State of Peace and Conflict 2025

CWA # 1891
State of Peace and Conflict 2025
China and Taiwan: Political Tensions, Military escalation, and External intervention
Conflict Weekly #313, 31 December 2025, Vol. 6, No. 52

Femy Francis
31 December 2025

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What happened? 
In 2025, the pre-existing tensions between Taiwan and China escalated as both sides showcased military, diplomatic, and strategic tout. Throughout 2025, the Taiwan Strait witnessed Chinese military aircraft and warships, including Fujian, crossing or manoeuvring near and over the median line and the Air Defence Identification Zone. Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defence reported that PLA aircraft and fighter jets flew 4,935 times near Taiwan by November. They noted that this will surpass the 5,107 times flown in 2024. Out of which, Chinese sorties by November crossed the median line 3,467 times, beating the 2024 record of 3,074.

China conducted “Strait Thunder-2025 A” exercise in April by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). This was the first large-scale PLA exercise focused on Taiwan, following the “Joint Sword-2024” exercise. This focused on practising naval blockade and simulated strikes against Taiwanese energy sector facilities. The PLA Eastern Theatre Command focused on training its troops’ capabilities in regional control, blockade and precision strike. In 2025, operations were conducted by PLA Ground Force (PLAGF), PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), PLA Air Force (PLAAF), PLA Navy (PLAN), and China Coast Guard.

This year also saw increased involvement of external actors and China’s retaliation against external interference. The US administration under President Donald Trump announced the largest arms sale to Taiwan in December, worth USD 11.1 billion. The arms sale will include 82 HIMARS rocket systems, 60 M109A7 self-propelled howitzers, Javelin anti-tank missiles, TOW anti-tank missiles, and 420 M57 ATACMS missile systems. In response, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs imposed sanctions on 30 US defence firms. Their assets are frozen, and the companies are barred from conducting sales with domestic organisations or individuals in China. Pentagon defence report of December 2025 claimed that China is currently building its capabilities to take Taiwan by force by 2027.

Japan’s newly elected Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi made a controversial statement on Taiwan in November, leading to tensing of ties with China. Takaichi stated that the possible invasion of Taiwan will constitute a “survival-threatening situation” for Japan. This, under their 2015 security law, allows Japan to deploy their Self-Defence Force to assist its ally. This statement drew heavy criticism from China, with the government demanding the retraction of the statement by the Prime Minister.

In October, Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te announced that they will be building their multilayered air defence system called the “T-Dome” to defend itself from air missile strikes. Taiwan’s National Defence Minister Wellington Koo informed that they aim to integrate systems for a faster and effective response to aerial threats and aim to pass the special budget by the end of the year.

What are the issues?
First, China’s hardline stance on Taiwan. China views Taiwan as part of its territory and its current government as a defunct entity that will eventually be reunified with the mainland. China proposes One Country and Two Systems in order to give Taiwan some autonomy, which has been vehemently rejected by Taiwan. China has always had a hardline stance on Taiwan, demanding that the international community and countries refrain from recognising their independent existence, stating that this goes against China’s national sovereignty. China has also become more hardline towards the Taiwanese government currently in power, labelling them as secessionist forces.

Second, China’s intensified military posturing. An increased and heightened military and diplomatic posturing by China can be seen as almost provoking Taiwan to retaliate. The increased violation of airspace and median line, and the aggressive behaviour of the Chinese coast guards near Taiwan's waters, is intended to provoke a response from Taiwan. There has been a pivot against China’s peaceful reunification plans as it openly admits to possibly engaging in coercive action, if needed. This aggressive posturing is not limited to Taiwan but with other contested waters like the South China Sea and Islands in East Asia.

Third, polarised Taiwan lacks a unified action plan. The current administration in power, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) led by President Lai-Ching-te, has a clear stance on Taiwan independence and protection of its sovereignty from China. DPP has the majority in the Executive Yuan, the highest administrative body. While the Legislative Yuan is led by the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) and the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), who are unofficially CPC sympathisers. This has led to deep incongruity in the government, with the DPP failing to pass bills as the opposition thwarts any efforts to increase military budget plans. This domestic divide hinders Taiwan from coming up with a unified action plan on China.

Fourth, China’s new red line against external intervention. The involvement or mere provocation of it by Japan has escalated tensions in the East Asian region. For the longest time, officially, Taiwan is considered to be part of China, while countries engaged in relations with Taiwan through the back door, in order not to anger Beijing. The statement by Takaichi and the US sale of arms to Taiwan have escalated regional tensions, with external parties backing Taiwan. This has led to China sending aggressive warnings against interference, stating that this affects the regional stability.

Fifth, the threat to the semiconductor supply chain. The rising tensions between Taiwan and China will have a global impact on the supply chain of semiconductors produced by TSMC, one of the world’s largest and advanced suppliers. TSMC’s Global Foundry revenue reached USD 41.7 billion, having a 70 per cent market share in 2025. TSMC currently supplies worldwide, from Asia, Europe, to North America. In light of this, countries like the US, Japan and Germany are planning to open domestic TSMC facilities in case of conflict, as it might lead to a complete global shutdown of data centres, AI innovation, and all kinds of electronics.

What does it mean for 2026?
First, no one is likely to back down. China in 2025 practised aggressive posturing against Taiwan as it continues to practice possible war exercises. Taiwan is not backing down, with the DPP backed by external allies. It implies that China will continue its aggressive tactics as it weans itself of the idea of peaceful reunification. Taiwan is projected to be seen as bulking by strengthening its military infrastructure and getting as much external support as it can. Neither is projected to back down, and an eventual showdown is possible if not in 2026, but sooner than later.

Second, strict adherence to the One-China policy. Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s statement has triggered China to garner support for its One-China Policy. In the year ahead, China is likely to demand a pledge of allegiance from its partners, especially developing or underdeveloped, hoping to get investments and support from China. Additionally, China is likely to demand the same from the more developed countries in Europe, and the US, for whom it is an important trading partner, especially of rare earths.

Third, pivoting towards forced reunification. The year 2026 is likely to see the shedding of China’s “peaceful reunification” plan as it grows tiresome with Taiwan’s non-compliance and the external interference. China’s “One-Country and Two Systems” framework will continue to be rejected by Taiwan, as it saw what it did to Hong Kong. China violated the principles of the framework by taking away Hong Kong’s autonomy and annihilating any political dissent. The year ahead will see continued aggressive military posturing as it gives up its plan for reunification through peace and cooperation, especially with the involvement of external actors.

About the author 
Femy Francis is a Project Associate at NIAS.

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