State of Peace and Conflict 2025

CWA # 1893
State of Peace and Conflict 2025
The Ukraine War: Trump’s 28-point peace plan and Strategic Manoeuvres
Conflict Weekly #313, 31 December 2025, Vol. 6, No. 52

Lekshmi MK
31 December 2025

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What happened?
On 19 November, US President Donald Trump announced a 28-point draft peace plan to end the Russia-Ukraine War. The draft covered ceasefire mechanisms, security guarantees, territorial arrangements, sanctions relief, and post-war reconstruction. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky described the proposal as a “US vision” rather than a negotiated settlement. European leaders argued that the plan favoured Russia and risked legitimising territorial aggression. EU Foreign Policy Chief Kaja Kallas stated that “any viable peace deal must have the backing of both Kyiv and Europe.” European diplomats warned that concessions could embolden Russia and undermine NATO security.

On 24 November, European countries submitted a modified version of the US plan, adjusting proposed limits on Ukraine’s armed forces and softening territorial concessions. On the same day, leaders from the UK, France, and Germany, under the “coalition of the willing,” reiterated that Ukraine must be fully involved in any settlement.

On 26 November, President Trump stated that his peace plan had been “fine-tuned,” following consultations with allies and Ukraine.

On 27 November, at a security conference in Kyrgyzstan, Russian President Vladimir Putin said that the plan “could be used as a basis for future agreements,” however, signing it under Ukraine’s current leadership was “pointless” due to the absence of presidential elections. He stated that Russia would halt operations if Ukraine withdrew from occupied territories, adding, “if they don’t, we will make them,” indicating continued military pressure.

During 1-2 December, following the Florida talks involving Trump administration envoys Steve Witkoff, Marco Rubio, and Jared Kushner on 30 November, Trump said there was a “good chance” for a deal. However, on 3 December, Kremlin aide Yuri Ushakov said that negotiators were “neither further nor closer” to a settlement. On 4 December, Trump stated that ongoing US-Russia diplomatic discussions were “reasonably good,” although uncertain. The Kremlin responded that while some elements were discussed, “compromises have not yet been found.”

On 12 December, Kyiv presented a revised 20-point framework to Washington. On the same day, the US accepted elements of the revised 20-point plan, but did not endorse Ukraine’s territorial positions or long-term security demands. Instead, the US floated the idea of a “free economic zone” in the Ukrainian-controlled Donbas as a compromise. Talks also discussed possible Russian withdrawals from Kharkiv, Sumy, and Dnipropetrovsk, and freezing frontlines in Zaporizhzhia and Kherson.

On 14 December, Ukraine withdrew its NATO ambition in exchange for legally binding security guarantees. Meanwhile, on 15 December, President Zelensky held extended meetings with Steve Witkoff, Jared Kushner, Friedrich Merz, and NATO officials, and reiterated that Ukraine will not withdraw from areas it controls unless Russia does the same

On 17 December, President Zelensky described the US-backed proposal as “not perfect but workable.” On 19 December, President Putin reiterated that territories under Russian control were “closed” for negotiation, praised Trump’s efforts as “serious,” and warned that using frozen Russian assets would be “theft.” During 20-21 December, senior US and Russian officials met again in Florida. President Zelensky expressed openness to direct negotiations involving the US, Russia, Ukraine, and possibly Europe. On 25 December, President Zelensky stated that Kyiv was open to considering a demilitarised zone in eastern Ukraine as part of ongoing talks.  On 26 December 2025, President Zelensky said Ukraine may accept limited territorial flexibility on territory if it receives strong security guarantees from the US and its partners for up to 15 years.

