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CWA # 1588, 10 January 2025
NIAS Polar and Ocean Studies
NATO expansion in the Nordic: Return of the post-Cold War era

  Padmashree Anandhan

The NATO was formed in 1949 as a collective response to the soviet aggression. Out of the 12 founding members, the national interests of Canada, Norway, Denmark (Greenland), Iceland, and the US recognised the strategic significance of the Nordic and the Arctic.[1] The participation of these states laid the groundwork was seen as a crucial frontier. The key principle of the organisation is bound by Article 5 of the treaty, which states that an armed attack on one NATO member is considered an attack on all.[2] The ideas may have emerged from the Cold War and collective defence motto however it has grown in the past decades by several times in response to the geopolitical scenarios. In the 2000s, three major expansions brought East and Western Europe together. One was in 1999, when the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland joined NATO, a major shift of Warsaw Pact members signing into NATO.[3] Next was in 2004, the largest ever with Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, the former Soviet republics or Warsaw members joining NATO.[4] After this, Albania, Croatia, Montenegro, and North Macedonia joined, strengthening the presence of western Balkan states in NATO. The last two additions were Finland and Sweden which compromised on their neutral stance and joined in response to the Russian aggression in Ukraine. Initially, the NATO missions focused on defending Europe against the Soviet Union in the post-Cold War by conducting its military operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Libya and now it is back to the same with new actors in the security dynamics with the rise of China and Russia. The nature of operations has also expanded from countering terrorism to cyber threats.

Recent developments
On 01 October 2024, Mark Rutte became the 14th Secretary General of NATO after Jens Stoltenberg.[5] He was a former Prime Minister of the Netherlands with domestic and international accomplishments in security, defence, employment and social affairs, and economics.[6] He strongly supports global and transatlantic cooperation.

On 04 April 2024, NATO commemorated its 75th year with a steadfast commitment to a peaceful Arctic.[7] The High North has been woven into NATO's trajectory since its inception, with a nexus of geopolitical importance and strategic interests influencing its evolution. In April, the 75th year celebrations marked the membership of Finland and Sweden underlining the dynamic partnership, cooperation, and adaptation. Finland and Sweden joined NATO, marking seven Arctic states in NATO. 

The 2023 Vilnius Summit Communiqué pledged to continue joint exercises and Arctic surveillance coordination.[8] These were partly enacted with recent exercises in the Norwegian Sea. However insufficient to secure NATO's northern flank.

In recent years, the Arctic has emerged as a focal point for geopolitical competition and security challenges. Rapid climate change has led to ice caps melting, opening new shipping routes, access to natural resources, and potential military activity. Russia's firm activities of military stockpile and exercises in the Arctic have elevated fears about security and stability in the region. Stalling of the operations in the Arctic Council have added challenges to NATO. It’s strategy in the Arctic emphasises the importance of addressing both traditional and emerging security threats, ensuring the region remains stable and secure. 

In September 2023, NATO’s defence chiefs meeting in Oslo focused on Finland and Sweden's membership and how Nordic countries will be responsible for creating “NATO’s deterrence in the northern areas.”[9] In response, in March 2024, the Norwegian Arctic held a joint exercise with soldiers from 13 countries called Steadfast Defender with 90,000 troops from each NATO member state. It was the largest exercise since the Cold War.

Key issues
First, geographic proximity in the Baltic. Russia’s plan to prevent the expansion of NATO forfeited with Sweden and Finland's decision to join NATO. Although it still has a hold over eastern Ukraine in Europe, Russia’s access in the Finnish-Sweden Border around Bodo's shores, which extends to 70 to 90 kilometres, will be limited. Finland which shares 1,340 kilometres border with Russia has a strategic depth to proceed to Murmansk, and facilitate a naval base at Barents and White Sea.[10] This region holds more than half of Russia’s ballistic missile submarines, and upon its membership, Russia’s strategic position in the North Atlantic would require more troops to protect the flank. The issue here would be its ability to exercise anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) zones in Kaliningrad and the Arctic, which could be a combination of attacks. This would affect NATO, Finland, and Sweden’s operations in the Baltic Sea in terms of movement and deployment of troops. Similarly in the Kola Peninsula which holds Russia’s second-strike capability, can be expected to expand to create buffer zone around it Northern Fleet, impacting the mobility of Sweden and Finland.[11] While Sweden and Finland belong in the subarctic, the Baltic-Arctic will be the next contested area as NATO and Russia mark their presence.

