Conflict Weekly

Conflict Weekly
Trump-Putin Talks on Ukraine, Israel's reoccupation of Gaza City, and a Fragile Ceasefire in DR Congo

Conflict Weekly # 294, 14 August 2025, Vol 6, No. 33

IPRI Team
14 August 2025
Photo Source: AFP

Conflict Weekly #294, 14 August  2025, Vol.6, No. 33
An initiative by NIAS-IPRI

Padmashree Anandha, Brighty Ann Sarah, R Preetha and Anu Maria Joseph


Trump-Putin talks on Ukraine: The tough road ahead
Padmashree Anandhan
 
In the news
On 14 August, Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, along with European leaders and US President Donald Trump, held a virtual meeting. This comes ahead of the direct talks between Trump and Russia’s President Vladimir Putin in Alaska. During the meeting, Germany’s Chancellor Friedrich Merz stressed that Europe’s and Ukraine's security interests should be valued and that Ukraine should be present in the next set of negotiations. France’s President Emmanuel Macron, on the territory exchange, said: “…must only be discussed with Ukraine.” Zelenskyy warned: “Russia is attempting to portray itself as capable of occupying all of Ukraine…Everything concerning Ukraine must be discussed exclusively with Ukraine.” The coalition of willing, containing 31 countries, issued a statement: “If Russia refuses a ceasefire in Alaska, sanctions and other economic measures should be intensified.”

On the same day, following the online meeting, Trump confirmed the possibility of a second meeting between Putin and Zelenskyy. He also stressed on finding a way to end the war. He said: “I want to end the war. It’s Biden’s war, but I want to end it.”

On 12 August, 26 EU member states issued a joint statement calling for just and stable peace for Ukraine, along with security guarantees. They stressed on participation of Ukraine in the discussion involving any land swap and ceasefire. They also committed to strengthening Ukraine’s self-defence capabilities and EU membership. However, Hungary did not join the declaration, citing that it was wrong to set conditions on the sidelines of the dialogue. Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orban's friendly equation with Russia and his history of rejecting sanctions on Russia were viewed as major reasons.

Issues at large
First, a brief note on Trump-Putin talks so far. The attempts taken till now by the Trump administration to slow Russia’s offensive on the ground have not been successful. The continued aerial attacks and no progress at the negotiation table, except for prisoner exchanges, added to Trump’s frustrations. Despite the 50-day or ten-days reduced deadline, Russia remains stubborn on its demand to Ukraine to cede the annexed territories. With no positive signal from Russia at the military and political level, shows stagnation and uncertainty in attaining any deal.

Second, Ukraine’s territory under Russia’s control and its strategic importance. As of August, Russia controls 114,000 square kilometres or 19 to 20 per cent of Ukraine’s territory. This includes Crimea, 99 per cent of Luhansk, 75 per cent of Donetsk, 73 per cent of Zaporizhzhia, 69 per cent of Kherson and a few parts of Kharkiv and Sumy regions. The annexed territories, combined with Crimea, provide a strategic advantage to Russia in geopolitical, military and economic terms. With Crimea serving as a power projection into the Mediterranean Sea, Donetsk and Luhansk serve as a political symbol to protect the Russian-speaking population. Whereas, Zaporizhzhia gives access to key energy assets and serves as a link between Crimea and Donbas. The Dnipro River in Kherson gives control to the North Crimean Canal, providing water supply and securing Russia’s southern flank. Overall, the four regions form a corridor from Russia’s border to Crimea, cutting out Ukraine’s access to major parts of its coastline.

Third, Europe’s united efforts for Ukraine. Since Trump’s presidency, Europe has remained sidelined in the direct talks. However, starting from the formation of the “coalition of willing,” advancing the military weapon to coordinating the sanctions on Russia, Europe has increased its efforts to boost the NATO alliance. It has used the multilateral forums and has gathered the countries to outline the red lines for Ukraine in the negotiation and ensure security guarantees. Through this, it has played a decisive role in shaping the conflict. 

In perspective
There are three possible outputs of the direct talks and it would mainly focus on diplomacy, humanitarian and less on the geographic factors. First, the meeting would be a symbolic gesture in continuation of Trump’s ongoing mediation efforts across the war in Gaza and the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict. This would showcase Trump’s diplomatic ability to act as a link between Ukraine and Russia but also include Europe’s perspectives. Second, there can be limited deals facilitating more prisoner swaps, a temporary ceasefire for civilian aid. Lastly, discussions on the land swap would remain nascent since for Ukraine and Europe, ceding any territory is a red line. 


The War in Gaza: Israel’s reoccupation plan and International support for the “Two-State Solution”
Brighty Ann Sarah and R Preetha
 
In the news
On 8 August, Israel’s security cabinet approved the move to take control of Gaza through expanded military operations. 

On 11 August, Israel’s strikes in eastern Gaza killed six journalists, including Al Jazeera correspondent Anas Al Sharif, who Israel had accused of Hamas affiliations. 

On 13 August, severe Israeli bombardment in eastern and southern Gaza before Israel’s planned re-seizure of Gaza killed 123 civilians, recording the highest death toll in the week. 

On 11 August, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese said: “Australia will recognise the State of Palestine at the 80th Sessions of the United Nations General Assembly in September, to contribute to international momentum towards a two-state solution, a ceasefire in Gaza and the release of hostages." 

On 12 August, the foreign ministers of 24 countries, including Britain, Canada, and Australia, issued a statement: "Famine is unfolding before our eyes. Urgent action is needed now to halt and reverse starvation.” 

