Conflict Weekly

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CWA # 1633, 21 March 2025
Conflict Weekly
Ukraine's Failed Kursk Offensive, Congo-Rwanda Ceasefire Statement, and the Return of War in Gaza

  IPRI Team

Conflict Weekly #273, 20 March 2025, Vol.6, No. 12
An initiative by NIAS-IPRI

Padmashree Anandhan, Anu Maria Joseph and D Suba Chandran 

Ukraine’s failed Kursk Offensive 
Padmashree Anandhan
 
In the news
On 17 March, the BBC reported on an interview with five soldiers who had fought in Kursk and returned over heavy fire and constant Russian drone attacks. One of the soldiers stated that on receiving the order they retreated in an organised way. He added that Russia had accumulated a mass number of troops including North Korean soldiers. Another soldier indicated that: “Logistics no longer work – organised deliveries of weapons, ammunition, food and water are no longer possible…from a military point of view, the Kursk direction has exhausted itself. There is no point in keeping it any more.”

On 15 March, Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy accused Russia’s President Vladimir Putin of attempting to encircle Ukraine’s troops to strengthen its position as the ceasefire talks take place. He said: “There are Ukrainian troops in Kursk region…Their encirclement is Putin’s lie.”

On 13 March, Russia’s Defense Ministry claimed to regain Suzha town, one of the populated centers of the Kursk region which was captured by Ukrainian troops in 2024. On the same day, in response to US President Donald Trump's statement on the Kursk offensive, Russia said: “If they lay down their arms and surrender, [we] will guarantee them their lives and dignified treatment in accordance with international law and Russian legal norms.”

Issues at large
First, significance of the Kursk region. The offensive into Kursk was symbolic for Ukraine to showcase its ability to launch war inside Russian territory cutting through the Russian military dominance narrative. It also aimed at showcasing the West, Ukrainian troop’s offensive capability to strike despite the battlefield pressure within. The objective was to attack by surprise the larger expectation was to keep it as a bargaining chip in the negotiation against Donbas. However, the strategic importance of Kursk cannot be ignored either. Its 100-kilometer proximity from the Ukrainian border serves as a key logistical hub for Russia’s railway and highway lines. Being a critical route for Russia to carry out its operations in northeastern Ukraine into Kharkiv and Sumy and left without guard became an advantage for Ukraine to invade.

Second, Ukraine’s objectives in Kursk. Ukraine's counteroffensive challenged Russia’s security by extending the war beyond Ukraine’s borders, forcing it to divert resources to defend its territory. This pushed Russia to immediately divert its troops from Donbas to some extent (Exact troop number unknown) but by early 2025 with help from the North Korean troops, the Ukrainian troop’s advance was halted. Its primary objective to divert Russian forces from eastern Ukraine and to launch missiles further into Russia was executed fairly however, it has not been able to succeed. This has left Ukraine in a tough place to yield to Russia’s pressure on the ground and table. 

Third, the turnaround. Ukraine which initially captured 1000 square kilometers now struggles to continue its presence. This comes as it faces major strategic, logistical and tactical disadvantages. Starting from Russia which has managed to boost its military strength by fortifying, and deploying defensive lines with “minefields, anti-tank obstacles, and layered artillery positions,” costing heavily on Ukraine’s troops. Another factor that led to the weakening of Ukraine’s position is the persistent shortage of artillery shells, slowed delivery of air defence missiles and lack of intelligence support from the West’s delivery while Russia ramped up its defence. Lastly, Russia's air superiority and the hostile terrain in Kursk with open fields turned disadvantageous for Ukraine to hold ground.
 
In perspective
Kursk is no longer an advantage for Ukraine. On the ground, the Kursk operation which was symbolic to showcase Ukraine’s ability and strategy to launch deeper into Russia is no longer possible for Ukraine. Russia’s adaptability to maneuver its forces and benefit from North Korean troops has seized Ukraine’s position. Instead of having Kursk as one of the bargaining chips, Ukraine will be now forced into negotiations as per Russia’s terms. Considering the mediation efforts of Trump not showing immediate progress while the vulnerable position on the ground and pressure at the table grows for Ukraine. 

