State of Peace and Conflict 2025

CWA # 1881
State of Peace and Conflict 2025
The War in Ukraine: Transatlantic divide, Europe’s internal fractures and an Ineffective UN
Conflict Weekly #313, 31 December 2025, Vol 6, No. 52

Sunidhi Sampige
31 December 2025

Photo Source: Stimson

What happened?
In 2025, Europe found itself caught between sustaining support for Ukraine in the war and managing the geopolitical tremors unleashed by an uneasy transatlantic relationship under President Donald Trump. The following has been the US and Europe’s response to the war in Ukraine.

The US's response
On 18 February, US President Donald Trump carried out direct talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Riyadh. During the meeting, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Russia's Sergey Lavrov discussed on a "fair, enduring" peace deal.

On 19 February, Trump strongly criticised Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, saying Kyiv "should have never started" the war and wasted US aid.

On 27 February, in a100-day peace plan, the US asked Ukraine to pull out of Kursk Oblast and accept Russian control of some areas. Meanwhile, aid stopped after a tense meeting between Zelenskyy and Trump in the Oval Office on 28 February. Aid restarted following the Jeddah talks in early April.

In August, Trump met Putin in Alaska, but there were no major developments towards ending the war. In November, Trump introduced a 28-point plan. Trump also proposed that Ukraine limit its army to 600,000 troops, drop NATO hopes, and give mineral access to the US.

On 24 December, the US and Ukraine reached a consensus on critical elements of the 28-point peace proposal, including Russian troop withdrawals from certain regions.

On 28 December, Trump hosted Zelenskyy at Mar-a-Lago for discussions on the 20-point peace plan, stating the two leaders were "getting a lot closer" to a deal. Trump noted progress but unresolved "thorny issues" over Donbas. He also proposed a potential trilateral US-Russia-Ukraine talks.

Europe's response
On 14 February, in Munich, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stated that Ukraine's failure would hurt Europe.

On 17 February, France held a summit in Paris, with Germany, Poland, Italy, and the Nordic countries, pushing for "coherent security." However, no plan came out due to several disagreements.

In March, France and the UK started the "Coalition of the Willing" with 31 countries for peacekeeping. On the same day,  Von der Leyen suggested EUR 800 billion for the ReArm Europe initiative, with Germany promising EUR 100 billion.

In November, the Brussels summit rejected Trump's 28-point peace plan. On 18 December, a USD 90 billion loan was passed by the EU, despite several internal arguments. In 2025, Europe provided USD 166 billion in total aid, more than the US.

What are the issues?
First, the deepening internal fault lines within Europe. In 2025, rather than military prowess, political unity was Europe's biggest challenge. Southern Europe opposed increased defence spending due to budgetary constraints and inflation. Spain, Portugal, and Italy were among the countries hesitant to contribute the two per cent of GDP required by NATO. Meanwhile, the Czech Republic, Poland, and the Baltic states called for tougher sanctions against Moscow and more cooperation with Washington. The UK and France took a selective but assertive stance. Others' demand for NATO continuity clashed with Macron's idea of "strategic autonomy." Germany made significant financial contributions while avoiding explicit security commitments eastward, oscillating between moral commitment and practical restraint. Far-right parties gained popularity in several countries by portraying the burden of the Ukraine war.

Second, ineffective coalitions and stalled initiatives. Europe responded to Washington's decreased support for Ukraine by forming the Coalition of the Willing. However, the coalition’s defence industrial capacities lagged, logistics coordination deteriorated, and force size estimates were limited. Similarly, the ReArm Europe initiative revealed the same structural flaws. Due to budgetary restrictions and divergent spending priorities, the EU's plan to raise EUR 800 billion over ten years stalled at the committee level. Germany focused on supply chains and infrastructure, while Poland and France promoted the production of weapons. Even Mark Rutte, the recently appointed Secretary General of NATO, acknowledged that "Europe is rearming in plans, but not yet in practice."

Third, the uneasy transatlantic balance. Europe's "victory-first" stance stood in stark contrast to President Trump's "peace-first" approach. European countries perceived Trump’s decision to temporarily halt arms deliveries to Ukraine and hold exclusive talks with Russia in Riyadh as a departure from alliance norms. Despite providing more aid overall than the US, the EU's stance lacked strategic coherence. Mistrust was heightened by Trump's tariff campaign against European goods, his renewed demand for increased defence contributions, and transactional attitude toward NATO. By the middle of 2025, NATO's unity became less cohesive, with Washington downplaying its obligations under Article 5 while simultaneously urging Europe to take on more financial and logistical responsibility. 

Fourth, Trump’s pressure on Ukraine. Kyiv was forced to adopt a defensive diplomatic stance throughout 2025 because of Trump's transactional approach. In Riyadh, Trump accused Zelenskyy of initiating the conflict and wasting US aid. It created a tense atmosphere between the US and Ukraine. Following the Oval Office meeting, the US approach towards Ukraine shifted more towards pressure on Ukraine to accept US peace terms. The 100-day peace plan called for the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from Kursk Oblast and the acknowledgement of Russian sovereignty over occupied territories. Also, Trump halted military supplies and forced Zelenskyy to negotiate rare earth mineral access for the US in exchange for support, a deal Kyiv rejected without security guarantees.

Fifth, the ineffective role of the UN. Due to Russia's permanent seat at the UNSC, efforts by the UN were rendered ineffective by frequent vetoes on ceasefire motions, humanitarian corridors, and war crimes investigations. Resolutions passed by the General Assembly were symbolic. For example, an appeal for a ceasefire in March received widespread support but lacked legal force, which limited its implementation. US-Russia negotiations continued without UN intervention despite Secretary-General António Guterres' diplomatic efforts, which included a visit to Kyiv in April and several dialogue calls. Millions of displaced people received vital humanitarian aid from UN organizations, including UNHCR. The UN's structural limitations in superpower conflicts, with observer status without coercive power, limited its capacity as a mediator.

What does it mean for 2026?
Trump's 2025 Ukraine strategy, which prioritises US national interest, imply at US transactional approach towards peace mediation. While economic leverage was obtained through aid pauses and mineral demands, NATO cohesion was strained by excluding Europe from the mediations. The move has repositioned the US as a deal-maker rather than a guarantor in transatlantic security. For Ukraine, the US pressure and terms risk further developments that favour Moscow in the absence of strong military and political European support. The fragile US-Russian relations also point to likely violations of any agreed terms.

About the author
Sunidhi Sampige is a Postgraduate student from O.P. Jindal Global University, Sonipat. 

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