On 13 August, over 100 humanitarian groups, including Oxfam and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), issued a joint letter demanding that Israel stop the “weaponisation of aid" into Gaza, as "starvation deepens.” The letter revealed that most international non-governmental organisations have been unable to deliver supplies and medication since 2 March.

Issues at large
First, Israel’s proposed reoccupation of Gaza and Hamas’ influence in a historical context. Gaza has long been the epicentre of the Israel–Palestine conflict. The region was under Israeli control after the 1967 Six-Day War. It was home to over 200,000 Palestinian refugees displaced during the 1948 Arab–Israeli War, known as the Nakba (“the catastrophe”). Israeli occupation and reforms deepened anti-Israel sentiment, leading to the First Intifada (1987–1993) and the Oslo Accords, which created the Palestinian Authority with limited powers in Gaza and the West Bank. Hamas emerged during the First Intifada as an Islamist counterweight to the secular Palestine Liberation Organisation, pursuing armed resistance rooted in the anti-Israel cause. 2000-2005 was a period of the second, deadlier Intifada, which led to Israel withdrawing its troops and settlements from the region. In 2006, Hamas secured victory in the Palestine elections and formed a short-lived coalition with Fatah that collapsed in 2007 due to infighting. Hamas has remained in control of Gaza since, deepening its stronghold in the region and transforming Gaza into the centre of its operations. Israel’s proposed reoccupation and intensified military campaign seek to uproot Hamas from the heart of its influence.

Second, Israel’s plans to reoccupy Gaza and the post-occupation. Israel’s security cabinet’s decision to take control of Gaza City marks a significant escalation in the war. Israel has detailed a five-point plan: disarming Hamas, releasing all hostages, demilitarising Gaza, maintaining Israeli security control, and establishing an alternative non-Hamas, non-Palestinian Authority civil administration. The phased, expanded military campaign aims to pressure Hamas into releasing the roughly 50 remaining hostages and dismantling its presence in the region. Netanyahu’s push for full reoccupation of Gaza raises the threat of an Israeli resettlement, although he insists Israel will not remain in long-term control. Israel’s rejection of the ‘two-state’ solution and demands for an alternate non-Hamas, non-Palestinian Authority civil administration further complicates the question of a post-war administration. His proposal to transfer control to a coalition of “Arab forces” faces strong regional resistance. A Jordanian official stated that Arabs would “only support what Palestinians agree and decide on” and would not “agree to Netanyahu’s policies nor clean his mess,” reported Reuters. 

Third, the idea of a two-state solution. The two-state solution introduced in 1937 by the Peel Commission proposes the coexistence of independent Israeli and Palestinian states along pre-1967 borders, with the West Bank and Gaza forming a Palestinian state and East Jerusalem as its capital. Although widely promoted internationally, the proposal was rejected by the Arabs in 1947, citing its undue favour towards Israel. The proposal has once again gained momentum through international backing, although Israel has rejected the idea of an independent Palestinian state. Although the Palestinian Authority backs a two-state solution, Hamas does not, as it opposes the existence of Israel. Hamas has, however, indicated an interim acceptance of a Palestinian state based on 1967 de facto borders, without formally recognising Israel, if refugees’ return is allowed. 

In perspective
First, the human and political cost of Israel’s reoccupation plan. It risks extending a war that has already devastated Gaza’s civilian population. Military pressure has neither neutralised Hamas nor secured hostage releases; civilians are likely to bear the brunt. UN famine alerts and reports of more than 1,000 deaths at aid distribution sites highlight the pressing need for humanitarian access rather than further military escalation. 

Second, the diplomatic divide and stalemate over the two-state solution. President Trump stated it was “pretty much up to Israel” whether to occupy Gaza, while Washington’s ambassador to Israel made it more explicit that Netanyahu’s plan was not America’s concern. Western pledges to recognise Palestine, on the other hand, risk becoming performative without concrete pressure on both sides to halt the war. Arab opposition, led by Turkey, may round up diplomatic support but lacks the leverage to shift Israel’s course.

Third, the larger questions. Who will take charge of governing Gaza in the short term and the years ahead, who will finance and manage the enormous task of rebuilding the territory, how security and law enforcement will be maintained, and what political framework can be established to guide Israelis and Palestinians are bigger questions. Addressing these foundational questions will be far more challenging than the current difficulties in achieving a temporary ceasefire or negotiating the release of hostages. 


DR Congo: M23’s renewed violence and a fragile ceasefire
Anu Maria Joseph
 
In the news
On 12 August, the DR Congo forces accused Rwanda-backed M23 rebels of carrying out several attacks in eastern Congo. The Congolese army stated that the group violated the agreements signed in Washington and Doha and warned of a response to the provocation.

On 11 August, M23 accused Congolese forces of mobilising troops and violating the terms of the declaration of principles signed on 19 July in Doha.

On the same day, a rebel leader told Reuters that the group would not go to Doha on 18 August for the final deal talks "until Kinshasa begins to respect the declaration of principles, which provides for the release of our detained members."

On 12 August, Congolese army spokesperson Sylrain Ekenge stated that M23's "almost daily" attacks are an "intentional and manifest violation" of the declaration of principles signed in Doha.

Issues at large
First, a brief note on the recent peace deals in Washington and Doha. DRC and Rwanda signed a peace deal brokered by the US in Washington on 27 June, and to a cessation of hostilities and respect for the territorial integrity, marking an end to the violent conflict in eastern DRC. The deal also included disengagement, disarmament and conditional integration of all armed groups supported by DRC and Rwanda in the region. The M23 group, although the main actor in the conflict, was not included during the Washington talks. On 19 July, in Doha, the DRC and M23 signed a ceasefire agreement and committed to a comprehensive peace deal in August. As part of the ceasefire deal, M23 demanded the release of its captured fighters, and Congo demanded the withdrawal of the troops from the regions it had seized. 

