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CWA # 1445, 14 August 2024
NIAS Africa Studies
Russia’s increasing footprints in Africa

  Anu Maria Joseph

On 3-8 June, Russia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergei Lavrov visited Guinea, the Republic of Congo and Chad. The major focus of the visit was military partnership and energy investments. Russia-Africa engagements have strengthened since the War in Ukraine. There were frequent visits from Russia and to Russia. Russia’s relations with the continent appear to have taken a new turn with increasing and expanding political, military and economic footprints. The growing footprints have changed the narratives of Russia in Africa in 2024.

Russia’s footprints in Africa
1. Military ties. Russia has been militarily supporting several African countries through its PMCs. It has military cooperation agreements with 43 African countries. Russian mercenaries first appeared in the Central African Republic in 2017. Around 1000 Russian PMC troops have been fighting the rebels in the country. In Libya, around 300 Wagner troops have been fighting alongside Khalifa Haftar in the civil war since 2018. In Sudan, the Wagner Group allegedly supported the Omar al Bashir to suppress the 2019 revolution. Initially, there were reports of the Group supporting the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in the Sudanese civil war. Following the French withdrawal, the Wagner Group expanded its footprints in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, fighting Islamist insurgency. Despite the death of Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin, the group has continued its activities with the support of the Russian government. Besides, Russia has been supplying weapons to Angola, Mali, Ethiopia, Sudan, Algeria, Nigeria, Niger, Libya, Rwanda and Burkina Faso.

2. Political ties. Russia hosted the second Russia-Africa Summit on 27 July 2023. 49 African countries participated in the summit. It emphasised the principles of “sovereign equality of States, non-interference in their internal affairs, respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and the right of all peoples to self-determination.” Besides, Lavrov and the Russian delegation's visits have increased in the past year. Lavrov visited Guinea, the Republic of Congo, Burkina Faso, Chad, Kenya, Sudan, Mali, Mauritania, South Africa, Eritrea, Angola, and Eswatini in a year. Visits by the Russian delegation to African countries including Mali, and Burkina Faso have become frequent. Besides, several African heads, ministers and delegations have been visiting Russia; Burkina Faso’s defence minister in November 2023, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed in July 2023, Chad’s military head in January 2024, Sudanese delegation in June 2024, and the Republic of Congo President Denis Sassou Nguesso in June 2024. In December 2023, Russia reopened its embassy in Burkina Faso after 30 years. Russia has also been providing aid and expanding its investments in Africa’s health and education sectors.

3. Trade and energy. Africa’s imports from Russia account for less than one per cent. Exports from Africa to Russia are even smaller. The country has a major presence in Africa’s mining and energy sector apart from oil and gas. Russia’s mining investments in Africa include gold from Sudan, cobalt and coltan from the Democratic Republic of Congo, platinum and diamonds from Zimbabwe, nickel and manganese from South Africa, Uranium from Namibia, and gold and diamond from the Central African Republic. Egypt and Nigeria have signed a nuclear cooperation agreement and preliminary plans to build nuclear plants. South Africa’s Koeberg Nuclear Power Station is the only one in Africa, supported by Russian technology. 

Russia’s growing influence in Africa: Factors and Actors
The following are the factors and actors behind Russia’s growing influence in Africa. 

1. Successful Russia-Africa Summit 2023. In July 2023, Russia successfully hosted the second Russia-Africa summit. 17 heads of state attended the summit. Putin promised 25,000 to 50,000 tonnes of grain to six African countries including Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Eritrea, Mali, Somalia and Zimbabwe, clearing the uncertainties following the suspension of the grain deal. Although Russia’s rejection of Africa’s peace plan in Ukraine brought unfavourable narratives, Putin successfully diverted the focus to the joint declaration to counter neocolonialism. 92 agreements, contracts and memoranda of understanding, worth USD 12.5 billion were signed during the summit. 

2. Ukraine War. Russia has increased seeking African alliances following the onset of the War in Ukraine, a move to gather support in the UN. 17 of the 54 African countries abstained from a UN vote condemning Russia's invasion in 2022. While the EU reduced its reliance on Russian supplies, Russia has been trying to find alternative markets in Africa.

