State of Peace and Conflict 2025

CWA # 1886
State of Peace and Conflict 2025
Sudan: A prolonged war, a divided country and failed mediations
Conflict Weekly #313, 31 December 2025, Vol 6, No. 52

Anu Maria Joseph
31 December 2025

Photo Source: AP

What happened?
In 2025, the civil war in Sudan between two military factions, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), entered a third year. This year, the war saw significant developments, including major geographic and strategic shifts, battles for Khartoum and el Fasher, the establishment of a parallel government by the RSF and another round of failed peace mediations.

In January, the SAF captured the army headquarters from the RSF and began advancing towards the capital, Khartoum. By March, the army pushed the RSF out of Jebel Awliya Dam Bridge, Manshiya Bridge and finally took over the presidential palace. The SAF recaptured el-Obeid city on 24 February, Wad Madani on 12 January, and areas around greater Khartoum in February. On 27 March, the SAF announced "Khartoum is Free."

In February, the UN described the situation in Sudan as the “most devastating humanitarian and displacement crisis in the world.” In the same month, famine was confirmed in five locations in North Darfur.

The second quarter of 2025 saw the RSF focusing on the western regions with a plan to establish a parallel government. Subsequently, Darfur and Kordofan emerged as the centre of the conflict. In July, the RSF announced the formation of the parallel Government of Unity in the regions under its control. It captured the majority of Darfur states and parts of the Kordofan states by the end of September.

On 27 October, the RSF took control of the city of el-Fasher in North Darfur, the only city in Darfur under the control of the SAF. More than 450 civilians were killed in RSF atrocities against non-Arabs and other civilian resistance in the region.  

In November, the US, along with the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, proposed a comprehensive ceasefire plan to the SAF and the RSF. However, the SAF called the US proposal the "worst yet" and unacceptable. It also described the mediators as "biased" as long as the UAE, a major weapons supplier of the RSF, is involved. Meanwhile, the RSF announced a humanitarian ceasefire following the US proposal.

In December, the fighting escalated when the RSF attacked power plants in Khartoum and killed six UN peacekeepers in Kaduhli, South Kordofan. 

What are the issues?
First, a prolonged civil war. The war between the SAF and the RSF started as a military rivalry between the heads of the two forces, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Hamdan Dagalo, in April 2023. The rivalry started over disagreements on the civilian transition, the RSF's integration into the SAF, and the leadership of the integrated force. Later, it evolved into a civil war with greater intensity, geographic expansion, ethnic spillover, regional crisis and external involvement. According to the UN, more than 20,000 people have been killed, and 13 million have been displaced. Geographically, the war has divided the country into East, under the SAF, and West, under the RSF. Ethnically, the Arab and non-Arab armed groups are supporting the RSF and the SAF, respectively. Regionally, the war has induced a refugee crisis in neighbouring countries, including Chad, Ethiopia, the Central African Republic and Sudan. With abundant weapon supply from external actors, the violence has intensified, ultimately leading to a prolonged war.

Second, the battles of Khartoum and el Fasher and a divided country. For the SAF, victory in the Battle of Khartoum marked a strategic and symbolic victory. The recapture of the palace symbolised power and sovereignty, supporting the SAF’s claims as Sudan’s legitimate authority. Strategically, the SAF successfully pushed the RSF out of the palace, situated in the central Khartoum, and projected the narrative of “Khartoum is free.” This implied that even if the RSF continue to have troops inside Khartoum, it has lost its control of the capital. Although recapture of Khartoum was a major victory for the SAF, following the victory in the Battle of el Fasher, the RSF crossed the final barrier in controlling the western states in Sudan. Strategically, control of El-Fasher meant access to mineral routes and networks to neighbouring countries. Militarily, it was a major setback for the SAF. The SAF's withdrawal from the city signalled a critical loss of military capacity, which increased the risks of further RSF offensives that pushed the SAF to the east. Politically, with all five Darfur states and the majority of the Kordofan states under the RSF, the group consolidated a parallel government in the west.

Third, regional and international efforts and their ineffectiveness. There have been multiple regional and international efforts to end the war, including talks led by the UK and Sierra Leon in November 2024, the US and Saudi Arabia in May 2023, and the African Union and Egypt in May 2023. Since the war began in April 2023, there have been more than nine rounds of ceasefire mediations led by the US, Saudi Arabia, the AU and neighbouring countries, including Egypt. However, all the attempts failed. The recent peace efforts led by the US came after a lull in regional and international efforts to end the war. However, the SAF has objected to the UAE’s involvement in the mediations for its alleged weapon supply to the RSF, an accusation it has denied. The SAF, internationally considered the legitimate government, seeks a complete victory. It demands the RSF’s withdrawal from civilian areas ahead of a truce. Although the RSF has agreed to a humanitarian truce, it rejected direct talks with the SAF by accusing it of being controlled by the members of the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood, a banned party of former leader Omar al-Bashir. The regional and international efforts have been criticised for their bias towards either of the warring parties. Additionally, the mediators struggle to bring the warring parties to the bargaining table and secure their commitment and compliance.

Fourth, the abundant weapon supply despite the UN arms embargo. Despite a UN arms embargo, the UAE and Iran are allegedly supporting the RSF and the SAF with weapon supply. The UAE is accused by the UN, the US and other international actors of supporting the RSF with weapons. Amnesty International claimed that weapons used in the civil war have been manufactured in Serbia, Iran, Russia, China, Turkey, Yemen and the UAE. According to the UN, they are smuggled via the UAE through Chad and then to Darfur. Meanwhile, the UAE has denied the allegations. The abundant flow of weapons, despite the UN arms embargo, also implies a global ignorance. It has given the warring parties a strong incentive to disregard the peace talks efforts and continue the violence.

What does it mean for 2026?
With the capture of the western states, the RSF has not only consolidated its parallel government but also gained more confidence to once again advance towards the capital Khartoum. Although recent RSF advancements point to a weakened SAF, considering continued weapon supply to both factions, RSF's complete victory over the SAF is unlikely. It implies that the civil war will continue with more violence. It also implies that war is likely to witness further geographical shifts, an increase in the frequency and intensity of violence, and a devastating humanitarian cost towards an unpredictable timeline.

The US-led ceasefire mediation was the only peace effort in 2025. It also came after almost a year of a lull in international peace mediation. This ignorance has made the war more complex and difficult for any actors to mediate. Given Sudan’s history of persistent multidimensional violent conflicts before the civil war and previously failed peace mediations, the global ignorance is likely to remain a major issue in 2026 as well. It indicates that, sadly, Sudan will have to anticipate a worse humanitarian crisis in 2026.

About the author 
Anu Maria Joseph is a Project Associate at NIAS. 

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