State of Peace and Conflict 2025

CWA # 1902
State of Peace and Conflict 2025
Trump’s 20-Point Gaza Peace Plan in Gaza: Progress, Enduring Challenges and the Path Ahead
Conflict Weekly #313, 31 December 2025, Vol. 6, No. 52

Brighty Ann Sarah
31 December 2025

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What happened?
On 29 September, US President Donald Trump unveiled the 20-point peace plan for Gaza, titled   "President Donald J. Trump’s Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict," during a White House press conference alongside Israel’s Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu.

Key provisions of the peace-plan
Phase one of the plan aimed at the immediate cessation of hostilities, with Israel withdrawing its troops to pre-designated lines, referred to as the "Yellow Line" or initial deployment lines and freezing battle lines, retaining 53 per cent control of the territory. Hamas was to release all remaining living hostages and the remains of deceased hostages in batches, in exchange for Israel releasing around 2,000 Palestinian prisoners and detainees. The flow of humanitarian aid into the enclave was also raised to 600 trucks a day, distributed through the UN, Red Crescent, and other agencies.

The second phase of the plan called for the transformation of Gaza into a “deradicalized, terror-free zone,” hinged on the disarmament and demilitarisation of Hamas. It also included supervised decommissioning of weapons, destruction of military infrastructure, and a reintegration program for the Hamas members. Gaza will be governed by a technocratic, apolitical Palestinian committee, overseen by the "Board of Peace," chaired by President Trump. It also called for the establishment of a temporary International Stabilisation Forces, which will train and provide support to vetted Palestinian police forces in Gaza, in consultation with Jordan and Egypt. The force was to work with Israel and Egypt to help secure border areas and prevent munitions from entering Gaza.

Other critical provisions of the plan underscored that “Israel will not occupy or annex Gaza,” and stated the complete withdrawal of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) from the territory. It also hinted at the possibility of a Palestinian state, although in broad and ambiguous terms.

Progress of the peace plan
On 3 October, Hamas agreed to key aspects of the plan, including the end to hostilities and the exchange of hostages, while rejecting the demands for disarmament.

On 10 October, the ceasefire officially took effect after Israel’s parliament approved the agreement with Hamas, initiating the first phase of the peace plan and paving the way to suspend hostilities in Gaza within 24 hours.

On 12 October, Hamas released the remaining 20 living Israeli hostages and Israel reciprocated by freeing nearly 2,000 Palestinian prisoners and detainees. Addressing Israel’s Parliament, the Knesset, President Trump declared that the “war is over” in Gaza.

On 17 November, the UN Security Council adopted a US-drafted resolution 2803 on Gaza, offering legal viability to the 20-point peace plan. The resolution provided Washington with a legal mandate to implement key elements of the plan, including the establishment of an International Stabilization Force (ISF), and the formation of a committee to manage Gaza’s security and political transition through 2027, after which governance would be transferred to the Palestinian Authority.

On 29 December, during Netanyahu’s meeting with President Trump in Florida, Trump stated that Hamas “will be given a very short period of time” to disarm to move to the second phase of his Gaza peace plan and that Israel has “100 per cent” lived up to the plan.

The humanitarian aid access has improved, allowing up to 600 trucks daily initially, although actual deliveries averaged around 120-200 trucks per day by December, enabling the entry of thousands of trucks and infrastructure rehabilitation. The US established a Civil-Military Coordination Centre in Israel and deployed 200 troops to monitor aid and the ceasefire. Meanwhile, the UN resolution adopted in November amplified international support, with countries like Azerbaijan and Indonesia committing troops to the ISF.