Second, the challenges of the peace deal and the ceasefire. First is holding, but the second is fragile. DRC and Rwanda agreed to the terms of economic cooperation in several sectors on 2 August, a major move towards delivering the peace deal. The economic integration signalled the commitment to the peace deal. Meanwhile, the ceasefire between M23 and DRC appears to be fragile. Despite reaching the deadline to sign the comprehensive peace agreement between M23 and DRC, neither side has achieved the terms of the ceasefire deal. Neither DRC has released M23 prisoners nor has M23 withdrawn from the captured territories. M23 has resumed attacks against pro-state militias and the Congolese army. They blame each other for violating the ceasefire, which makes it fragile.

In perspective
First, a holding peace deal. The peace deal between the DRC and Rwanda seems to be holding. The US peace deal has instituted a Joint Oversight Committee to implement the peace agreement. The implementation process has begun, and the economic cooperation deal was the first step, signalling a commitment from DRC and Rwanda. It loosened diplomatic tensions between the DRC and Rwanda. But, has not made any substantial development towards a conflict settlement.

Second, a collapsing ceasefire. A ceasefire collapse would likely impact the peace deal, considering Rwanda's ties with the M23 rebels. It would potentially threaten the trust built between DRC and Rwanda through the Washington peace deal. While the ceasefire violations continue, the peace deal is on the brink of collapse.

Third, ceasefire violations. For M23, the group likely agreed to the ceasefire under pressure, as the cost of refusal would have been unfavourable. The ceasefire violation and the resumption of violence imply that either the parties lack trust towards each other's peace intentions or they never had the intention to end the fighting in the first place.

Fourth, a peace deal without peace. The US-brokered deal was highly criticised for the US's economic interests involved. Many criticised it as an economic deal instead of a peace deal. Rather than an inclusive peace process, it was a high-level political agreement. The deal does not discuss resolving the conflict in eastern DRC. Meanwhile, neither Qatar nor the US have shown much interest in sustaining the M23-DRC ceasefire. They have not responded to the reports of the ceasefire violations. A peace deal was reached between the DRC and Rwanda. The recent development says the peace deal has not brought any developments towards peace in eastern Congo. 


Issues in Peace and Conflict This Week:
Regional Roundups

Padmashree Anandhan, Anu Maria Joseph, Rohini Reenum, Femy Francis, Abhiruchi Chowdhury, Kasvi Batra, Brighty Ann Sarah, R Preetha, Lekshmi MK, Aparna A Nair, M Kejia, Rizwana Banu Vaihali Chittrothu and Santhiya M 

China, East, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific
China: Beijing accuses a US vessel of violating “China's sovereignty and security” by sailing close to the disputed Scarborough Shoal
On 13 August, the Chinese military's Southern Theatre Command accused the USS Higgins of sailing near the disputed Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea "without approval of the Chinese government." The statement added that the US action “seriously violated China's sovereignty and security, severely undermined peace and stability in the South China Sea." The US Navy's Seventh Fleet responded that the Chinese accusations were false and that the vessel was “consistent with international law” in asserting its navigational rights and freedoms in the region. The allegations follow the Philippines’ accusations of Chinese vessels blocking it from getting near the Scarborough Shoal. The US carries out regular “freedom of navigation” operations in the South China Sea, claiming to challenge the restrictions on passage imposed by China and other claimants.

China: Trump signs an executive order to extend the tariff truce with China
On 11 August, US President Donald Trump signed an executive order extending the tariff truce between China and the US from 12 August until 10 November. In July, heads and representatives from China and the US discussed the tariff issue, agreed to extend the deadline, and it was finalised when Trump signed the executive order. As per the agreement, the US has levied 30 per cent tariffs against Chinese goods while China levies ten per tariffs. The White House stated that this will give time for both sides to remedy the situation and their trade imbalance. The US faces the largest trade deficit with China, estimated at USD 223 billion in 2024. China’s Embassy in Washington said: “Win-win cooperation between China and the United States is the right path; suppression and containment will lead nowhere.”

China: Ceases engagement with the Czech Republic President over meeting the 14th Dalai Lama
On 13 August, China informed that it will cease engagement with the Czech Republic President Petr Pavel over his meeting with the Dalai Lama. Pavel met the 14th Dalai Lama in India despite opposition from China. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson, Lin Jian, said: “China strongly deplores and firmly opposes this, and has lodged serious protests with the Czech side,” and that “in the light of the severity of Pavel’s provocative action, China decides to cease all engagement with him.” China views the exiled Dalai Lama as a secessionist, as it believes Tibet is part of its territory.

The Philippines: Concerns over Chinese actions following the Scarborough Shoal collision
On 12 August, the Philippines raised serious concerns over "dangerous manoeuvres and unlawful interference" by Chinese vessels during a coast guard supply mission for Filipino fishermen in the Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea. The Philippines' Foreign Ministry stated: "Their actions not only posed a grave danger to the Philippine personnel and vessels, but also resulted in the unfortunate collision between the two Chinese vessels." The Philippine Coast Guard deployed three vessels to deliver fuel and ice but faced "hazardous" blocking actions, culminating in a collision between two Chinese ships, one from the Coast Guard and one from the People's Liberation Army Navy. A Chinese navy ship abruptly cut across the path of a Philippine vessel, damaging its forecastle. Armed Forces Chief General Romeo Brawner said: "We assess that the real objective of the PLA Navy ship is to ram our Philippine Coast Guard vessel." China's coast guard claimed it expelled Philippine vessels from the waters, amid ongoing tensions. The Philippine foreign ministry stated: "Yesterday's incident demonstrates the importance of adhering to international maritime rules," reaffirming commitment to diplomacy despite a 2016 arbitral ruling invalidating Beijing's claims. 