DR Congo: A redundant joint statement vs M23’s absolute control 
Anu Maria Joseph

In the news
On 18 March, Democratic Republic of Congo's President Félix Tshisekedi and his Rwandan counterpart Paul Kagame held direct talks in Doha, Qatar. A joint statement following the talks implied commitment to an “immediate and conditional” ceasefire in eastern DRC. Later, the Rwandan presidency separately stated that direct talks between DR Congo and M23 are "key to addressing the root causes of the conflict.”

On 17 March, M23 rebels in eastern DRC withdrew from the peace talks in Luanda, Angola; the first to directly involve the rebels. The rebel alliance implied the EU sanctions of obstructing the peace talks. The group stated: "Successive sanctions imposed on our members, including those enacted on the eve of the Luanda discussions, severely undermine direct dialogue and make any progress impossible."

On 17 March, the EU imposed sanctions against nine individuals of the M23 rebel group and senior officials of Rwanda's military. The measures included asset freezes and travel bans. 

Issues at large
First, a brief background to the conflict. DR Congo’s M23 rebel problem was an outcome of the Rwandan genocide in 1994, and the two Congo wars that followed. M23, a group by the Congolese Tutsi minority, was formed to fight the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). The latter was a militant group of ethnic Hutus who fled Rwanda to eastern DRC after carrying out the genocide. Congo-backed FDLR has been fighting the Rwanda-backed M23 group for years. 

Second, M23 in control of Goma and Bukavu. In 2012, M23 was contained by the UN and Congolese forces, but it reemerged in 2021. In January, the violence escalated and M23 captured Goma and Bukavu, the capital cities of North and South Kivu provinces. The group is in absolute control of two cities and neighbouring mining towns. Congolese defences failed and have withdrawn from the region. SADC regional troops have withdrawn after its losses. Congolese allied militia, Kabido, defected to M23. The group seems to have come closer to achieving its objectives of territorial control, access to minerals, regional and political influence, and protection of Tutsi minorities.

Third, Rwanda’s objectives in Congo. The link between M23 rebels and Rwanda is the Tutsi kinship. The minority Tutsi community in eastern DRC, who migrated from Rwanda to the region over centuries, has always been considered "foreigners" by other communities. However, the Tutsi-led government in Rwanda, formed after the genocide in 1994, has been supporting its DRC kin ever since, for two reasons: To use the group to fight and stop the FDLR from expanding and returning and accessing the mineral deposits in eastern DRC. 

Fourth, the EU’s role and concerns. For the EU, DRC is an important partner in its objective to diversify its critical mineral supply. DRC is the world's leading producer of cobalt, accounting for 70 per cent and the second largest producer of copper. It is also a leading producer of coltan, lithium, nickel and rear earth. The majority of the mineral reserves are concentrated in the conflict-hit eastern DRC. The instability in eastern DRC has directly posed security concerns to European mineral investments. The EU signed another deal with Rwanda in February 2024, accessing its supply of critical minerals. However, Rwanda is currently being accused by the UN of using M23 rebels to seize mining towns in eastern DRC and smuggle minerals into Rwanda's supply chain. This created a narrative that the EU-Rwanda agreement enables illicit mineral trade in the international market. Thereby financing the rebels and exacerbating the conflict. 
 
In perspective
First, weak state, and the complex DRC problems. There are numerous actors and issues are multifold but inclusive efforts have been minimal. M23 being one problem of this crisis, an end to the conflict is nearly impossible. The latest wave of violence is an example of how in the absence of functioning state institutions and military, external actors take advantage of instability for their interests. 

Second, the M23 problem and redundant ceasefire calls in Doha. Congolese forces’ failure in Goma and Bukavu and failed regional mediations enabled M23 to carry out its lightning advances, bringing the region under its absolute control. Likely, M23’s withdrawal from Angola-led peace talks, pointing at the EU sanctions, was intentional to stay in control of the region. With M23 achieving its objectives and no fighting with Congolese forces, the Doha ceasefire is redundant. Besides, the ceasefire talks did not include M23, the major party to the conflict. However, the violence is likely to recur as leaving the region under M23’s control is unlikely to be a choice of DR Congo. And, it is unpredictable whether the group plans to advance further. Previously, it had made comments on advancing towards the capital Kinshasa. 

