Crisis in Syria, Protests in Georgia, Violence in Mozambique, and an Update on Ukraine War

CWA # 1559

Conflict Weekly

Crisis in Syria, Protests in Georgia, Violence in Mozambique, and an Update on Ukraine War

IPRI Team
3 January 2025

Photo Source: AFP, Reuters and AP

Vaishak Sreekumar, Neha Tresa George, Manoranjan Kumar and Ayan Datta

Syria: Three weeks after HTS takeover
Vaishak Sreekumar

In the news
On 28 December, Syria's new Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) government launched a security campaign across the country against what it termed as "remnants" of previous President Bashar al-Assad's regime. SANA, the national Syrian news agency, claimed that police were conducting "a large-scale sweep operation" near the city of Latakia on Syria's north-western coast.

On 29 December, Syria's de-facto leader Ahmad al Sharra said that drafting a constitution would take three years and elections would take another four years after a comprehensive census of the Syrian population.

On 29 December, Syria's new authorities detained about 300 individuals, including informants, pro-regime militants and former military, as part of a crackdown on Assad loyalists.

On 2 January, following the visit of Syria's new foreign minister and defence minister to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia announced a humanitarian air bridge to Syria, delivering food, shelter, and medical supplies.

On 2 January, the UNHCR reported that more than 115,000 individuals returned to Syria from countries including Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon after the fall of the Assad government on 8 December. Turkey’s Minister of Interior, Ali Yerlikaya, stated that 35,113 Syrians had willingly returned home.

Issues at large
First, a brief note on the HTS government. The Syrian government under the HTS and Ahmad al Sharra has promised democratic institutions safeguarding the rights of women and religious and ethnic minorities. The current prime minister is Mohammad al Bashir, and Ahmad al Sharra acts as the country's de facto leader.

Second, foreign interests in Syria. Turkey had backed the Syrian rebels in the overthrowing of the Assad government. Although Turkey has officially denied supporting the rebel forces, following the fall of Assad, the Turkish embassy was reopened in Damascus and there were visits from high-level Turkish ministers. Ukraine and Saudi Arabia have had meetings and provided aid. The US has commuted a USD ten million bounty on Ahmad al Sharra. Israel has permanently occupied Golan Heights and is continuing its military presence. Israel argues that the 1974 border agreement became void when the HTS took control of the government. Although Israel has moved a few points past the buffer zone, its authorities claim of not moving toward Damascus.

Third, the remaining Assad forces. Ahmad al Sharra has announced that the individuals who carried out torture and detention with the Assad government will be prosecuted. Although Assad's regional strongholds, including the Alawite community, have acknowledged the new government, violent resistance is breaking out throughout the country with arrests of Assad loyalists.

In perspective
First, the Syrian government seems liberal, but the situation is unpredictable. The country's de facto leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, is a former al Qaeda militant, although he claims to have renounced terrorism. HTS is a designated terrorist organization by the US. There are fears that unresolved tensions between Syria's ethnic and religious groups could impede al-Sharaa's efforts to unify the country and consolidate his rule. In 2017, Ahmad al Sharra ousted many of the organization's foreign fighters to embrace a Syrian national agenda. However, the reports of foreign fighters in the newly formed cabinet call this into question. The timeline set for the elections as four years leaves things unpredictable. The leadership has also called for a constitution before the elections. Ensuring the Syrian population’s say in the drafting of this constitution is also an important metric.

Second, foreign intervention. Turkey has denied supporting HTS. Meanwhile, the fighting in Syria's north continues. At the same time as HTS started its assault, the Syrian National Army (SNA), backed by Turkey, launched a second assault on the Kurdish-Syrian Democratic Front-held territories. The US now maintains roughly 2000 troops in Syria, primarily in the northeast. The US, under Trump, has the opportunity to withdraw its presence from Syria and give the HTS government a chance. However, its needs guarantee that al-Sharaa and HTS have the power and desire to keep ISIS at bay and ensure the safety and inclusion of Syria's Kurds, even if it means breaking away from Ankara.

War in Ukraine: Prisoner's Exchange, Drone Attacks and the Military Aid
Neha Tresa George

In the news
On 1 January, Russia launched drones in Ukraine’s capital Kyiv, killing one person and injuring four others. On the same day, the Russian forces carried out a drone attack in Kyiv, killing two people and injuring several others.

On 31 December, Ukraine launched a drone attack, targeting the Yartsevskaya oil depot in western Russia’s Smolensk region.

