State of Peace and Conflict 2025

CWA # 1887
State of Peace and Conflict 2025
DR Congo: A three-decade conflict, M23 resurgence, and a peace deal without peace
Conflict Weekly #313, 31 December 2025, Vol. 6, No. 52

Anu Maria Joseph
31 December 2025

Photo Source: AFP

What happened?
In 2025, DR Congo was one of the major conflict hotspots in Africa. The year started with a resurgence of M23 rebels in eastern DR Congo. During January and February, the group captured Goma and Bukavu, the provincial capitals of North Kivu and South Kivu. As the year comes to an end, the group continues to control Goma and Bukavu, as well as several other mineral towns adjacent to them. For the first time since its formation in 2012, the group has come closer to achieving geographic, strategic, political and economic upper hand in the conflict.

The other major development in the conflict was the entry of the US into the peace mediation. On 27 June, the US brokered a peace deal between the DR Congo and Rwanda in Washington. According to the deal, both parties have agreed to a cessation of hostilities and respect the territorial integrity. The deal called for "disengagement, disarmament and conditional integration" of armed groups in eastern Congo, and the return of refugees and displaced people. In return, the US sought access to critical minerals in DR Congo. This was formalised when the DRC signed a strategic partnership agreement with the US in December, alongside reaffirming the commitments to the peace deal.

Alongside the US-led peace deal, Qatar mediated a ceasefire between the DRC and the Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC) coalition, which includes M23, on 19 July. In November, following upon the Qatari ceasefire deal, M23 and the DRC signed a framework for peace with eight protocols related to humanitarian access, return of displaced people, protection of the judiciary and prisoner exchange, among others.

Despite a peace agreement and a comprehensive ceasefire agreement, the M23 offensives have continued in the region throughout the year. Recently, during the latest M23 offensive in December, the group killed more than 400 people in South Kivu while attempting to capture Uvira. According to the UN, during the first half of 2025 alone, more than 7000 people were killed in the violence. According to OCHA, one million people have sought refuge in neighbouring countries. Meanwhile, Amnesty International and other human rights groups have reported widespread war crimes, summary killings, and sexual atrocities across the conflict region.

What are the issues?
First, a three-decade-long multidimensional conflict. The post-colonial tensions that persisted over land, resources and hundreds of ethnic rivalries evolved into a multidimensional crisis after the Rwandan genocide in 1994 and the two Congo wars that followed. Fearing another holocaust, several ethnic and inter-ethnic groups in the region formed armed groups to defend against each other. The mineral reserves and illegal mining and trading activities became the source of funding for the armed groups. According to the UN, currently, there are more than 120 armed groups in eastern DRC.  Many of the armed groups have been supported by DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi at various points, acting as proxies for each country’s economic interests in the region. M23, or March 23, is one of the groups. The ethnic Tutsi-led group was formed in 2012 against the Hutus, who fled Rwanda to eastern DRC out of fear of persecution for carrying out the Rwandan genocide in 1994. The Hutus who fled Rwanda after the genocide formed the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) in eastern DRC. Since then, Rwanda has accused the DRC of supporting FDLR against the minority Tutsis in eastern DRC. Although M23’s emergence was thwarted by Congolese and UN forces in 2013, it re-emerged in 2021.

Second, Congo’s ignored periphery, Rwanda’s Tutsi minority and the rebels’ sanctuary. The conflict is occurring in the DRC’s eastern peripheral provinces, including North Kivu, South Kivu, and Ituri. DRC seeks to regain territories lost to the rebels and prevent them from capturing more. The state institutions have less control in the peripheries. The Kinshasa government has always left the governance of these peripheries to ethnic chiefdoms or armed ethnic wings. Since independence, the regimes in DRC have survived on a patron-client relationship with these ethnic chiefdoms. With less control over the region, the security apparatus of the state is incapacitated in recovering the lost territories to M23.

Meanwhile, Congo accuses Rwanda of supporting M23 rebels with weapons and troops. The link between the M23 rebels and Rwanda is the Tutsi kinship. The minority Tutsi community in eastern DRC, who migrated from Rwanda to the region over centuries, has always been considered "foreigners" by other communities. However, the Tutsi-led government in Rwanda, formed after the genocide in 1994, has been supporting its DRC kin or M23, ever since, for two reasons: to use the group to fight and stop the FDLR from expanding and returning and accessing the mineral deposits in eastern DRC.

For M23, the two capital cities are strategically important because of their connectivity to trade networks and mining towns in the provinces. The group is in absolute control of two cities and mining towns across South and North Kivu. The group has come closer to achieving its objectives of territorial control, access to minerals, regional and political influence, and protection of Tutsi minorities.

Third, a failed Qatari ceasefire mediation and the US's peace deal without peace. Although conveyed commitment, neither DRC nor M23 has complied with the terms of the Qatari ceasefire deal. DRC has not released M23 prisoners, and M23 has not withdrawn from the captured territories. M23 has continued its attacks and has captured several other towns across the region. They blame each other for violating the ceasefire. Ceasefire was an outcome of international pressure rather than a voluntary commitment from the warring sides. The ceasefire violation and the resumption of violence imply that either the parties lack trust towards each other's peace intentions or they never had the intention to end the fighting in the first place.

The Trump deal is being criticised for many reasons. First, the deal lacked inclusivity; M23, the major actor in the conflict, was not a signatory to the agreement. Second, the deal depicted a transactional character when Trump involved the US's mineral interests in the bargaining and deviated from a genuine interest in resolving the conflict. Third, the deal discusses an end to hostilities, disarmament and disengagement of the rebel groups, and a regional economic integration. However, the deal does not discuss resolving the decades-long root causes behind the complex conflict in eastern DRC. Ultimately, the deal reflected a US geopolitical manoeuvre that served Trump's global peace pursuits. Finally, six months into the signing, the deal could not materialise any of its provisions on the ground and ended up being a peace deal without peace.

What does it mean for 2026?
M23’s substantial territorial control, mineral access and political influence, Congo’s state incapacity and Rwanda’s support imply that the group has more leverage in any peace mediation. Hence, the group has less incentive to end the violence. Besides, the group has been forcefully recruiting and sourcing funding through illegal mineral trade. In 2026, the group is likely to expand its offensive even further towards Kinshasa. It also implies that thwarting the M23 advances requires substantial international support.

While the US-led peace deal was a major positive development, the deal’s transactional nature and lack of any progress towards peace so far indicate that the peace agreement is likely to face an absolute failure. Besides, the deal’s exclusive approach is likely to produce spoiler violence, and rebel groups may resort to violence to assert their relevance. Until an inclusive peace deal, addressing the underlying issues in eastern Congo, is proposed, 2026 is unlikely to make any decisive breakthrough towards peace in the region. Rather, it would likely witness further violence and expansion of the conflict, implying that the region will remain one of the major conflict hotspots in Africa in 2026.

About the author 
Anu Maria Joseph is a Project Associate at NIAS. 

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