Third, the EU’s role. Although stability in the region is important for the EU, the sanctions were likely a move to imply its non-supportive stance against M23, defend the allegations of involvement in illicit trade with Rwanda and thereby protect its investments in the region.

Gaza: After a ceasefire break, the War returns
D Suba Chandran
 
In the news
On 19 March, in a significant development on the ground, Israel’s military moved into Gaza along the Netzarim Corridor, with an objective to “create a partial buffer between the north and south of the Strip.” In February, Israel withdrew its military from this corridor, allowing the movement of aid, people and vehicles between the two sides.

On 18 March, Israel launched aerial attacks in Gaza, killing more than 400 people and effectively ending the ceasefire that came into place on 19 January. On the same day, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said: “This is just the beginning…We will keep fighting to achieve all of the war’s objectives.” Israel’s foreign minister said: “This is not a one-day operation…We will pursue military action in the days to come. We found ourselves in a dead end, with no hostages released and no military action. This situation cannot continue.”

Issues at large
First, recapturing the ceasefire roadmap and its first phase. Following hectic and complex discussions supported by the US and the Arab countries, Israel and Hamas agreed to a three-phase ceasefire on 19 January 2025. The first phase, despite a few hiccups, was largely successful; during this phase, Hamas released 25 hostages and handed over eight dead bodies to Israel. In return, Israel released 1900 plus Palestinian prisoners from its prisons. During this phase, Israel also allowed the return of aid to move in Gaza.

Second, the failure to start the ceasefire’s second phase. According to the original agreement, Israel and Hamas agreed to start the second phase of the ceasefire in the first week of March. This phase should have completed the release of all hostages by Hamas; Israel was to release a specified number of prisoners and withdraw its forces from Gaza. Israel demanded an extension of the first phase; it wanted to get the hostages released before any withdrawal of its troops. Trump sided with Israel on this demand and threatened Hamas that hell would break if the latter would not release the hostages.

Third, the emphasis on “release of all hostages” and “complete withdrawal.” After agreeing to implement a ceasefire in three phases, Israel and Hamas went back to their original position. For Israel, it was the release of all hostages, and for Hamas, it was the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza. Israel is apprehensive that the release of hostages may not help it to achieve the other main war objective – neutralizing the Hamas. On the other hand, Hamas is apprehensive that once the hostages are released, Israel will return to its original mission. Both sides want to maximize their position during the post-ceasefire period, endangering the present.
 
In perspective
First, the return of war. The six weeks of ceasefire that was in place since 19 January not only witnessed the release of hostages by Hamas and the Palestinian prisoners by Israel but also the movement of humanitarian aid into Gaza. More importantly, the first phase of the ceasefire witnessed the halting of military actions, aerial bombing and missile attacks. These actions meant some breathing space for the civilians in Gaza and comfort for the families in Israel whose members were kidnapped on 7 October. The failure to move into the second phase impacts both.

Second, the difficulties in continuing a ceasefire in conflict theatres. While it is easy to break a ceasefire, enforcing and extending it is a complicated task. This always requires a strategic intervention by the leadership and strong support to achieve it by those who are supporting the negotiation process from outside. In Gaza, as could be seen from the breakdown of the ceasefire, both are absent. Hamas and Netanyahu look at tactical gains, while the US and Arab states are unwilling or unable to pressurize the two primary actors in the conflict. This means the war would continue.

Issues in Peace and Conflict This Week:
Regional Roundups
Padmashree Anandhan, Anu Maria Joseph, Femy Francis, Ayan Datta, Nuha Aamina, Abhiruchi Chowdhury, and Fleur Elizebeth Philip 

China, East, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific
China: Hong Kong firm condemned for sale of Panama port shares to a US firm
On 14 March, The Guardian reported that China’s Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office (HKMAO) strongly criticised the deal by the Hong Kong-based CK Hutchison to sell its shares in Panama Port to a US firm, BlackRock. A commentary in Ta Kung Pao was reposted by KMAO, noting that this act disregards Chinese national interest. The commentary said: “This deal is an act of hegemony by the US, which uses its state power to infringe upon the legitimate rights and interests of other countries through despicable means such as coercion, pressure and inducement.” The co-managing director of CK Hutchison responded: “I would like to stress that the transaction is purely commercial in nature and wholly unrelated to recent political news reports concerning the Panama Port.” 

