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CWA # 1665
Conflict Weekly
Conflict Weekly # 280-81
India-Pakistan De-escalation I Ukraine Discussion in Istanbul I The Battle over Port Sudan I Disbanding of PKK in Turkiye I France-Algeria Diplomatic Tensions
15 May 2025, Vol.6, No. 19 & 20

 
15 May 2025

Conflict Weekly #280&281, 15 May 2025, Vol.6, No. 19 & 20
An initiative by NIAS-IPRI
 

D Suba Chandran, Padmashree Anandhan, Anu Maria Joseph, Lekshmi M K, R Preetha and Brighty Ann Sarah

India and Pakistan: De-escalation and the “New Normal”
D Suba Chandran
 
In the news
On 10 May, India and Pakistan agreed to stop military actions. India’s External Affairs Minister said: “India and Pakistan have today worked out an understanding on the stoppage of firing and military action. India has consistently maintained a firm and uncompromising stance against terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. It will continue to do so.” On 12 May, the Director Generals of Military Operations (DGMOs) of India and Pakistan held a meeting to implement the understanding. 

On 12 May, the Indian Prime Minister in his address to the nation, underlined the establishment of a “new normal” in counter terrorism measures. He also stated: “Talks and terror cannot go together, terror and trade cannot go together, and water and blood cannot go together.”

On 13 May, Pakistan confirmed the killing of 40 civilians and 11 armed forces personnel during India’s attacks over nine targets in Pakistan and PoK. On 14 May, Pakistan’s Prime Minister, in his address to the troops, said: “You have taken revenge for the 1971 war...and now the whole nation is standing with you,” and warned India: “If you again attack us, you will lose everything…We are ready for war and dialogue. Now the choice is yours.”

On 13 May, the US President repeated his claims that his administration played a role in brokering a “historic ceasefire” between India and Pakistan, to “stop the escalating violence between India and Pakistan.” While Pakistan welcomed the US role, India repeated its position that “any issues pertaining to the Indian Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir have to be addressed by India and Pakistan bilaterally.” 

Issues at large
First, a brief note on the terror attack in J&K, which led to the military confrontation between India and Pakistan. On 22 April, a terror attack in Pahalgam, a tourist attraction in J&K, witnessed the massacre of civilians, mostly tourists from the rest of India. The Resistance Front (TRF), believed to be linked with Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Toiba, initially claimed the attack. The terror attack attracted global condemnation, including a statement from the UN Security Council.

Second, terror attacks in J&K, leading to India-Pakistan tensions. Following the terrible attacks in Mumbai by terror groups based in Pakistan during 2008, there were terrorist attacks in J&K during 2016 and 2019, which resulted in a strong reaction by India. In September 2016, following a terrorist attack in Uri in J&K, India launched surgical strikes. In February 2019, following a terrorist attack in Pulwama in J&K that killed 40 Indian para-military officials, India responded with air-strikes. During 2016 and 2019, India responded to terrorist attacks by targeting terror camps in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK).

Third, Operation Sindhoor and the latest tension between India and Pakistan. Following the terrorist attack in Pahalgam in J&K, New Delhi downgraded the diplomatic and economic relations with Pakistan and closed the Attari border. Islamabad took similar measures against India. On 7 May, India launched a military operation with precise targeting of nine places in Pakistan and Pok, belonging to Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Toiba – two terrorist organizations that were primarily responsible for terror attacks in India. On 10 May, Pakistan launched a military operation Bunyan Marsoos and claims to have targeted Indian military targets along the India-Pakistan border.

Fourth, the ceasefire along LoC and the role of DGMOs. Ever since the establishment of a comprehensive ceasefire in 2003 by India and Pakistan, the Directors General of Military Operations (DGMOs) of the two militaries played an important role in addressing cross-LoC firings and violations. Although established much before the 2003 ceasefire, the DGMOs-level communication is a strong tool to convey violations and discuss at the local level between the two militaries. 

Fifth, the role of external mediation. While Trump has repeatedly taken credit for de-escalating the tensions between India and Pakistan, New Delhi and Islamabad have different approaches towards external mediation. While Islamabad wants external mediation and “internationalization” of bilateral issues, New Delhi emphasizes bilateral negotiations between India and Pakistan to address all contentious bilateral issues. 
 
In perspective
First, the “new normal” between India and Pakistan during the last ten years. While there were escalations during 2016, 2019, and now in 2025, there were political tensions between India and Pakistan that continued. Terrorist attacks, escalation and de-escalation have become a new normal between the two countries.

Second, terrorist attacks in India by Pakistan based groups as a trigger for military tensions between the two countries. From the terror attacks in Mumbai in 2018 to Pahalgam in 2025, the terrorist attacks have either resulted in the collapse of a normalization process (before the Mumbai attack, India and Pakistan pursued a normalization process that witnessed significant development between the two countries and across two parts of Kashmir) or fuelling the political tensions into a military escalation. Both Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad are listed as terrorist organizations across the world – from the US to the UN. While Pakistan claims to face an existential threat from terrorism, its (in)actions in controlling the activities of the above two in India act as the primary factor, triggering bilateral escalation.