On 30 December, Russia and Ukraine exchanged over 300 prisoners of war, under the mediation of the UAE. According to BBC, this marked the 59th prisoner exchange since the beginning of the war in 2022. Russia's Ministry of Defence informed that around 150 Ukrainian prisoners were exchanged.

On the same day, Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that 189 Ukrainians including two civilians were transferred as part of the exchange. He said: "We are working to free everyone from Russian captivity. The return of our people from Russian captivity is always very good news for each of us." He further thanked the UAE and the team who worked for the success of the exchange.

Issues at large
First, drone attacks by Russia and Ukraine. The air forces of both countries have escalated attacks by launching drones. Russia has targeted the capital city of Kyiv and eastern Ukraine. Ukraine tried to damage Russia’s energy facilities and naval power. There were also extensive drone attacks on the Donetsk region by Russia, targeting Chasiv Yar and Zaporizhzhia towns, resulting in casualties and the destruction of infrastructure. The primary aim of these advances is to take over Pokrovsk, a key logistical hub of Ukraine that supplements the frontline military. Ukrainian soldiers use its railways and roads for transportation, movement of military supplies and evacuation.

Second, the role of the UAE in mediating prisoner exchanges. The UAE has become a major mediator of prisoner exchanges between Russia and Ukraine. The country has mediated up to ten exchanges since the beginning of the war. The number of captives released under the mediation of the UAE is 2,484. It had previously managed to conduct a successful prisoner swap between the US and Russia in 2022.

Third, the West’s military assistance to Ukraine. Since 2022, the US, the UK and the EU along with NATO have contributed military and financial assistance to Ukraine. The countries mostly work through the Ukraine Defence Contact Group led by the US which has 57 member states including the 32 NATO countries. The US has so far provided more than USD 61.4 billion as military assistance. Recently, the US Department of Treasury allocated around USD six billion as security assistance which included “High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), optically guided missiles, anti-tank weapons systems and air-to-ground munitions.” It additionally allocated USD 50 billion as part of the G7 assistance initiative. Besides the US, the UK proposed five principles for its support to Ukraine, offering training programs and defence systems.

In perspective
First, Russia has been constantly advancing toward the cities of Kurakhove and Pokrovsk in the eastern Donetsk region. The town termed as the "gateway to Donetsk" by Russia is crucial to gain the entire eastern Ukraine. It would also allow Russian troops to have an upper hand in capturing primary defensive positions and thus secure a commanding position over the surrounding areas, especially Chasiv Yar and Zaporizhzhia.

Second, the limited role of mediators. The UAE showcases a neutral stance to the war while emphasising achieving a peaceful solution and de-escalation of the conflict. It has also become a platform of negotiation for both Russian and Ukrainian diplomats. The prospects of reaching a ceasefire between the warring parties could only be facilitated through mediators. Although countries like Slovakia, Turkey and the UAE are offering a platform for negotiation, none of the countries have taken a step in this regard. The mediator’s role seems limited as they have only been able to commission prisoner exchanges so far.

Third, continuing war despite peace efforts. Efforts like prisoner exchanges seem to have little or no impact on the war. The war has seen no improvement towards any peace initiatives even after 59 rounds of exchanges. There was a drone attack in Kyiv just one day after the exchange. Russia is continuing its advances in eastern Ukraine every day.

Georgia: Continuing protests
Manoranjan Kumar

In the news
On 28 December, France24 reported that thousands of Georgians have formed a human chain across the country in support of the EU membership, marking the second month of their daily pro-Europe rallies.

On 29 December, BBC reported that thousands of Georgians protested waving Georgian and the EU flags in the capital Tbilisi as a new president allied with the ruling Georgian Dream party was inaugurated. However, the outgoing president refused to step down and said that she was the “only legitimate president.”

On 31 December, Euronews reported that tens of thousands of pro-Europe Protestors rallied in front of the Georgian parliament building in the capital Tbilisi for the 34th consecutive day.

Issues at large
First, the nature of the protests. Georgia has been plunged into an unprecedented wave of turmoil following Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze’s announcement on 28 November of a four-year suspension on the EU accession talks. This step was taken by Kobakhidze after the European Parliament rejected the results of Georgia’s 26 October parliamentary elections. The decision sparked daily mass protests that often became violent, with police deploying riot squads, tear gas, and water cannons to disperse crowds. Protestors have used fireworks and stones in response. The government is trying to suppress the protests by detaining the opposition leaders.