China: DeepSeek imposes travel ban and confiscates passports of employees 
On 15 March, The Information reported that DeepSeek issued travel bans on its employees over national security concerns to prevent sensitive information from being leaked. DeepSeek’s parent company, High-Flyer, is holding employees’ passports and preventing them from travelling abroad. The development came after the Chinese government ordered AI scientists not to visit the US to protect their trade secrets. 

China: Beijing slams TSMC's investments in the US
On 12 March, Global Times quoted China’s Taiwan Affairs Office of State Council that the US is pressuring TSMC to invest USD 100 billion in the US to build the world’s largest chip industry. The office questioned whether it was beneficial to Taiwan or the US. Taiwan Affairs Office spokesperson Chen Binhua stated: “TSMC has become USMC.” Chen described US efforts as counteractive. He added that the move would turn Taiwan into a porcupine and a ticking time bomb while Taiwan’s economy has long benefited from stable cross-strait ties and supply chains. Taiwan’s exports to the US have surpassed China and Hong Kong for the first time in 24 years. Chen commented that the Taiwanese government and the party’s push to sever ties with China are “doomed to fail.” 

China: “Dogfighting” in outer space, comments US Vice Chief of Space Operations
On 18 March, the Vice Chief of US Space Operations, General Michael Guetlein, commented that China is engaging in “dogfighting” manoeuvres in the lower earth orbit. Guetlein noted that their commercial assets in outer space observed five objects going in and out around each other, synchronising. Michael said: “That’s what we call dogfighting in space. They are practising tactics, techniques, and procedures to do on-orbit space operations from one satellite to another.” The incident happened in 2024 with three Shiyan-24C experimental satellites and two Shijian-605 A and B. He noted that this behaviour shows the shortening capability gap between the US and China. Michael said: “The purpose of the Space Force is to guarantee space superiority for the joint force — not space for space’s sake. Space [operations] guarantee that, just like all the other domains, we can fight as a joint force and we can depend on those capabilities.”

China: New ‘jack-up barges’ may support China in Taiwan invasion, says a US think tank
On 13 March, a video on Chinese social media app, WeChat, showed three “jack-up barges” that could support large-scale amphibious landings of Chinese tanks and troops. China has been constructing a fleet of barges with long support legs and road bridges for offloading materials. An adjunct senior fellow with the Defense Program at the Center for a New American Security, Tom Shugart, stated on X that three barges left China’s Guangzhou Shipyard International on Longxue Island. Shugart stated that the vessels are for “civilian-crewed auxiliary landing platform — transfer,” and that they have “fully self-propelled landing ships” with dual pilothouses and radars. The barges have six pilings that can be lowered to “jack this vessel up,” two folded-up ramps to enable roll-on/roll-off and ships to transport their vehicles to shore. 

China: Military exercises around Taiwan 
On 17 March, China conducted military exercises around Taiwan in response to Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te’s comments and changes in the US State Department’s fact sheet on Taiwan. China’s Taiwan Affairs Office spokesperson, Chen Binhua, justified the drills as “just and necessary” for regional peace and condemned the US for allegedly supporting Taiwan’s independence. Mao stated: “The United States deleted the literal expression that reflected the one-China principle and that did not support Taiwan independence on the website of the U.S. Department of State, which indicates wrong signals to Taiwan separatist forces.” Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs refuted China’s claims, denouncing Beijing’s military actions as destabilising and hypocritical. Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense detected 59 PLA aircraft and nine PLAN ships near Taiwan, with 43 aircraft crossing the median line and two balloons spotted north of the country. 

Japan: To deploy long-range missiles in the East China Sea 
On 18 March, Kyodo reported that Japan plans to deploy long-range missiles on its southwestern island of Kyushu near the East China Sea. This move is to strengthen “counterstrike capabilities” in the event of an emergency amid growing tensions in the Taiwan Strait. The deployment is likely to begin in March 2026. Assessment of possible deployment sites in Kyushu is underway. Japan’s ground defence force’s surface-to-ship missile regiment garrisons in Yufu in Oita prefecture and the city of Kumamoto are two likely locations. The missiles are an upgraded version of Japan’s Type-12 surface-to-ship guided missile with an extended range of 1,000 kilometres. 