Japan: Warships visit New Zealand after 90 years to boost security ties
On 8 August, The Asahi Shimbun reported that for the first time in 90 years, Japanese warships visited Wellington, New Zealand, signalling Japan’s push to deepen strategic ties in the South Pacific. Two destroyers, JS Ise and JS Suzunami, carrying over 500 personnel, arrived from Sydney after participating in Indo-Pacific exercises with New Zealand, Australia, and other countries, escorted by HMNZS Canterbury. The visit reflects Japan’s efforts to expand military cooperation beyond its US alliance, promoting a “free and open Indo-Pacific.” Japanese corporation Mitsubishi Heavy Industries recently won a major Australian warship contract, marking significant defence collaboration. New Zealand is strengthening its regional security partnerships, including a defence logistics agreement with Japan.

South Korea: Military manpower shortages amidst a declining birthrate and an ageing population
On 10 August, Reuters reported that South Korea’s armed forces have decreased by 20 per cent over the past six years, numbering at 450,000, primarily due to a sharp drop in enlistment-age males amid the lowest birth rate. The population of 20-year-old men fell 30 per cent from 2019 to 2025, creating shortages in officers and non-commissioned ranks, raising concerns over readiness. Military strength has steadily declined from roughly 690,000 in the early 2000s to 563,000 in 2019. Although mandatory service was shortened to 18 months from 36 months in 1953, improved capabilities through the US alliance and a growing defence industry helped offset the reduction. South Korea’s 2025 defence budget exceeds USD 43 billion, surpassing North Korea’s economy. Yet, the military faces a 50,000-troop shortfall. The country’s rapidly ageing population and record-low fertility rate of 0.75 pose long-term manpower challenges.

The Philippines: Warns of being drawn into the Taiwan conflict amid South China Sea tensions
On 11 August, the Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr stated that the Philippines would be inevitably drawn “kicking and screaming” into any war over Taiwan due to its geographical proximity and the fact that there are around 200,000 Filipino workers on the island. The statement followed a confrontation in the South China Sea, where Chinese coast guard vessels used water cannons and blocking manoeuvres against Philippine ships near Scarborough Shoal, a disputed fishing atoll. Marcos emphasised that the Philippines would never back down in defending its territorial interests. Since taking office in 2022, his administration has strengthened security alliances with the US, Japan, Australia, India, and EU states to counter China. He further stated that the country must plan for a potential conflict while continuing to assert sovereignty and maintain a presence in the contested waters of the South China Sea.

Indonesia: Undertakes the largest military restructuring in decades 
On 10 August, Indonesia carried out significant military restructuring in decades, establishing more than 20 new regional commands across the army, navy, and air force, alongside a substantial increase in defence spending under President Prabowo Subianto. The reorganisation is the largest since Suharto’s era. Prabowo, a former general, justified the move as necessary to address global uncertainties and enhance security in border and conflict-prone regions. Since assuming office in 2024, he has expanded the military’s role in civilian affairs, placing active-duty and retired officers in government and state enterprise positions, including social programmes. Defence expenditure is projected to reach USD19.5 billion in 2025, nearly 50 per cent higher than initially planned, to modernise equipment and infrastructure. The army added six commands, the navy 14, and the air force three, significantly extending Indonesia’s military presence across its vast territory.

Myanmar: UNHRC report uncovers severe systematic torture and human rights violations perpetrated by military forces
On 12 August, the UN Human Rights Council released the annual report of the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM). The IIM has been investigating violations in Myanmar since 2011 and had previously highlighted the crimes against the Muslim Rohingya minority in the country in 2017. Myanmar had been struggling under a state of emergency since a military coup in 2021, which ended on 31 July 2025 when the military nominally transferred power to a civilian-led interim government ahead of a planned election, with army chief Min Aung Hlaing as the acting president. The 16-page report reveals severe human rights violations by the military forces, covering one year through 30 June, from over 1,300 sources. The perpetrators identified by the report include high-level military commanders. The investigations “uncovered significant evidence, including eyewitness testimony, showing systematic torture in Myanmar detention facilities," stated Nicholas Koumjian, head of the IIMM. According to the report, victims, including unlawfully detained children, were subject to beatings, electric shocks, gang rape, strangulation and other forms of torture that led to several deaths, reported Reuters. The military-backed government has made no comments on the report despite repeated requests from the UN for access to the country and information on the alleged crimes. The military has shifted the blame onto “terrorists” for causing unrest and stated that it must ensure peace and security.

South Asia
Pakistan: Prime Minister  Sharif warns India against withholding its share of the Indus water
On 12 August, at the International Youth ceremony in Islamabad, Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif, in his address, cautioned India against withholding Pakistan’s share of water. He asserted that “not a single drop would be allowed to be stolen.” He warned India of Pakistan’s “decisive response” in the event of blocking Pakistan’s share of the Indus water. Further, he claimed that a “new Pakistan” has come into being after the Pakistan military’s alleged victory over India in the brief confrontation which took place in May. In April, after the Pahalgam terrorist attack, India announced that it would not adhere to the Indus Water Treaty. 