Second, the profile of the protestors. The protestors are mainly pro-EU supporters of the outgoing President Salome Zourabichvili. Their main demands are to conduct new parliamentary elections, roll back the suspension of the EU talks and free all political prisoners. Civil servants, members of the diplomatic corps and hundreds of academicians have joined the resistance. A poll conducted by the Washington-based nongovernmental organization, National Democratic Institute, revealed that nearly 80 per cent of Georgians support their country’s aspiration to join the EU. Georgia submitted its application for EU membership in March 2022 and achieved candidate status in December 2023.

Third, the government’s response. The government has responded to the protests through arrests of major opposition leaders and the use of tear gas and water cannons to disperse the crowd. The new government has criticized the demonstrations, describing them as violent and driven by foreign interference. Kobakhidze claimed that the opposition is trying to create a situation similar to Ukraine’s pro-Europe demonstrations in 2014 in Maidan Square. That uprising was followed by Russia’s annexation of Crimea. The largest opposition group in Georgia is the Coalition for Change, which comprises pro-Western liberal parties.

Fourth, regional response. Despite a potential shift away from pro-European values, the EU leadership reaffirmed the EU’s openness to Georgia. In a statement released by the EU, it is said that “the EU stand with Georgian people and their choice for a European future. The door to the EU remains open and the return of Georgia to the European values and the EU accession path is in the hands of the Georgian leadership.” However, recently, the foreign ministers of Germany, France and Poland have expressed concern about the unfolding political crisis in Georgia. They jointly condemned the violence against peaceful protestors, media, and opposition leaders and recalled Georgian authorities’ responsibility to respect human rights and protect fundamental freedoms. The ministers also announced plans to implement an EU decision to revoke visa-free travel for Georgian diplomatic and service passport holders.

In perspective
The ongoing political turmoil in Georgia seems grave as the confrontation between the government and pro-EU Georgians is unlikely to end soon. The continued protests against the suspension of the EU talks until 2028 entered a second month. It will be difficult for the government to suppress such a mass protest without any concrete solution. Georgian people are united against the government's decision and they don’t want to abandon their European choice. The result of this confrontation will decide the future of Georgia; whether the South Caucasus country will be close to the EU or Russia.

The relationship between the current leadership of Georgia and the EU has bittered following the EU report about the recent parliamentary election in Georgia. The report suggested that Georgia should conduct re-election for parliament within a year, which was allegedly rigged. Without fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria, any European country cannot join the institution. The democratic backsliding in Georgia has made sure that the path to the EU is very far.

Mozambique: Continuing post-election violence and refugee crisis
Ayan Datta

In the news
On 31 December, Venancio Mondlane, the exiled opposition leader of Mozambique’s Podemos party, announced a fresh phase of protests against the Presidential Election results, continuing for almost three months. Expressing dissatisfaction with the Constitutional Council’s decision to uphold Frelimo party candidate Daniel Chapo’s election victory, Mondlane accused the government of misrepresenting the people’s will by playing power politics.

On 1 December, the BBC reported that the protests had resulted in 278 deaths since their onset in early October.

On 30 December, multiple NGOs in the region noted that the worsening post-election violence was causing a mass emigration of Mozambicans to neighbouring countries, with 13,000 Mozambican refugees entering Malawi and 1,000 in Eswatini.

On 28 December, South Africa diverted trade and travel from its Leebombo Border Post to Eswatini’s Managa Border Post in a bid to stem the arrival of Mozambican refugees.

Issues at large
First, the political conflict between Frelimo and Mondlane. Despite Chapo securing a 71 per cent vote share in the October elections, Mondlane, backed by Mozambique’s young population and their anti-establishment sentiment, called the outcome “absurd” and led anti-government protests and strikes. The Podemos leader claimed that Frelimo-aligned election officials rigged the elections by engaging in fraudulent practices, including ballot stuffing. Despite foreign observers highlighting inconsistencies and malpractices in the counting and tabulation process, the CC, whose six out of seven judges had been nominated by Frelimo, upheld the outcome by declaring Chapo President by 65 per cent of the popular vote. For Chapo, the election results should be reversed in his favour, making him President and leading to what he calls “electoral justice.” Furthermore, he stressed that charges against peaceful protestors should be dropped, and the Frelimo should be investigated for its repression.