Issues at large
First, the security and territory deadlock. A major obstacle to the peace process has been     Ukraine’s demand for security guarantees and Russia’s insistence on territorial recognition, especially over Donbas and Zaporizhzhia. Ukraine has sought guarantees from the US and European partners, including arrangements similar to NATO’s Article 5, to deter future Russian aggression. However, neither the US nor the European countries have expressed willingness to extend such guarantees outside existing alliance structures. The peace proposals envisioned freezing the front lines, creating demilitarised zones, or granting special economic arrangements in contested regions. However, these mechanisms did not resolve the territorial claims. Ukraine has rejected permanent territorial concessions, arguing it would legitimise aggression and undermine international law. Meanwhile, Russia has prioritised the formal recognition of territories it controls as a non-negotiable precondition for ending hostilities.

Second, incremental progress rather than a full settlement. The plan prioritises early steps such as ceasefire arrangements, freezing of current frontlines, humanitarian corridors, and monitoring mechanisms. The plan suggests advancing peace in phases by managing escalation and short-term risks. This incremental design has limited its effectiveness, as both Russia and Ukraine remain unwilling to make concessions without upfront clarity on the core issues. For Ukraine and its partner allies, limited steps help stabilise the battlefield without legitimising territorial losses. For Russia, partial agreements allow continued leverage while avoiding binding political concessions. As a result, diplomacy has functioned more as a war-management tool rather than a resolution process.

Third, lack of mutual acceptance. The negotiations have been conducted against a backdrop of deep mistrust, shaped by prior failed agreements and continuous military operations. The lack of mutual acceptance concerns both the proposed peace frameworks and the ceasefire mediation process. Russia has combined diplomatic engagement with continued military operations and explicit threats. While participating in talks and engaging through envoys, Moscow has continued strikes, troop deployments, and warnings of escalation. Mediations are occurring under coercive conditions rather than a ceasefire environment. Ukraine and its partners view such tactics as attempts to extract concessions rather than a genuine pursuit of peace. Simultaneously, the US and Europe resorted to sanctions, military aid, and economic pressure against Moscow.

Fourth, Europe’s hesitation and limited engagement. European governments have shown caution and, at times, reluctance to assume a more proactive diplomatic role. Internal divisions within European countries stem from differing national interests, domestic political pressures, and varying levels of exposure to the Ukraine war. While frontline states in Eastern Europe view Russia as an immediate security threat and favour stronger military support for Ukraine, several Western and Southern European countries are more cautious due to economic costs, energy dependence, domestic public opinion, and fears of escalation. These differences have made it difficult for Europe to adopt a unified position on security guarantees, sanctions enforcement, and long-term military commitments, contributing to hesitation in deeper involvement. Fifth, ambiguity in Trump’s 28-point plan. The proposal is Trump’s campaign-oriented diplomacy rather than a formally endorsed US government framework. Ukraine and European partners viewed the plan as a US vision rather than a negotiated agreement. Russia engaged tactically without committing to binding obligations. The nature of Trump’s mediation, centred on envoys and other channels, has thus eroded confidence in the process's durability and complicated efforts to build a broad peace framework.

What is expected in 2026?
First, a full settlement is unlikely. The 28-point plan sought to address a wide range of political, territorial, security, and economic issues in a single settlement. However, persistent disagreements, particularly over territorial recognition and binding security guarantees, have made consensus unattainable, suggesting that a full commitment to the peace deal is unlikely in 2026. The talks are likely to continue to focus on managing immediate issues such as ceasefires, humanitarian aid, and monitoring compliance, rather than resolving the deeper territorial and security disputes.

Second, sustained US-led mediation with selective European involvement. In 2026, the US is likely to remain the principal mediator. Meanwhile, European countries are likely to continue supporting Ukraine through political backing, financial assistance, and military aid. European engagement is likely to remain selective, shaped by concerns over Russian retaliation and internal divisions. Achieving consistent alignment among the US, European partners, and Ukraine will remain difficult, limiting the prospects for a fully unified negotiation strategy.

Third, conditional pressure through economic and security tools. In 2026, the US and European countries are likely to rely on conditional economic and security instruments to sustain momentum and pressure Ukraine and Russia to commit to the peace process.

About the author 
Lekshmi M K is a Postgraduate student from Madras Christian College, Chennai. 

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