Second, the transatlantic trouble. The president-elect, Donald Trump, had earlier threatened to withdraw support for NATO citing the allies failure to meet the defence expediture threshold. After the election result, he has also pledged to end the war in Ukraine within 24 hours of his presidency. Whereas NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has called the present two per cent defence limit adequate while the future defence capacity is in gray zone. It is not the first time Trump has warned NATO’s trans-Atlantic members to increase their defence expenditure. During his presidential term (2017-2021),[12] he emphasised on reducing or withdrawing aid to NATO. At present, the 2024 budget has been met by the NATO members, however the US remains the prime contributor to indirect funding, with EUR 800 billion (68 per cent) out of the total EUR 1,173 billion.[13]

Third, increased military activity in the Nordic. In the face of EU security policy and defence, the Nordic Policymakers have always focused on ensuring that they should not become “militarised” and rather opt for “peaceful” solutions. On the other side, while the debate has existed since the 1990s over its institutional choices and Nordic balance questioning its neutral stance, the Nordic has maintained a secret military alliance with NATO. While Sweden maintains a straight line, Finland has increased its defence spending by exceeding two per cent of the GDP over two decades, and Denmark voted to join the EU’s Common Defence Policy 1999 to speed the process.[14] In terms of combined military expenditures, Sweden, Finland, and with the Baltic states have increased from USD 10 to 15 billion in 2021 especially in the Kola Peninsula which is considered sensitive, Finland may open door to NATO activities. The war and security risks have led to increased military exercises in northern Europe.

Fourth, the energy dilemma. In the Nordic countries, Denmark and Finland are most dependent on Russian fossil fuels, but in Europe, the Nordic region marks the least dependency on the energy mix. The scenario changed as Europe detached from Russia’s energy, increasing the value of energy resources on the Norwegian continental shelf, which is spread through the North Sea and Barents Sea. Another likely impact on energy is expected from the high energy prices due to Europe’s open market. In terms of economy, except Finland, due to its geographic location, none of the Nordic countries heavily depend on Russia or Ukraine. The economic fallout could be due to supply chain challenges and high food prices, which add to inflation. This could be worse if the inflation continues to increase and the government underperforms to protect the consumers, which is likely until the prices surge.

Fifth, strengthening NATO's presence in the Nordic. NATO has been more inclusive of Finland and Sweden in its exercises since the overturn of Finland and Sweden to join NATO after the war in Ukraine. It conducts annual and bi-annual political exercises, defence ministers meetings, and summits to manoeuvre its defence plan. Finland joining NATO in April allowed the longest deployment of US Marines in May to hold Freezing Winds 22 exercise joined by the Netherlands, Denmark, Germany, and Sweden naval forces.[15] In June, Sweden was invited to be part of NATO’s Unified Vision 2023 Joint Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR) exercise. This involves intelligence experts from Europe and North US to respond to crisis triggered by natural disasters.[16] In September 2023, NATO conducted its first surveillance drone mission over Finland, which is only predominant in the Black Sea region, and the eastern flank was flown over Finland to familiarise the terrain.[17] Denmark and NATO announced their latest quantum strategy, which aims to make their allies “quantum ready” to integrate technologies with capabilities. An initiative with Denmark is to provide quantum-enabled solutions and innovate new technologies for security challenges.[18] Three defence exercises were held in Iceland, Baltic Sea, Estonia and Latvia coasts, and Nordic countries focused on problem-solving, high-end warfare and collective defence. [19] [20] In October, NATO, along with Sweden, proposed a “Digital Ocean Vision” to boost NATO’s maritime awareness and surveillance. Military exercises aside, the Vilnius Summit after the Madrid Summit in 2022 sealed down NATO’s deterrence and defence strategy in the north as the primary in agenda. Its focus on boosting ability, higher readiness, and reinforcement in all domains, whereas the second objective has been to integrate defence plans of the Nordic, especially air defence with Finland, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark.[21] Similarly, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg's address showcased NATO’s determination to engage in “deep cooperation” and establish its presence in the Nordic region in the recent 75th Nordic Council session held in Norway in October.

