Conflict Weekly Special Essay

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CWA # 1637
Conflict Weekly Special Essay
Myanmar: State of Perpetual War

  Bibhu Prasad Routray
31 March 2025

On 2 February 2025, the State Administration Council (SAC), the governing body of the Myanmar military Junta, completed four years in power. However, real power has continued to slip away from its control. The intensity of the pro-democracy forces' military actions has been steadily increasing. Cornered, the Junta is determined to cling to power at any cost, even though its control is estimated to extend to only a quarter of the country. The brutal campaign against opposition strongholds continues to result in the deaths and injuries of fighters and civilians, including women and children. A long-delayed national election is being planned to be held only in areas controlled by the military to form a quasi-civilian government. 

Prevailing geopolitical factors favour the Junta and embolden it. Overt and covert support, along with tactical indifference from regional powers, have combined with a global detachment in dealing with the crisis in Myanmar. Developments in the first quarter of 2025 indicate that neither the return of democracy nor an outright victory for the Junta seems likely in the near future.

Major Developments during Jan-Mar 2025
Following were the three major developments in Myanmar during the first quarter in 2025. 

Civil War across the regions
A BBC investigation in December 2024 estimated that only 21 percent of Myanmar’s territory is under the control of the military. While major cities and population centres continue to remain under state control, the peripheries, especially in the Shan, Rakhine, Chin, Kachin and Karen states have slipped away. China-brokered peace talks led to the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) agreeing to cease hostilities in the Shan state. In January, the MNDAA signed a truce with the Junta in Kunming after the group’s leader Peng Daren was reportedly placed under house arrest by China. The Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA)’s peace process with the Junta, however, failed. In February, the group announced that no agreement could be reached. 

The Arakan Army (AA), which is the third constituent of the Three Brotherhood Alliance (TBA), along with the MNDAA and TNLA, continues its anti-military campaign along with the People’s Defence Forces (PDFs) in Rakhine and Chin provinces. In January 2025, the AA and its allies expanded the conflict to Ayeyarwady region. In February and March, the AA shifted its focus to Yegyi, Lemyethna and Thabaung townships in the Irrawaddy delta while carrying out attacks in Bago and Magwe regions. AA controls 14 out of 17 Rakhine townships and Paletwa township in neighbouring Chin State. 
 
In January, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) announced that it will continue to pursue its military objectives against the Junta army during 2025 and that it expects fighting in Kachin State to escalate. KIA’s incremental gains in Kachin and the Karen National Union (KNU) success seizing in Junta outposts continued.   

A brutal military campaign
Each defeat on the battlefield has led the Junta to adopt increasingly brutal tactics. Setbacks during ground offensives have prompted a reliance on aerial strikes, which, without accurate intelligence, fail to differentiate between combatants and civilians. The Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) have historically lived within their civilian communities, placing these civilians directly in harm's way during military operations. According to the Assistance Association of Political Prisoners (AAPP), the Junta has killed 6,452 civilians since the coup.

The fact that the Junta considers the opposition ‘terrorists’, makes its campaigns, however brutal, a justified strategy to bring stability. The number of air strikes on civilians has risen year on year during the civil war, according to non-profit organisation Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED), with nearly 800 in 2024. Among the air strikes that caused maximum fatalities in the first three months of 2025 were: the air strike on 9 January in Rakhine state that killed 40 people, another strike on a temporary detention area that killed 28 people on 18 January in Rakhine state;  killing of 12 people in Letpanhla village, around 60 kilometres north of the country's second biggest city of Mandalay on 14 March; and killing of 11 people including a doctor and his wife in an airstrike on Hnan Khar in the western region of Magway on 22 March.

Preparations for the National Elections
After a botched-up attempt to carry out a national census between October and December 2024, that threw in extremely questionable data, the Junta is preparing to hold national elections. In March, Junta chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing announced that elections could be held in December 2025 or January 2026. For the military, a potential vote will be a return to democratic norms, albeit riding on the shoulders of political entities that share deep connections with the military. For the opposition forces, elections are merely an attempt to legitimise the illegitimate regime that seized power in February 2021. They have vowed to disrupt any process that keeps the generals in power through proxies.
    
In January, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) categorically said that peace and not elections should be the priority for the Junta. The latter acknowledges the challenges posed by the opposition and the necessity of at least a semblance of peace and stability before the elections are held. However, in the absence of any reconciliation move, the peace it wishes to establish is akin to the tranquillity that prevails in a graveyard. In February, an announcement to extend the state of emergency by another six months was made by the SAC.    