Ukraine: The Discussion in Turkiye and the Elusive Ceasefire
Padmashree Anandhan
 
In the news
On 15 May, US President Trump expressed his doubts on Ukraine and Russia reaching any agreement until his direct meeting with Russia’s President Putin. On the same day, following the non-participation of Putin, Ukraine’s President Zelenskyy criticised the Russian delegation in Turkiye for the direct talks as “decorative.” Putin’s no-show invited criticism from European leaders, calling it an “old Russian trick” to prolong negotiations and the 30-day ceasefire.

On 11 May, Putin proposed direct peace talks with Ukraine in Istanbul. He said that the aim would be to achieve a lasting resolution and to address the root causes of the war. Although Putin did not respond to a separate call by Ukraine and four key Western allies—France, the UK, Germany, and Poland—for an unconditional 30-day ceasefire. In response to the direct talk proposal, Zelenskyy emphasized that a full and reliable ceasefire must come first. He urged Russia to confirm a ceasefire beginning 12 May, as a clear condition for any negotiations to proceed.

On 11 May, Trump announced that he would continue to help end the war in Ukraine, calling it a "never ending bloodbath" and hinting at major developments ahead. He described the coming days as a “BIG week” and suggested a “potentially great day for Russia and Ukraine.”

On 10 May, during the meeting organised by Ukraine in Kyiv, leaders from the UK, France, Germany, and Poland reaffirmed their strong support, highlighting the unity between European and US allies. The meeting ended in an agreement to impose heavy sanctions on Russia unless Moscow agrees to an unconditional 30-day ceasefire. UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer urged Putin to demonstrate seriousness about peace by extending the three-day ceasefire into a full, unconditional pause in hostilities. Germany’s Chancellor Friedrich Merz expressed optimism, saying the ceasefire proposal gives "a small chance" to end the war, with the US now backing the plan.

Issues at large
First, the search for a ceasefire. In April, Russia announced a unilateral 30-hour Easter ceasefire that was agreed by Ukraine but resulted in an exchange of violation accusations. Later, Trump and Putin agreed to a 30-day pause on attacks targeting energy infrastructure. This also failed as Ukraine and Russia accused of breaching the agreement with the exchange of drone strikes and infrastructure damage. The latest being Putin’s three-day ceasefire marking 80 years of the Soviet Union's victory in World War II. Following this, Ukraine and the EU have strongly pushed for an immediate and 30-day halt to hostilities, eventually leading to a long-lasting ceasefire. However, the complexities in coming together to discuss and negotiate the conditions continue.

Second, contradictory positions of Ukraine and Russia on ceasefire. Ukraine's conditions include a full withdrawal of Russian forces from all illegally annexed regions in the southeast. It calls for the return of thousands of deported civilians and prisoners of war, and staunch security guarantees to deter future aggression. While Russia mandates legal recognition of the captured territory, including Crimea. It demands the withdrawal of Ukraine’s forces from these territories and a formal pledge that Ukraine will not join NATO or form any military alliances perceived as hostile to Russia. It also argues that a temporary or tactical ceasefire without these concessions would help Ukraine rearm and prolong the conflict. Putin has also rejected recent Western-mediated proposals for short-term truces and has instead called for a long-term agreement, which seems too far.

Third, a united Europe and the US call for a ceasefire. Earlier, the EU and the US had diverging approaches to resolving the war. The EU’s focus remained on combined transatlantic negotiations, along with military aid and security guarantees, with the larger European security concern in the background. While the US engaged in more direct talks with Russia, delaying military aid to Ukraine over a mineral deal with a more transactional stance. However, the recent meeting and calls between the European and US officials show a slight shift or adapted approach to strive for a temporary ceasefire on a primary basis. Although there is more unity than before among the European leaders to ensure in achieving a 30-day ceasefire and ensuring long term security guarantees for Ukraine.
 
In perspective
First, ambitious preconditions and impossible direct talks. The exclusive conditions placed by Ukraine and Russia are the first hindrance to beginning negotiations. Such ambitious demands only lead to more distrust in settling for common conditions, thereby prolonging the negotiation process. This has also led to more mediators, such as Turkey and China, to help in mediation. The lack of trust, high-end demands, and ceasefire breaches combined have resulted in ceasefire efforts being more fragmented. This reflects the larger deadlock and mismatch in diplomatic efforts and battlefield scenarios.

Second, Trump’s limitations as a mediator. Trump's claims to end the war in 24 hours of presidency have so far failed to broker a temporary ceasefire. Recent efforts to mediate a 30-day ceasefire between Ukraine and Russia have been delayed, with Russia rejecting the US-backed proposal as inadequate for addressing its demands. 

Sudan: RSF’s offensive in Port Sudan and the battlefield shifts 
Anu Maria Joseph
 
In the news
On 11 May, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) claimed that at least nine people were killed in an artillery shelling by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in el-Fasher, the capital of North Darfur. The SAF added that it killed six members of the RSF in response.

On 9 May, at least 14 people were killed in an RSF air strike in Darfur and on 10 May, 19 people were killed in el-Obeid. 

On 5 May, the RSF drones hit multiple locations in Port Sudan, a Red Sea port city. The targets included a fuel depot, Port Sudan International Airport, and a power station. 

On the same day, Sudan's SAF-led government cut diplomatic ties with the UAE, accusing it of supplying weapons to the RSF. Sudan's Defence Minister Yassin Ibrahim described the UAE as an "aggressor state" and violating the country's sovereignty through its "proxy." The UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs dismissed the decision, stating: “Port Sudan Authority does not represent the legitimate government of Sudan and its honourable people.”

