Conflict Weekly 300th Issue

CWA # 1819
Conflict Weekly 300th Issue
Sudan: A Civil War’s Implications Beyond Borders
Africa
Conflict Weekly 300, 25 September 2025, Vol 6, No. 38

Ayan Datta
25 September 2025

Photo Source: Reuters

The civil war in Sudan has crossed two years, and has now divided the country between East and West. In March, the SAF, with Turkish and Iranian drones, pushed out the RSF troops in Omdurman and Khartoum North. By July, the SAF retook the government buildings, including the Presidential Palace, Khartoum airport, Central Bank, and state broadcasting office in Khartoum. The besieged SAF garrison in Darfur’s El Fashir remains the sole exception to the trend. Encircled by RSF troops, El Fashir is continually subjected to bombardment by the rebels’ recently acquired Chinese-made drones. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) are operating from their traditional power base in Western Sudan, stretching from Darfur and Kordofan up to the White Nile. Meanwhile, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) based in Port Sudan gained control over the capital Khartoum, the Southeast and key Eastern towns and cities, especially those along the Nile. While the war continues, almost dividing the country, the regional implications are multifold.

The following are the major regional implications of the war. 

1. Regional military involvement. With the war grinding towards an East-West stalemate and over three million refugees fleeing Sudan, both factions invited external support from the region and beyond. The support from the immediate neighbours has tilted mostly towards Burhan’s SAF. Egypt, a long-time government ally, has been supporting Burhan militarily, providing his air force with much-needed reinforcements. Egypt’s air force has also been suspected to be launching pro-SAF bombing missions from its territory. 

To Sudan’s East, Eritrea has agreed to host army training camps on its borders and keep its doors open to Sudanese refugees. The Eritrean government has also been sending clandestine mercenary fighters to bolster the SAF’s Eastern flanks. Abiy Ahmed’s government in Ethiopia has been suspected of mobilising Tigrayan fighters to prevent a spillover of the fighting into their borders. Chad’s President Mahamat Deby and US-backed Libyan National Army (LNA) chief Khalifa Haftar have been aiding RSF chief Hemedti, mainly by facilitating his access to Emirati and Russian assistance. 

2. Political and security implications for Egypt and Chad. Besides drawing regional actors into Sudan, the war, especially the outflows of refugees, has had destabilising political effects on Sudan’s neighbourhood and the wider Sahel region. Egypt and Chad, which host the bulk of Sudanese refugees — the numbers hover around 1.5 million and 770,000 respectively — have become entangled in complex refugee politics and socio-political tensions. In Egypt, the refugee influx has worsened pre-existing economic pressure. In response, the government has reversed its earlier policy of welcoming the Sudanese influx and has designed a publicised train system to return the refugees to their country of origin. This move has invited tacit encouragement from the EU, which wants to prevent Egypt from becoming a transit hub for Sudanese refugees wanting to enter Europe. To keep the “problem” contained, Brussels recently signed a USD 8.7 billion deal with Cairo for the latter to bolster its sea borders. It reflects how Sudanese refugees have become pawns in the hands of regional actors as “problems” to be “managed” as per the designs of other countries. The Sudanese refugees in overcrowded camps are unwelcome in Chadian villages. The refugees have been involved in clashes with locals, contesting for essentials like water. The tribal chiefs feel threatened by Hemedti’s massacre of the non-Arab Masalit community in Darfur. Similar tensions surrounding Sudanese refugees can be seen in Ethiopia, home to around 50,000 Sudanese refugees. Here, the Amhara-based rebel group FANO has capitalised on anti-refugee sentiment, attacking, killing and raping the camp-dwellers for local approval. 

3. Destabilising effects in South Sudan. The war in Sudan has impacted the political crisis in South Sudan. The war in Sudan destroyed a critical pipeline used to export oil, cutting almost two-thirds of the already fragile state’s revenues. The setback weakened President Sava Kiir’s control over key political figures and was partially responsible for the recent crackdown on Vice-President Reik Machar. Fighting in Sudan could spill over into South Sudan, especially with the SAF’s interest in controlling South Sudan’s Upper Nile region to prevent the RSF from pushing further eastward. 

What does it mean?
The conflict’s regional fallouts reveal the shortcomings of regional integration and porous borders across the Sahel. As the Interpol-backed research centre ENACT recently uncovered, the war has been prolonged by a vast network of cross-border arms and precious metals smuggling networks operating through the porous boundaries between Libya, Chad and Sudan. Increasingly, these local arms and gold dealers active in these networks have acquired the backing of US-backed Libyan rebel Khalifa Haftar and corrupt local officials in Chad’s army and in Sudan’s RSF. Over time, the officials enabling these informal, state-backed networks have developed vested interests in prolonging the war, since they can personally profit from weapons and gold smuggling. The incentive for ceasefires or peace deals, therefore, remains weak in the wider region.

 A second East-West partition, with an RSF-controlled West and SAF-ruled East, is increasingly becoming a viable option for the self-serving aspirations of both factions. However, the September 2025 proposals by the East Africa-based Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the “Quad group” of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and the US are unlikely to find much traction. The proposal’s focus on a humanitarian ceasefire, a civilian-led and unified future for Sudan, does not recognise the deep divisions between the SAF’s Arab leadership and the RSF’s aspirational non-Arab chieftains. They do not account for the vested interests that both leaderships have developed with cross-border arms and precious metals smuggling networks. Unless future peace proposals recognise this dominance and extractive nature of Sudan’s military elites, their civilian-focused orientation will fail to have an impact on the ground. For the foreseeable future, therefore, Sudan’s civil war will prove intractable. 

About the author
Ayan Datta holds a Master of Arts (Political Science) University of Hyderabad. His research interests include International Relations Theory, Comparative Politics of Africa, and Peace and Conflict Issues in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 

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