Second, the changing nature of protests and state response. Despite being largely peaceful, the protests turned violent after the Council’s 23 November decision, with protesters using firebombs against the police and engaging in widespread theft and looting, resulting in trade disruptions, food insecurity, resource shortages, rising unemployment, and flight of refugees to neighbouring Malawi and South Africa. The crime and violence worsened following a massive prison break in Maputo on 25 December, where 6000 inmates, including 29 terror convicts escaped. However, Podemos supporters claimed that Frelimo orchestrated the jailbreak to delegitimise the protests. Although Mondlane urged his supporters to demonstrate peacefully, he justified the looting by framing it as an act of protest against businessmen and a natural consequence of the widespread poverty and impoverishment under Frelimo. Meanwhile, human rights groups have criticised the state’s response as disproportionate, with the police attempting to disperse protesters with tear gas, barricades and live rounds, leading to around 500 deaths so far.

Third, the refugee crisis and its implications. The ongoing looting and violence have pushed the already impoverished population into neighbouring states, whose relative stability and openness (Malawi) and prosperity (South Africa) have acted as pull factors. South Africa, with its vast industrial base, has traditionally been the destination for Mozambican refugees during the civil war years (1977 to 1992), with over 300,000 crossing into that country at the time. However, this time, with Pretoria reluctant to accept more Mozambicans, the refugees have resorted to Malawi, where refugee camps are already operating at capacity.

In perspective
Mondlane’s victory, the public’s support for him and the subsequent mobilisation around him have exposed the long-brewing frustration in Mozambique with entrenched elites and political options. However, the violent turn in the protests will prove counterproductive for Mozambican society by adding to the new government’s economic and law and order challenges. Additionally, the refugee crisis will put Mondlane at a disadvantage as Mozambique’s neighbours, eager to return the refugees, will cooperate with the Frelimo government. Moreover, recent evidence shows that although Africa has a long tradition of youth-led protests, such protests are seldom successful in their aims and fizzle out in the medium-to-long term because police brutality, applied with sufficient intensity and frequency on impoverished populations, can decisively end protest movements (not their underlying conflicts). Although the protests reflect the genuine aspirations of impoverished Mozambicans, if they continue, they are likely to join the ranks of Nigeria’s failed Anti-SARS protests and Kenya’s Anti-Finance Bill demonstrations, both of which were dispersed primarily by the strength of police and armed forces.

Issues in Peace and Conflict This Week:
Regional Roundups
Anu Maria Joseph, Samruddhi Pathak, Ayan Datta, Sayeka Ghosh, Neha Tresa George, Nuha Aamina, Nova Karun, Vaishak Sreekumar, C Shraddha, and Kumari Krishna

China, East, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific
China: Concern over Human Metapneumovirus outbreak
On 3 January, The Economic Times reported a surge in Human Metapneumovirus (HVMP) in China. Neither the World Health Organisation (WHO) nor China’s government has issued any official alert against the virus. According to the Economic Times, people in the 40 to 80 age group are prone to contracting the disease. The National Centre for Disease Control under the Ministry of Health is monitoring seasonal influenza and respiratory diseases. A chief doctor from the Department of Respiratory and Infectious Diseases at Capital Medical University, Li Tongzeng, stated that HMPV is a contagious disease, especially through people-to-people contact and respiratory droplets.

China: India protests Brahmaputra dam plan
On 3 January, India raised concern over the construction of a massive hydropower dam on the Brahmaputra River (Yarlung Tsangpo) and the establishment of new counties in the Aksai Chin region. India was not informed by China about the USD 137 billion dam project, which is located near the Indian border to Tibet, despite prior agreements on the sharing of information. Additionally, the Indian government objected to China establishing two new counties in Xinjiang's Hotan prefecture, claiming jurisdiction over parts of the Indian Union Territory of Ladakh, particularly in the Aksai Chin.

South Korea: Defence ministry forms review committee against military commanders
On 1 January, the Ministry of National Defence formed a review committee to investigate the conduct of Defense Counterintelligence Command Chief Yeo In-hyung and Capital Defense Command Chief Lieutenant General Lee Jin-woo. The review was launched over their alleged involvement in President Yoon’s martial law decree. Both commanders were suspended in December and detained on charges of abuse of power and participating in insurrection. Prosecutors allege that Yeo deployed troops to the National Assembly and National Election Commission on 3 December. The committee added that Yeo ordered the arrest of 14 individuals, including former People Power Party (PPP) leader Han Dong-hoon and opposition leader Lee Jae-myung. Lieutenant General Lee faced similar allegations of planning to seal off the Assembly and deploying troops under former Minister of Defence Kim Yong-hyun’s command.

