State of Peace and Conflict 2025

CWA # 1885
State of Peace and Conflict 2025
Instability in Post-Assad Syria: Continuing sectarian violence, unresolved Kurdish question and persisting Israeli aggression
Conflict Weekly #313, 31 December 2025, Vol 6, No. 52

Rohini Reenum
31 December 2025

Photo Source: AP

What happened?
Political Developments
On 29 January, the head of the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) group, Ahmed al-Sharaa, was declared President of Syria for a transitional period.

On 13 March, al-Sharaa unveiled and signed “a temporary constitution” for a five-year transitional period.

On 20 March, a new transitional government was announced with ministers from diverse backgrounds, including one from the Alawite minority.

Recurring Sectarian Violence
Between 6 and 12 March, fighters loyal to the former Assad regime carried out attacks on security forces in Latakia and Tartous, a region home to the Alawite minority to which the al-Assad family belonged. Following this, hundreds of people, mostly Alawite, were killed in attacks by unidentified armed individuals, members of armed groups allegedly supporting the caretaker authorities’ security forces, and by elements associated with the former government.

Between 13-18 July, sectarian violence broke out in Syria’s southern Suwayda province between Druze and Bedouin tribe members. According to the UN, more than 250 people were killed and 160,000 displaced.

Agreement with the SDF
On 10 March, the transitional government reached an agreement with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) for their integration into the state military apparatus. Despite this, clashes between Syrian security forces and the SDF intermittently broken out in August, October and most recently in December.

Continuing Israeli aggression
On 3 April, al-Sharaa accused Israel of trying to destabilise Syria following an intensification of cross-border attacks. According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED), Israel has carried out nearly 600 “air, drone or artillery attacks across Syria” until 28 November.

On 16 July, Israel launched airstrikes on Suwayda in solidarity with the Druze community. It also struck the headquarters of the Syrian Defence Ministry in Damascus. Syria condemned this as a violation of international law.
On 2 December, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that a “non-aggression pact between Israel and Syria is achievable” on the precondition that Syria establishes “a demilitarised buffer zone stretching from Damascus to Jabal al-Sheikh, which Israel currently occupies.”

Continuing terrorist attacks
On 22 May, seven soldiers were killed in a blast in the al-Safa desert region of Suwayda province. ISIL (ISIS) later claimed responsibility for the attack.

On 23 June, a suicide attack on the Mar Elias Church in Damascus killed 25 people. The Syrian Interior Ministry blamed IS for the attack; however, later, Saraya Ansar al-Sunnah, a breakaway faction of the HTS, claimed responsibility.

On 13 December, three Americans were killed in a shooting attack on US and Syrian troops. US President Donald Trump blamed the IS for the attack and vowed “serious retaliation.”

On 20 December, the US attacked multiple ISIL targets in Syria. Syrian Observatory for Human Rights confirmed to the AFP news agency that “at least five members” of ISIL were killed in these attacks.

What are the issues?
First, the inherent sectarian divide in Syria. Syria is a multi-religious and ethnically diverse country with a predominantly Muslim population (90 per cent), out of which 74 per cent are Sunnis and 16 per cent are other Muslim groups, including the Alawites, Shi'a, and the Druze. Christians and Kurds make up ten and nine per cent of the population, respectively. Despite being a minority, the Alawites gained political prominence and clout under the Assad family’s nearly half-decade rule. During the pro-democracy protests, Bashar al-Assad gave it a sectarian colour, calling it an Islamist insurrection backed by foreign powers. The protestors were largely composed of the Sunni majority, and the security forces were dominated by Alawites, which fuelled sectarian tensions. This sectarian divide grew and solidified with the progression of the protests into the civil war, as the violence perpetrated was viewed as sectarian violence.

Second, continuing sectarian violence and state incapacity. The formation of government by al-Sharaa, leader of a Sunni Islamist rebel group, generated fear of persecution among religious minorities in Syria. Conversely, the new Syrian government’s call for “national unity” and “domestic peace” and vow to protect the minorities alienated its traditional support base, which has carried out retaliatory attacks. Despite government reassurances, violence has broken out against the Alawites and Druze, further fuelling sectarianism and sectarian violence. The participation of the government’s supporters in the violence against Alawites has also raised concerns regarding government collusion. Additionally, the government’s inability to curb violence or punish perpetrators has exacerbated fears and emerged as the biggest roadblock to national integration and a cause for instability in Syria.