Issues at large
First, a brief background on the war. The war between the SAF and the RSF started as a military rivalry between the heads of the two forces, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Hamdan Dagalo. Together, both forces toppled Omar al-Bashir in 2019 and established a transitional military rule. While the SAF is considered the formal military of the country, the RSF is a paramilitary force formed in 2013, which has its origins in the Janjaweed militia that carried out the Darfur genocide in 2004. The rivalry between the forces was over disagreements on the civilian transition, the RSF integrating into the SAF, and if so, who would lead the new force. Two years into the war, more than 20,000 people have been killed, and 13 million have been displaced. 

Second, the new shifts on the battlefield. In April, the SAF recaptured the capital Khartoum from the RSF (Khartoum had been under the control of the RSF since the war began). Although recapturing Khartoum was a major victory for the SAF, defeating the RSF was nowhere near. The RSF formally declared a parallel "Government of Peace and Unity" on 15 April in areas under its control. In the west, except for North Darfur, RSF has a major advantage over the Darfur and Kordofan states. Additionally, several strategic points in Khartoum, including the vicinity of the Presidential Palace, several government buildings in the University of Khartoum and the Martyrs Mosque in the Al Muqrin area, remain under the control of the RSF. Meanwhile, central Khartoum, parts of western Omdurman, Bahri, East Nile, Kardo, Wad Madani, Port Sudan and the states of Gezira and parts of Sennar are under the SAF. On geographic and military advantage, both forces are on par. The RSF’s attack on Port Sudan came in response to the SAF's attack on the RSF's aircraft and weapons depot in Nyala airport in Darfur. 

Third, the significance of Port Sudan. Port Sudan has been the de facto capital for the SAF-led government since the RSF took control of Khartoum in April 2023. The city was never a violent zone and was regarded as one of the safest places in the country. Port Sudan and its infrastructure have been crucial for the SAF’s war efforts. The city hosts Sudan's only functioning international airport, a major power station, import and storage fuel depots, supplying fuel countrywide. Several foreign diplomatic missions and aid agencies have been functioning from the city since Khartoum came under the RSF. Its geographic location in the Red Sea is a major entry point for aid and trade. 

Fourth, tensions with the UAE. In January 2024, the UN verified the reports on the UAE supplying weapons to the RSF through Chad despite the arms embargo. In April, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) dismissed the SAF’s case against the UAE for being complicit in the RSF’s genocide in Darfur, stating that the court lacked jurisdiction to enact a provision against the UAE. For the SAF, severing diplomatic ties with the UAE implies many losses. The UAE-backed company, Emiral Resources, owns the majority share in Sudan's Kush mine, administered by the SAF. According to the Central Bank of Sudan, 97 per cent of gold exported from SAF-controlled regions is to the UAE. 
 
In perspective
First, the RSF's attempt to weaken the SAF. The attack on Port Sudan, a major stronghold of the SAF, was likely an attempt by the RSF to weaken the SAF. Parts of Khartoum remain with the RSF. While SAF re-focused towards Port Sudan from Khartoum, the paramilitary would potentially intensify its offensive to recapture Khartoum. Besides, the fight for el-Fasher has been ongoing for months. The city in North Darfur connects the western states with Khartoum and the eastern states. It is the only major city in the Darfur region under the control of the SAF.  If the RSF manages to capture el-Fasher and recaptures Khartoum, it would bring the western parts of the country and Khartoum as its centre under the RSF-led government. 

Second, the escalation of the war. While the SAF focus on its defensive posture in Port Sudan, it continues its offensive in Nyala and el-Fasher. Continuing offensives, an abundant weapon supply, and the RSF's announcement of the new government imply that the war is unlikely to end until one side is defeated. Or, the war will divide the country in the east and the west. Several international actors have prioritised their economic interests in Sudan by supplying weapons and continuing mineral trade with the warring parties. In 2024, Sudan generated USD 1.5 billion from gold exports, a major financial source for the RSF and the SAF. After a series of failed ceasefires mediated by the US and Saudi Arabia, the international actors have shown limited interest in mediating peace talks in Sudan. Abundant weapon supply, financial support and ignorance have given the incentive for the RSF and the SAF to continue the war.  

Turkey: PKK disbands after 40 years of armed insurgency
Lekshmi M K 
 
In the news
On 12 May, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) declared disarmament and the end of its insurgency. Reuters quoted the PKK’s statement: “The PKK 12th Congress decided to dissolve the PKK's organizational structure... and end the armed struggle.”

On 12 May, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan welcomed the announcement, and said: "With terror and violence being completely disengaged, the doors of a new era in every area, namely strengthening politics and democratic capacity, will be opened.” 

On 12 May, UN Secretary-General António Guterres welcomed the PKK's announcement. The UN Secretary-General spokesperson, Stéphane Dujarric, stated: “The Secretary-General welcomes the news of the decision of the PKK to dissolve and disarm. This decision, if implemented, represents another important step towards the peaceful resolution of a long-standing conflict.”

