At one level, the military junta in Myanmar can be likened to a quack—a fraudulent pretender to medicine, who attempts to treat diseases well beyond his understanding and capability. In the four years and ten months since the infamous coup on 1 February 2021, the military's governing body, the State Administration Council (SAC), has employed a wide range of tactics, from co-option to brutal force. It has even sought, and to some extent successfully received, assistance from external powers to suppress the civil war that has significantly undermined its authority and control over much of the country’s territory. On 28 December, a staggered voting began in the country to elect the national parliament and the provincial assemblies, representing the junta’s desperate attempt to ensure stability. However, the elections are likely to fail as a tactic for legitimising its grip on power. The cycle of intense violence is unlikely to come to an end, even with a military-supported government in place.
What do the numbers say?
As of 26 December, a total of 7,635 people have been reported killed, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), a Bangkok-based non-profit organisation. In addition to these confirmed deaths, another 4,200 deaths have occurred but have yet to be verified by AAPP. The majority of the confirmed killings have taken place in the Sagaing, Mandalay, and Magway regions. Other severely affected areas include Bago, Rakhine, Shan, Yangon, Tanintharyi, Kachin, and Chin. While Sagaing remains the epicentre of resistance against the junta and the site of its brutal attacks, much of the country continues to experience military conflict. Not surprisingly, the description of ‘civil war’ remains so apt.
It is interesting to observe the trend in killings since the coup, which suggests an escalating pattern of desperation from the junta to establish order. In the first year following the coup, there were 1,329 killings. This number increased to 1,611 in the second year, culminating by the end of December 2022. By the end of 2023, the total reached 4,273 fatalities, marking 1,333 deaths that year.
The year 2024 was the bloodiest, as the military's desperation to eliminate opposition reached alarming levels, resulting in 1,814 deaths. That year proved to be particularly devastating for women and children, with 622 women and 182 children killed, averaging more than two deaths per day in these categories. In 2025 (till 26 December), 1,549 people were killed, averaging 129 killings per month. Among them, 657 were women and 295 were children, accounting for a staggering 61 percent of the total fatalities for the year, which is the highest since the coup.
The Cost and Consequences of Containment
The scorched earth policy, heavily reliant on air power to conduct strikes and artillery shelling, hasn’t, however, produced results for the junta. It has suffered heavy personnel attrition, forcing it to implement forced conscription, further subjecting Myanmar’s desolate youth to an impending peril. As per a July 2025 analysis, the military's effective fighting force may have dwindled to around 130,000 soldiers, down from an estimated 300,000 before the coup.
Not surprisingly, the junta controls only 21 percent of the country’s territory, half of the 42 percent under the control of the National Unity Government (NUG) and the Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs). Control over the remaining 37 percent is contested and fleeting, changing hands between the military and the EAOs. Nevertheless, the ability to withstand the military’s assault, which is backed by Russian, Chinese, and other military hardware supplies and hold an expansive territory is a testament to the fighting spirit and commitment of the resistance movement headed by the NUG. Special focus of the Junta’s operations are on the highways and key roads that form part of the trade routes.
What Next?
Voting for the elections will continue into January 2026. The Union Election Commission (UEC) has officially ruled out voting in 121 constituencies across 56 towns, indirectly acknowledging the lack of government control in these areas and its inability to conduct polls. The staged political process is likely to be accompanied by an expansion of military operations to strengthen control over these regions, which will likely result in increased violence and bloodshed.
Although the results are set to be announced by the end of January 2026, it is expected that the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), which is affiliated with the military, will emerge as the uncontested winner. Many serving generals, ministers, and retired officials are joining the USDP. The intention is to establish a technocratic government to manage the country; however, this government is likely to be the weakest in Myanmar’s history. It will not represent the will of the people and will struggle to govern the nation effectively. Consequently, much of the government’s focus will likely be on gradually asserting control over liberated areas under the NUG and EAOs, with governance being a secondary priority.
Myanmar's current situation and the junta's ability to maintain power can be attributed not only to its authoritarian tendencies but also to the support it receives from regional countries and external powers, including autocracies, oppressive regimes, and even democracies. This support, combined with the West's detachment from this reclusive nation, highlights a dysfunctional world order. It suggests a precarious future where the thirst for power and strategic interests will take precedence over all other considerations. While autocracies and authoritarian regimes are known to live by these principles, the democracies who stand by Myanmar’s military junta need to ponder over their operating principles.
About the author
Dr Bibhu Prasad Routray is the Director of Mantraya Institute for Strategic Studies (MISS), Goa, and has been Deputy Director in the National Security Council Secretariat, Government of India.