Sixth, U-turn from neutrality to militarily non-alignment to alliance. Norway and Denmark joined NATO during the Cold War, whereas Finland and Sweden continued to pursue neutral policies. Although neutrality was maintained, the reasons behind the stance were different. For Sweden, in 1809, in the war against the Russian Empire, the territory it was to cede was merged into Finland, and since then, it has opted not to join the conflict. In the case of Finland, during 1939-40 in the fight against the Soviet Union lost 10 per cent of its territory and post the 1948 agreement with the Soviet Union, turned neutral. Parting from the neutrality policy took place quickly after the dissolution of the Soviet Union into military nonalignment. While the partnership grew between Finland, Sweden and NATO through military partnerships, Russia’s 2014 Crimean annexation stirred back the risk of conflict. This triggered Finland and Sweden to reconsider their position and to upsize their military in 2017, and the start of war in Ukraine pushed them to join NATO.[22]

Seventh, modernisation post-World War II and concern over Soviet attack. Following World War II, the northern States realised the military and civilian significance of the Arctic, which led to the establishment of scientific and military bases. In the following decades, the region became one of the Cold War's most militarised spaces. The postwar innovation of military technology altered the province.[23] Meanwhile, the Soviet industrialisation policies directed by leaders Vladimir Lenin and Joseph Stalin, made the Russian Arctic the most militarised. This includes warships, icebreakers, nuclear submarines, and ballistic weapons. NATO and the West considered this a direct threat. This build-up of forces effectively in NATO’s backyard, that is Norway, led the High North to become a central issue of NATO’s security strategy throughout the Cold War. A report released in 1950 called the Arctic Ocean and the zone around Norway, Iceland, Greenland, and the Northwest Territory of Canada as hostile for naval and submarine forces. Norway was becoming a key concern as the possibility of a soviet attack heightened.[24]

Eighth, Sweden and Finland as new points of escalation. In February 2022, when Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine led to the Arctic Council members' statement to pause work with Russia. At the same time, Sweden and Finland reversed the neutrality policy and joined in 2023 and 2024. Both being Arctic states affected the balance of power in the north. Why? Because NATO lacks an official Arctic policy and, discussions to have one have been fragmented. However, Russia’s belligerence has impacted Arctic affairs, making it clear that it is no longer at the periphery of the West, like it was twenty years ago, but at the centre of NATO.

Ninth, missing Arctic policy and warming problem.  NATO currently has no official Arctic policy nor a command devoted to northern affairs, which some experts have called problematic due to the possibility that this will impede NATO’s ability to “adequately navigate revived strategic competition in the region.” Over the past 15 years, NATO officials have dismissed ideas of developing a dedicated body to oversee Arctic projects. In 2020, Camille Grand, NATO’s assistant secretary for defence investment, said: “A separate Joint Force Command (JFC) for the Arctic was unnecessary because the Organization did not have any other regional working groups.”[25] Experts arguing for a more significant NATO presence in the Arctic say it is necessary to clearly show Russia that NATO has its eye on the region and deter further Russian aggression. Despite NATO lacking an Arctic position, its members do seem to be invested in the Arctic since the Ukraine invasion. This could be evidenced by the often-held exercises and operation of warships in the Arctic.

Arctic warming began in 2006, and experts argue that Russia’s efforts to revitalize its northern areas have pushed Norway to increase its engagement with NATO.[26] Russia also began rapidly developing its Arctic regions primarily to exploit resources. As Arctic warming accelerated, retreating sea ice began to open access to Russia’s Northern Sea Route (NSR). This maritime corridor could reduce shipping times between Europe and Asia.

Challenges ahead
First, a stronger NORDEFCO. Finland and Sweden which have high level of interoperability with NATO’s structures, membership was the limitation, on attaining that will now be able to realise an integrated defence plan fully. The same was exhibited in the Vilnius Summit on integrated northern Europe defence. The NORDEFCO 2050 vision of “minimal restrictions on movement and storage of military units and equipment” would now be possible with new defence capabilities and increased military activities in the Russian side.