Japan: 43rd day of Chinese maritime presence near Senkaku Islands
On 31 December, the Japan Coast Guard reported four autocannon-equipped Chinese vessels sailing outside territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands. This marked the 43rd straight day of Chinese presence near the contested islands. China's maritime activity near the Senkaku Islands reached record-high levels in 2024. Chinese Coast Guard vessels were spotted 355 days in 2024, surpassing 2023’s record of 352 days

North Korea: Kim Jong Un vows “toughest anti-US counteraction strategy” at party meeting
On 29 December, during a Workers’ Party central committee meeting, North Korea’s leader Kim Jong Un announced plans to implement the "toughest anti-U.S. counteraction" strategy, denouncing the US as “the most reactionary state.” Kim criticised the US-Japan-South Korea alliance as "a nuclear military bloc for aggression" and emphasised stronger ties with “friendly countries.” The five-day meeting concluded ahead of US President-elect Trump's inauguration and focused on reviewing 2024 policies and future planning. Following North Korea’s military support for Russia in Ukraine, Kim ordered enhanced military research "to meet the demands and features of modern warfare.” However, he made no direct mentions of nuclear programs or satellite launches.

South Asia
Pakistan: Kurram protests spread to Karachi
On 26 December, Dawn reported that the Kurram protests spread to Karachi. Kurram has been isolated from the rest of the country after violence surged in November. On 22 December, two people were killed and beheaded. The Majlis Wahdat Muslimeen (MWM) protested in Karachi in “solidarity” with the people who lost their lives in Kurram violence. The protests resulted in the closure of the national highway from the Malir-15 bridge to Quaidabad. More than 130 people were killed in violence in Parachinar.

Pakistan: Nine militants killed in Baro Khel, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
On 27 December, security forces killed nine militants in North Waziristan. Another seven terrorists were wounded in the confrontation. The skirmish took place in the Barho Khel region of Mir Ali Tehsil. Separately, security forces attacked terrorists’ hideouts in Birmal Tehsil, South Waziristan. Although no one was killed during the operation, Manra has become a breeding ground for the Tehreek-e-Taliban terrorists.

Pakistan: Security post in Dera Ismail Khan attacked
On 28 December, a suicide bomber backed by armed militants attacked a security post in Kulachi, Dera Ismail Khan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The explosion injured four security officers and destroyed the security post. The suicide bomber’s vehicle was owned by the communications and works department of the KP government. According to the department, the militants had stolen the vehicle on 10 December. Police and security officers have initiated a “search operation” to arrest the militants who escaped.

Pakistan: Peace agreement between warring parties in Kurram
On 2 January, a peace agreement was signed between the rival groups in Kurram. A “grand jirga” had been trying to broker a peace deal between the rival parties. However, because of the absence of two leaders from Lower Kurram, the peace agreement, which was supposed to be signed on 31 December, was delayed. As per the agreement, the rival sides have agreed to stick to the Muree Agreement 2008. The agreement would also bring “displaced” people to their “native areas.” With the signing of the peace accord, there would not be any building of bunkers and the earlier constructed bunkers would be demolished. Separately, a protest by Majlis Wahdat-i-Muslimeen (MWM) in support of residents of Kurram started on 24 December in Karachi and was suspended after the agreement was signed.

Pakistan: 2024 deadliest year for civil and military security forces, reports Dawn
On 31 December, Dawn reported on Pakistan’s state of violence in 2024. It revealed that 2024 has been the worst in the past four years for civil and military casualties. There were a total of 444 terrorist incidents, killing 685 security personnel. The total deaths due to terror attacks were the highest in the past nine years. In 2024, the number of deaths escalated by 66 per cent in comparison to 2023. Violence-related deaths reached 2546 and wounded 2267. The provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan witnessed 94 per cent of the total deaths. The number of deaths in KP was double compared to Balochistan.

Bangladesh: Student movement calls for prosecution of Sheikh Hasina
On 31 December, the Anti-Discrimination Student Movement took to the streets demanding the interim regime to prosecute the ousted Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and many others involved in the death of protestors during the uprising in July. Moreover, a formal request was sent to India to extradite Sheikh Hasina. Hasina has been charged with several offences across various courts in Bangladesh, including crimes against humanity. Youth protestors have called upon the interim government to officially declare 15 January an uprising.

Bangladesh: Immigrants settled in Mozambique fear persecution
On 31 December, Daily Star reported on the growing state of insecurity among 5,000 to 8,000 Bangladeshis residing in Mozambique. The recent controversial elections in the country were followed by violent protests. In the process, many businesses and houses of Bangladeshis were looted and attacked. Law enforcement forces have been demanding monetary benefits to address the concerns of Bangladeshis, leaving the businesses in crisis. The Bangladesh government has no record of the number of Bangladeshis in Mozambique as it is not considered a labour export market for the country.