Issues at large
First, the Kurdish question in the Middle East and Turkey. Kurds are an ethnic group residing across southeastern Turkey, northern Syria, northern Iraq and northwestern Iran. Their population is distributed 14.7 million in Turkey, 8.1 million in Iran, 5.5 million in Iraq and 1.7 million in Syria. The issue goes back to the end of the First World War. Despite a promise by Britain and France of a Kurdish state after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire during the First World War, they went back with the formation of modern-day Turkey with the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. Subsequently, despite their large demographic composition, Kurds became divided in different countries and formed an ethnic minority in Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Iran and Armenia. Kurdish protests and movements led to the Sheikh Rebellion and the Dersim Rebellion (1937-38) in Turkey, the Anfal Campaign in Iraq during the late 1980s, and the shortlived Republic of Mahabad in Iran in 1946. All of them were suppressed.

Second, the rise of the Kurdish insurgency and the emergence of the PKK. In Turkey, years of violent suppression resulted in a radical section led by Abdullah Ocalan to form the PKK in 1978, calling for an independent Kurdish state. It became an insurgent group in 1984, and the insurgency expanded from southeastern Turkey to northern Iraq and Syria. By the 1990s, more than 40,000 people were killed, and Turkey, the US and the EU listed the PKK as a terrorist organisation. Following Ocalan’s arrest in 1999, the PKK declared multiple unilateral ceasefires during the 2000s and gradually shifted its demand from full independence to political autonomy. A series of ceasefires and peace processes collapsed during 2010 and 2015. According to the UN, the renewed fighting during 2015-2020 claimed over 5,000 lives and displaced nearly 500,000 people, especially in southeastern Turkey. Since 2020, Turkey has conducted over 30 cross-border military operations against the PKK in northern Iraq and Syria. 

Third, Ocalan-Erdogan negotiations. Since 2020, Turkey’s intensified military operations pushed the PKK towards the Iraqi border, weakening their domestic presence. In October 2024, Erdogan’s coalition partner, Devlet Bahçeli, proposed granting Abdullah Ocalan parole if the PKK ends violence and dissolves. This was also a strategy to secure support from the pro-Kurdish People's Equality and Democratic Party (DEM) for a constitutional change allowing Erdogan to remain in power beyond 2028. Ocalan’s appeal for disarmament was influenced by these offers and the realisation that achieving the PKK’s objective through military means is unfeasible. Besides, Syria’s administrative change, which benefited the PKK (The Assad regime pulled out from Kurdish-majority areas of Kobane, Afrin, and Qamishli in northern Syria) and Iran’s vulnerability after Israeli strikes further isolated the PKK.
 
In perspective
First, Ocalan's strategic recalibration. Ocalan recognised the futility of continuing armed conflict against overwhelming military pressure. The decision implies a pragmatic act, balancing external military pressure with the capacity of the movement. The move would likely secure a parole, political autonomy, and inclusivity through peaceful means. 

Second, Erdogan’s plan to hold on to power. Erdogan's role in the PKK disbandment is likely to receive widespread public appraisal. By projecting himself as a peace negotiator on the Kurdish issue, Erdogan aims to gain support domestically and internationally, especially ahead of elections. This incremental strategy allows gradual control over Kurdish political movements while maintaining a facade of reconciliation. Ultimately, it is less about resolving the Kurds' question and more about reinforcing Erdogan’s long-term hold on power.

Third, the PKK's pivot from insurgency to legitimacy. The PKK's move to abandon armed struggle is not only a tactical withdrawal but a rebalancing. This rebalancing also raises questions on the prospective acceptance of the PKK as a peaceful political voice by the Turkish government and the public. 

Algeria and France: Escalating Diplomatic Tensions
Brighty Ann Sarah and R Preetha
 
In the news
On 12 May, Algeria expelled 15 French diplomatic officers and on 11 May, it expelled two French intelligence operatives on the grounds of using “fake diplomatic passports.”
 
On 14 May, France’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jean-Noël  Barrot, stated: "The departure of agents on temporary missions is unjustified and, as I did last month, we will respond immediately and in a strong and proportionate manner.” Following the statement, he expelled Algerians holding diplomatic passports without visas.

On the same day, Algeria’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated the move was “not a coincidence as it happens in a very specific context with the aim of stymying the process of relaunching bilateral relations.”

This marked the second round of diplomatic expulsions from France since April, when 12 Algerian diplomatic and consular staff were expelled and a French ambassador to Algeria was recalled.

Issues at large
First, a brief background to France-Algeria relations. Algeria was a French colony during 1830-1962. The period was marked by violent conquest, economic exploitation, and the brutal Algerian War of Independence (1954–1962). Algeria has repeatedly demanded France’s acknowledgement and apology for the colonial atrocities, especially for the massacres in 1945. This was reflected in the Algerian parliament's decision in March 2025 to relaunch draft legislation criminalising French colonialism. Despite political tensions, France-Algeria relations have grown in the economic sector. By 2023, trade between the two countries reached nearly EUR 12 billion, with around 6,000 French companies investing in the country. According to the Observatory of Economic Complexity, Algeria's mineral exports to France stood at USD 6.84 billion in 2023. According to Algerian government sources, its exports are dominated by hydrocarbons at 90.74 per cent, with France being a key export destination, receiving 13.27 per cent of them as of 2023. On the social front, France is home to a vast Algerian diaspora. According to a 2025 Reuters article, an estimated ten per cent of France's 68 million population has links to Algeria, including immigrants and their descendants.