3. Coups and authoritarian shift. Nine military coups occurred in Africa since 2020; two in Mali, Sudan and Burkina Faso and one each in Guinea, Gabon and Niger. Military coups and authoritarian shifts in Africa have always been favourable to Russia. Unlike the West, Russia’s engagements in Africa do not come with the baggage of democratic values. This has encouraged African juntas and populist illiberal leaders to forge Russia’s partnership.

4. West losing the ground. Since 2020, anti-West sentiments have been strengthening in West Africa and beyond. It is attributed to the West’s failure in fighting the Islamist insurgency and its interventionist approach. The West’s approach in Africa was always perceived as paternalistic and neocolonial. Western countries’ lucrative ties with African populist leaders received public scepticism. This led to anti-West protests and pro-Russia narratives across West Africa. While French forces in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso and the US forces in Niger were asked to withdraw, Russia introduced itself as an alternative to fill the vacuum.

5. Russia’s successful narratives and Africa’s positive responses. Russia’s modus operandi has been based on equal partnership, and a non-interventionist approach, placing it as the right alternative to the neocolonial West. Its narrative as a security provider without involvement in internal affairs is a partner in the best interest of African leaders. Pro-Russian narratives accompanied the anti-West sentiments simultaneously. Russia has gained popular support across Africa. Financial Times quoted a Malian media representative: “Down to the last peasant in the last village, if you ask them who’s working in the best interests of Africans, they’ll say Russia.” 

Major Issues
The following are the major issues of Russia’s increasing engagements in Africa.

1. Human rights allegations. Several human rights groups have accused the Russian mercenaries of carrying out human rights atrocities in West African countries. In 2023, Human Rights Watch found out that the Wagner Group executed nearly 300 people in Mali under suspicion of involvement with jihadists. In the Central African Republic, the UN accused the Wagner forces and instructors, fighting the rebels alongside the government forces since 2017, of more than 500 incidents of human rights violations including extrajudicial killings, torture and sexual violence. 

2. Allegations of Russian propaganda. Many Western countries accuse Russia of using tactics of disinformation propaganda, and deception to bring African countries under Russian influence. They accuse Russia of infiltrating pro-Russian narratives equating it with anti-neocolonialism. Financial Times quoted a report by Meta which found around 30 networks in Africa, the majority pushing pro-Russia narratives. 

3. Democratic degradation. While Russia placed itself as an alternative to the West, African countries are more incentivised to move away from the West. Series of coups, increasing authoritarian governments and illiberal democracies were outcomes that followed. It has undermined Africa’s democratic aspirations. 

4. Conflict multiplier. The involvement of Russian paramilitaries has worsened several civil conflicts in African countries. During the Libyan civil war, the Wagner Group supported Khalifa Hafter to secure access to oil fields. The group was also allegedly supporting the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in the Sudanese civil war. 

Conclusion
Russia’s influence in Africa has strengthened in the past two years. It has secured African allies through the narratives of anti-neocolonialism and equal partnership. Russia is committed to showcasing its power by being Africa’s security provider. Africa has become the geopolitical flashpoint for Russia in its competition against the West. Additionally, it serves Russia’s economic interests in securing markets and minerals. With the African countries, Russia has been modelling a multipolar world far off from Western influence. However, Russian footprints in Africa accompany several uncertainties. The Western forces were able to contain the Islamist insurgency in West Africa for a long time. Following the withdrawal of the Western forces, the frequency of attacks has increased and the Tuareg rebellion is said to have re-emerged in the region. According to Relief Web Terrorism Index 2023, the number of attacks has increased with Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger topping the ranking. Although Russian forces have replaced the Western forces, their capacity to address the insurgency in the region is uncertain. Besides, Russia’s engagements in Africa come at the cost of human rights and democracy. While Russia successfully expands its footprints in Africa, apparent objectives and unclear methodologies are Africa’s concerns.  

About the author
Ana Maria Joseph is a Research Associate at NIAS.

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