India: Situation in Bangladesh will not affect West Bengal, comments states’ DGP
On 29 December, West Bengal's Director General of Police, Rajeev Kumar announced that the current volatile situation in Bangladesh will not affect India. He announced: “We do not want people to use it, (the situation in Bangladesh) to create communal and security problems here.” The statement came as diplomatic ties between India and Bangladesh strained after the fall of Sheikh Hasina. Kumar claimed that the police had written to the Ministry of External Affairs to "strengthen the passport verification system." He additionally proposed the adoption of a "new system where the district intelligence branch (DIB), local police stations, and senior officers will have a more significant role."

Sri Lanka: Human rights commission’s letter to President on Rohingya refugees
On 30 December, Tribune India reported that the Sri Lanka Human Rights Commission submitted a letter to President Aruna Dissanayake alleging that they were denied access to Rohingya refugees. The letter said: “On December 26, a team of officials from the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka (HRCSL), including a director, attempted to monitor the detention conditions of these asylum seekers at the Sri Lanka Air Force Camp in Mullaitivu in the Northern Province. However, they were refused access to the asylum seekers.” On 20 December, more than 100 Rohingyas were rescued by the Sri Lankan Navy. The Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Arun Hemachandra said: “Investigations revealed that they had deliberately landed here and we consider them as illegal immigrants.”

The Middle East and Africa
Yemen: Houthis fire missile towards Israel amid Netanyahu’s focus shift
On 25 December, Yemen’s Houthis fired a ballistic missile towards Israel, making it the fourth Houthi attack in a week. The missile set off sirens across central Israel and was intercepted by Israel’s air defences. Previously, on 22 December, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that the country’s armed forces would act against the Houthis similarly to Iran’s other “terrorist arms,” indicating that the Yemen-based armed group would become Israel’s focus in the coming days. The Israeli leader stated: “Just as we acted forcefully against the terrorist arms of Iran’s evil axis, so we will act against the Houthis…with force, determination and sophistication.” He stressed that Israel would continue with its strikes against them in cooperation with the US and the UK forces. Netanyahu’s statement came in the backdrop of the Israel and US air forces conducting airstrikes against the Houthis on 20 and 21 December, respectively, with Israel’s Air Force targeting the armed group’s oil facilities in Sanaa.

Israel: IAF fighters target Houthi infrastructure
On 26 December, Israel’s Air Force (IAF) conducted its fourth wave of airstrikes on Houthi-controlled sites in Yemen, killing two people and injuring 11 others. The IAF targeted Sana’s International Airport and the Hezyaz and Ras Kanatib power stations, calling the latter “military infrastructure used by the Houthi terrorist regime for its military activities.” The airstrikes were the IDF’s largest against the Yemeni group since the beginning of the latter’s campaign against Israel. Commenting on the airstrikes, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu vowed to “cut this arm of Iran’s Axis of Evil off. We will pursue this until we complete the task.” The World Health Organisation Director, Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, who was present in Sanaa’s international airport while Israel’s fighter jets were conducting their strikes, confirmed the attacks. On the same day, Iran and Hamas condemned the attack, with the Islamic Republic’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs calling Israel’s operations a “clear violation of international peace and security,” amounting to a “crime against the heroic and noble people of Yemen.” Furthermore, Hamas condemned the “terrorist aggression carried out by the Zionist enemy against our brothers from Yemen.”

Israel: IDF kills Islamic Jihad “terrorists posing as journalists”
On 26 December, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) conducted an airstrike on a vehicle in central Gaza’s Nuseirat city, killing five individuals. Israel’s military claimed those killed were “combat propagandists” and “former operatives” of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) armed group “posing as journalists.” Additionally, the IDF claimed to have tallied the names of those killed against a list of PIJ operatives found by its soldiers, which “explicitly” identified four of the five individuals as the armed group’s members. However, Al Jazeera contested the IDF’s claim, tacitly denying that the victims had any Jihadist links and framing the victims solely as innocent journalists. According to the Qatar-based network, the five individuals were reporters and employees from the local Al-Quds Today network covering events near Nuseirat’s Awda Hospital, which was close to the nearby refugee camp for Gazans. Although Israel called the network an “Islamic Jihad affiliated TV station,” The Palestinian Journalists Syndicate endorsed the Al Jazeera view, condemning Israel’s targeting of journalists, framing the five as “martyrs” of Israel’s “heinous attack.”