Second, recent tensions in France-Algeria relations. In October 2021, Algeria recalled its ambassador to France and banned French military overflights following Macron’s remarks on Algeria’s pre-colonial nationhood and the government's fostering of anti-French sentiments. In response, France reduced visas for Algerians and pressured Algeria to repatriate undocumented migrants. A thaw followed Macron’s visit to Algiers in August 2022, where he acknowledged colonial “crimes” and established a joint historians’ commission to examine France’s 130-year rule. However, he rejected a formal apology. In April 2024, the relations deteriorated when an Algerian critic, Amir Boukhors, was kidnapped in France. France arrested an Algerian consular employee over the incident, prompting Algeria to expel 12 French diplomats. In response, France expelled 12 Algerian diplomats and recalled its ambassador from Algiers. The relations plummeted in 2024 when France shifted its support to Morocco’s claim over Western Sahara, a long-disputed region between Algeria and Morocco. 

Third, France’s recent setbacks in Francophone countries. Since 2020, France had to withdraw its troops and end military cooperation with Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Senegal and Chad. Three reasons behind the withdrawal were French troops’ failure in addressing the insurgency in the region, growing public anti-French sentiments and discontent over France’s involvement in the internal affairs of the respective countries. 
 
In perspective
First, Algeria’s stance against France. Algeria’s tit-for-tat response against French expulsions and swift retaliation to France’s visa restrictions and Western Sahara policy demonstrates a resolute stance against its former coloniser. Its growing assertiveness and retaliation align with broader African sentiments on opposing foreign interference.

Second, France's waning influence in Africa. The current diplomatic tension between France and Algeria comes against the backdrop of eroding French influence in Francophone countries. While France loses its traditional colonial partners to China, Russia and other private military enterprises, Paris is looking for alternative partners in the region. However, France took a controversial approach to align with Morocco on Western Sahara. It has angered Algeria and led to the resurfacing of historical colonial issues, leading to diplomatic tensions.

Issues in Peace and Conflict This Week:
Regional Roundups
Padmashree Anandhan, Anu Maria Joseph, Femy Francis, Fleur Elizabeth Philip, R Preetha, Brighty Ann Sarah, and Merin Treesa Alex 

China, East, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific
China: PLA hosts 100 military officers from 40 African countries
On 10 May, SCMP reported that China is hosting 100 mid-career military officers from 40 African countries. This is part of the PLA's long-term strategy to deepen its defence ties across the continent, noted SCMP. According to China’s Ministry of National Defence, the ten-day visit, which ends on 15 May, includes visiting China’s top military academies in Beijing, Changsha and Shaoshan to study its military systems and modern technologies. This programme is the fourth of its kind organised by China’s Ministry of National Defence with the National University of Defence Technology in Changsha, Hunan province.

China: The US and China agree to reduce tariffs after negotiations in Geneva
On 12 May, the US and China agreed to reduce tariffs, easing economic tensions. US President Donald Trump called the deal a “total reset.” According to the agreed terms, the US will reduce its tariffs on China from 145 per cent to 30 per cent, and China from 125 per cent to ten per cent. Trump told reporters that while some tariffs were suspended for 90 days, they have not been removed and “may rise in three months.” Investors welcomed the de-escalation; the S&P 500, Dow Jones, and Nasdaq stocks hiked by 3.2 per cent, 2.8 per cent, and 4.3 per cent, respectively. The US will maintain a 20 per cent tariff on illegal fentanyl imports “to pressurise Beijing.”

China: Beijing reveals the details of the nuclear-powered submarine “Type 094” 
On 2 May, SCMP reported that China’s People’s Liberation Army revealed the details of the Type 094 nuclear-powered ballistic submarine. It has a submerged displacement of 11,000 tons, has a maximum speed of 30 knots, and can operate at a depth of 400 meters. Additionally, the submarine’s size – about 135 meters long, 13 meters wide, and with a surface displacement of 8,000 tons. The US Department of Defence called the submarine China’s first “nuclear triad,” noting that they have capabilities to conduct a nuclear attack from land, sea, and air. The submarine is equipped with 12 JL-2 ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads, having a range of about 7,000 kilometres.

Taiwan: Taipei tests US-supplied HIMARS
On 13 May, the South China Morning Post reported that Taiwan tested its US-supplied High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) at Jiupeng military base on 12 May, as part of the annual precision strike missile drills. With a 300-kilometre range, the HIMARS, previously used by Ukraine against Russia, is critical for Taiwan’s defence against China. Taiwan bought 29 HIMARS from the US. The first batch of 11 was received in 2024, and the rest is to arrive in 2026. The test came a day after China’s Shandong carrier was spotted near the island, part of the PLA’s joint combat readiness patrol. 

North Korea: Kim Jong Un urges full preparedness for war
On 12 May, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un urged his armed forces to be fully prepared for a war. The state media, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), quoted Kim: "Our revolutionary armed forces are now in charge of not a few fronts, but the most important among them is the anti-imperialist class front, and making full preparations for war is the most crucial task.” The statement was made during the combined tactical drills for special operations, supervised by Kim. 

Cambodia: Golden Dragon joint military exercise with China
On 14 May, Cambodia’s armed forces began the Golden Dragon joint military exercise with China, involving the army, navy and air force. The Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) stated that at least 900 Chinese military personnel and more than 1,300 Cambodian soldiers are participating in the drills, ending on 28 May. The exercise will feature advanced Chinese military hardware, including armoured vehicles, helicopters, warships, reconnaissance drones and robot battle dogs. The first Golden Dragon drills were held in 2016. The drills came after a two-day visit by Chinese President Xi Jinping in April. China’s Ministry of National Defence stated: “The exercise focuses on joint counter-terrorism and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations, and is also the 7th one of this series between the Chinese and Cambodian militaries.”