Myanmar: Ethnic Armed Organisations attack military base in Rakhine
On 12 March, the Arakan Army (AA) attacked the Rakhine capital, Sittwe, and the naval base four kilometres north of the city. The AA additionally bombarded nearby towns of Ponnagyun, Pauktaw, and Rathedaung with airstrikes and shelling. They seized the Kyaukphyu Township, where the major Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) investments are located. On 14 March, the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) and its allies seized the Myanmar military base in Pulotu along the Thai border in the Hpa-an District. Additionally, 100 KNLA troops seized the Mae Pale base in Mon State Belin Township, capturing 29 soldiers. On 18 March, the Myanmar military suffered heavy casualties during a clash with People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) in the Katha township in the northern Sagaing Region. The clashes broke out when the 200 military forces from the Katha town-based Light Infantry Battalion advanced on rural parts of the township. Light Infantry Battalion 309 is the only military base in Katha town.

South Asia
Pakistan: Multiple militant attacks in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan
On 18 March, Dawn reported on multiple terrorist attacks in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. As per the security officials, gunmen on motorbikes killed a constable in Bannu. On 17 March, unknown militants attacked a police station in Lakki Marwat, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The militants possessed light and heavy weapons. The police officers thwarted the attack. Meanwhile, police officers informed that they have successfully dismantled known “hideouts” of militants located in Kurrum Par, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Separately, two terrorists were neutralized in Bannu. In another incident, on 17 March, the family of a police officer came under a grenade attack in Khuzdar, Balochistan. Militants on motorbikes hurled a grenade into the residence of the Station House Officer (SHO). The blast wounded five family members of the SHO. 

Nepal: 4.3 magnitude earthquake strikes Accham
On 18 March, an earthquake hit the western belt of Nepal with Batulasain in Accham district, about 450 kilometres from Kathmandu, as its epicentre. According to the National Earthquake Monitoring Research Centre, the quake recorded 4.3 magnitude on the Richter scale. However, no casualties were reported.  

Sri Lanka: 14 citizens rescued from Myanmar scam centres
On 18 March, 14 Sri Lankan nationals rescued from Myanmar’s scam centres have been scheduled to be repatriated. Coordinated diplomatic efforts were made between Sri Lanka's Embassies in Myanmar and Thailand, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Employment, and Tourism, and the governments of Myanmar and Thailand. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Employment, and Tourism expressed gratitude to the Thai and Burmese governments, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and Non-Governmental Organizations in Myanmar. 

Bangladesh: US to hold talks over the rise of religious extremism
On 17 March, US Intelligence Chief Tulsi Gabbard stated that the Trump administration is planning to defeat “Islamic terrorism” around the world during an interview with Indian media, NDTV. She highlighted that the Trump administration will hold talks with Bangladesh’s interim government about the rising terrorist elements and Islamic extremism in the country. Bangladesh’s leader of the interim government Muhammad Yunus refuted these comments as baseless without “any evidence or specific allegations.” He further added that Gabbard’s statements were “misleading and damaging to the image and reputation of Bangladesh,” which has “ made remarkable strides in its fight against extremism” and been “famously inclusive and peaceful.”

Bangladesh: Increasing atrocities in refugee camps by separatists, says a report 
On 18 March, a report titled “"I May Be Killed at Any Moment" - Killing, Abduction, Torture and Other Serious Violations by Rohingya Militant Groups in Bangladesh” by Fortify Rights was released. The report highlights the members of Rohingya separatist groups in Bangladesh carrying out human rights violations in the form of killings, abductions, and torture against Rohingya refugees since 2021. According to the report, the separatists in the camps have killed 22 people in 2021, 42 in 2022, 90 in 2023, and at least 65 in 2024. The increase in attacks is linked to the transfer of camp control from the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) to the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO). It resulted in disputes between the groups, leading to gunshot incidents, extortion, and abduction. The report also claims that the heightened security concern is due to the Sheikh Hasina government’s prolonged denial of militant groups engaging in violence against Rohingyas.