Pakistan: Joint statement with the US names BLA for the first time
On 13 August, The Express Tribune reported that in a joint statement issued after the recent counterterrorism dialogue, Pakistan and the US committed to strengthening counterterrorism collaboration, placing renewed emphasis on combating banned militant organisations such as the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), Islamic State Khorasan (ISIS-K), and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). While Pakistan and the US have long engaged in counterterrorism dialogues, this is the first time their joint statement has explicitly named groups like the BLA. It follows the US State Department’s decision to formally designate the BLA and its suicide unit, the Majeed Brigade, as Foreign Terrorist Organisations (FTOs). In the joint statement, the US praised Pakistan’s efforts to contain terrorist threats, expressed condolences over civilian and security force casualties in attacks such as the Jaffar Express bombing and the Khuzdar school bus blast. Pakistan and the US reiterated their commitment to collaborate in multilateral platforms, including the UN, to advance lasting counterterrorism strategies. Relations between both countries have improved since Trump’s second term, marked by high-level exchanges, Pakistan’s US-assisted arrest and extradition of a 2021 Kabul Airport attack mastermind, which in turn was praised by Donald Trump in his first US Congress address.

Pakistan: 50 militants neutralised in Balochistan 
On 13 August, Dawn reported that from 7 to 9 August, security forces carried out successful operations in the Sambaza area of Zhob district, resulting in the killing of 47 militants, while three others were taken down in consequent operations. This follows as the security forces thwarted an infiltration attempt by militants trying to enter Balochistan’s Zhob district from Afghanistan. Three more militants linked to the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) were killed during a “sanitisation operation” on 11 August, with authorities recovering arms and ammunition from them.

In a separate incident, nine soldiers, including an officer, were killed and six wounded when militants ambushed a convoy in Washuk, near the Iran border. The attackers targeted a police station in Basima, injuring three officers before being repelled. A grenade blast in Sibi wounded a police officer. No group has claimed responsibility for the Sibi attacks.

The Middle East and Africa
Iran: France, Germany, and the UK indicate reinstatement of sanctions 
On 12 August, foreign ministers of France, Germany and the UK wrote to the UN, stating that they would be prepared to “trigger the snapback mechanism” built into the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) if Iran does not express willingness to “reach a diplomatic solution before the end of August 2025 or does not seize the opportunity of an extension” about negotiations with the international community over the development of its nuclear programme. The three European countries, along with China and Russia, are the remaining parties to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) signed with Iran. It involves the withdrawal of sanctions on Iran in exchange for restrictions on its nuclear programme. The US withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018. This development comes after delegations of the three countries conducted dialogue with Iran in Istanbul in July this year, in the aftermath of Israeli and US strikes on the country's nuclear installations in June.

Chad: Opposition leader Masra sentenced to 20 years in jail for inciting ethnic violence
On 11 August, Chad’s former Prime Minister and opposition leader Succes Masra was sentenced to 20 years in prison for disseminating racist and xenophobic messages that incited violence. He was accused, along with 67 co-defendants from the same Ngambayae group, of causing a clash between herders and farmers in May in Logone Occidental. This fight left 35 people dead and six injured. Masra denied the charges against him. He served as Prime Minister under President Mahamat Deby during the transitional period.

Gambia: Outrage after an infant died from female genital mutilation
On 12 August, the death of a one-month-old baby girl, victim of female genital mutilation, sparked widespread outrage in Gambia. The infant was rushed to a hospital in Banjul after severe bleeding but was declared dead on arrival. While the autopsy is ongoing, many have linked her death to FGM, a practice which is said to be illegal in the country since 2015. Two women were arrested for their alleged involvement in the baby’s death.

Mali: Soldiers arrested over an alleged coup plot 
On 12 August, Mali’s military government arrested dozens of soldiers accused of plotting to overthrow the junta government led by General Assimi Goita, who came to power through the 2020 and 2021 coups. According to AFP, up to 50 soldiers were involved in the coup attempt. In May, the junta dissolved all political parties and delayed elections until 2030.

Europe and the Americas
The War in Ukraine: EU joint statement reiterates Kyiv's participation in peace talks; Trump states that Russia and Ukraine will have to cede territories to end the conflict
On 11 August, EU member states, except Hungary, issued a joint statement ahead of the Trump-Putin meeting. The statement reiterated that “the path to peace in Ukraine cannot be decided without Ukraine," and that any peace deal must be by international law and inclusive of Ukraine's independence and territorial integrity. Ukraine's DeepState war map revealed that Russian forces had advanced by at least ten km (six miles) north in their campaign to take control of Ukraine's Donetsk region. On 10 August, Trump stated that Russia and Ukraine will have to cede territories to end the war and that his meeting with Putin on 15 August in Alaska would be a “feel-out meeting” to assess Moscow’s willingness. He stated that a future meeting could include President Zelensky making a three-way session with the US, Russia and Ukraine possible.

The US: Trump calls to remove Intel CEO for alleged ties with China
On 8 August, the BBC reported that US President Donald Trump demanded that the Intel chipmakers immediately resign for having problematic ties with China. Trump stated that the CEO, Lip-Bu-Tan, had alleged investments in companies tied to China. Tan was recently made the CEO of the firm Intel. The company has received billions of US dollars aimed at rebuilding America’s semiconductor industry. Intel replied that it has been making significant investments to align itself with Trump's “America First Agenda.”  They stated: "Intel, the Board of Directors, and Lip-Bu Tan are deeply committed to advancing US national and economic security interests.”


