NIAS Europe Studies

Photo Source: Murat Usubali/Anadolu
   NIAS Course on Global Politics
National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS)
Indian Institute of Science Campus, Bangalore
For any further information or to subscribe to GP alerts send an email to subachandran@nias.res.in

CWA # 1457, 24 August 2024
NIAS Europe Studies
Ukraine’s Kursk Offensive: What does Kyiv want to achieve?

  Padmashree Anandhan

On 06 August, the Ukrainian forces began the counter-offensive into the Kursk Oblast. Russian forces were the first to report the fighting in the districts of Kursk. According to the report from Aleksey Smirnov, Kursk's acting governor, Ukrainian forces breached the Kursk border using armoured vehicles and explosives. In response, Vladimir Putin, Russia’s President condemned the incursion and declared an emergency, at the federal and district level in the Kursk and Belgorod oblasts. 

On 12 August, Putin stated the objective of Ukraine in the Kursk operation was to create a diversion from the Donbas. While the Ukrainian military later in August revealed the creation of a “buffer zone” after progressing 1,294 square kilometers as its objective. 

On 27 August, Ukraine's armed forces stated that the objective of the Kursk cross-border offensive was to redirect Russian forces from “the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove directions.” However, Putin denied on Kursk offensive affecting its eastern offensive.

What is the significance of the Kursk oblast?
Bryansk, Kursk and Belgorod Oblasts are the bordering districts of Ukraine and Russia in the east. Belgorod has been subject to shelling and minor incursions by separatist groups which Russia has managed to deter. In the case of Bryansk Oblast, Ukraine had launched a few drone attacks in July which were also prevented by Russian air defences. This left Kursk to be the possible target. Another factor is the presence of the Russian army’s “Sever” operational group, which has been fighting in northern Kharkiv since May. The Ukrainian forces efforts to pressure the “Sever” troops out of Kharkiv and Vovchansk to create space for Ukraine’s brigades was a failure. This was one of the reasons why Ukrainian intelligence identified a vulnerable border area of Russia and its target.

Why did Ukraine launch a cross-border attack?
Engaging two brigades, mechanised and air assault in launching attacks into Russia while maintaining defence on home ground could be viewed as Ukraine’s showcasing move. In contrast with the 2023 failed spring counteroffensive of Ukraine, the brigades appeared well-experienced and trained for the operation. The nature of attack which used mechanised forces with high level mobility was also another advantage helping in quick advance. Both combined with the set of advanced air defence capabilities which had lacked in previous counteroffensives boosted Ukraine’s chance of advancing deeper.  In the past three months, the Russian offensive has targeted North-western Kharkiv, Northern Sumy and Chasiv Yar in the eastern Donbas. Since Russia’s eastern Ukraine offensive, Ukraine has been able to only defend strongly without a chance to repel. More specifically, since the November 2022 Kherson counteroffensive, Ukraine does not have a record of capturing back the Russian-occupied areas. Kursk is one of the key locations for gas supply neither holds Russian brigades nor communication hubs. What makes it important is a tactical advantage for Ukraine’s military to launch deeper missile and drone attacks in Russia. This can be evidenced by the attacks across Bryansk, oil refineries in Moscow and increased drone launches into Belgorod. Comparing the three bordering regions, both Bryansk and Belgorod have been well defended by Russia through its instant counterattacks on launched Ukrainian missiles leaving Kursk the likely target.

How has Russia responded?
Russian forces in the initial stage of incursion showed no strong defence to counter Ukrainian troops since there were no strong forces deployed. Although in response, it quickly redeployed troops, and aerial weapon systems and carried out evacuations. The Ukrainian forces advance has now slowed down but the larger problem for Russia is deterring the deeper drone and missile attacks by Ukraine. The recent advances of Russia toward Pokrovsk, which is 40 kilometres from Avdiivka (last captured by Russia) and the nearby Myrnohrad are the last remaining towns in Donetsk under Ukraine. Following the win in the battle for Avidiivka, Pokrovsk and Chasiv Yar were the next targets for Russian forces. Despite the relocation and shifting of weapons and resources to combat the Kursk incursion, Russia spearheads its advance to capture Pokrovsk. While Ukraine was observed to have moved its troops (20,000) from Novohrodivka town to improve its defence in Pokrovsk. Therefore, for Russia deterring Ukrainian forces from advancing in Kursk may be the tactical objective but the strategic priority remains on advancing in eastern Ukraine and capturing the larger Donetsk.

What has been the West response?
Initially, when Ukraine invaded Russia’s Kursk border, there were ambiguous reactions among the US and European allies. The US White House stated that it was unaware of the objectives of the cross-border attack. Later the EU and NATO expressed their support in defence of Ukraine. The larger muffled debate is the usage of west-supplied weapons inside Russian territory which was overall objected across the US and Europe. However, this limitation no longer exists for Ukrainian forces. This compromise has helped the Ukrainian military to defend its ground and expand its strikes further into Russia. 

Print Bookmark

PREVIOUS COMMENTS

NIAS Global Politics Database
March 2024 | CWA # 1251

NIAS Africa Team

Africa This Week
NIAS Global Politics Database
February 2024 | CWA # 1226

NIAS Africa Team

Africa This Week
The World This Year
December 2023 | CWA # 1189

Hoimi Mukherjee | Hoimi Mukherjee is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science in Bankura Zilla Saradamani Mahila Mahavidyapith.

Chile in 2023: Crises of Constitutionality
The World This Year
December 2023 | CWA # 1187

Aprajita Kashyap | Aprajita Kashyap is a faculty of Latin American Studies, School of International Studies at the Jawaharlal Nehru University New Delhi.

Haiti in 2023: The Humanitarian Crisis
The World This Year
December 2023 | CWA # 1185

Binod Khanal | Binod Khanal is a Doctoral candidate at the Centre for European Studies, School of International Studies, JNU, New Delhi.

The Baltic: Energy, Russia, NATO and China
The World This Year
December 2023 | CWA # 1183

Padmashree Anandhan | Padmashree Anandhan is a Research Associate at the School of Conflict and Security Studies, National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangaluru.

Germany in 2023: Defence, Economy and Energy Triangle
The World This Year
December 2023 | CWA # 1178

​​​​​​​Ashok Alex Luke | Ashok Alex Luke is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science at CMS College, Kottayam.

China and South Asia in 2023: Advantage Beijing?
The World This Year
December 2023 | CWA # 1177

Annem Naga Bindhu Madhuri | Annem Naga Bindhu Madhuri is a postgraduate student at the Department of Defence and Strategic Studies at the University of Madras, Chennai.

China and East Asia
The War in Ukraine
October 2023 | CWA # 1091

Annem Naga Bindhu Madhuri

Issues for Europe
IPRI Quarterly Forecasts I Triggers, Trends, and Trajectories
July 2023 | CWA # 1012

Bibhu Prasad Routray

Myanmar continues to burn
2022: The World This Year
December 2022 | CWA # 879

Padmashree Anandhan

The Ukraine War
Europe: Heatwaves, Wildfires, Droughts, and Ice Melt in Alps
November 2022 | CWA # 838

Rishma Banerjee

Tracing Europe's droughts
NIAS Fortnightly on Science, Technology and International Relations (STIR)
August 2022 | CWA # 776

STIR Team