The note below was first published as part of NIAS-IPRI Conflict Weekly. See, "Trump’s “Board of Peace” in Gaza I Escalation/De-escalation in Greenland," Conflict Weekly #316, 23 January 2026, Vol 7, No. 3
What happened this week?
On 21 January, Turkey’s President Tayyip Erdogan stated that Kurdish forces in northern Syria must “lay down weapons and disband” now to avoid further bloodshed, and that any provocation would be a “suicide attempt.” The US envoy Tom Barrack also stated that the offer of integration into the central Syrian state was the "greatest opportunity" the Kurds have. He added that the original purpose of the SDF of battling the Islamic State had “largely expired,” and that the US had no long-term interest in retaining its presence in Syria. On the same day, Syria's government accused the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces of drone attacks that killed 11 soldiers, threatening to violate the four-day ceasefire between the government and the SDF.
On 20 January, Syria's defence ministry announced a four-day ceasefire following a new agreement with the SDF and the government, and that it has seized swathes of territory in the northeast, including major oil fields.
On 19 January, Syria and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) struck a deal to bring Kurdish civilian and military authorities under central government control. The deal ended days of fighting and the Syrian forces captured key territories of SDF control including Deir al-Zor, the country’s main oil- and wheat-producing area, and Raqqa, home to key hydroelectric dams along the Euphrates. The 14-point deal published by Syria's presidency featured the signatures of both Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and SDF head Mazloum Abdi.
What are the issues?
1. The terms of the US-brokered ceasefire deal
The 14-point agreement of ceasefire and the full integration of the SDF into the state military apparatus was aimed to end hostilities and reassert central state authority over north-eastern Syria. Major provisions of the agreement include an immediate and nationwide ceasefire across all fronts and the dissolution of the SDF and the individual integration of its fighters into Syria’s Ministries of Defence and Interior after security vetting, granting them appropriate ranks, and benefits. Further, full administrative and military handover of key territories of SDF control including Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa will be implemented. The handover also includes control over critical oil and gas fields, hydroelectric dams. The SDF will also transfer control over ISIS prisons, detention centres, and camps to the Syrian government, and withdraw its military and security forces east of the Euphrates River as a preliminary step.
2. Turkey’s interests and investments in Syria and the SDF factor
Ankara’s interests in post-Assad Syria hinge on eliminating the major security concerns posed by the SDF’s affiliation with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), regarded as a terrorist organisation that has waged armed insurgency in Turkey since 1986. Integrating the SDF will ensure the neutralisation of the PKK elements in the SDF along the Syria-Turkey border to and prevent cross-border attacks. Following the fall of the Assad regime, Turkey had made significant investments in Syria’s reconstruction, securing over USD 11 billion in power and aviation contracts. The investments largely aim to utilise the vast natural-gas resources in the north-eastern regions under the SDF control. For Turkey, the integration of the SDF into the central command and the expulsion of YKK elements unlocks the resource-rich areas under Syria’s centralized control and potential Turkish-backed development, while bolstering bilateral ties, and regional influence in a unified Syria.
3. The endgames for the government and the military
For the al-Sharaa government, the dissolution of the SDF is a step towards the reestablishment of a unified, centralized Syrian state under Damascus' sovereign control and eliminating separatist threats. This would involve dismantling the long-standing semi-autonomous Kurdish administration in the northeast, including the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, eliminating parallel military establishments, and reintegrating all territories and populations into the folds of centralized decision-making. Al-Sharaa has framed this as ending Syria's “state of division” to achieve “unity and progress for all,” and consolidating his authority post-Assad by extending state institutions everywhere,
For the Syrian military, this agreement signals the objective of creating a unified, professional national army under exclusive central command, free of factional or autonomous units that could challenge its command. This mandates the dissolution of the SDF as an independent entity and the individual integration of its approximately 100,000 fighters, ensuring no SDF units or parallel command structures remain active. By absorbing vetted SDF personnel and reclaiming strategic sites the military also benefits additional forces and neutralised threats. Further, neutralising a key adversary like the SDF also positions the army as the sole defender of a reconstituted, sovereign Syria while reducing risks of internal fragmentation.
What does it mean?
Eliminating the SDF is a monumental political win for President Ahmed al-Sharaa as the government stabilises from the fall of the previous regime. The move has dismantled the Kurdish administration in north-eastern Syria, diminishing separatist forces an bringing roughly one-third of the country, including resource-rich regions and key Arab-majority provinces like Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa under direct state control. This grants al-Sharaa more cohesive territorial authority, enabling centralized resource management for reconstruction and state-building. It also strengthens the new regime by establishing the Syrian state's control over ethnic lines and limiting Kurdish separatist efforts, minimizing internal fragmentation risks.
The event also underscores the regime’s growing ties with the US, as Washington, the most critical backer of the SDF due to the shared threat of ISIS, withdrew its support for the group and urged its integration into the state forces. It also facilitates closer ties with Turkey, strengthening the al-Sharaa government's regional standing and prospects of wider bilateral and economic cooperation.