About the authors
Padmashree Anandhan, Anu Maria Joseph and Femy Francis are Project Associates at NIAS. Abhiruchi Chowdhury is a Research Assistant at NIAS. Kasvi Batra is a Research Intern at NIAS. Brighty Ann Sarah and R Preetha are postgraduate students at the Department of International Studies, Stella Maris College, Chennai. Lekshmi MK is a postgraduate student at the Department of Political Science, Madras Christian College, Chennai. Rizwana Banu, Santhiya M and Aparna A Nair are undergraduate students at the Department of Political Science, Madras Christian College, Chennai. M Kejia is an undergraduate student at the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Pondicherry University, Pondicherry. Swati Sood is an undergraduate student at Vivekananda College, University of Delhi. Vaihali Chittrothu is an undergraduate student at the Department of Political Science, St Ann's College for Women, Hyderabad.


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May 2026 | CWA # 2090

Brighty Ann Sarah

The US-Iran War, Week Ten:
Fraying Ceasefire, Renewed Negotiations and the Risk of a Stalemate
May 2026 | CWA # 2088

Nithin V

King Charles's US Visit:
Emphasis on strong bilateral relations, democratic values and security cooperation
May 2026 | CWA # 2086

Aishal Hab Yousuf

UAEs Exit from OPEC:
Implications for the Middle East and the Energy Market
May 2026 | CWA # 2083

Brighty Ann Sarah

The US-Iran War, Week Nine:
Deadlocked Negotiations, Competing Agendas and Domestic Pressure
May 2026 | CWA # 2082

Akshath Kaimal

Escalating Violence in Mali:
Between Ethnic Insurgencies, Jihadist Attacks, and Military Coups
April 2026 | CWA # 2079

Aishal Hab Yousuf

Japans New Defence Posture:
From Post-War Pacifism to Strategic Recalibration and Autonomy
April 2026 | CWA # 2074

Brighty Ann Sarah

Israel-Lebanon Ceasefire:
Asymmetric Terms, Fragile Truce and Israeli Occupation
April 2026 | CWA # 2073

Akshath Kaimal

The US-Iran War, Week Eight:
A Fragile Ceasefire, Attempts to Control Hormuz and the Stalled Talks in Islamabad
April 2026 | CWA # 2072

Anu Maria Joseph

Three Years of War in Sudan
Prolonged Stalemate, Humanitarian Cost, External Interventions and Regional Fallouts
April 2026 | CWA # 2069

Padmashree Anandhan

The War in Ukraine
Expanding Drone Warfare, Russia's Strategic Patience and Ukraine's Diplomatic Outreach
April 2026 | CWA # 2068

Femy Francis

China-Japan Tensions
Escalating Defence Posturing and Economic Decoupling
April 2026 | CWA # 2067

Anu Maria Joseph

Conflicts in Africa
Continuing Conflicts in Sudan, South Sudan and DR Congo, Security issues in Nigeria, and Political Instability in Madagascar
April 2026 | CWA # 2066

Akshath Kaimal

The Pakistan-Afghanistan Conflict
Recurrent Clashes, Defiant Taliban, Contesting Narratives and Emerging Chinas Role
April 2026 | CWA # 2065

Lakshmi Venugopal Menon

The Middle East (JanMar 2026):
The US-Iran War, Israel-Hamas Conflict and their interconnected fallouts
April 2026 | CWA # 2064

Anwesha Ghosh

Afghanistan (JanMar 2026):
Gender Repression, Leadership Rifts, Regional Realignments and Clashes with Pakistan
April 2026 | CWA # 2063

Ramya B

Russia (Jan-Mar 2026)
Assertive Military Posture, Attempts for an Economic Turnaround and Search for Partners
April 2026 | CWA # 2062

Himani Pant

Europe (Jan-Mar 2026)
Trade diversification & FTAs, Increased defence spending, Tightening irregular migration and Economic slowdown
April 2026 | CWA # 2061

S Shaji

Africa (Jan-Mar 2026)
Elections, Civil Wars, Militancy and Peace Initiatives
April 2026 | CWA # 2059

Adarsh Vijay

India and the World(Jan-Mar 2026)
Maintaining Strategic Autonomy, Balancing the US relations and Resetting the China ties
April 2026 | CWA # 2058

Nishchal N Pandey & Mahesh Raj Bhatta

Nepal (Jan-Mar 2026)
Political Upheaval, Generational Change and Economic Uncertainty
April 2026 | CWA # 2057

Bibhu Prasad Routray

Myanmar (Jan-Mar 2026)
An Illegitimate Regimes Consolidation Game
April 2026 | CWA # 2056

Ashik J Bonofer

Southeast Asia (Jan-Mar 2026)
Deteriorating situation in Myanmar, Philippines as the ASEAN Chair, New government in Thailand, and Economic & Environmental challenges
April 2026 | CWA # 2055

Haans J Freddy

East Asia (Jan-Mar 2026)
Chinas military operations near Taiwan, Japan-China tensions and South Koreas security challenges
April 2026 | CWA # 2054

Amrita Jash

Chinas External Landscape (Jan-Mar 2026):
Regional assertion, Pragmatic recalibration with the West and Avoiding military entanglement in the Middle East
April 2026 | CWA # 2052

Shreya Upadhyay

The United States(Jan-Mar2026)
Tariffs, Ukraine, Iran and Operationalization of Trumps World Order
March 2026 | CWA # 2039

Femy Francis

Trump-Xi Meeting
Why did Trump reschedule it? What does that mean?
March 2026 | CWA # 2035

Akshath Kaimal

Pakistan-Afghanistan Conflict
Broken ceasefire, Expanding military strikes and Worsening humanitarian situation
March 2026 | CWA # 2033

Mahesh Bhatta

Nepal after elections:
Five major challenges for the new government
March 2026 | CWA # 2024