What are the Issues?
First, impediments to the comprehensive implementation of the plan. The foremost challenge remains the fragile Israel-Hamas ceasefire that is tested by persisting violations from both sides. Reports highlight that since the initiation of the US brokered ceasefire on 10 October, Israel has violated the agreement over 850 times. The airstrikes, targeted assassinations, and reported bombardments of civilians have killed nearly 406 Palestinians and injured over a thousand. Israel claims that the attacks are prompted by Hamas attacking Israeli forces using explosives and reasserting control in evacuated areas. The persistent ceasefire violations and the fragility of the ceasefire erode the plan’s fundamental goal of suspending all military operations. Israel has been accused of restricting the entry of aid and relief into the enclave, worsening the humanitarian crisis amid an already insufficient supply. According to the UN, “Israeli authorities have rejected 107 requests for the entry of relief materials,” on grounds that some materials are out of the scope of humanitarian relief and can potentially amount to “dual-use.” The continued violations emerge from the lack of enforcement mechanisms, and monitoring or penalties for breaches.

Second, Hamas's steadfast resistance to demilitarization. Hamas perceives the requirement to decommission weapons, destroy tunnels, and dismantle military infrastructure as a strategic trap by Israel and the US to erode Palestinian resistance and entrench permanent occupation, rather than as a genuine path to peace. Senior Hamas officials have explicitly rejected disarmament, equating it to "removing the soul" of the organisation and violating their right to resistance against Israeli aggression. Despite suffering heavy losses, Hamas has also been successful in consolidating power in post-ceasefire Gaza, reasserting political influence. The group demands complete Israeli withdrawal from the territory as a prerequisite for any further progress, which has prompted increasing Israeli attacks on Hamas, further entrenching mutual distrust and stalling the plan's transition.

Third, the plan remains frozen in phase one and the pronounced absence of a reliable enforcement authority. The ISF was meant to play a key role in demilitarising Gaza, aiding the revival of the Palestinian law enforcement, and upholding the truce's terms through neutral monitoring and border security. Despite initial guarantees from regional partners, delays due to unresolved mandates, troop commitments from partners, and Israel's vetoes on contributors such as Turkey have halted the establishment of the ISF.  Additionally, countries aim for the troops to be peacekeepers rather than an enforcing authority that infringes on the agency of the Palestinian people. The US refraining from directly involving or deploying troops to the ISF has also hindered its establishment and the trust of other parties.

Fourth, the unanswered question of Palestinian statehood. Trump's peace plan addresses Palestinian statehood in highly conditional and vague terms, stating that only after Gaza's redevelopment and PA reforms, "may" conditions emerge for a "credible pathway" towards Palestinian statehood. It reduces statehood as an “aspiration,” rather than a right. The ambiguity also reflects an asymmetrical approach favouring Israel's security concerns over Palestinian aspirations, with no guarantees against West Bank annexation or explicit timelines.

What does it mean for 2026?
First, potential advancement towards phase-two. Despite the numerous violations, the tenuous ceasefire has largely held, and has successfully facilitated the exchange of hostages and the emerging humanitarian relief. Fulfilling these goals call for phase two of the peace plan and working comprehensively towards the demilitarization of Gaza and the disarming of Hamas. Trump’s latest statement also signals growing impatience with the delays and a more active push toward deradicalizing the region, aligning with the broader objective of reconstructing Gaza and establishing the “Board of Peace,” and the technocratic government envisaged under his plan.

Second, fragile peace and potential resistance from Hamas. The tenuous ceasefire is likely to be tested if Hamas continues to vehemently reject the demand of disarmament amid heightened US pressure and Israel’s military posturing. Armed resistance from Hamas could embolden Israel’s demands for complete demilitarisation as a prerequisite for further withdrawals or reconstruction. This also heightens the chances of renewed conflict, with Israel amplifying its efforts to militarily paralyze the group.

Ultimately, the underlying crisis of the unresolved coexistence of Israel and Palestine as sovereign states is likely to persist. In the post-ceasefire period, calls for a two-state solution have markedly receded, and the unhindered expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank eroded the chances of a geographically contiguous Palestinian territory. Immediate priorities like reconstruction and the rehabilitation of a war-ravaged population, are likely to be the focus, rather than the deeper political and territorial aspects of the conflict. Moreover, initiatives aimed at “de-radicalising” Gaza, alongside proposals for a technocratic administration led by external stakeholders and the “Board of Peace,” risk further delaying the question of Palestinian statehood.

About the author 
Brighty Ann Sarah is a Postgraduate student from Stella Maris College, Chennai. 

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