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CWA # 1392, 23 July 2024
NIAS Europe Studies
Poland: Tusk’s centrist coalition wins narrowly; Far-right gains ground

  Ayan Datta

By Ayan Datta,

Introduction
On 09 June, Poland held its elections for the European Parliament. Poland is the fifth largest contributor of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). For 2024, Poland elected 53 MEPs, one more than in the 2019 elections, because the UK’s seats were redistributed among EU member-states after Brexit. Poland acceded to the EU in 2003 and has held EU Parliament elections since 2004. For election purposes, the country is divided into 13 constituencies. Based on geographic trends in the past ten years’ voting behaviour, these constituencies can be classified as belonging to eastern and western regions.

Since 2009 Poland’s two established parties have dominated in EU elections: the right-wing Law and Justice and the centrist Civic Platform. The Law and Justice party is part of the European Conservatives (ECR) group because of their shared Euroscepticism and right-wing values.  Civic Platform is aligned with the European People’s Party (EPP) group at the European Parliament because of their shared centrist policies and support for European integration. Multiple minor parties play an active role in the political process, including the agrarian Polish People’s Party, left-wing parties like the Democratic Left Alliance and Labour Union, and the far-right Confederation. However, the Polish elections reflect a strong two-party dominant system led by the established parties, with minor parties struggling to gain ground. Poland’s National Election Commission is responsible for conducting the EU parliament elections. The voting follows a proportional representation system with open lists and preferential voting. Voters can choose specific candidates from their preferred party lists. Polish citizens over 18 years old and EU citizens over 21 residing in Poland are eligible to vote in the elections. As per EU rules, all parties are subject to a six per cent threshold for securing seats in the EU Parliament.

How they voted
Voter turnouts saw a slight drop compared to the EU 2019 elections. In 2019 Poland saw a record-high turnout of 45.7 per cent whereas in 2024 the rate reduced to 40.7 per cent. The decline in voter participation can be attributed to the lack of intense campaigning by the two major parties and apathy towards EU politics among younger voters. Indeed, only 25 per cent of the eligible voters between ages 18-29 showed up to a polling booth. However, around half of all eligible citizens above 50 cast their votes. Voter fatigue was another reason for the low turnout, as Poland completed its local elections in April.

The election revealed multiple demographic trends. According to exit polls, the Confederation, a coalition of far-right parties including Coalition for the Renewal of the Republic (KORWiN), National Movement, and Confederation of the Polish Crown, was the most popular party among young voters. 30 per cent of Poles aged between 18-29 years supported preferred thefar-right coalition, the Confederation’s focus on cultural and religious nationalism, small government, opposition to established parties, and distrust of immigrants. However, voters above 30 strongly supported the two established parties. Civic Platform was massively popular among middle-aged voters, with around 30 to 40 per cent between the ages of 30 and 50 considering it their preferred choice. These voters favoured the party’s focus on improving Poland’s position within the EU, supporting Ukraine’s efforts against Russia, and socio-economic reforms in Poland. The 50-to-59-year-old demographic was split between the right and the centre, with Civic Platform and Law and Justice enjoying 40 per cent support among this age group.

The election outcomes reaffirmed the continuing geographic divide between the East and West. Eastern Poland, with its agricultural economy and devoutly religious population, preferred the right wing. Law and Justice won 10 out of 18 seats in the eastern districts. Warsaw, and western Poland, with their urban societies and industrially advanced economies, preferred Civic Platform. The party won 15 out of the 35 seats in these two regions. The far-right Confederation gained seats from both regions. However, because of its low overall popularity, it received very few seats and could not break the geographic divide. Led by the current Prime Minister, Donald Tusk, Civic Platform won a narrow victory in the elections. The party contested as the leaders of a larger centrist coalition called the Civic Coalition. The Tusk-led coalition secured 23 of Poland’s 53 seats and 37 per cent votes. Civic Coalition’s victory reflected growing support among the electorate for the rule of law, strong ties with the EU, and liberal economic policies. Law and Justice, led by Jarosław Kaczyński, followed closely behind with 20 seats and 36.16 per cent votes. This was the first time in ten years that Law and Justice did not win a Polish election. The party’s vote share fell by over ten per cent compared to the previous EU Parliament elections of 2019. The decline in Law and Justice’s popularity reflected growing disapproval among the electorate for their Eurosceptic vision and conservative policies on social issues like abortion.

