NIAS Africa Studies

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CWA # 1600, 19 February 2025
NIAS Africa Studies
Iran in Africa: Strategic Interests and Expanding Footprints

  Trisha Roy

Iran has launched a comprehensive approach to deepen ties with African countries through economic partnerships, military alliances and diplomatic relations. This was underscored by President Ebrahim Raisi’s historic visit to Kenya, Uganda and Zimbabwe in 2023. Raisi executed thirteen agreements during his tour including Zimbabwe uranium exploration agreements and deals worth USD 500 million for Ugandan agricultural development and establishing a Kenyan telecommunications infrastructure project via technological transfers. The Iran-Africa Trade Summit in April 2024 prioritized joint ventures in mining, with Tehran offering to share drone surveillance technology for mineral exploration in exchange for cobalt and lithium concessions in Zimbabwe and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Pharmaceutical exports also featured prominently, with Iranian state-owned companies like Darou Pakhsh securing contracts to supply antiretroviral drugs to Uganda and Mozambique. However, growing scepticism among African countries was accentuated by the muted attendance over Iran’s capacity to deliver large-scale investments due to its struggling economy amid ongoing Western sanctions.

Additionally, Iran has also deployed military cooperation in Africa. For instance, its drone supply agreements with juntas of Burkina Faso and Mali in 2024, including Tehran’s indigenous Ababil-2 and Mohajer-6 drones. The use of these drones against Islamic jihadist groups like ama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) points to Iran’s increasing presence in the security sphere of Sahel. Further, if advanced negotiations between Niger’s post-coup government and Tehran follow through, Iran would gain access to 300 metric tons of uranium ore worth more than USD 56 million, furthering its nuclear weapons program. In exchange, Iran would provide economic aid, agricultural assistance, drones and surface-to-air missiles to the Niger’s junta. Iran has also enhanced its cultural footprint, with state-funded cultural centres in Dakar and Abuja promoting Shia Islam among Sunni-majority populations.

Iran’s Major Footprints in Africa  
Iran’s influence operations in Africa reflect a calculated blend of statecraft and asymmetric warfare, tailored to exploit regional instability and anti-Western sentiment:

Economic Partnerships: Iran’s established trade hubs in Nairobi, Harare, and Dakar function as sanctions-busting conduits, facilitating the exchange of Iranian products for African raw materials using a mix of gold reserves and local currencies to bypass dollar-based transactions. For example, Zimbabwe now supplies 15 per cent of Iran’s lithium imports in exchange for Iranian tractors and mining equipment. 

Military Exports: Iran’s supply of loitering munitions to Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) helped destroy Sudanese Army armour in April 2024, suggesting Tehran’s willingness to arm non-state actors. Its Mohajer-6 drones, maintained by Iranian technicians from a secret base in Gao, have also facilitated Mali’s Air Force conduct strikes against Tuareg rebels in northern Mali. This has helped Iran gain leverage over African militaries dependent on Tehran’s arms.

Ideological Outreach: Iran’s religious networks have made inroads among Africa’s Shia minorities. The Al-Mustafa International University in Qom now hosts 1,200 African seminarians, primarily from Nigeria and Tanzania, who return home to propagate Khomeinist ideology. In Senegal, the Iranian Cultural House sponsors annual Ashura processions attended by 20,000 devotees, challenging Saudi-backed Wahhabi institutions. This soft power offensive complements harder security measures.

Diplomatic Mobilization: Iran has skilfully aligned with Africa’s anti-imperialist currents. At the 2023 Russia-Africa Summit, Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian proposed a “Tripartite Axis” linking Moscow, Tehran, and African countries against NATO “neo-colonialism.” This rhetoric resonated in Bamako and Ouagadougou, where post-coup regimes have expelled French troops and welcomed Russian Wagner mercenaries. Iran capitalized on this shift by dispatching IRGC advisors to train Burkina Faso’s elite Cobra Force in urban counterinsurgency.