Second, a task ahead for Sweden. Sweden’s membership in NATO makes it a perfect base for deploying troops and sending of materials to Finland, Norway and the Baltic states. This will boost Sweden’s ability to put its defence policy into full practice, but it can no longer hold a balanced stance or stay away from US policies. In line with NATO’s security agreements may have to work its strategic priorities which might affect its interests in the Arctic, but will strengthen its position in Scandinavia.

Third, improved cooperation and defence. Efforts to improve cooperation and defence are also ongoing in the European Arctic. Even before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and Finland and Sweden’s bids to join NATO, the Nordic states discussed forming a joint Nordic air force to improve communication and defence between Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Finland. According to journalists and military sources, the project has received even more support since 2022. One of the Nordic news, High North News observed that there was a high-level military presence of the US and NATO forces in Iceland and Norway pointed out in the summer of 2023 that there is a larger than normal military presence of both American and NATO forces in Iceland and that Norway is working on developing an air command centre in northern Norway in collaboration with the US and UK which called itself “The Arctic’s nearest neighbor” in 2013 and 2015 policy documents.

Fourth, NATO’s quandary. There has been much discussion about what NATO should do in the face of growing Arctic tension but NATO furthering its military presence in the Arctic is imprudent as it will aggravate Russia. However, Russia has proven not to consider the territorial integrity of sovereign states, and has been increasingly aggressive in the past. This can be applied to the Arctic and indicates the need for a swift response if serious tensions emerge in the north.

A new cold war in the Arctic. The tensions began to build in 2006 and have risen to the Cold War level in the last decade due to increasing military and derailing diplomacy or dialogue in the Arctic. Hard security is at the vanguard of Northern European policy agendas. While NATO does not have an official Arctic policy, it is well present in the region through its member states in the Arctic. Some scholars argue that the Cold War never came to an end in the Arctic as most of the military installations still remain.

Fifth, Arctic is no longer at NATO’s periphery. For a long time, the Arctic has been seen as remote and exterior for global courses, but this is changing now with more participation from middle and superpowers. With growing Russian aggression, climate change, expansion of NATO and flow of investments across the international countries, the Arctic is no longer poled away. Developments in the Arctic do create an impact outside and are expected to amplify in the coming decades. Therefore, political and geopolitical changes are quickly unfolding, putting NATO under pressure to make key decisions to secure the alliance members. The re-emergence of the Arctic on the centre stage would have far-reaching consequences, altering the security order of Europe as NATO engages more.

Conclusion
Increasing Russian aggression in eastern Donetsk and Ukraine’s aerial attacks into Russia has gone hand in hand with US President Joe Biden’s cooperation with NATO. Winning of Trump is predicted to have severe consequences for Ukraine and pressure on NATO members to rethink their contribution and transatlantic equation. If they are not able to meet the demands that could placed in future by Trump they not only risk the region’s security but its transatlantic relations. It would take decades to replace the US’s military contribution. It being the major shareholder of NATO’s defence. Although its GDP spending ranged between high and low tendencies, losing its support entirely would take decades for NATO to revive its military arsenal. And then comes questions of leadership for a Europe-led security bloc. NATO, which has doubled its geopolitical presence to 30+ members, needs to hold a united front. Ambiguity persists over who can lead NATO post the US or which group of countries (The nordic or the western) will stride high to establish a safe security landscape for Europe.

 

[1] “Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations - Office of the Historian,” n.d. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/nato.

[2] Brennan Center for Justice. “NATO’s Article 5 Collective Defense Obligations, Explained,” June 29, 2023. https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/natos-article-5-collective-defense-obligations-explained.

[3] “Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations - Office of the Historian,” n.d. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1993-2000/evolution-of-nato.

[4] U.S. Department of Defense. “NATO,” n.d. https://www.defense.gov/Spotlights/nato/.

[5] Afp, Le Monde With. “Mark Rutte Takes Over as NATO Chief.” Le Monde.Fr, October 1, 2024. https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/10/01/mark-rutte-takes-over-as-nato-chief_6727844_4.html.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Wilson Center. “No. 26 | NATO In the Arctic: 75 Years Of Security, Cooperation, and Adaptation,” January 14, 2001. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/no-26-nato-arctic-75-years-security-cooperation-and-adaptation.