The Left alliance secured three seats and a 12 per cent vote share among the minor parties. The far-right coalition Confederation was the surprise performer in the polls. Led by Janusz Ryszard Korwin-Mikke, Confederation crossed the six per cent threshold for the first time since its founding. The alliance secured three seats and 12.1 per cent votes. Although it received significant support from the youth, it failed to upset the country’s two-party dominant system because of the low participation of young voters. Confederation gained ground, but there was no far-right shift among the electorate.

Civic Coalition strengthened the EPP with 23 seats at the level of European parliament groups, while Law and Justice strengthened the ECR with 20 seats. The three Left MEPs aligned with the S&D Group, reflecting their shared socialist values.

Performance of major parties in the past three EU parliament elections
2009: Civic Platform wins comfortably, Law and Justice’s Eurosceptic agenda fails
In the past ten years, EU parliament elections in Poland reflected varying levels of participation from the electorate and reinforced the dominance of established parties. The 2009 elections saw a low voter turnout of 24.5 per cent. Civic Platform secured a comfortable victory, winning 25 out of Poland’s 51 seats and 44 per cent votes. Poland joined the EU in 2003, and this was the country’s second EU parliament election. Victory for Civic Platform reflected support for Poland’s growing role within the EU and the economic benefits of EU membership. The results also reflected the public’s disapproval of Law and Justice’s Euroscepticism, its claims about the loss of Poland’s sovereignty, and its criticism of the EU’s economic policies. Law and Justice had a distant second-place finish, with 15 seats and a 27 per cent vote share. The left-wing coalition of the Democratic Left Alliance and Labour Union secured third place with seven seats and 12.34 per cent votes. The agrarian Polish People’s Party, which mainly represented the interests of the eastern region’s agrarian classes, finished fourth with three seats and 7.04 per cent. The party’s popularity reflected concerns among Polish farmers about the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and debates on agricultural subsidies.

Out of Poland’s 52 seats in the European Parliament, the EPP group secured 28. Of these, 25 were from Civic Platform and three from the Polish People’s Party. The ECR group secured 15 seats, all from Law and Justice. The S&D group secured seven seats from the Democratic Left Alliance-Labour Union coalition.

2014: Civic Platform wins narrowly; electorate divided on integration, Ukraine conflict and rule of law
In the 2014 elections, the trend of low voter turnouts continued. Only 23 per cent of the eligible voters participated. Civic Platform emerged victorious by a narrow margin, securing 19 out of Poland’s 52 seats and 32 per cent votes. Close behind was Law and Justice, with 18 seats and 31 per cent votes. The results reflected a divide within the electorate on several issues, including European integration versus Euroscepticism, the conflict in Ukraine, energy dependency on Russia, and judicial independence in Poland. The leftist coalition of the Democratic Left Alliance and Labour Union finished third with five seats and 9.44 per cent votes. The Polish People’s Party secured four seats and 6.80 per cent votes, narrowly crossing the seat threshold.

Out of Poland’s 52 seats in the EU parliament, the EPP group secured 23. Of these, 19 seats were from Civic Platform and four from the Polish People’s Party. The ECR group secured 22 seats: 18 from Law and Justice and one from a minor far-right party, Right Wing of the Republic. The Democratic Left Alliance-Labour Union coalition strengthened the S&D group with five seats.

2019: United Right coalition secures massive victory amid record-high turnout
In 2019, EU Parliament elections in Poland saw a record-high voter turnout of 45.7 per cent, indicating increased electorate engagement with EU issues and institutions. Law and Justice contested the election as part of a coalition of right-wing parties called the United Right. The right-wing alliance secured a decisive victory, securing 27 out of 52 seats and a 45 per cent vote share. This was the highest vote share of any party in Polish elections. The same year, the European Commission launched infringement procedures against Poland on the rule of law issue. The right-wing’s victory reflected concerns among the electorate about the EU’s role in Poland’s domestic politics. Civic Platform finished second with 12 seats and around 21 per cent of the votes. The results once again reflected the divide between pro-European and Eurosceptic voters. The leftist coalition, New Left finished third with five seats.

The United Right contributed to the ECR group’s tally of 27 out of 52 seats from Poland. The EPP group secured 16 seats: 12 from Civic Platform and five from minor right-wing parties. The S&D group gained seven seats: five from the New Left and two from the leftist coalition party, the Democratic Left Alliance-Labour Union.

In ten years of EU Parliament elections in Poland (2009, 2014, and 2019), certain common trends emerged. Voter turnout remained low (below 50 per cent) in all three elections. In 2009 and 2014, the turnout was around 23 per cent. However, in 2019, voter participation saw a significant to 45.70 per cent, indicating heightened engagement. Civil Platform and Law and Justice remained the dominant parties. While the Civic Coalition led the polls in 2009 and 2014, Law and Justice dominated in 2019. Minor parties, like the Democratic Left Alliance-Labour Union coalition and the Polish People’s parties, remained a consistent, though relatively small, presence.

