural changes in the Arctic zone of Russia. 
  5. To have adequate “fundamental and applied scientific research” to create knowledge based on modern science and geoinformation. This is to manage the Arctic territories and form means to solve issues relating to defence, security and climate changes in the Arctic.
  6. Formation of a “mutually beneficial” bilateral and multilateral cooperation between Russia and other Arctic countries through international treaties and agreements. 

The key priority as per the state policy of Russia on the Arctic 2008, is to delineate the maritime spaces as per international agreements and take account of Russia’s national interest. The second major priority was to increase Russia’s state institution participation and interaction in the international forums and Arctic countries for scientific, cultural and technical cooperation. The policy also prioritised resolving external border issues through bilateral and multilateral cooperation under the framework of Russia-EU collaboration. The policy also looks into forming a unified response group for man-made disasters and addressing the climate change problems. It called for the development of a resource base, infrastructure and socio-economic.

The key priorities for Russia in the Arctic as of 2020 strategy are protecting the ecology and preserving it as a zone of peace and cooperation. Secondly to use the Arctic as a “strategic resource base” and to develop an integrated transport system in the Northern Sea Route. At present, it is aimed at developing the seaport of Murmansk towards constructing a hub by 2023. This is to ensure the development of the Arctic zone and Russia’s national security. Developing the Northern Sea Route has gained importance due to the increased freight carriage flow and the formation of new transport corridors from other Russian ports. Therefore, improving the port capacity and building a “multi-mode transport hub” is the key priority for Russia for the coming decade. To achieve this, favourable financial and economic conditions are needed. 

Comparing the 2008 and 2020 Basic Principles on the Arctic, the use of strategic resources to boost the Russian economy and stress on developing the Northern Sea Route to improve the transport corridor remains key. From protecting the ecological systems of the Arctic, the 2020 policy expands to preserving the larger environment and protecting indigenous traditions. Two unique features of the policy would be prioritising Russian sovereignty and territorial integrity and improving the living standards of Russians. 

What are the Russian national interests in the Arctic?
Strengthening its geopolitical influence and securing the nuclear assets
Russia’s recent “Conception of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation” emphasises “territorial integrity” and building its relations with non-Arctic states through constructive policies. Russia aims to place measures which could be critical to its interest, militarising the Arctic. Although it signed the Murmansk Memorandum for security cooperation with China, it is wary of China’s growing engagement and increasing NATO’s footprints.

According to the report in Carnegie in 2021, Russia intends to hold six out of 11 ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) in the Kola Peninsula as a readiness against NATO. This is to protect its North Atlantic and Arctic front with NATO and strengthen its position in the exit to the Barents Sea and the Norwegian Sea through its North Navy.

Exploring new resources for economic development
Both the 2008 and 2020 strategies released by Russia concentrate on developing the Arctic. Till now 80 per cent of natural gas and 17 per cent of oil have been extracted by Russia and it further plans to increase its oil production while reducing its gas output. It intends to expand its Northern Sea Route and increase ship transit through the Arctic via better infrastructure, energy projects and technologies.

Compete against west
The Arctic Council includes the US, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and Russia which are predominantly NATO members making it challenging for interactions since the war in Ukraine. The same can be resonated with Russia’s 2008 and 2020 policies on the Arctic which shows a draft shift in Russia’s focus to build its relations within the Arctic Council. According to the report in The Guardian, Russia holds 475 military sites on its northern border built in the past six years. This indicates its determination to outperform the West’s operations in the Arctic and ensure the superiority of its military significance in the region.

The 2020 Arctic policy also emphasises Russia’s “self-reliance” ability. It aims to become independent in ship-building and acquire ice-capable gas and oil tankers to develop navigation in the Northern Sea Route. However, the Western sanctions remain an obstacle. In ensuring energy supply, it plans to supply the populated areas and industrial zones near NSR with domestically built “low-powered nuclear power plants.” One such facility was built and sent through the Baltics and Norwegian coastline in 2018 to the Arctic town for electricity and heat supply.

What are Russia’s tools to achieve its objectives?
First, Russia’s Northern Fleet remains the key at the military level.  From securing its SSBN force and the Arctic borders, Russia intends to use the fleet as an assertion tool to satisfy its economic needs and to use it against the military buildup by NATO and any others who threaten Russian interests. In 2014, Russia formed a joint strategic command and an Arctic brigade to enhance the protection of its existing and proposed military installations. The NSR fleet is currently were earlier modernised with more naval surface combatants, missiles, artillery, combat teams, air defence systems, communications and anti-ship cruise missiles. Most of the capabilities are viewed as defensive and focused on protecting the borders. However, according to the report in Carnegie, the present capabilities and operations in the Arctic pose an inherent threat to NATO countries on the northern flank. This is highly possible in the current scenario with the increased threat due to NATO’s expanded border in the footsteps of Murmansk Oblast and Kola Peninsula. This could lead to Russia’s agenda turning offensive to guard its Arctic coast.

Second, information campaigns to promote Russian ambitions. Russia launched its information operation to showcase its achievements and ambitions. An expedition was carried out in 2007 as a symbolic move to show Russia’s claims in the Arctic. The recent one was May 2024, where “Severny Polyus” was set out from St. Petersburg into Kola Bay, towards Murmansk. Russian Minister of Natural Resources Aleksandr Kozlov claimed that Russia could undertake “long-term scientific experiments on high altitudes” after the arrival of Severny Polyus in Murmansk spanning 20 months. Apart from the expeditions, Russia also organises international conferences and dialogue to facilitate discussion among senior authorities and companies such as Rosneft, Norilsk Nickel, and Gazprom under the Arctic Territorial Dialogue/International Arctic Forum.

Third, significant fiscal and monetary support to fulfil the Arctic agenda. There are limited resources for Russia and an additional weight on the economy after the Western sanctions following the war in Ukraine. Despite this, it offers tax incentives to mining and infrastructure companies to boost investment in the eastern and Siberian Arctic zones which remain underdeveloped than those in the West of the Urals. One such example would be the 2019 decision to give USD 41 billion in tax incentives for the next 30 years to Rosneft to build a Vostok oil field to produce two million barrels. According to the Russian government, the project plan is set forth to produce up to 100 million tons of oil per year. This is aimed at engaging investors from India and China in the project. Similarly, in 2020 Russia approved a USD 300 billion incentive programme for Arctic infrastructure and oil and gas extraction projects to trigger economic activity and building of independent power plants, ports and towns.

References
“On the Fundamentals of Russia's State Policy in the Arctic for the Period up to 2020 and Beyond,” Government of Russia, 18 September 2008
“What Are Russia’s Interests In The Arctic, And How Do They Affect Regional Security?,” ukraineworld.org, 21 August 2023
Eugene Rumer, Richard Sokolsky, and Paul Stronski, “Russia in the Arctic— A Critical Examination,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2021
“Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of 26.10.2020 No 645,” Official Publication of Legal Acts, 26 October 2022
Ekaterina Klimenko, “Russia’s new Arctic policy document signals continuity rather than change,” SIPRI, 06 April 2020
“How to Take Advantage of NATO Enlargement in the Arctic,” RAND, 24 June 2024
“The Arctic as a resource base,” Bellona.org, 26 March 2024

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