The following note was earlier published in The World This Week #318 Vol 7, No 27, 6 July 2025
Quad Foreign Ministers Meeting:
Countering China’s rare earth dominance
Brighty Ann Sarah
What happened?
On 1 July, the Secretary of State of the United States and the Foreign Ministers of Australia, India, and Japan convened at Washington, D.C. on July 1, 2025, for the 10th Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting. The 2025 meeting, hosted by U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio. This was the second Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting of the year, following the meeting in January.
The July 2025 session unveiled a comprehensive agenda centered on four pillars: maritime and transnational security, economic prosperity and security, critical and emerging technologies, and humanitarian assistance and emergency response. The launch of the Quad Critical Mineral Initiative under the umbrella of economic prosperity and security emerged as the highlight of the meeting. However, official agreements are yet to be signed.
The militarization of the East China Sea and South China Sea was also among the serious considerations. The launch of the first-ever Quad-at-Sea Ship Observer Mission, aimed at heightening interoperability and knowledge sharing, the first Maritime Initiative for Training in the Indo-Pacific (MAITRI) workshop and the space-based intelligence sharing operations of the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) were highlighted as proactive measures towards ensuring maritime security in the region.
The members also condemned international terrorism in the light of the Pahalgam attack, and criticized North-Korea's ballistic missile launches and nuclear ambition.
What is the background?
First, a brief note on Quad. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, Quad, is a strategic mini-lateral forum comprising the United States, Japan, India, and Australia, upholding the directive of a “free and open Indo-Pacific” as their operational focus. The Quad was formalised in 2007 and revived during the first term of the Trump Presidency, driven by shared concerns over China’s aggressions and encroachments in the South-China Sea and Indian Ocean regions. The administration's 2017 National Security Strategy emphasized the Indo-Pacific as a priority, framing the Quad as a counterbalance to China’s influence. Since 2019, the annual Foreign Ministers Meetings have gained momentum, with the 2024 meeting in Tokyo.
Second, China’s dominance in global critical mineral and rare-earth supply chains. China dominates the ownership and supply of critical minerals globally, wielding 60 per cent of global rare earth production. This makes the production of everyday electronic devices, clean-energy technologies, and even defence technology heavily reliant on China. The United States relies on China for approximately 74 per cent of its rare earth imports, particularly for its defence infrastructure. Australia is a major producer, with 4.2 million tonnes of rare earth elements (REEs) and substantial lithium, cobalt, and nickel reserves. India also possesses nearly 6.9 million tonnes of REEs. However, China remains their major source of refining and processing services.
Third, China’s counter-measures in response to Trump’s tariffs. On 4 April, in response to the tariffs imposed by the Trump administration, China imposed export restrictions on seven of the seventeen rare-earth minerals and magnets, severely impacting the electric vehicle, semiconductor, and defence industries. Although the restrictions were eased after several rounds of negotiations and the adoption of a new trade framework, it exposed persisting vulnerabilities in the global supply chain, and the absence of reliable alternatives despite the critical nature of the industry.
Fourth, the presence of critical minerals in the Indo-Pacific. The Indo-Pacific region holds significant reserves of critical minerals. Indonesia has the world's largest nickel reserves and has substantial levels of cobalt, crucial to the production of electric vehicles. Malaysia and Vietnam, among others, possess considerable amounts of REE as well. The Indo-Pacific ocean bed also harbours vast reserves of mostly untapped critical resources. Despite the abundance of critical mineral resources, there lacks sufficient mining and processing infrastructure to fully exercise the potential of the region
What does it mean?
First, the urgency of Quad member states to recalibrate the global critical mineral supply chain. China’s latest export restrictions have highlighted the strategic leverage it holds in the critical minerals sector, and how it can be wielded to counter U.S. measures. Despite the minor bilateral frictions between the US and the other members, the collective agreement in the Critical Minerals Initiative is a proactive attempt to confront the gaps and build an alternate force in the critical mineral industry.
Second, the Quad Critical Minerals Initiative could emerge as a major contender to China’s dominance in the industry by tapping into the resources of the Indo-Pacific through regional partnerships, collective action and utilising the diverse capabilities of the Quad countries. In addition to providing mineral security to the region, the increasing importance of the rare earth industry globally would afford the region substantial economic growth as a reliable competition to China if operationalized successfully.
About the Author
Brighty Ann Sarah is a postgraduate student of International Studies at Stella Maris College, Chennai.