Issues in voting
Immigration and border control
The 2024 European Parliament elections in Poland involved multiple issues that mobilised voters. Immigration via Belarus and strengthening the Polish-Belorussian border became a pressing issue in the polls. Since 2021, Belarus and Russia have coordinated to send thousands of migrants into Poland through the Polish-Belorussian border. Migrants and Belarus border guards killed multiple Polish soldiers in skirmishes. Civic Platform and Law and Justice made migration a significant election issue. Since Tusk became Poland’s Prime Minister in December 2023, Law and Justice leaders accused him of being soft on immigration. Law and Justice leaders argued that after coming to power, Tusk would introduce an EU-backed system to relocate illegal migrants in Europe and normalise the migrants’ legal status.

However, during his EU election campaign, Tusk and his party prioritised immigration and border controls. in January 2024, Tusk rejected the EU’s relocation scheme, stating, “The position of the Polish government [is that] we will not accept any forced mechanism… We will not accept a single migrant.” in February 2024, Prime Minister Tusk stated the “brutal truth” that “the survival of Western civilisation” depended on stopping “uncontrolled migration.” He added “The first and most important task of the Polish state when it comes to the situation at the border is to protect the border, including from illegal migration.” Tusk promised to “fill the gaps and holes” in border policy created by the preceding Law and Justice government, including corruption in the country’s visa regime and the dysfunctional border fence. Tusk’s emphasis on controlling migration expanded his support base beyond traditional centrist voters. According to polling data from Politico, Tusk’s uncompromising stance on immigration might have gained him the support of right-wing voters who would otherwise have voted for Law and Justice or Confederation.

The war in Ukraine
Following Russia’s invasion in 2022, the war in Ukraine became a crucial issue in the elections. The Law and Justice Party initially supported Ukraine’s right to self-defence and supplied it with weapons and humanitarian aid. However, in September 2023, Poland’s Law and Justice Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiechi stated that Poland would not provide any further weapons to Ukraine. However, the Ukrainian cause was popular in Poland. According to the European Commission, 60 per cent of Poles support Ukrainian refugees. Around 70 per cent support closer ties between NATO and Ukraine. Tusk tapped into the pro-Ukrainian sentiment ignored by Law and Justice and resumed military engagement with Ukraine. In January 2024, in a meeting with Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukraine’s President, he announced a defence package from Poland, plans for joint production of weapons, increased Ukraine’s capabilities using “Polish equipment and weapons systems”, and a loan.

Tusk also appealed to Poles who were afraid of Russian aggression. According to the European Commission, 50 per cent of Poles think Russia would attack Poland without provocation. In May 2024, Tusk announced a USD 2.5 billion project to reinforce Poland’s borders with Russia and Belarus. According to the BBC, Tusk appealed to Poles who feared Russian aggression and supported Ukraine. Such appeals together with his firm position on migration from Belarus, explain why Civic Platform’s vote share increased from 21 per cent in 2019 to over 37 per cent in 2024.

Abortion rights
The issue of abortion rights was significant in the elections, particularly for liberal-minded voters. Poland has stringent abortion laws. Under Poland’s previous Law and Justice government, abortions were allowed only if the pregnancy resulted from a crime like rape or incest or if the mother’s life or health were threatened. As part of his campaign, in January 2024, Tusk promised to relax Poland’s abortion laws and give women the right to safe abortion until the 12th week of pregnancy. Abortion rights were important for liberal voters who protested the Law and Justice Party abortion policies multiple times. Tusk’s promises helped him gain young and liberal voters, contributing to his vote share.

Judicial independence and the rule of law
Poland’s dispute with the EU over judicial reforms and the rule of law also influenced public opinion in the run-up to the elections, though to a lesser extent than the previously stated issues. In 2016, the then-ruling Law and Justice government introduced reforms to the country’s highest constitutional court, called the Constitutional Tribunal, giving the government powers to appoint members of the Tribunal. In 2021, the European Commission took action against the Polish government by starting an infringement procedure against it for violating the rule of law and froze EU funds to Poland. Before the 2024 elections, Law and Justice defended the reforms and mobilised their supporters by framing the dispute as an attempt by the EU to interfere in Polish politics. However, Civic Platform opposed the judicial reforms, emphasising the need to align Polish laws with EU standards and uphold judicial independence. After coming to power in 2023, Tusk’s party passed a bill to reverse the reforms. In 2024, the Commission released 137 billion Euros of frozen funds for Poland. Tusk’s decision strengthened his support among pro-European and liberal voters by emphasising his commitment to integration with the EU.