Why does Africa matter to Iran?
Five interlocking factors drive Tehran’s African pivot amid escalating Middle Eastern pressures:  

First, sanctions evasion. Africa’s fragmented financial systems allow Iran to launder oil revenues through shell companies in Djibouti and Mauritius. The Central Bank of Iran now holds USD 800 million in gold reserves via Zimbabwean intermediaries, circumventing SWIFT restrictions. Additionally, Iran’s 2024 agreement with South Africa to trade oil for spare auto parts—using a blockchain-based ledger—demonstrates how African partnerships provide technological workarounds to sanctions.  

Second, resource access. With China dominating Africa’s rare earth minerals, Iran has targeted secondary resources crucial for its military-industrial complex. Niger’s uranium deposits could reduce Iran’s reliance on Russian-supplied reactor fuel, while Zimbabwean lithium enhances its drone battery production. Iran’s 2024 deal with Uganda for cobalt—a key component in missile guidance systems—highlights how African resources underpin its defence modernization.  

Third, anti-Western alliances. The Sahel’s anti-French revolutions have created a geopolitical vacuum which Iran is uniquely positioned to fill. Mali’s 2022 expulsion of France’s Barkhane Force and Niger’s 2024 cancellation of US drone base agreements mirror Tehran’s confrontations with Western powers. By offering cheap arms and UN diplomatic cover, Iran positions itself as a partner in their “second liberation” from perceived Western imperialism.  

Fourth, geopolitical diversification. As Hezbollah struggles under Israeli bombardment and Houthi rebels face Saudi-backed counteroffensives, Africa provides Iran with a lower-risk theatre to project power. The 2024 deployment of IRGC advisors to Burkina Faso—far from US Central Command’s Middle Eastern bases—allows Tehran to test hybrid warfare tactics without direct confrontation. Similarly, Iran’s mediation role in Sudan’s civil war, where it arms both the RSF and government-aligned Popular Defense Forces, mirrors its “controlled chaos” strategy in Syria and Iraq.  

Fifth, soft power expansion. Iran’s Africa strategy extends beyond governments. The 2023 launch of Hausa TV, broadcasting pro-Palestinian content to 60 million Hausa speakers in Nigeria and Niger, counters Saudi-funded Arabic channels. Meanwhile, scholarships for 500 Malian students at the Tehran University of Medical Sciences build long-term goodwill, creating a pro-Iranian professional class. 

What does it mean?
The erosion of Iran’s Middle Eastern “Axis of Resistance” has forced a strategic reorientation toward Africa. This has redirected Iranian resources toward Sahelian jihadist groups. In Mali, IRGC-Quds Force operatives now coordinate with JNIM, providing explosives training in exchange for safe havens to stockpile weapons. This mirrors Tehran’s 1980s playbook in Lebanon but adapts it to Africa’s stateless border regions.  

Simultaneously, Iran leverages great power rivalries to amplify its influence. China’s reluctance to directly arm Sahelian juntas has made Tehran their primary arms supplier. Russia’s approval of these arrangements—evidenced by joint Iran-Russia naval exercises off Sudan in March 2024—reflects Moscow’s interest in using Iran as a cost-effective proxy to destabilize French interests.  

Africa’s ambivalence toward the Israel-Gaza conflict further aids Iran. During the 2024 UN vote condemning Hamas’ October 7 attacks, some African countries abstained and few voted against—a contrast to near-universal Western condemnation Meanwhile, Iran’s mediation in Sudan’s civil war—arming factions while posing as a peacemaker—illustrates its dual strategy of chaos and diplomacy to secure Red Sea access.

However, challenges persist. Declining attendance at the 2024 Iran-Africa summit hints at scepticism among some African leaders, while competition with Turkey and China in sectors like construction and telecoms tests Iran’s limited economic capacity120. Nevertheless, Tehran’s ability to offer affordable arms and ideological solidarity ensures its relevance, particularly in unstable Sahel states. 

About the author
Trisha Roy is a PhD Scholar at Christ (Deemed To Be) University, Bangalore.

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