CWA # 1794
CW Note
The War in Gaza: Israel's reoccupation plan and International support for the Two-State Solution
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Brighty Ann Sarah and R Preetha
14 August 2025
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In the news
On 8 August, Israel’s security cabinet approved the move to take control of Gaza through expanded military operations.
On 11 August, Israel’s strikes in eastern Gaza killed six journalists, including Al Jazeera correspondent Anas Al Sharif, who Israel had accused of Hamas affiliations.
On 13 August, severe Israeli bombardment in eastern and southern Gaza before Israel’s planned re-seizure of Gaza killed 123 civilians, recording the highest death toll in the week.
On 11 August, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese said: “Australia will recognise the State of Palestine at the 80th Sessions of the United Nations General Assembly in September, to contribute to international momentum towards a two-state solution, a ceasefire in Gaza and the release of hostages."
On 12 August, the foreign ministers of 24 countries, including Britain, Canada, and Australia, issued a statement: "Famine is unfolding before our eyes. Urgent action is needed now to halt and reverse starvation.”
On 13 August, over 100 humanitarian groups, including Oxfam and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), issued a joint letter demanding that Israel stop the “weaponisation of aid" into Gaza, as "starvation deepens.” The letter revealed that most international non-governmental organisations have been unable to deliver supplies and medication since 2 March.
Issues at large
First, Israel’s proposed reoccupation of Gaza and Hamas’ influence in a historical context. Gaza has long been the epicentre of the Israel–Palestine conflict. The region was under Israeli control after the 1967 Six-Day War. It was home to over 200,000 Palestinian refugees displaced during the 1948 Arab–Israeli War, known as the Nakba (“the catastrophe”). Israeli occupation and reforms deepened anti-Israel sentiment, leading to the First Intifada (1987–1993) and the Oslo Accords, which created the Palestinian Authority with limited powers in Gaza and the West Bank. Hamas emerged during the First Intifada as an Islamist counterweight to the secular Palestine Liberation Organisation, pursuing armed resistance rooted in the anti-Israel cause. 2000-2005 was a period of the second, deadlier Intifada, which led to Israel withdrawing its troops and settlements from the region. In 2006, Hamas secured victory in the Palestine elections and formed a short-lived coalition with Fatah that collapsed in 2007 due to infighting. Hamas has remained in control of Gaza since, deepening its stronghold in the region and transforming Gaza into the centre of its operations. Israel’s proposed reoccupation and intensified military campaign seek to uproot Hamas from the heart of its influence.
Second, Israel’s plans to reoccupy Gaza and the post-occupation. Israel’s security cabinet’s decision to take control of Gaza City marks a significant escalation in the war. Israel has detailed a five-point plan: disarming Hamas, releasing all hostages, demilitarising Gaza, maintaining Israeli security control, and establishing an alternative non-Hamas, non-Palestinian Authority civil administration. The phased, expanded military campaign aims to pressure Hamas into releasing the roughly 50 remaining hostages and dismantling its presence in the region. Netanyahu’s push for full reoccupation of Gaza raises the threat of an Israeli resettlement, although he insists Israel will not remain in long-term control. Israel’s rejection of the ‘two-state’ solution and demands for an alternate non-Hamas, non-Palestinian Authority civil administration further complicates the question of a post-war administration. His proposal to transfer control to a coalition of “Arab forces” faces strong regional resistance. A Jordanian official stated that Arabs would “only support what Palestinians agree and decide on” and would not “agree to Netanyahu’s policies nor clean his mess,” reported Reuters.
Third, the idea of a two-state solution. The two-state solution introduced in 1937 by the Peel Commission proposes the coexistence of independent Israeli and Palestinian states along pre-1967 borders, with the West Bank and Gaza forming a Palestinian state and East Jerusalem as its capital. Although widely promoted internationally, the proposal was rejected by the Arabs in 1947, citing its undue favour towards Israel. The proposal has once again gained momentum through international backing, although Israel has rejected the idea of an independent Palestinian state. Although the Palestinian Authority backs a two-state solution, Hamas does not, as it opposes the existence of Israel. Hamas has, however, indicated an interim acceptance of a Palestinian state based on 1967 de facto borders, without formally recognising Israel, if refugees’ return is allowed.
In perspective
First, the human and political cost of Israel’s reoccupation plan. It risks extending a war that has already devastated Gaza’s civilian population. Military pressure has neither neutralised Hamas nor secured hostage releases; civilians are likely to bear the brunt. UN famine alerts and reports of more than 1,000 deaths at aid distribution sites highlight the pressing need for humanitarian access rather than further military escalation.
Second, the diplomatic divide and stalemate over the two-state solution. President Trump stated it was “pretty much up to Israel” whether to occupy Gaza, while Washington’s ambassador to Israel made it more explicit that Netanyahu’s plan was not America’s concern. Western pledges to recognise Palestine, on the other hand, risk becoming performative without concrete pressure on both sides to halt the war. Arab opposition, led by Turkey, may round up diplomatic support but lacks the leverage to shift Israel’s course.
Third, the larger questions. Who will take charge of governing Gaza in the short term and the years ahead, who will finance and manage the enormous task of rebuilding the territory, how security and law enforcement will be maintained, and what political framework can be established to guide Israelis and Palestinians are bigger questions. Addressing these foundational questions will be far more challenging than the current difficulties in achieving a temporary ceasefire or negotiating the release of hostages.
About the authors
Brighty Ann Sarah and R Preetha are postgraduate students at Stella Maris College, Chennai.