The Middle East and Africa
Iran: Khamenei dismisses Trump’s call for negotiations on the nuclear deal
On 12 March, Al Jazeera reported that Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has described US President Donald Trump’s call for negotiating a new nuclear deal as “a deception aimed at shaping global opinion.” Khamenei referenced Trump’s unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018 as a reason for his lack of faith in any new negotiation. Meanwhile, since taking office, Trump has tried to bring Iran to the negotiating table for a new nuclear deal while maintaining “maximum pressure.”

Lebanon and Syria: Defence officials reach ceasefire after days of cross-border clashes
On 17 March, Lebanon and Syria’s defence officials reached a ceasefire agreement, halting border clashes that broke out on 15 March. Apart from establishing a ceasefire and opening communication lines between both sides, the agreement stipulated increased cooperation and coordination between the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and Syria’s Hayat Tahrir Al-Shams (HTS) on Lebanon’s porous and compromised border with Syria. Before the agreement of the ceasefire, Lebanon’s President and former LAF chief Joseph Aoun ordered his forces to retaliate against Syrian forces after fighting erupted between both sides, leading to the death of 17 Lebanese citizens. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported that five Syrian soldiers were killed in the exchange. Furthermore, four Syrian journalists working with the HTS military were wounded by an artillery strike from Lebanon, which they claimed was launched by Hezbollah. The clashes began on 15 March when Syria’s HTS-controlled government accused the Lebanon-based Hezbollah of crossing into Syria, abducting three HTS soldiers, and killing them in Lebanon. However, on 16 March, Lebanon’s Minister of Defence claimed that those killed were local smugglers. According to the Associated Press, the recent spike in cross-border violence has been between the HTS military and armed Shia Lebanese clans who used to be allies of Syria’s former Assad government. They inhabit the border villages between the two countries, especially the Lebanese border village of Al-Qasr and northeastern Lebanon’s Baalbek-Hermel province. 

Syria: Israel conducts airstrikes in Homs and Daraa
On 18 March, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) struck outposts of the erstwhile Syrian Arab Army (SAA) in the Homs province of central Syria. The targets included fortified SAA positions in Homs’ Shinshar and Shamsin villages. Previously, on 17 March, the IAF conducted a similar attack in southern Syria’s Daraa province, killing two and injuring 19 others. The Israel Defence Forces (IDF) claimed that it was targeting military headquarters and sites containing weapons and other military equipment to block HTS from implicating a threat to Israel. However, Syria’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned the attacks, calling them a “part of a campaign waged by Israel against the Syrian people and country’s stability.” The ministry claimed the attacks were part of Israeli aggression on Syria’s territory and a threat to regional and international security. 

Israel: IDF tanks enter Netzarim Corridor as ground operations resume
On 19 March, the Jerusalem Post reported that Israeli tanks entered the Netzarim Corridor in central Gaza, splitting the Palestinian enclave in two. Thereafter, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) stated that it resumed infantry operations across central and southern Gaza. Israel’s military decisions marked the latest renewal of hostilities since the 19 January ceasefire deal. Furthermore, the IDF stated that it was launching targeted ground operations in central and southern Gaza to expand the zone of operation for its troops and enforce a partial buffer, separating the northern and southern parts of the enclave. Meanwhile, the IDF decided that it would station its Golani Brigade (numbering 1000 to 2000 soldiers) in southern Gaza, where Israeli troops would remain on standby to conduct operations. 

Ethiopia: Divisions within Tigray regional administration and tensions with Eritrea
On 14 March, BBC reported that a faction of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) seized control of major offices and a radio station in Mekelle. This has raised concerns of a political struggle within Tigray’s regional administration and a fresh conflict. Tigray's interim administration’s leader Getachew Reda accused the rival group led by Debretsion Gebremichael of attempting to take over. Getachew has requested the Ethiopian government for “necessary assistance.” Getachew has additionally accused the rival faction of aligning with Eritrea to carry out an “open coup.” Meanwhile, tensions between Eritrea and Ethiopia have increased since the former refused to sign the peace deal in 2022, although it supported Ethiopian forces during the conflict in Tigray. Tigray’s interim administration claims that Eritrean troops are continuing their presence along the borders. However, Eritrea claims that the allegations are “fabricated” and the areas are “Eritrean sovereign territories.”

