State of Peace and Conflict 2025

CWA # 1883
State of Peace and Conflict 2025
The War in Ukraine: Russian gains, Drone dominance, and Infrastructure strain
Conflict Weekly #313, 31 December 2025, Vol 6, No. 52

Sunidhi Sampige
31 December 2025

Photo Source: AFP

What happened?
Frontline Dynamics
In 2025, the long-running conflict between Russia and Ukraine entered its fourth year. Since 2022, Russia has taken control of nearly 20 per cent of Ukrainian territory, including significant portions of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson, amounting to about 90,000 square kilometres.

During January-March, Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson were taken over by Russian ground forces. Meanwhile, Ukraine's winter counteroffensive around Robotyne and Avdiivka was hampered by ammunition shortages and reduced personnel.

By mid-February, Russian forces took control of Avdiivka following prolonged fighting and Ukrainian withdrawal to defensive positions.

During July-September, Russia mobilised an additional 250,000 troops to reinforce in Pokrovsk. The move was to counter Ukraine’s re-advances towards the Kursk region, where Russia had barely managed to counter a previous Ukrainian advance in May.

In October-December, Russia gained 3400 square kilometres and a positional advantage along the 1,200 km frontline as a result of Ukraine’s limited counterattacks along the Kherson front and Dnipro River.

Attacks on infrastructure
To weaken civilian resilience and military logistics, Russian forces systematically attacked Ukraine's energy and transportation infrastructure throughout 2025, focusing on power generation, substations, and rail networks.

During April to June, missile and drone attacks hit Kyiv, Odesa, and Kharkiv, causing extensive blackouts affecting millions and disrupting industrial production. Ukrainian air defences intercepted many but were overwhelmed by Russian inventories, including Iranian Shahed drones. Ukraine launched long-range attacks on Russian oil refineries near Belgorod and Kazan in response.

Key battlegrounds and losses
The main areas of military activity were the Kharkiv salient, Kherson front, Kursk border region, and the Donbas theatre, which included Pokrovsk, Avdiivka, Chasiv Yar, and Vuhledar. Following Avdiivka's capture, Russian advances toward Pokrovsk continued through entrenched positions in the Donbas. Meanwhile, Ukrainian counterattacks in the Kharkiv and Kherson sectors resulted in a limited territorial recovery against persistent Russian pressure. 

What are the issues?
First, the asymmetric military advances. Russian forces expanded their territory on several fronts in 2025, gaining more than 3400 square kilometres by October, with advances close to Pokrovsk, Dobropillia, and Siversk. After 21 months of fighting, Russian forces in Donetsk reached Pokrovsk by early November, a symbolic victory with a huge cost. By late 2025, Russian offensives reclaimed about half of the territory that Ukraine had temporarily taken over in the Kursk border region. Meanwhile, Ukraine conducted defensive counterattacks in Kharkiv in October, pushing Russian forces backwards from Vovchansk. In Kherson, Ukrainian marines expanded towards the Dnipro River by mid-November, capturing small islands and neutralising Russian pontoon crossings. Near Kupiansk, Ukrainian forces reclaimed 15 square kilometres through drone-assisted assaults. Ukrainian advances pointed to limited territorial gains.

Second, Ukraine's growing reliance on Western assistance and reduced offensive capability. In 2025, Ukraine's offensive operations were limited, and it shifted to defensive postures due to its growing reliance on Western assistance. Winter counteroffensives around Robotyne and Avdiivka were hampered by resupply gaps caused by delays in NATO's EUR 60 billion "Sustain Ukraine" framework in April and June. It was caused by US budgetary disputes and EU internal divisions. There were temporary gains during the Kursk offensive in early 2025. However, during the last quarter of 2025, Russian forces reclaimed about half of the area due to a lack of sustained Western munition supplies. With limited personnel and ammunition, Ukrainian counterattacks in Kharkiv and Kherson in November produced little territorial gain. With reliance on Western assistance dictating operations, the war on the ground highlighted Ukraine’s shift from offensive initiatives to defensive postures.

Third, the impact of drone warfare. In 2025, the war was shaped more by unmanned operations. Russia used a hybrid drone strategy that combined domestic and Iranian models to launch saturation strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure and logistics. Ukraine retaliated by launching long-range drone attacks on refineries in Belgorod and Kazan.

Fourth, a reduced interest in a ceasefire. In 2025, Russia and Ukraine prioritised gaining ground over actively pursuing a ceasefire. Pausing the fighting was perceived by both actors as a disadvantage rather than an opportunity, because territorial gains were considered as negotiating chips during peace talks. The prisoner exchanges did not result in a broader de-escalation due to disagreements over verification and monitoring. The increased use of drones reduced the political and military cost of continuing the war by making it simpler to launch attacks without many personnel casualties. Besides, Ukrainian long-range strikes inside Russia and Russian retaliatory attacks left little room for trust-building or meaningful ceasefire negotiations.

What does it mean for 2026?
For Russia, due to its gains in 2025, including the acquisition of Avdiivka and the addition of 5,100 square kilometres, Russia enters 2026 in a stronger position. It also gained support from North Korea and Iran. Russia also has more negotiating power thanks to the consistent push in Donbas. Ukraine's capacity is hampered by Russian attacks on the former’s critical infrastructure. This implies that in 2026, Russia can maintain the leverage on the ground without taking significant risks if Western aid to Ukraine further slows down.

For Ukraine, after suffering severe losses in 2025, Ukraine faces significant challenges while entering 2026, primarily due to a lack of troops and the delayed delivery of weapons from the West. Damage to power plants could make winter extremely difficult. The failed push into Kursk and the loss of ground in the Donbas demonstrate defensive weaknesses. Drones allow Ukraine to retaliate without suffering as many casualties, but it still heavily relies on foreign assistance, which may decline considering the internal divisions within Europe.

In 2026, the war is likely evolve into a slow, prolonged conflict. With no major positive development towards ending hostilities, prolonged and unresolved territorial disputes and dominance of unmanned weapons, a ceasefire is highly unlikely in the first quarter.

About the author
Sunidhi Sampige is a Postgraduate student from O.P. Jindal Global University, Sonipat. 

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