CW Note
Syria: Druze-Bedouin clashes and the Israeli intervention
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Rohini Reenum
17 July 2025 |
In the news
On 13 July, clashes broke out between Druze militias and Bedouin tribes in the city of Suwayda in southern Syria. The clashes erupted following the kidnapping of a Druze merchant on 11 July. The kidnapping was followed by retaliatory abductions and attacks, leading to the spread of violence.
On the same day, the Syrian Ministry of Interior expressed concern and stated: “In this context, the Ministry of Interior confirms that units of its forces, in coordination with the Ministry of Defence, will intervene directly in the region to resolve the conflict, stop clashes, impose security, prosecute those responsible for the events, and refer them to the competent judiciary.”
On 14 July, Israel began attacks against Syrian government forces, advancing towards the city of Suwayda to protect the Druze community. Israel’s Minister of Defence, Israel Katz, said that the attacks will continue unless the government forces withdraw. The Syrian Ministry of Interior termed the attacks a grave violation of international law.
On 15 July, Syria’s Ministry of Defence declared a ceasefire following claims of an agreement with Suwayda’s “notables and dignitaries.” However, the Syrian Ministry of Interior announced that Israel-backed armed groups resumed attacks against Syrian security forces.
On the same day, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) reported that the death toll reached 203, including 71civilians.
On 16 July, Israel launched attacks on the Syrian Ministry of Defence and the Presidential Palace in Damascus, killing three and wounding 34 others.
Issues at large
First, sectarian violence in Syria. Syria is a multi-religious country with a Sunni majority and minority Christians, Alawites, Druze and other communities. Despite being a minority, the Alawites gained political prominence with the rise of the Assad family, which ruled Syria for nearly half a decade. During the pro-democracy protests against the Bashar al-Assad regime in 2011, Assad gave it a sectarian colour, terming the protests an Islamist insurrection backed by foreign powers. The protestors were largely composed of the Sunni majority, and the security forces were dominated by minority Alawites. This sectarian division grew with the progression of the protests into a full-fledged civil war, and the violence perpetrated was viewed as sectarian violence. When the civil war ended in 2024 with the Sunni Islamist rebel group, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) forming an interim government, the fear of persecution among religious minorities in Syria grew. Despite the government’s reassurances, violence broke out against the Alawites (March 2025) and the Druze community (April-May 2025), fueling sectarianism and sectarian violence and compounding fear.
Second, the Druze community in Syria and its apprehensions. The Druze community is an ethno-religious group that emerged from the Shiite Islam faction during the 11th century. The Druze population predominantly reside in the southern province of Suwayda. The province has witnessed a “long-standing feud” between the Druze and the Bedouin tribe, with the outbreak of periodic violence. Following the fall of the Assad regime, targeted attacks against the Druze have increased. In April, the Druze town of Jaramana (near Damascus) was attacked by Sunni groups after an audio criticising Prophet Muhammad attributed to a Druze leader was circulated. During the Syrian Civil War, the Druze community formed militias to fight against the Assad regime. These militias were neither disbanded nor incorporated into the Syrian Army despite efforts, as the Druze community remains suspicious of the new government and its ability to protect the minority communities.
Third, the involvement of the Syrian government and its fallout. The Syrian government’s response to the clashes has drawn Israel’s intervention, which has widened the ambit of the conflict. Second, it has heightened suspicion among the Druze against the new government. They believe that the Syrian security intervened to support the Bedouin tribes. Third, it demonstrated the government’s inability to curb violence and the lack of control over unwieldy territories.
Fourth, Israel’s Druze connection and its intervention. Israel houses the third-largest population of Druze after Syria and Lebanon. They reside predominantly in northern Israel, including the Israel-occupied Golan Heights bordering Syria. The Druze community in Israel is loyal to the state and serves in the military. And, the Israeli state is supportive of and loyal to the community. Israel has previously intervened for the Druze minority in Syria. In May, Israel launched attacks at several sites across Syria, intervening on behalf of the Druze community. On the attacks, Israel reiterated an identical reasoning that it views the Druze as a “political ally.” Additionally, it stated that the intervention is geared towards keeping its border with Syria demilitarised. However, Israeli strikes, previously concentrated in Suwayda, have now expanded to Damascus.
In perspective
First, the instability in Syria. The new Syrian government has called for “national unity” and “domestic peace” and vowed to protect the minorities. However, its inability to incorporate non-state armed groups and to stop sectarian violence has raised doubts over its effective control. A conflict between two sub-national ethno-religious/tribal groups has turned into an inter-state conflict where the newly formed Syrian government feels cornered/obligated to demonstrate its effective control over its southern territories. This marks a serious escalation in the conflict. Additionally, different groups are aiming to carve out their respective areas of influence. The transition from a civil war-ravaged country to a stable government is a complicated process. Unless it is achieved, sporadic violence is likely to continue to plague the new Syria.
Second, Israel’s larger endgame. Israel’s immediate motivations are the protection of the Druze and keeping its border with Syria demilitarised. However, it is likely that, given the history of being geographically surrounded by hostile neighbours, including Syria, Lebanon and Palestine, all of which have housed non-state anti-Israel armed groups like Hezbollah and Hamas, supported by Iran, Israel aims to neutralise this threat once and for all. This stance is reflected in its continuing attacks on Gaza, Lebanon and Syria.
About the author
Rohini Reenum is a PhD Scholar at NIAS.