CWA # 485
Taiwan, the US and China
For the Economist, Taiwan is the most dangerous place. The argument is complicated
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Joeana Cera Matthews
7 June 2021
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Photo Source: The Economist
A look into the island that has become the field for superpower hostilities to play out and the role it has in this dangerous face-off.
The headline of the May cover for The Economist read – "Taiwan: The Most Dangerous Place on Earth". The story addressed concerns of Taiwan being on the verge of a Chinese invasion, the possible aftermaths of a war emerging from the power politics between the US and China, and the seemingly diminishing American supremacy in the region. Taiwan does find itself in knots, but that doesn't necessarily make it the 'most dangerous place on Earth'. Titling any place as 'the most dangerous place' is controversial and attributing the same to Taiwan is a rather complicated stance.
Why is terming Taiwan as 'the most dangerous place on Earth' complicated?
First, the headline might be exaggerated, but the military threat in Taiwan is real. China has been conducting military drills and intensifying "grey-zone" warfare. Barren reefs in the South China Sea being converted into military bases have raised Taiwanese concerns. Mainland China has always believed in 'one China' – one that includes Taiwan and has reiterated this fact over the decades. Those Taiwanese who support secession are accused of being egged on by America to undermine the Chinese unity in South Asia. China warning the US against playing the 'Taiwan card' is quite a dominating stance as well. Chinese law also instructs the use of force to unite Taiwan if peaceful efforts are to fail. These actions are to be viewed as Beijing stating its supremacy over Taiwan.
Considering the US-Taiwan relations, the US has always believed Taiwan should increase its military spending. The US opinion is that they shouldn't be obligated to defend Taiwan when Taiwan isn't doing enough to defend itself. This strategic ambiguity is also witnessed with the US refusal to transfer key technologies that would significantly alter the aftermath of a Chinese invasion. Ironically, their justification is the fear that these technologies would fall into Chinese hands and backfire on them when it prevents the attack in the first place. On the outset, America fears its inability to deter forceful Chinese advances into Taiwanese territory. China does have an advantage over the US as they are fighting close to home. America is not treaty-bound to defend Taiwan. The US failure to show up would lead its allies to recognize America as someone they cannot count upon. It would also imply Chinese dominance and supremacy in Asia-Pacific.
Second, the belief in an imminent Chinese invasion is far-fetched. To conduct a successful Taiwanese invasion, few factors must be considered. Primarily, the Chinese capabilities currently lack the lift capacity required for an invasion and long-term occupation. According to their timeline of uniting Taiwan by 2049, they might be able to build this as it is a hypothetical period for such an increase in capacity. Next, the geographical disadvantage that China has in the face of a naval invasion. In an amphibious invasion, the defender always has an advantage. Hiding the movements of mass troops in the sea would be difficult given satellite imagery detection allowing Taiwan time to prepare itself. Further deterrence is provided by the minimum number of beaches large enough for naval landings.
The most important factor is the significant blow to Chinese credibility. An invasion would imply mass casualties, economic pain on both sides, regime instability, and other catastrophes. Even Taiwan going into an economic crisis should not be downplayed as it would cause a ripple effect in the global economy. Also, once China starts fighting, anything short of victory implies regime-toppling humiliation. As the trends are not ideal from a Chinese perspective, Xi Jinping would wait for better odds than risk jeopardizing everything China has. Therefore, there is no imminent apocalypse scenario, but when it does happen it will be disastrous.
Third, Taiwan's position is undermined. It is viewed as this helpless entity – a puppet in the hands of China and the US. This is not the case. The structural advantages lie with Taiwan. It has seen a GDP growth of more than 8 per cent in the first season of 2021, despite China's economic sanctions. It was a haven for Hong Kong protesters who had escaped Beijing's political persecution. Their COVID-19 handling is also worthy of praise – there have only been 59 COVID-19 deaths on the island since the start of the pandemic. A marked liberal streak with the liberty of free speech has characterized Taiwan. It was also the first place in Asia to legalize gay marriage. All this points to the contrary of Taiwan being a 'dangerous' place.
Finally, Taiwan's lack of reaction doesn't imply indifference. China's failed attempts to intimidate Taiwan via its routine fear-mongering tactics have dulled Taiwanese fears. Taiwanese distrust in China has deepened over the years – especially regarding its 'one country, two systems' promise that failed in Hong Kong. Political trends such as the weak standing of the pro-China KMT in domestic politics can be considered as Taiwan's reaction. Electing governments that stress separateness from China, like the DPP, along with its liberal tendencies cast Taiwan far from indifferent.
What lies ahead?
It is high time Taiwan devised a new strategy. Building on tactics to frustrate amphibious invasions must be prioritized. Taiwan needs to find new diplomatic partners instead of relying only on the US. Strengthening the geographical advantage should also be focused on. Making TSMC an indispensable part of the semiconductor industry such that an invasion would be against the global interests can also be considered. The only possibility of an imminent Chinese invasion is if Xi becomes overambitious and stakes his legacy and legitimacy on Taiwan's return. The scenario of the "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation" happening in the short-term future would only be if it is fundamentally politically irrational.
About the author
Joeana Cera Matthews is a Postgraduate Scholar at the Department of International Relations, University of Mysore. Her research interests include the refugee crises in the Middle East, human rights violations of transgender and non-binary people during wars, and the issues faced by unrecognized countries. Currently, she is an intern at the School of Security and Conflict Studies, NIAS (Bengaluru).