Myanmar: Military bombings in Sagaing kill 20 children
On 12 May, the military regime attacked the Depayin Township in the Sagaing region, killing 17 people, including 11 children. The airstrike hit a school in O Htein Twin village. The area is under the administration of the National Unity Government (NUG). 

Myanmar: Military airstrikes on the TNLA territory after failed peace talks
On 3 May, the Myanmar military carried out airstrikes against the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), after the Chinese-brokered ceasefire talks failed. The peace talks in Kunming on 28-29 April failed after the TNLA refused to let go of the five towns liberated from the military and retreat to Palaung, in the northern Shan state. The five towns that the Myanmar military demanded the return of included: Hispaw, Nawnghkio, Kyaukme, and Monmitt towns in Shan State and the Ruby town in the Mandalay region. The military bombed villages west of Mogoke and the village of Lon Kham in Nawnghiko Township, which are TNLA-held areas.

South Asia
Pakistan: Bodies of kidnapped truck drivers from Punjab found in Galangoor
On 14 May, Dawn reported on the discovery of bullet-ridden bodies of four truck drivers who were abducted from Punjab. The bodies were found in Galangoor on 13 May. The drivers were abducted by armed men on 9 May while delivering LPG imported from Iran. The victims were from Pakpattan and Rahimyar Khan. No group has claimed responsibility. The Balochistan government spokesperson has condemned the killings as “barbaric and deeply tragic.”

Pakistan: Advanced version of Abdali missile tested amidst hostilities with India
On 4 May, Dawn quoted the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) that Pakistan has successfully tested the Abdali Weapon System as part of “Exercise INDUS.” The newly tested version of the missile has a range of 450 kilometres, in contrast to the original 180 kilometres to 200 kilometres range, and is equipped with inertial guidance systems capable of targeting key infrastructure. ISPR stated that the test was conducted to “ensure the operational readiness of the troops,” and the enhanced manoeuvrability features. Due to its mobility and solid fuel propulsion, the missile possesses relatively small warheads and can be deployed from a Trans­porter-Erector-Launcher (TEL) vehicle. 

The Middle East and Africa
Iran: Fourth round of nuclear talks concludes in Oman
On 11 May, Iran and the US concluded a fourth round of indirect nuclear talks in Muscat, Oman. Iran's Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson described it as “difficult but useful talks to better understand each other’s positions and to find reasonable and realistic ways to address the differences." Ahead of the talks, US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff said that Iran can never again have a uranium enrichment program. He stated: "That’s our red line. No enrichment. That means dismantlement, it means no weaponization, and it means that Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan — those are their three enrichment facilities — have to be dismantled.”  

On 10 May, Iran's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abbas Araghchi, visited Saudi Arabia and Qatar for consultations ahead of the talks in Oman. He insisted on the country's legal right to uranium enrichment for civilian purposes. He said: "Enrichment is one of the achievements and honours of the Iranian nation. We have paid a heavy price for enrichment. The blood of our nuclear scientists has been spilled for this achievement."

The Middle East: Trump visits Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE
On 13 May, US President Donald Trump began his visit to the Middle East with Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The three-day visit includes Qatar and the UAE as well. 

In Saudi Arabia, Trump secured a USD 600 billion investment pledge in the sectors of defence, energy, aviation, infrastructure, AI, and health care. The US signed a defence and security deal worth USD 142 billion, equipping Saudi Arabia with several war equipment from several US firms. In Riyadh, Trump met the Syrian President al-Sharaa. He agreed to lift sanctions against Syria, which were imposed during al-Assad's regime.

On 14 May, Trump began his visit to Qatar. In Doha, Trump and Qatar’s emir, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, witnessed state-owned Qatar Airways sign an agreement with Boeing to buy 210 aircraft. It was part of a USD 96 billion worth deal, which additionally includes purchases of drones and anti-drone technology from US firms and Qatari investments in the US energy sector. In total, the US and Qatar signed a USD 1.2 trillion worth of deals.

The War in Gaza: Israel to intensify its attacks on Gaza
On 13 May, Israel bombed the Nasser Medical Complex in Khan Younis, killing two people. The total Israeli attacks on Palestinian hospitals have come to 35, according to Al Jazeera. 

On 12 May, Hamas released Edan Alexander, a US-Israeli national and a soldier. There was a brief end to the fighting from Israel's side to permit safe passage for the release, but it did not commit to a broader ceasefire. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's office stated that the ceasefire negotiations “will continue under fire, during preparations for an intensification of the fighting." He previously commented that the military pressure has forced Hamas to release Alexander. Meanwhile, a report by the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) said that the Gaza Strip "is still confronted with a critical risk of famine,” with 2.1 million people at severe risk. Israel has halted the entry of food, water, medicine and all life-saving supplies to Gaza for the past 71 days. According to the report, 93 per cent of Gaza's population is experiencing acute food shortages. 

Yemen: Israeli retaliation on Sanaa after the attack on Ben Gurion airport
On 11 May, the Houthis denied the Israeli claim of attacks on three Yemeni ports in Ras Issa, Hodeida and Salif. It came after Israel warned people to leave the ports in western Yemen controlled by the rebels. 

