State of Peace and Conflict 2025

State of Peace and Conflict 2025
Nepal: Youth Unrest, Bad Governance and Political Breakdown
Conflict Weekly #313, 31 December 2025, Vol. 6, No. 52

Mahesh Batt
31 December 2025

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What happened?
On 8 September, thousands of young Nepalese, predominantly students and young professionals belonging to Generation Z, took to the streets of Kathmandu and other major cities. The protests were sparked by the government’s ban on 26 social media platforms, including Facebook, WhatsApp, Instagram, X and YouTube. 

Wearing school uniforms and carrying school bags, protesters gathered in symbolic public spaces such as Maitighar Mandala, peacefully demanding that the social media ban be lifted, corrupt politicians be held accountable, and entrenched leaders be removed from power. Security forces responded using tear gas, water cannons, rubber bullets and in some cases, open fire. Demonstrations took a violent turn after the police response, resulting in the death of at least 30 protesters. What began as peaceful demonstrations immediately reached new heights, forcing the resignation of the Home Minister, followed soon after by the Prime Minister. Violence spread across the country; houses of leaders, ministry quarters, media houses, businesses and even key government buildings, including the Parliament, Supreme Court and Singh Durbar and other key administrative offices, were attacked and set on fire.

On the same day, under growing pressure, the government lifted the ban; however, the demonstrations escalated. 

On 9 September, Nepal’s Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli resigned. On 10 September, the army took control of Nepal’s parliament and patrolled the streets amidst curfew in Kathmandu. The Nepal Army stated that the measures were necessitated to curb possible incidents of looting, arson, and other crimes "under the guise of agitation.” Talks between the Nepal Army, President Ram Chandra Paudel and the protesters began to decide the new interim leadership.

On 11 September, the protesters nominated Nepal’s first female Chief Justice Sushila Karki to become Prime Minister of the interim government. 

On 17 November, Nepal’s Election Commission announced that the elections will be held on 5 March 2026.

What are the issues?
First, the ban on social media that triggered the protests. During early September, the government banned all social media platforms across the country, amidst companies' failure to register under the new rules imposed by the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology. Young protesters saw the social media ban as censorship and an attack on their freedom of expression and civic space. For Gen Z, social media is not merely a source of entertainment, but also education, communication, social life, promoting enterprises, community organising and political expression. 

Second, the peak youth unrest. The nature of youth participation in the protests makes it unique. Unlike the previous waves of protests in Nepal, this one is not organised by traditional political parties. Instead, it is a grassroots, digitally coordinated uprising, largely led by students. The Gen Z generation, born roughly between the mid-1990s and 2010, is challenging both political stagnation and restrictions on digital freedom at the same time. They are demanding that leaders be held accountable and that the political system serve the people, not just the elites. The scale of mobilisation across cities highlights not only the anger of young Nepalese but also their capacity to organise independently and demand a more just and accountable political system.

Third, the long-standing political instability and public discontent over corruption and bad governance. Nepal has a long history of political instability, frequent changes in government and widespread complaints and protests about corruption and bad governance. The country has seen 14 different governments since 2008. No government has completed a full five-year term. Many young Nepalese point out the stark contrast between the lavish lifestyles of politicians’ children and the everyday struggles of ordinary youths, who often face unemployment, low wages or the painful choice of migrating abroad for work. This frustration has taken shape online in the form of the #Nepobaby movement, a rallying cry against inherited privilege and political entitlement. Demonstrators are no longer satisfied with small reforms or half-hearted promises. They are demanding wholesale change, including mass resignations, new elections and even the dissolution of parliament. Many feel that Nepal’s political institutions have become self-serving, detached from the public and unwilling to prioritise the needs of young citizens.

Fourth, uncertainties post-protests. After nearly three and a half months of the interim government, there has been negligible progress in holding those responsible for the violence during the Gen Z protests accountable; over 76 youth lost their lives during the protests. This prolonged delay has deepened frustration and mistrust among Gen Z groups, who see justice and accountability as the core promises of the post-protest political transition. Meanwhile, the re-emergence of traditional political leaders, many of whom have openly rejected the legitimacy of the current government, has further complicated the situation. Public threats, confrontational rhetoric and attempts to undermine the interim leadership by senior figures from established parties have raised serious concerns about political sabotage and institutional paralysis. Together, the lack of accountability, continued elite resistance, and rising political polarization are contributing to ongoing instability and uncertainty, increasing the risk of renewed unrest and weakening public confidence in the state’s ability to manage a free and fair election and a peaceful transition.

What does it mean for 2026?
Nepal stands at a critical crossroads shaped by the September 2025 Gen Z-led uprising, deep public anger over corruption and bad governance and the approaching early elections of 2026.

The September 2025 Gen Z protests were different from the previous protests. Within just 48 hours, the government collapsed. Although the transitional government was formed, a lot of uncertainties remain. Timely elections could channel youth frustration into democratic change and bring relative stability, while delays or political manipulation risk renewed protests, deeper polarization and prolonged instability.

A lot of risks and challenges remain. Violence can further escalate, leading to more loss of life, property damage and stricter crackdowns from the Nepal Army. There is also the danger of political parties trying to take over the movement for their own benefit, as some leaders and political parties have already begun claiming credit. Keeping the protests peaceful, maintaining focus and turning anger into clear demands are major challenges for the youth.

Meanwhile, the recent release of Rabi Lamichhane, chairman of the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP), significantly alters the political equation for 2026. With his strong appeal among youth and middle-class voters, Lamichhane embodies many of the aspirations raised during the Gen Z movement. His freedom and renewed political activity are likely to energize voters who feel alienated from traditional parties. Furthermore, the collaboration between RSP and Balen Shah, the popular Mayor of Kathmandu and another powerful youth icon, could be transformative and possibly create a strong alternative political force that could significantly disrupt established political leaders and parties such as the Nepali Congress, UML and Nepali Communist Party if elections are held on time.

Overall, Nepal’s immediate future depends on whether the state can manage a peaceful political transition, uphold democratic timelines and respond to the youth’s demand for accountability or whether missed opportunities push the country toward further uncertainty and instability. A key question remains: will the movement bring real change or only symbolic gestures?


About the author 
Mahesh Batt is a Project Manager at COSATT, Nepal. 

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