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CWA # 1619, 14 March 2025
NIAS Pakistan Reader
Militancy, Security and Politics in Balochistan: Evaluating the early responses to BLA's train hijacking

  D Suba Chandran

On 13 March, according to the latest media reports, the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) Director General and Information Minister announced "the successful completion of the operation and the recovery of all hostages." (Dawn, 13 March 2025) 

On 11 March 2025, the BLA targeted the Jaffer Express in Balochistan and took more than 400 passengers hostage. According to the media reports, 33 militants, 21 passengers and eight soldiers of Pakistan's paramilitary were killed in the rescue operation.

On the first day, the immediate response was shock and anger; on the second day, Pakistan has raised questions and also provided a road map on what needs to be done further in Balochistan. Though some of these responses are still early, they explain how Pakistan looks at issues relating to militancy, security and politics in Balochistan. Following is an evaluation of Pakistan's early reactions to what is happening in Balochistan.

Is the militancy in Balochistan fueled from outside, or internal?
An immediate reaction to problems within Pakistan – both in Balochistan and in KP has been to blame the "external" forces. Dawn quoted DG-ISPR Lt Gen Sharif saying: "These terrorists were in contact with their supporters and masterminds in Afghanistan during the operation via satellite phone…This incident changes the rules of the game, because these terrorists have no link to Balochistan or religion."

This has been the case for the last two decades. The immediate blame for violence in the province would be on Baloch militants as being provided sanctuary - previously by the elected Afghan government (led by Karzai and Ghani) and supported by the Americans and the Indians. Now, perhaps the Taliban regime and also the Indian intelligence agencies. Why would the Afghan Taliban support the Baloch insurgency? And is there an Indian collusion with the Taliban in Afghanistan on this? Pakistan needs to relook at blaming everything on Afghanistan and India for what is happening in Balochistan.

On the other hand, an editorial in The News ("Terror's long night," The News International, 13 March 2025) identifies internal issues as the root causes of the problem in Balochistan. The editorial reads: "Balochistan, along with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, has been the primary victim of terrorism in recent years. However, the challenges in the province are unique, stemming from political alienation, economic exploitation and human rights violations. The missing persons crisis has fueled resentment, the unequal distribution of resources has deepened economic disparities, and political disenfranchisement has only widened the gap between the people and the state." Dawn, in its editorial ("Shocking ambush," Dawn, 13 March 2025), makes a point. It says: "Beyond kinetic actions, there must be sincere efforts to address the root causes of Balochistan's misery that are exploited by separatists. These include enforced disappearances, the province's appalling socioeconomic indicators, and curbs on political activity. While no cause can justify atrocities that target civilians, many voices — including this paper's — have been raising these issues for years. But those who make and execute policies in this country are not listening."

Above is the question that Pakistan has to find answers to. What has led to the political alienation of the people, economic exploitation of the province, and the abuse of human rights by the State? Were they internal, or supported by external factors? Blaming external actors for violence in KP and Balochistan has not helped Pakistan so far, and is less likely to do so in the future.

Is the problem of violence in Balochistan linked to a lack of Baloch political representation? Did the political engagement curb militancy before?
There is violence perpetrated by the BLA and other militant groups. And there are root causes. The first is a security problem, while the second is a complex mix of political, economic and social. The security forces are best placed to address the first, but they cannot and should not address the second. The polity and society should pursue it.

The News editorial ("Terror's long night," The News International, 13 March 2025), makes an interesting comparison with developments in Balochistan during the last decades. It reads: "The ongoing insurgency is not simply a law-and-order problem but a symptom of these deeper structural issues. There was a time when political engagement helped curb violence. In 2013, when the PML-N appointed nationalist leader Dr Abdul Malik Baloch as Balochistan's chief minister, insurgency levels saw a significant decline. That period offered a glimpse of what genuine representation and dialogue could achieve. However, with nationalist leaders sidelined and disillusioned, the space for political reconciliation has shrunk, creating a vacuum that militant groups have readily filled."

The argument is straightforward. When there was a political engagement, there was a decline in militancy. Data would support the above argument. Political machinations during the previous elections and what happened to the provincial assembly should underline the above case. The 2018 elections, in particular – at the national and provincial levels in Balochistan should highlight what went wrong. In the 2018 Baloch provincial elections, the newly formed Balochistan Awami Party (BAP) became the largest party with 24 seats, followed by the MMA and the PTI with ten and seven seats. Leading Baloch (and Pashtun) parties such as the NP, BNP and PkMAP became (or made) irrelevant. The formation of BAP just before the elections and its win would underline the primary problem in Balochistan. 

Have the "big-ticket" projects failed to address the economic situation? Have they made the situation worse?
The Express Tribune, in its editorial, ("The Mashkaf Moment," The Express Tribune, 13 March 2025), says: "Big-ticket projects, such as CPEC, have made little impact, and are in the eye of the storm as terrorists have regrouped and are gaining currency."

The CPEC projects in Balochistan were expected to uplift the local population. In Gwadar alone, there are multiple projects, including the Gwadar Port. Gwadar Free Zone, Gwadar International Airport, Gwadar Coal Power Plant, and Gwadar Expressway. Have they changed the economic situation for the local population? 

The CPEC projects were sold to the local people as game changers. The same way the Sui gas plant was sold in the 1950s. There were promises of local employment, royalties, revenue, local supply etc. In the long run, the local population feel that the resources are being exploited by the outsiders for the benefit of other provinces. This is one of the reasons behind the attack on CPEC projects by the militants and also the targeted attack on migrant workers from other provinces.

Does the answer lie in more security or a democratic process?
Dawn, in its editorial ("Shocking ambush," Dawn, 13 March 2025), argues: "Security and the rule of law are essential. Lasting peace in Balochistan, however, can only come when there is good governance, the province's people have a share in its mineral wealth and other resources, and the genuine representatives of the inhabitants are allowed to take the democratic process forward."

Security is important. The immediate response will have to be aimed at enforcing the writ of the state. The militants cannot be allowed to hijack buses and trains and take hostage of civilians. The security forces – starting from the local police, paramilitary and the military have to play a role – in that order. The primary responsibility of provincial security should be with the local police.

What is more important is the democratic process and decisions by political representatives. Balochistan needs a democratic process; the province has enough political parties representing the Baloch grievances. They should be allowed to grow at the grassroots and reach Quetta and not engineered in Islamabad (worse in Rawalpindi).

About the author
D Suba Chandran is a Professor and Dean of the School of Conflict and Security Studies, NIAS.

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