Israel: Barnea disagrees with Netanyahu on the Houthi approach
On 26 December, David Barnea, Director of Israel’s Institute for Intelligence and Special Operations (known popularly as the Mossad), reportedly stated that the military should attack Iran to stem the Yemeni Houthi attacks on Israel. According to Haaretz, Barnea voiced the opinion during internal discussions with the central leadership, citing the failure of Israel’s three earlier waves of strikes against the armed group. The Mossad chief reportedly believed that attacking Iran would dissuade the Houthis from continuing their attacks. He said: “We need to go head-on against Iran...If we only attack the Houthis, it’s not certain that we’ll be able to stop them.” However, his views did not align with those of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Minister of Defence Israel Katz. They wanted to continue strikes against the Houthis instead of pursuing Iran directly.

Israel: IDF using drones as a regular part of West Bank operations, reports Jerusalem Post
On 26 December, the Jerusalem Post reported that drones had become a “regular part” of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) operations in the West Bank. It marked a departure from the IDF’s tactics between the Second Intifada in 2005 and Hamas’ attack in October 2023, when Israel did not deploy any air power assets in the eastern enclave. Given the futility of using armored vehicles and tanks in the West Banks narrow alleyways and cramped refugee camps, Israel has been deploying drones to assist its infantry forces, reflecting an “integrated air and ground forces” strategy. These drone operations in the West Bank were part of a larger effort to “close a circle” around the armed groups operating in the region, aimed at preventing them from receiving weapons smuggled from Iran and Jordan.

Israel: Airstrikes near hospital kill 50 Palestinians in northern Gaza
On 27 December, Israel carried out an airstrike on a building in the northern Gaza Strip, killing 50 Palestinians, including three medical staff and workers from the neighbouring Kamal Adwan Hospital who were present in the building. The airstrikes accompanied Israel’s renewed ground offensive in the enclave on 5 October, to prevent Hamas from reconstituting its forces. On the same day, Israel’s air forces struck the Janta crossing on the Syria-Lebanon border, claiming that Hezbollah was using the crossing to procure weapons from Iran through Syria.

Israel: IDF confirms September raid on Iranian missile facility in Syria
On 1 January, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) confirmed that it conducted a covert special force raid on an underground Iran-controlled missile production facility near Syria’s Maysaf city in early September. The IDF also confirmed, without providing details, that it had hugely increased its operations in Syria since the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government. After the raid, the Israeli commandos, who belonged to the Israeli Air Force’s Shaldag special forces unit, seized documents from the facility and destroyed the building with explosives.

Yemen: Houthis claim to shoot down US MQ-9 drone
On 1 January, the Yemeni Houthi’s spokesperson, Brigadier General Yahya Saree, stated that their armed forces shot down a US MQ-9 drone over Yemeni airspace. Saree added that it was the second US drone downed by the Houthis in the past 72 hours and the fourteenth Western drone they had destroyed since the beginning of their conflict against Israel and its Western partners. The attack followed an earlier claim by the Houthis, who previously claimed to have shot down a US F/A 18 fighter aircraft, although the US military disputed the Houthi claim, calling it a case of friendly fire.

Kenya: Protest against the abduction of government critics
On 30 December, Al Jazeera reported that police fired tear gas against protesters who were demonstrating against a wave of unexplained abductions of government critics. Many human rights groups in Kenya claim that several government critics have been abducted since the June violent protests in the country. They blame Kenya’s intelligence services and police for the extrajudicial arrests. However, the government has denied the allegations. The Kenya National Commission on Human Rights claims that 82 government critics have been missing since the protests in June against President William Ruto’s controversial financial bill and handling of the economy.

Chad: Concludes parliamentary elections
On 29 December, Chad concluded its first parliamentary elections in 13 years. The military government has made a key step towards civilian rule. The provincial results are expected to be declared on 15 January and official results on 31 January. The vote will choose a new parliament, provincial assemblies and local councils. Opposition parties boycotted the elections alleging vote rigging. Chad’s previous military leader Mahamat Idriss Deby Itno was elected as President in May 2024. Since then, opposition parties have been describing the presidential elections and Deby’s presidency as fraudulent.

Ivory Coast: President says French troops to withdraw in January
On 1 January, Ivory Coast announced that French troops would withdraw from the country in January. During the end-of-year address by President Alassane Ouattara, he announced that the 43rd BIMA marine infantry battalion at Port-Bouet in Abidjan, led by French troops, “will be handed over” to the country’s armed forces. Ouattara stated: “We can be proud of our army, whose modernisation is now effective. It is in this context that we have decided on the concerted and organised withdrawal of French forces.” There are nearly 1,000 French soldiers stationed in the country. This development comes after Chad announced the end of military cooperation with France in November and French troops began their withdrawal from the country the previous week. Ivory Coast and Chad are the two latest countries to ask France to withdraw its troops after Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso.