II
Issues

In the months following the coup, key issues such as the restoration of democracy, the release of political prisoners, and the cessation of violence against the pro-democracy camp by the Junta became the dominant narrative in Myanmar. The ability of the pro-democracy camp not only to resist the violence of the Junta but to launch a wave of counterviolence shifted the narrative to the possible collapse of the Junta. However, it is possible to argue the issues that currently dominate the narrative on Myanmar are the following three.

Longevity of Conflict
Conflicts are generally expected to be short-lived. While prolonged conflicts are not uncommon around the world, the ongoing civil war in Myanmar has surprised even the most avid observers of the country. Initially, the swift victories of the NUG led to expectations of an early triumph. However, the Junta has managed to maintain its grip on power by launching a brutal offensive against its own people. This situation has resulted in a deadlock, as the Junta, despite controlling a limited area that shrinks incrementally, shows no signs of giving up. Meanwhile, the NUG remains optimistic, encouraged by the military successes of EAOs and PDFs, and is determined to continue its armed campaign to shift the momentum in its favour. Its success in establishing a reliable supply chain of logistics to sustain its efforts remains at the heart of such prolonged conflict. These contrasting ‘perceptions of winnability’ can perpetuate the ongoing civil war. 

Perception of Unwinnability: 
The likelihood of reaching a negotiated resolution to the conflict remains extremely low unless the Junta starts losing control over more territory, including urban areas. This scenario does not seem probable in the near future, given the Junta's access to advanced weapon systems and its casual willingness to use them against the opposition. Despite losing some territory and facing a rather embarrassing military campaign, the Junta remains largely unified, and an internal collapse leading to a change in leadership is also unlikely. Therefore, external mediation may be the only viable option for the conflicting parties to consider negotiating. However, for such mediation to be successful, a “perception of un-winnability” must develop within either of the parties involved in the conflict.

 External Power Centres: 
The ongoing civil war’s escalation as well as longevity has largely been sustained by external powers who support the Junta and a few others who covertly aid the NUG. Despite openly declaring that it abhors civil war and wants stability in Myanmar, China’s meddling has been selective and largely in favour of the Junta. The latter also benefits from a sustained supply of weapons as well as morale-boosting diplomatic engagement by a host of other countries. As the civil war prolongs and the intensity of the conflict deepens, the role of external actors is likely to grow as well. 

III
Implications

Myanmar’s current condition corresponds to any country under a prolonged spell of conflict. The civil war has had inexplicable costs on the population, especially those living in areas under attacks by the military. The resultant humanitarian crisis has unfolded in a number of ways and continues to do so as the war intensifies. Within that broad parameter, three following implications of the civil war pertaining to the transformation of the state can be identified.

The Rise of a Self-Preserving State
While self-preservation is a fundamental goal for all states, the Junta has been limited to making it their only priority, which negatively impacts their effectiveness as a governing body. Every action taken by the State Administration Council (SAC) is focused on preventing territorial loss and inflicting damage on groups and individuals associated with the NUG. As a consequence, the SAC has largely failed to restore Myanmar’s economy, initiate socio-economic activities, and stabilize the country.

Rise of a military-industrial complex
Wars bring smiles to the faces of the arms manufacturers.  Such smiles linger in case of a protracted war. A significant amount of arms and weapons, primarily from Russia, China, Singapore, India and Thailand, find their way into Myanmar through a network of state-entities, manufacturing companies, and private players. A large number of arms and drones are also manufactured within Myanmar to sustain the momentum of the war. With the growing sophistication of the attacks by the opposition, the Junta is constrained to spend valuable resources of the state on defence. Since the 2021 coup, the Junta has tripled its defence budget from 1.746 trillion kyats to 5.635 trillion kyats (US$2.68 billion) by 2023. Min Aung Hlaing has committed to hike it further. This is reminiscent of a military-industrial complex when the primary need of a threatened state is fulfilled by a complex network whose ultimate intention is not to end the conflict, but to sustain it.

Rise of a Narco-State
The Junta’s focus on survival and the financial needs of various EAOs are making opium cultivation and the production of synthetic drugs increasingly attractive. With the Taliban reducing poppy cultivation in Afghanistan by 95%, Myanmar has become the world's largest opiate-producing country, following a steady increase since 2021. The decline in supply from Afghanistan has caused market prices for opium to rise. Traditionally, both the military and EAOs have benefited from the narcotics trade, and this dynamic is unlikely to change as the cash-strapped Junta and the EAOs seek new sources of funding. The emergence of a narco-state has serious implications for regional countries and the world at large.

About the Author
Dr Bibhu Prasad Routray is Director, Mantraya Institute for Strategic Studies (MISS), Goa.

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