State of Peace and Conflict 2025

CWA # 1894
State of Peace and Conflict 2025
Israel and Lebanon: Continuing Conflict, Escalation and Endgames
Conflict Weekly #313, 31 December 2025, Vol. 6, No. 52

Rohini Reenum
31 December 2025

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What happened?
27 November 2025 marked one year of the US-France-brokered Lebanon-Israel ceasefire agreement. Although the violent conflict was between Hezbollah and Israel, the ceasefire was finalised between Israel and the Republic of Lebanon. Since the ceasefire came into effect, routine violations by Israel with varying intensity have been reported widely. The Lebanese government has accused Israel of violating Lebanon’s sovereignty and called for meaningful peace negotiations. Israel has accused Hezbollah of violating the terms of the agreement and the Lebanese government of not fulfilling the agreed mandate.

On 31 October, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun accused Israel of intensifying attacks after he proposed negotiations for lasting peace. Aoun stated: “Lebanon is ready for negotiations to end the Israeli occupation, but any negotiation … requires mutual willingness, which is not the case.”

On 2 November, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu claimed: “Hezbollah is constantly taking hits, but it’s also trying to rearm and recuperate.” He added: “We expect the Lebanese government to uphold its commitments, namely, to disarm Hezbollah. But it’s clear that we’ll exercise our right to self-defense as stipulated in the ceasefire terms. We won’t let Lebanon become a renewed front against us, and we’ll do what’s necessary.”

On 20 November, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) said that it had recorded more than 10,000 air and ground violations (7500 air and 2500 ground violations) by Israel since the ceasefire came into effect.

What are the issues?
First, the decades-long Israel-Lebanon conflict. The genesis of the conflict goes back to Israel’s brief occupation of a part of southern Lebanon during the Arab-Israeli war of 1948. Over the years, Lebanon became home to both Palestinian refugees and anti-Israel groups such as the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), its splinter groups of Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) and others. This led to increased cross-border attacks against Israel, especially after the PLO shifted base from Jordan to Lebanon in 1970. Increasing cross-border attacks resulted in Israel’s first invasion of Lebanon in 1978 during the Lebanese Civil War, when it occupied a narrow zone in the South and started backing a local Christian militia called the South Lebanese Army (SLA). The SLA is accused of carrying out massive killings in Palestinian refugee camps during the war with alleged Israeli support. In 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon for a second time, extending up to West Beirut. The invasion was also in retaliation for cross-border attacks by the PLO.  It was in this context and year that Hezbollah was born with alleged support from Iran’s Revolutionary Guards. Later, the Israeli-Lebanon conflict turned into an Israeli-Hezbollah one. In 1983, Israel withdrew its forces from Beirut but continued to occupy Southern Lebanon until 2000. Since then, skirmishes have intermittently broken out, particularly between Israel and Hezbollah, including a seven-day war in 1993, a five-week war in 2006, and most recently in 2023-24.

Second, Hezbollah’s Israel problem. Hezbollah is a Shi’ite armed group that was formed in 1982 to counter the Israeli occupation of Southern Lebanon. Its manifesto explicitly mentions resistance against Israel and overt allegiance to Iran. Over the years, with backing from Iran, it became a well-armed group, and it is widely believed that it was Hezbollah’s offensive that forced Israel to finally withdraw from Southern Lebanon, ending the 22-year-old occupation.

Third, Israel’s Hezbollah problem. Hezbollah concurrently began cross-border attacks into Israel in solidarity with Hamas following Israel’s offensive in Gaza on 7 October 2023. Israel retaliated with force, with near-daily attacks into Lebanon, targeting what it called Hezbollah infrastructure, its members and first-rung leadership. After nearly a year of fighting, Israel invaded Southern Lebanon on 1 October 2024. Following this, France and the US brokered a ceasefire in November 2024. This ceasefire was agreed amidst a weakened Hezbollah following the targeted assassination of its Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, his successor Hashem Safieddine and a pager attack to dismantle its communications. According to Hezbollah, around 500 of its fighters had been killed by September 2024.

Fourth, the ceasefire violations. Both sides have accused each other of ceasefire violations. Israel has argued that Hezbollah is regrouping and rearming in violation of the ceasefire and that its attacks are in self-defence. Meanwhile, Hezbollah has refused to disarm until Israel ends its attacks and withdraws from Southern Lebanon. This has created a tit-for-tat situation that has jeopardized the fragile agreement. A clause of the peace agreement states that none of the stated commitments “preclude either Israel or Lebanon from exercising their inherent right of self-defence, consistent with international law.” This clause has given both parties de facto justification to violate the ceasefire under the pretext of self-defence. Further, Israel has also refused to withdraw its security forces, arguing that Lebanese forces were being deployed slowly, which allowed Hezbollah to regroup and that the group was violating the agreement by smuggling weapons. Hezbollah has so far not launched any attacks into Israel after the ceasefire.

Fifth, Lebanon’s Hezbollah conundrum. In Lebanon, Hezbollah is a political party with political representation and popular support, especially in the south and among Shia populations. Since the Lebanese Civil War, it has been the face of resistance against Israel. The Lebanese government has, despite efforts, not been able to disarm Hezbollah. The incumbent Lebanese president, Joseph Aoun, came to power promising a “state monopoly on arms,” which in effect meant disarming Hezbollah. The government fears a domestic backlash and resurgence of sectarian violence if it were to take concrete action. Given Israel’s past interventions in Lebanon and the state’s incapacity to act against its aggressive neighbour, the Lebanese government possibly views Hezbollah as an effective deterrent.

What does this mean for 2026?
First, Israel’s rationale and endgame. With Hezbollah significantly weakened after the 2024 war, Israel views this as an opportune moment to dismantle its adversary permanently or at least get the Lebanese government to disarm the group, even if it means violating the ceasefire. Although Israel has been unable to achieve a decisive victory against Hezbollah until now, the group’s loss of active support by its traditional partners, such as Syria and Iran, has lent urgency to Israeli actions.

After the 2023 Hamas attack, Israel’s endgame has been to completely obliterate regional non-state armed groups that pose a threat to it, including Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis. The Hamas attack and the other two groups joining it have provided Israel with the pretext to continue its attacks in Lebanon and Yemen. The war in Gaza has provided adequate cover for Israel’s transgressions across the region, reflected in its ground and air incursions into Syria and the blatant Doha attack. Israel’s ceasefire violations have become a new normal under various justifications until the objectives are met. Hence, it is likely that Israeli attacks in Lebanon are going to continue in 2026 until Hezbollah is decimated or disarmed.

Second, Hezbollah’s endgame. The ceasefire has provided Hezbollah time and space to re-group and re-strategise, especially while its chief patron Iran is itself recuperating from Israeli and the US attacks. This could be the reason that it has not retaliated against Israel, fearing total annihilation. Further, opposition to Israel is Hezbollah’s raison d'état for existence. A permanent peace would significantly hamper the group’s domestic popularity. If reports about rearmament are to be believed, Hezbollah’s recuperation is indicative of its desire for survival rather than achieving lasting peace for the Lebanese people. Further, Israeli transgressions into Lebanon, despite the ceasefire and international condemnation has stoked fears of Israeli aggression and its portrayal as a belligerent.  In this context, Hezbollah is unlikely to disarm soon and will likely use Israeli violations to cement its existence further.

About the author 
Rohini Reenum is a PhD student at NIAS, Bengaluru. 

 

 

 

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