CWA # 1815
Conflict Weekly 300th Issue
State of Conflicts and Peace in India’s Northeast India: The Challenge of Demography, Development and Dialogue in Divided Societies
South Asia
Conflict Weekly 300, 25 September 2025, Vol 6, No. 38
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Anshuman Behera
25 September 2025
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India’s Union Home Minister, Amit Shah, recently declared that the Government of India has signed twelve peace accords with various militant groups across the Northeastern states. This initiative, according to the Home Minister, has led to over 10,900 youth giving up arms and joining the mainstream, a milestone projected as a significant step in India's internal peace-building efforts. While this development is no doubt notable, particularly in a region historically marked by armed insurgency, ethnic fragmentation, and alienation from the Indian mainstream, it necessitates a closer and more critical examination.
The success of these peace accords should not be judged solely by the reduction in militant violence or the number of surrendered cadres. Rather, a comprehensive understanding of peace must account for the underlying structural, ethnic, and political challenges that continue to trouble the region. The Northeast of India, comprising eight states, is one of the most ethnically diverse and politically sensitive regions in the country. Historically, this region has experienced various forms of armed conflicts, ranging from struggles for sovereignty and autonomy to inter-ethnic violence and demands for cultural and political recognition. While each conflict has had its distinct features, they have all been shaped by ethnic identity assertions, perceived historical injustices, and political neglect.
State of Conflicts in the Northeastern States
In Assam, insurgencies led by groups such as the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) have revolved around identity, migration, and self-determination. The Assam Accord of 1985 attempted to address these demands, particularly in relation to illegal immigration and preservation of Assamese identity. However, incomplete implementation and continued demographic anxieties have kept the issue alive, making peace tenuous. Similarly, Nagaland has seen extended periods of dialogue with armed groups, particularly the NSCN-IM, under ceasefire agreements. Yet, despite decades of talks, a final resolution remains elusive, and internal divisions within Naga groups further complicate the political landscape. These examples from Assam and Nagaland reveal that while the reduction of violence is a welcome development, the structural roots of conflict — identity, representation, and equitable development — remain largely unaddressed.
The state of Manipur, however, presents a more acute and troubling case. Since May 2023, the state has been engulfed in a protracted and devastating ethnic conflict between the Meiteis and the Kukis. The violence was triggered by the Meiteis’ demand for Scheduled Tribe status, which was viewed by the Kuki-Zo communities as a threat to their land rights, autonomy, and socio-political identity. What followed was a rapid escalation of violence, which has now persisted for over twenty-eight months, resulting in a massive humanitarian crisis. The prolonged nature of this conflict, combined with the scale of displacement and social fragmentation, has exposed the inadequacy of state mechanisms in responding to such crises.
The failure of both the state and union governments to contain the violence has been evident. Despite the continued unrest, the state government under Chief Minister Biren Singh remained in power for over twenty-one months, even as public confidence in its impartiality and capacity to manage the situation eroded significantly. The imposition of President's Rule on 13 February 2025, while overdue, has done little to reverse the course of the conflict. Even six months later, thousands remain displaced, and the administration has made little headway in restoring normalcy, dialogue, or meaningful reconciliation. The recent extension of President’s Rule underscores the persistent administrative and political failure to address the root causes of the conflict.
In a significant political gesture, Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Manipur for the first time since the conflict began, nearly twenty-eight months after its eruption. During his visit, the Prime Minister announced major development packages, including the Manipur Infotech Development Project with an investment of ₹500 crores and the Manipur Urban Development Roads Project with a proposed allocation of ₹3,600 crores. While these projects have the potential to stimulate economic activity and rebuild infrastructure, their capacity to address the conflict is questionable. Development alone, especially in a deeply divided society, cannot substitute for political negotiation and social reconciliation. In Manipur, the development gap between the Hills (inhabited largely by tribal communities) and the Valley (dominated by Meiteis) has long been a source of grievance. If these new development packages replicate the historical patterns of unequal benefit distribution, they are likely to exacerbate rather than reduce tensions.
Equally critical is the collapse of platforms for social dialogue in the state. At present, there is virtually no space where conflicting communities — the Meiteis and the Kukis — can engage in meaningful conversation. This absence of social and political fraternity has eroded trust and deepened divides to an extent where the situation may be approaching irreversibility. In this vacuum, armed militant groups, many of whom claim to represent their respective ethnic constituencies, are regaining influence. Although the Government of India signed a peace accord with the United National Liberation Front (UNLF), a Meitei militant outfit, on 29 September 2023, the accord has not produced significant results on the ground. The violence continues, and displaced populations remain in relief camps, cut off from their homes, livelihoods, and community networks.
The conflict in Manipur is not merely the result of internal dynamics; external factors have also played a significant role. The porous border with Myanmar has facilitated illegal migration, which has further aggravated ethnic tensions. Additionally, the unchecked growth of poppy cultivation and the cross-border smuggling of narcotics and Chinese goods have created parallel economies that fund militancy and erode state authority. These developments highlight the complex, multidimensional nature of the conflict in Manipur and the limitations of a narrow security-centric or development-led approach.
Status of Peace
Across the Northeast, the continued assertion of ethnic identity — often rooted in demands for autonomy, recognition, and control over resources — remains a significant challenge to peace. In Manipur, these assertions have not only undermined the state's social fabric but have also had ripple effects in neighbouring states. For instance, there have been increasing calls among the Kuki-Zo communities for solidarity from their ethnic kin in Mizoram, referencing past support during the Mizo struggle for autonomy. While such vertical solidarity reinforces ethnic identities and historical bonds, it also inhibits the formation of horizontal solidarities across communities, which are essential for sustainable peacebuilding.
To move beyond this cycle of violence and fragile ceasefires, what is required is a reorientation of the peace-building framework in the Northeast. Political willingness must extend beyond the act of signing peace accords. It must involve proactive and sustained efforts to engage with contentious issues such as equitable distribution of resources, inclusive political representation, and democratic decentralisation. Effective local governance is critical to ensure that the benefits of development reach all communities, and that no ethnic group feels neglected by either the state or union governments. Furthermore, perceptions play a vital role in shaping political realities. If peace accords and development projects are seen to benefit certain groups disproportionately while ignoring the grievances of others, they are likely to generate new conflicts. Managing public perception — through transparency, participation, and inclusive dialogue — is therefore just as important as managing militant groups. The strategic importance of the Northeast — both as a frontier region and as India’s bridge to Southeast Asia — makes peace in the region more than just a domestic concern. It is central to India’s Act East Policy, to the legitimacy of India’s democratic federalism, and to the credibility of its commitment to inclusive nation-building. Durable peace in the Northeast will not only secure the region but will also enhance India’s diplomatic engagements, particularly in a time when geopolitical flux in the Indo-Pacific demands internal cohesion and stability.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the peace accords signed in the Northeast should be recognised as important milestones, but not as endpoints. They represent a beginning — a political opportunity to restructure relationships between the state and its diverse peoples. The limitations of these accords, as exposed in places like Manipur, call for a deeper, more inclusive, and participatory model of peacebuilding. Such a model must integrate justice, local governance, social reconciliation, and economic equity. Without these, peace will remain elusive, and the Northeast will continue to oscillate between ceasefires and conflict. Only through a genuine commitment to democratic inclusion and structural reform can the region hope to achieve lasting peace.
About the author
Dr Anshuman Behera is a Professor and the Academic Head at the National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS), Bengaluru.