South Africa: US expels South African ambassador after remarks on Trump
On 14 March, the US expelled the South African Ambassador Ebrahim Rasool following the remarks on Trump. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said that Rasool was “no longer welcome in our great country.” He added: “Ebrahim Rasool is a race-baiting politician who hates America and hates POTUS. We have nothing to discuss with him and so he is considered PERSONA NON GRATA.” The move came after Rasool commented that Trump mobilised a “supremacist instinct” and “white victimhood” as a “dog whistle” during the 2024 elections. South African presidency responded: “The Presidency urges all relevant and impacted stakeholders to maintain the established diplomatic decorum in their engagement with the matte” and that it “remains committed to building a mutually beneficial relationship with the United States of America.” 

Europe and the Americas
Ukraine: Zelenskyy agrees to a partial ceasefire
On 20 March, BBC reported on US President Donald Trump's call with Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on ceasefire efforts. This comes after Trump's call with Russia's President Vladimir Putin agreeing on a partial ceasefire to halt attacks on key infrastructure. Zelenskyy agreed to the partial ceasefire, however warned of retaliating if Russia violated the agreement. The talks involved the US involvement in Ukraine’s nuclear power plants. Trump suggested ownership of the plants to safeguard the energy infrastructure. Meanwhile, the US Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced Trump's plan to support Ukraine through additional air defence system support and improve cooperation at the defence level.

Serbia: Government criticised for using sonic weapons to disperse the protests in Belgrade
On 17 March, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic denied that his police forces had used sonic weapons to disperse the protesters in Belgrade. He said: “I have had the opportunity to see this weapon abroad due to its strong and piercing emission of sound, but this was not heard in the streets of Belgrade.” He added that “there will be an investigation, and also they should prosecute those who went public with such comments.” On 15 March, the protesters gathered in Belgrade to observe a 15-minute silence in honour of the 15 people killed when part of a railway station collapsed in Novi Sad in November. During the commemorative silence, eyewitnesses reported to have heard piercing noises causing the crowd to scatter in panic. Military analyst Aleksandar Radic said: “The sound would have originated from a Long Range Acoustic Device (LRAD), commonly referred to as a sonic weapon.” The Belgrade Center for Security Policy, a Serbian NGO, condemned the government for allegedly using the weapon. 

The US: Trump deports 200 immigrants to El Salvador using a wartime act of 1798
On 16 March, the US deported more than 200 immigrants, including the members of a Venezuelan criminal gang, to be imprisoned in El Salvador. The deportation was carried out by invoking the 1798 Alien Enemies Act. The act allows Trump to detain or deport noncitizens during wartime without a hearing. The deportation took place despite a US federal judge temporarily suspending the deportation order. On 19 March, Trump called for the impeachment of the judge who tried to halt the deportation. Trump called the judge a “troublemaker and agitator” and commented that “fighting illegal immigration may have been the number one reason for this historic victory” and that “I am just doing what the voters wanted me to do.” 

About the authors
Anu Maria Joseph and Padmashree Anandhan are Project Associates at NIAS. Nuha Aamina, Femy Francis and Abhiruchi Chowdhury are Research Assistants at NIAS. Fleur Elizebeth Philip is a Research Intern at NIAS. Ayan Datta is a Postgraduate Student at the University of Hyderabad. Nova Karun is a postgraduate student at Pondicherry University. 

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August 2021 | CWA # 528

STIR Team

Space Tourism
Science, Technology and International Relations
September 2019 | CWA # 162

Lakshman Chakravarthy N

5G: A Primer
South Asia Monthly Brief (Nov 2018)
December 2018 | CWA # 71

Mahesh Bhatta | Centre for South Asian Studies, Kathmandu

Nepal
South Asia Monthly Brief (Nov 2018)
December 2018 | CWA # 70

Nasima Khatoon | Research Associate, ISSSP, NIAS

The Maldives
South Asia Monthly Brief (Nov 2018)
December 2018 | CWA # 69

Harini Madhusudan | Research Associate, ISSSP, NIAS

India
South Asia Monthly Brief (Nov 2018)
December 2018 | CWA # 68

Sourina Bej | Research Associate, ISSSP, NIAS

Bangladesh
South Asia Monthly Brief (Nov 2018)
December 2018 | CWA # 67

Seetha Lakshmi Dinesh Iyer | Research Associate, ISSSP, NIAS

Afghanistan