West Africa: 69 migrants die after boat capsizes en route to Canary Islands
On 27 December, Al Jazeera reported that at least 69 people died after a boat capsized while travelling from West Africa to Spain’s Canary Islands. The boat was carrying 80 people. The Atlantic route from West Africa’s coast to the Canary Islands is often used by African migrants trying to reach Europe. According to Al Jazeera, 41,425 migrants reached the island between January and November 2024. Boat accidents are common on the route. This year, more than 1000 migrants have died while trying to cross the waters.

Europe and The Americas
Europe: WMO report on climate change in 2024
On 30 December, Deutsche Welle reported on the UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres’ New Year’s Eve address, highlighting the devastating effects of climate change. He said: “The world has endured a decade of deadly heat with 2024 capping 10 years of unprecedented temperatures.” According to a report published by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), climate change exacerbated 26 out of 29 extreme weather events in 2024. This led to the death of at least 3700 people and the displacement of millions. The report recorded around 41 days of dangerous heat in 2024. Besides the wildfires caused by the intense heat, 2024 also recorded a large number of floods due to record-breaking rainfall. WMO called for the countries to work together and combat these threats.

Ukraine: USD six billion in aid from the US
On 30 December, the US Department of Treasury released close to USD six billion to Ukraine. Secretary of the Treasury Janet L Yellen said that this aid was crucial to Ukraine as it was grappling with Russian attacks on civilians and infrastructure. Of the allotted budget, USD 2.5 billion would be given as security assistance, and USD 1.25 billion would be “military drawdown,” including “High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), optically guided missiles, anti-tank weapons systems, air-to-ground munitions and spare parts.” Meanwhile, USD 1.2 billion will be used to fund Ukraine’s security initiative. The fund allocated in coordination with the US Agency for International Development and the Department of State was the final one from the Ukraine Security Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2024. The move followed the US’s allocation of USD 50 billion from the G7 loan. Yellen further said that these funds indicated the US national interests and unwavering support to Ukraine. She also called for increasing military support to Ukraine and further sanctions on Russia.

Russia: Putin apologies for Azerbaijan Airlines crash
On 30 December, President of the Federation of Russia, Vladimir Putin said that Russia’s air defence systems were active when the plane attempted to land in Grozny. He apologised that the plane crashed. Azerbaijan charges Russia with accusations. However, Putin did not admit that Russian defence forces unintentionally caused it. The crash left 38 passengers killed. The US said that initial conclusions led to the involvement of a Russian anti-aircraft system. Russia’s investigative committee has opened a criminal case on the disaster. According to the presidential statement of Azerbaijan, the plane “encountered external physical and technical interference while in Russian airspace, resulting in a complete loss of control.” Five airlines have temporarily suspended flights to areas in Russia since the disaster, including Azerbaijan Airlines, Turkmenistan Airlines, El Al Israel, Flydubai and Qazaq Air.

Finland: Russia involved in damaging electricity cable link in the Baltic Sea
On 30 December, Finnish investigators said that they found a drag mark caused by an anchor near the cable link and a seabed trail of almost 100 kilometres. The ship that allegedly caused the damage, the Eagle S, sailing under the flag of the Cook Islands, is believed to be part of Russia’s so-called shadow fleet. The shadow fleet is used to transport Russian oil products and bypass the embargoes imposed on Russian ships. The dragging of the anchor has caused damage to Estlink 2, an electricity cable providing electricity to Estonia. The cable will take months to repair, which could lead to increased electricity prices in Estonia over the winter. Media reports in Finland suggest that the crew of the Eagle S was made up of Georgian and Indian nationals. The ship had recently docked in Russia and was believed to carry Russian oil products. It was stopped before any damage to Estlink 1, a second electricity cable linking Finland and Estonia. Estonia has launched a naval and special forces operation to protect the remaining cable line.

About the authors
Anu Maria Joseph is a Project Associate at NIAS. Neha Tresa George, Sayeka Ghosh and Nuha Aamina are Research Assistants at NIAS. Ayan Datta is a Postgraduate Student at the University of Hyderabad. Vaishak Sreekumar, C Shraddha, and Kumari Krishna are postgraduate students at Jindal Global University, Sonipat. Nova Karun is a postgraduate student at Pondicherry University. Manoranjan Kumar is a Guest Faculty at NCWEB, University of Delhi.

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