On 6 May, Israel attacked Yemen's airport in the capital, Sanaa. IDF stated that it "fully disabled" the airport. 

On 5 May, Israel carried out air strikes on Houthi targets in Yemen. The targets included Hudaydah Port and the al-Salakhanah and al-Hawak areas. 21 people were injured during the attack. The Houthis blamed the US and Israel for the attack, although the US denied its involvement. The Israeli attacks came in response to the Houthis' missile attack on the Ben Gurion Airport near Tel Aviv on 4 May, injuring four people. Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warned that anyone attacking Israel would be held "accountable."

Yemen: Houthis agree to a ceasefire with the US on Red Sea attacks
On 5 May, the US and Yemeni Houthis agreed to a ceasefire, after the rebel groups agreed to stop attacks in the Red Sea. The ceasefire was reached following the talks in Oman. Omani Minister of Foreign Affairs, Badr al-Busaidi, stated: “Following recent discussions and contacts … with the aim of de-escalation, efforts have resulted in a ceasefire agreement between the two sides." He added: "In the future, neither side will target the other, including American vessels, in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab Strait, ensuring freedom of navigation and the smooth flow of international commercial shipping." US President Donald Trump stated: "[The Houthis] just don't want to fight, and we will honour that and we will stop the bombings, and they have capitulated." 

Lebanon: Israel attacks the Nabatieh region
On 8 May, Israel carried out aerial strikes across the Nabatieh region, killing one person. The Israeli army claimed that the attacks targeted a "Hezbollah infrastructure site." Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam condemned the attack, stating: “All Israeli violations of UN Resolution 1701 and ceasefire agreements must come to an end. The Lebanese government has not – and will not – stop pushing for Israel’s full withdrawal from our territory.” The new wave of attacks has threatened the ceasefire between both parties signed in November 2024. According to the ceasefire, Hezbollah and other armed groups were required to stop operating or storing weapons south of the Litani River, and Israel was required to withdraw from southern Lebanon. However, both sides have continuously violated the ceasefire. 

Libya: Clashes between rival factions after the death of a powerful militia leader
On 11 May, the leader of the Stability Support Authority (SSA), Abdel Ghani al-Kikli, also known as “Gheniwa," was killed. It led to heavy gunfire between rival militias in Tripoli. SSA is a powerful militia in Libya and under the Presidential Council, which came to power in 2021 with the Government of National Unity (GNU), recognised by the UN. The UN has called for a de-escalation. The UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) called on all parties to "immediately cease fighting and restore calm, and reminds all parties of their obligations to protect civilians at all times."

South Sudan: Unknown faction attacks the town of Old Fangak
On 3 May, Al Jazeera quoted the medical charity, Doctors Without Borders, that at least seven people were killed in an attack in the town of Old Fangak in South Sudan. It is unclear which group carried out the attack or the reasons behind it. Recently, tensions between President Salva Kiir and Vice-President Riek Machar had increased, bringing the country to the brink of another civil war. 

South Africa: The US receive 59 white Africans as refugees
On 12 May, 59 white South Africans arrived in the US as refugees. The development came after Trump promised refugee status for the white African minority in South Africa, facing "racial discrimination." The South African government had denied the accusations. South Africa's President Cyril Ramaphosa responded: "A refugee is someone who has to leave their country out of fear of political persecution, religious persecution, or economic persecution. And they don't fit that bill." The US criticises South Africa's new law allowing the authorities to seize the private land owned by white Africans without compensation to make it "equitable and in the public interest." However, the South African government claimed that no land had been seized under the law. 

Rwanda: Talks with the US on receiving deported migrants
On 5 May, Rwanda's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Olivier Nduhungirehe, confirmed the discussion with the US to receive immigrants. Al Jazeera quoted Nduhungirehe talking to Rwanda TV: “It has not yet reached a stage where we can say exactly how things will proceed, but the talks are ongoing." This comes as a latest development to Trump's efforts to deport illegal immigrants to other countries. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated: “We are working with other countries to say, ‘We want to send you some of the most despicable human beings to your countries. Will you do that as a favour to us?’ And the farther away from America, the better, so they can’t come back across the border." 

Democratic Republic of Congo: Floods kill 100 people
On 11 May, Al Jazeera reported that at least 100 people were killed in floods in several villages in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The torrential rains caused the Kasaba River to overflow. Dangerous floods are frequent in eastern DR Congo, especially on the shores of the Great Lakes. In 2023, the floods killed 400 people in several villages along Lake Kivu in South Kivu province. In April, 33 people died in floods in the capital, Kinshasa. 

Nigeria: 30 people killed in suspected IPOB attack in Imo state
On 9 May, Al Jazeera quoted Amnesty International that at least 30 people were killed in a gunmen's attack in Nigeria's state of Imo. The separatist group, Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), is suspected to be behind the attack, according to Amnesty International. Amnesty stated: “The attack … shows callous disregard for the sanctity of life. The gunmen blocked Okigwe-Owerri highway and areas of Umuna in Onuimo LGA unleashed violence in an utter show of impunity." 

Mali: Protests against President Goita’s bid to stay in power until 2030
On 3 May, hundreds of people protested in Mali's capital, Bamako, against military leader Assimi Goita's plan to continue in power until 2030. The previous week, the government officials proposed a national conference on Goita leading the country until 2030. On 7 May, the military government suspended all political parties "until further notice for reasons of public order." This triggered the protests. Goita promised to hold elections and bring stability when he came to power through a coup in 2020. However, the promises were never met. 