[8] Jouan, Nicolas. “How to Take Advantage of NATO Enlargement in the Arctic.” RAND, June 24, 2024. https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2024/06/how-to-take-advantage-of-nato-enlargement-in-the-arctic.html.

[9] Regeringen och Regeringskansliet. “Swedish Contribution to NATO’s Deterrence and Defence in 2025.” Regeringskansliet, October 7, 2024. https://www.government.se/press-releases/2024/10/swedish-contribution-to-natos-deterrence-and-defence-in-2025/.

[10] International Peace Research Initiative (IPRI) - Europe: Ukraine War and the Nordic. “Europe: Ukraine War and the Nordic - Padmashree Anandhan,” n.d. https://conflictreader.org/view_ipri_articles.php?ArticleNo=332&url=Conflict%20Weekly%20Special%20Issue&recordNo=330.

[11] Ratiu, Andrea. “How Allied Sweden and Finland Can Secure Northern Europe  - Atlantic Council.” Atlantic Council, August 23, 2023. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/how-allied-sweden-finland-can-secure-northern-europe/.

[12] Anandhan, Padmashree. “What Is the Latest Row Between Trump and NATO? | Explained.” The Hindu, February 27, 2024. https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/what-is-the-latest-row-between-trump-and-nato-explained/article67889557.ece.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Migliorati, Marta. “New Nordic Pathways? Explaining Nordic Countries’ Defence Policy Choices in the Wake of the Ukrainian War.” Journal of European Public Policy 31, no. 10 (February 9, 2024): 3249–74. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2024.2314247.

[15] Yle News. “Finland Leads ‘Freezing Winds 23’ Drills in Baltic Sea.” News, November 16, 2023. https://yle.fi/a/74-20060591.

[16] Wemer, David. “Six Reasons NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre Is Important for Our Future Security - Atlantic Council.” Atlantic Council, June 25, 2020. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/six-reasons-natos-euro-atlantic-disaster-response-coordination-centre-is-important-for-our-future-security/.

[17] Null, Thomas Nilsen. “NATO Drone on First Time Mission Over Finland.” Thebarentsobserver, September 14, 2023. https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/security/nato-drone-on-first-time-mission-over-finland/163227.

[18] Ministry of Defence. “NATO and Denmark Are Opening a Center for Quantum Technologies in Copenhagen,” n.d. https://www.fmn.dk/en/news/2023/nato-and-denmark-are-opening-a-center-for-quantum-technologies-in-copenhagen/.

[19] ZÁJEDOVÁ, IIVI. “The Baltic States’ Security and NATO Enlargement.” Perspectives, no. 13 (1999): 79–90. http://www.jstor.org/stable/23615944.

[20] {"@type": “Person”,"name": “Minna Ålander”}. “Death by a Thousand Paper Cuts: Lessons From the Nordic-Baltic Region on Countering Russian Gray Zone Aggression.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, n.d. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/11/russia-gray-zone-aggression-baltic-nordic?lang=en.

[21] Andrea Ratiu, “How Allied Sweden and Finland Can Secure Northern Europe  - Atlantic Council,” Atlantic Council, August 23, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/how-allied-sweden-finland-can-secure-northern-europe/.

[22] Chatterjee, Phelan. “How Sweden and Finland Went From Neutral to Nato,” July 11, 2023. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61397478.

[23] Bykova, Alina. “NATO Has Always Been an Arctic Alliance (Part I).” The Arctic Institute - Center for Circumpolar Security Studies (blog), September 27, 2024. https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/nato-arctic-alliance-part-i/.

[24] Dean, Ryan. “Military Threats in, to, and Through the Arctic East of Greenland and Implications for Canada,” 2023. https://www.naadsn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/East-of-Greenland-report-RD.pdf.

[25] Alina Bykova, “NATO Has Always Been an Arctic Alliance (Part II),” The Arctic Institute - Center for Circumpolar Security Studies (blog), September 27, 2024, https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/nato-arctic-alliance-part-ii/.

[26] https://www.e-ir.info/2024/08/14/between-myth-and-reality-soviet-legacies-in-the-russian-arctic/

About the author
Padmashree Anandhan is a Project Associate (NIAS Europe Studies and NIAS Polar and Ocean Studies) at NIAS.

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