Conclusion: The Road Ahead
1. First, the parties' agendas in the EU parliament
Two major parties will highlight different issues in the EU Parliament. As part of the centrist EPP, Civic Platform is expected to advance policies that strengthen Poland’s integration into the EU regimes. The party will push for greater economic integration among member states by supporting the EU single market and tax policy harmonisation. It will promote liberal economic policies encouraging entrepreneurship, innovation, and competitiveness. Given Tusk’s efforts to resolve the rule of law dispute, his party is likely to promote judicial independence and greater monitoring of EU treaty violations, ensuring that member states align their national laws with EU standards.

As the runners-up of the 2024 elections, Law and Justice will use its position in the EU parliament to strengthen and expand its support base. As part of the ECR, it will advance policies that will help it regain its influence among conservative and Eurosceptic voters. In the EU Parliament, Law and Justice will oppose policies for EU integration and advance member states’ national sovereignty. It will advocate for a limited role of the EU in member-states’ domestic affairs. The party will also promote social policies that encourage traditional family values and oppose liberal policies on abortion and LGBTQ+ rights.

2. The Poland-EU equation in the coming years
In the near future, Poland’s relationship with the EU will likely be marked by multiple trends and policy directions. With Civic Platform Leader Tusk as Prime Minister, the coming years will be a marked departure from the conflictual state of EU-Poland ties during the previous Law and Justice government’s tenure. As part of the EPP, Tusk’s party will foster Poland’s integration into the EU’s political and economic regimes. He is expected to align Poland’s domestic policies more closely with EU standards. Poland will move closer to accepting the European Green Deal and gradually transition from fossil fuels. In foreign policy, Tusk’s party will support the EU’s stance on assisting Ukraine through military, economic, and diplomatic means. However, the Civic coalition will be reluctant to support the EU’s directives on migration, especially the EU’s refugee relocation plan, which Tusk will resist because Poland conflicts with Belarus over the latter’s weaponisation of immigrants.

3. The effects of the new EU-Poland equation on domestic affairs
The Civic Coalition’s rise will lead to greater EU-Poland alignment and cooperation. However, given that its victory margin was extremely thin, the party will balance the aspirations of its pro-European support base with those of the conservative and Eurosceptic voters. Civic Platform will manage EU funds carefully, considering the political divide between the eastern and western regions. On agricultural policy, the party will have to balance its preference for free trade and the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy with Polish farmers’ preferences for state protection and subsidies. With Law and Justice continuing as a significant opposition force, Civic Platform will continue facing internal debates on EU-related issues, particularly of national sovereignty versus EU integration.

References
“Meet the far-right potential kingmakers in Poland’s election,” Politico, 05 September 2023
“Poland’s Tusk under pressure to make good on social revolution,” Politico, 24 November 2023
“Rule of Law: Commission launches infringement procedure against Poland for violations of EU law by its Constitutional Tribunal,” European Commission, 22 December 2021
“How Poland’s Election Results Could Reshape Europe,” Council on Foreign Relations las, 19 October 2023
“Donald Tusk: A Guide to Poland’s New PM Who Wants West’s ‘Full Mobilization' for Ukraine,” Kyiv Post , 13 December, 2023
“Poland will not accept a single migrant under EU relocation scheme,” says Tusk,” Notes from Poland , 4 January 2024
“Survival of Western civilisation” depends on stopping uncontrolled migration, says Polish PM Tusk,” Notes From Poland, 12 February 2024
“War a real threat and Europe not ready, warns Poland's Tusk,”BBC, 30 March 2024
“Poland's political marathon: navigating the road to the 2024 EU elections ,”Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung , 3 June 2024
“'Vote or face war': Poland PM's stark warning ahead of EU election,” bbc.com, 4 June 2024
“Polish soldier stabbed at the Belarus border dies of his injuries as pressure from migrants rises,” AP news, 6 June 2024
“Poland: Tusk not assured victory in EU elections,” Deutsche Welle, 6 June 2024
“Turnout | 2024 European election results,”European Parliament, 21 June 2024
“Advanced search | Search | MEPs,” European Parliament, 25 June 2024
“Home | 2024 European election results | Poland,” European Parliament, 25 June 2024
“European elections,”European Parliament, 25 June 2024
“National results Poland | 2024 Election results | 2024 European election resultst,” European Parliament, 25 June 2024

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