Lekshmi MK

The UN and the Iran-US War
UNSC Resolution 2817 between Clear and Unified Message and Manifest Injustice
March 2026 | CWA # 2023

Femy Francis

Chinas Two Sessions 2026
New Five-Year Plan, Ethnic Unity Law, and an Enhanced Defence Budget
March 2026 | CWA # 2019

Akshath Kaimal

Rising Violence in Nigeria
Limited State Capacity, Multiple Actors, and a Complex Security Environment
March 2026 | CWA # 2012

Padmashree Anandhan

The War in Ukraine
Long-range strikes, Defence adaptation and the EUs energy dependence
March 2026 | CWA # 2010

Mahesh Bhatta

Nepal Elections 2026
The Rise of the New and the Fall of the Old
March 2026 | CWA # 2009

Sreemaya Nair

Nepal Elections 2026
Rise of a new leadership and Reset in political landscape
March 2026 | CWA # 2004

Akshath Kaimal

The Forgotten South Sudan Conflict
Instability returns, with a fragile peace agreement, uptick in violence and limited international engagement
March 2026 | CWA # 2003

Yesasvi Koganti

PM Modis Visit to Israel
From bilateral ties to a special strategic partnership
February 2026 | CWA # 1998

Anu Maria Joseph

Instability in Sudan
Response to the genocide call and the threats of a regional spillover
February 2026 | CWA # 1985

Abhimanyu Solanki

Basant in Pakistan
The return of Basant, and what it signifies
February 2026 | CWA # 1977

Anu Maria Joseph

Violence in Nigeria
US military deployment amidst worsening insurgency
February 2026 | CWA # 1976

Lekshmi MK

The War in Ukraine
The Geneva Talks and Growing Negotiation Asymmetry
December 2025 | CWA # 1971

Vani Vyshnavi Jupudi

Pakistan Budget 2025-26
Legislating stabilisation under IMF discipline and coalition constraints
December 2025 | CWA # 1970

Aparna A Nair

Pakistan & China
Ten Years of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)
November 2025 | CWA # 1968

Vani Vyshnavi Jupudi

Pakistan and the US
A New opening, or another cycle?
February 2026 | CWA # 1959

Yesasvi Koganti

UK and China
PM Keir Starmers visit and the Recalibration of Economic, Strategic, and Domestic ties
January 2026 | CWA # 1946

R Preetha

The Davos Summit 2026
Five Major Takeaways from The World Economic Forum
December 2025 | CWA # 1931

Padmashree Anandhan

NATO Summit 2025
December 2025 | CWA # 1924

Padmashree Anandhan

NATO Summit 2025
August 2025 | CWA # 1801

R Preetha

28 August 1963
Martin Luther King's "I Have a Dream" speech and the Civil Rights Movement in the US
August 2025 | CWA # 1790

GP Team

The World This Week#323-324
The Trump-Putin meeting & the US-China tariff extension
August 2025 | CWA # 1780

Abhiruchi Chowdhury

Trump tariffs:
Weaponization of access to the US economy
August 2025 | CWA # 1779

GP Team

The World This Week#322
US tariffs on India, Brazil and Canada & the EU-US trade deal
August 2025 | CWA # 1778

Lekshmi MK

28 July 1914
Austria-Hungary declares war on Serbia, starting the First World War
July 2025 | CWA # 1770

Abhiruchi Chowdhury

Pakistan-Afghanistan relations:
Why the focus on terrorism, refugees, and Uzbekistan as the third partner?
July 2025 | CWA # 1769

GP Team

The World This Week#321
Indian PM Modi's visit to the Maldives I Elections to the Upper House in Japan
July 2025 | CWA # 1762

Lekshmi MK

Ocean Darkening: 
What is the phenomenon? What are its effects? And who are more vulnerable?
July 2025 | CWA # 1749

R Preetha

Africa as the Hunger Epicenter
Of the 13 Global Hunger Hotspots, 8 are in Africa: Five reasons why
July 2025 | CWA # 1748

GP Team

The World This Week #318
PM Modi’s Visit to Trinidad and Tobago & Ghana, One big beautiful bill, and Quad Foreign Ministers Meeting
July 2025 | CWA # 1744

Chittrothu Vaihali

EU-Canada Summit 2025
What is security and defence partnership all about?
July 2025 | CWA # 1742

IPRI Team

Conflict Weekly # 287-88
The 12 Day War and the Congo-Rwanda Peace Deal
July 2025 | CWA # 1738

Fleur Elizabeth Philip

Thailand and Cambodia
What was the phone call between PM Shinawatra and President of Senate Hun Sen? What is the border dispute between the two? Why has this become an issue?
June 2025 | CWA # 1735

Padmashree Anandhan

NATO Summit 2025:
Trump making Europe great again
June 2025 | CWA # 1734

GP Team

The World This Week #317
NATO Summit 2025 and Russia-Mali bilateral agreements
June 2025 | CWA # 1733

Ananya Dinesh

China and the Pacific Islands 
What was the recent China-PIC joint statement about? What it says, and what it means?
June 2025 | CWA # 1728

M Kejia

G7 Summit 2025:
The Focus on the Middle East and Trade negotiations
June 2025 | CWA # 1726

GP Team

The World This Week #316
China-Central Asia Summit in Kazakhstan, and the G7 Summit in Canada
June 2025 | CWA # 1725

Brighty Ann Sarah, R Preetha, Santhiya M, Aparna A Nair & M Kejia

Operation Midnight Hammer: US bombs three nuclear sites in Iran
What were the three Iranian nuclear sites that were targeted? What are the B2 Bombers and Bunker Buster Bombs? What do these attacks mean? What Next?
June 2025 | CWA # 1724