Third, the unresolved Kurdish question. Kurds are the largest non-Arab ethnic minority, predominantly concentrated in northeast Syria. Historically repressed and denied citizenship, the situation of Kurds changed with the US-backed and trained Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)’s taking control of the semi-autonomous northeastern region in 2015. The new March Agreement has tried to integrate both the SDF and the Kurdish people in Syria’s military and polity (the agreement has affirmed the status of Kurdish people as “integral to Syria” and guaranteed them citizenship and constitutional rights), respectively. The Agreement also mandated a countrywide ceasefire with the SDF and reintegration of the territory it controls. This has not materialised as the nature of military reintegration remains contentious. Meanwhile, the Syrian government has expressed willingness to compromise with some preconditions. The civil war has also kept suspicions alive on both sides, as the SDF was accused of being allied with the Assad regime. Continuing sporadic clashes with the Syrian security forces indicate this trust-deficit, persisting tensions and the SDF’s unwillingness to relinquish its power.

Fourth, the threat of the resurgence of ISIS and the presence of other fringe militant groups. While ISIS was defeated in 2019 by the US-led coalition, they have conducted sporadic attacks in Syria, with two major attacks this year. A major plot was also foiled in January. According to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, the IS carried out 33 attacks by 15 May, mostly in the SDF-controlled areas, the erstwhile stronghold of the ISIS. The report also pointed out an increase since April, when the US began withdrawing forces from Syria. According to a 2024 press release by the US Central Command, around 2500 ISIS fighters are at large across Iraq and Syria. The UN pegs these numbers between 5,000 and 7,000 fighters. Further, there are around 9000 imprisoned IS fighters in the SDF detention centres. The group thrive in instability and a governance vacuum. Additionally, fringe groups like the Saraya Ansar al-Sunna have emerged. The group has accused the new government of abandoning its original goal of building an Islamic state and claimed responsibility for the killing of Alawites.

Fifth, the continuing Israeli aggression and intervention. Israel has attacked Assad-era military infrastructure and weaponry to render them unusable. It has also refused to honour the 1974 Disengagement Agreement with Syria, deeming it null and void “until order is restored.”  Despite assurances by al-Sharaa and appeals for peace, Israel has continued attacks, citing a lack of trust and cross-border threats from militant groups. Its biggest intervention in Syria, however, was on behalf of the Druze. This added an external dimension to a largely internal sectarian problem.

What does this mean for 2026?
First, 2026 will remain a year of transition, likely violent, for Syria. The transition from a civil war-ravaged country to a stable government is a complicated, gradual and often violent process. The incorporation of diverse interests and factions has emerged as the biggest challenge to state-building and peace so far. Unless the government can consolidate power and enhance state capacity, sporadic violence, including sectarian and terror-related, is likely to continue to plague the new Syria, at least during the transitional period.

Second, 2026 will be a litmus test for Al-Sharaa’s leadership and credibility. While Al-Sharaa has been able to garner international support for his role as Syria’s leader, which has in turn helped whitewash his militant past, the real test of his appeal and leadership will happen on the domestic front, especially now that the euphoria of Assad’s ouster has somewhat subsided and problems of nation-building in a deeply fragmented Syria have emerged. With power being concentrated in the hands of the HTS during the transitional period, there are concerns over the rise of a new Islamist dictatorship in Syria.

Third, Israeli aggression is likely to continue in 2026. Given Israel’s posture towards its neighbours in the past two years, where its endgame has evolved from a defensive to an offensive, it is unlikely that Israel will stop unless it is certain that there is no immediate or emergent cross-border threat from Syria. Whether this is purely a pre-emptive security measure or an expansionist agenda cannot be ascertained at the moment.

About the author 
Rohini Reenum is a PhD scholar at NIAS, Bengaluru.

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