Burkina Faso: 130 Fulani people killed by security forces, HRW report
On 13 May, Human Rights Watch (HRW) released a report that at least 130 people belonging to the Fulani ethnic group were killed by Burkina Faso's military in March in the western town of Solenzo. The report says that the al-Qaeda linked group, Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM), carried out retaliatory attacks. The "massacre" was carried out during an operation by Burkinabe special forces against insurgent groups in the region. The Fulani community, mainly pastoralists, belong to the Muslim religion and is often accused by the authorities of backing Islamist militants in the region. 

Europe and the Americas
Cyprus: Deal with Syria to return migrants entering through the Mediterranean Sea
On 12 May, Cyprus’ Deputy Minister for migration, Nicholas Ioannides, said that the Syrian government has agreed to receive its citizens returned trying to reach Cyprus by boat. He confirmed that 30 migrants who entered the Cyprus waters in the Mediterranean Sea using inflatable boats were returned as part of the bilateral agreement signed between Cyprus and Syria in Damascus. Cyprus and Syria are fighting against human trafficking, supplying labourers to the illegal markets. According to Ioannides, the human traffickers are bringing Syrian labourers to Cyprus, despite the laws preventing asylum seekers from working until they complete their nine-month temporary residence. Following the ousting of the Assad regime in December, the Cypriot government adopted laws similar to other European countries to accept asylum seekers solely based on merit.

Germany: Government tightens rules against illegal migrant entry
On 11 May, the new government began tightening the immigration rules, and asylum seekers are being rejected at the border. According to Bild am Sonntag, there have been 365 undocumented entries, and 286 people have been sent back, along with the 19 who are seeking asylum. The reasons for the rejections were: no visa, fake documents, and entry suspension. There have been reports of the detention of 14 smugglers along with 48 open arrest warrants, and arrests of nine individuals on charges of extremism. Chancellor Friedrich Merz vowed to implement permanent border control to curb illegal migrants. According to the Minister of Interior, Alexander Dobrindt, asylum seekers would be rejected under certain conditions, and the following are exemptions: children, pregnant women, and individuals identified as vulnerable. To successfully execute the proposition, 3000 federal police officers have been deployed. The Greens Party criticised the move and commented that the move was “contrary to European Law.” According to the Green Party spokesperson, Marcel Emmerich, the federal government opts for isolated and unilateral action, creating more chaos rather than cooperation. 

Turkey: Coast guard rescues 24 migrants off the coast of Izmir
On 9 May, the Turkish Coast Guard Command rescued 24 migrants at the coast of the western Izmir province, ÇeÅŸme district. These migrants were handed over to the Directorate of Migration Management. Several migrants from Asia and Africa enter Europe from Greece, and aid groups forcibly eject the migrants at sea or on land. Turkey receives migrants directly as it is a key transit point, and has been active since the beginning of the Syrian civil war in 2011.

Europe: France and Poland sign defence accord
On 9 May, France’s President Emmanuel Macron and Poland’s Prime Minister Donald Tusk signed an accord on security guarantees in Paris. The treaty states: "In the event of armed aggression on their territories, the parties shall provide mutual assistance, including by military means." Furthermore, the agreement does not substitute the efforts of the EU and NATO, but reinforces the current defence efforts. 

Peru: Prime Minister resigns as censure vote was set to begin 
On 13 May, Peruvian Prime Minister Gustavo Adrianzen resigned ahead of a scheduled congressional censure vote on escalating crime and the murder of a group of miners. His resignation poses a fresh challenge for President Dina Boluarte, whose approval rating has plummeted to a record-low two per cent according to a recent poll by Ipsos. The administration faces scrutiny over its handling of rising crime, particularly after the kidnapping and killing of 13 miners by illegal miners in May. It fueled demands for Adrianzen’s resignation. 

Haiti: Kenyan and Dominican Republic foreign ministers call for funding support to the UN mission
On 12 May, Kenya’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Musalia Mudavadi, and the Dominican Republic’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Roberto Alvarez, met in Santo Domingo. They called for an increase in funding support from the international community for the UN-backed Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission in Haiti. The ministers highlighted that insufficient funding and logistical support are hampering the mission’s ability to effectively counter Haiti’s worsening gang violence. The MSS, launched with 75 per cent Kenyan officers in June 2024, has about 1,000 personnel. 

The US: House of Representatives pass bills against China’s economic espionage and forced labour
On 6 May, the US House of Representatives passed two bills on countering China’s economic espionage and human rights violations in the Hong Kong and Xinjiang regions of China. Both bills received widespread support from the Democrats and Republicans. The economic bill seeks to impose stricter penalties on China and protect the US businesses. The human rights bill aims to prevent federal funds from supporting goods production involving forced labour in Xinjiang. The bills await Senate consideration, and if passed, require the President’s approval to become law.

About the authors
Anu Maria Joseph, Padmashree Anandhan and Femy Francis are Project Associates at NIAS. Fleur Elizebeth Philip is a Research Assistant at NIAS.  Merin Treesa Alex, R Preetha and Brighty Ann Sarah are postgraduate students from Stella Maris College, Chennai. Lekshmi M K is a postgraduate student at Madras Christian College, Chennai.

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