IPRI Team

Conflict Weekly #286
The Spiralling Israel-Iran Crisis, and the Dangerous Hunger Hotspots
June 2025 | CWA # 1721

Rizwana Banu S and Santhiya M

Who are the Afrikaners?
Why is Trump interested in the Afrikaner question in South Africa?
June 2025 | CWA # 1720

Lekshmi MK

New WMO Report on Arctic Warming
What are the social, economic and environmental implications of Arctic warming
June 2025 | CWA # 1719

J Yamini  

China’s EV Surge
What contributes to the rise of BYD
June 2025 | CWA # 1717

J Yamini

Gender Violence in Pakistan:
What are the larger issues in the Noor Mukadam case?
June 2025 | CWA # 1715

Femy Francis

The US-China:
On Tariffs, Rare Earths and Visas
June 2025 | CWA # 1713

GP Team

The World This Week #315
The UN Ocean Conference in France and the US-China Meeting in London
June 2025 | CWA # 1709

IPRI Team

Conflict Weekly #284-285
Cambodia-Thailand Border Tensions, Protests in the US, and the Indigenous Māori question in New Zealand
June 2025 | CWA # 1705

GP Team

The World This Week #314
Elections in South Korea and Poland I China and the Pacific Island Countries I Bangladesh Election Announcement 2026
June 2025 | CWA # 1700

R Preetha

Ethiopia bans the TPLF
What does the TPLF ban mean for the Pretoria agreement? What next for Ethiopia?
June 2025 | CWA # 1694

Aashish Ganeshan

The US:
Harvard vs Trump Administration
June 2025 | CWA # 1691

GP Team

The World This Week #313
China-ASEAN-GCC Summit I President Macron's visit to South East Asia I Trump Vs Harvard
May 2025 | CWA # 1690

GP Team

The World This Week #312
Elections in Romania, Portugal & Poland I UK-EU Summit
May 2025 | CWA # 1689

Padmashree Anandhan

Ukraine
Continuing Russia’s Aerial Attacks, despite exchange of prisoners
May 2025 | CWA # 1688

Ayan Datta

Gaza
The Humanitarian Crisis and Israel’s Renewed Offensive
May 2025 | CWA # 1685

Aparna A Nair

UK-EU Summit:
First step towards a reset
May 2025 | CWA # 1683

Aashish Ganeshan

Elections in Portugal:
The Rise of Chega Party and the Search for Political Stability
May 2025 | CWA # 1679

Aashish Ganeshan

US in the Middle Easr
Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia, Qatar and UAE
May 2025 | CWA # 1678

Gauri Gupta

China in Latin America
China-CELAC forum: Strengthening ties with Latin America and Caribbean
May 2025 | CWA # 1677

GP Team

The World This Week #310-311
China in Latin America and the Carribbean I Trump's Middle East Visit I Denmark as the new Arctic Chair
May 2025 | CWA # 1675

Lekshmi MK

Turkey:
PKK disbands after 40 years of armed insurgency
May 2025 | CWA # 1673

Padmashree Anandhan

Ukraine:
The Discussion in Turkiye and the Elusive Ceasefire
May 2025 | CWA # 1672

D Suba Chandran

India and Pakistan:
De-escalation and the “New Normal”
May 2025 | CWA # 1671

Abhiruchi Chowdhury

US, Ukraine and Russia:
Air attacks amidst a Minerals deal and Ceasefire Proposals
May 2025 | CWA # 1670

Fleur Elizabeth Philip

Singapore Elections in 2025:
People’s Action Party (PAP) Wins, Again
May 2025 | CWA # 1667

R Preetha and Brighty Ann Sarah

East Asia:
Tough Tariff Negotiations with the US
May 2025 | CWA # 1666

Padmashree Anandhan

The US-Ukraine
The mineral deal with the US
May 2025 | CWA # 1665
Conflict Weekly # 280-81
India-Pakistan De-escalation I Ukraine Discussion in Istanbul I The Battle over Port Sudan I Disbanding of PKK in Turkiye I France-Algeria Diplomatic Tensions
May 2025 | CWA # 1663

R Preetha

Canada Elections 2025:
What do the results convey? What next for Mark Carney?
March 2024 | CWA # 1251

NIAS Africa Team

Africa This Week
February 2024 | CWA # 1226

NIAS Africa Team

Africa This Week
October 2023 | CWA # 1091

Annem Naga Bindhu Madhuri

Issues for Europe
July 2023 | CWA # 1012

Bibhu Prasad Routray

Myanmar continues to burn
December 2022 | CWA # 879

Padmashree Anandhan

The Ukraine War
November 2022 | CWA # 838

Rishma Banerjee

Tracing Europe's droughts
March 2022 | CWA # 705

NIAS Africa Team

In Focus: Libya
December 2021 | CWA # 630

GP Team

Europe in 2021
October 2021 | CWA # 588

Abigail Miriam Fernandez

TLP is back again
August 2021 | CWA # 528

STIR Team

Space Tourism
September 2019 | CWA # 162

Lakshman Chakravarthy N

5G: A Primer
December 2018 | CWA # 71

Mahesh Bhatta

Nepal
December 2018 | CWA # 70

Nasima Khatoon

The Maldives
December 2018 | CWA # 69

Harini Madhusudan

India
December 2018 | CWA # 68

Sourina Bej

Bangladesh
December 2018 | CWA # 67

Seetha Lakshmi Dinesh Iyer

Afghanistan