In the news
In January, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)) and the Jamaat-e-Islaami (JI) began pushing for elections while the interim government focused on multiple electoral, constitutional and security reforms. This led to a political standoff between the traditional parties and the interim government.
In February, rioters burnt down Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s home. Following the incident, there was an unprecedented rise in attacks against minority communities and the Awami League (AL) members. In March, the government initiated Operation Devil Hunt to curb the violence.
In May, the Awami League (AL) was formally banned from all political activities.
In October, the July National Charter was finalised after multiple revisions. The Charter is a supra-legal framework of over 80 constitutional, legislative, and judicial reform proposals. There have been consistent protests regarding the Charter. Various political parties have called the Charter “ambiguous,” but have agreed to its implementation after a referendum scheduled for 12 February, along with elections.
In November, Sheikh Hasina was sentenced to death in absentia for her crimes against humanity. The Indian government said that it will examine Bangladesh’s extradition request and that it is committed to Bangladesh’s democratic processes. India’s response led to a wave of “de-Indianisation” amongst Bangladeshi youth.
In December, a series of riots broke out after the death of Osman Hadi on 12 December, a spokesperson of the Inquilab Monchi. During the later weeks, there was an unprecedented rise in arson attacks and lynching of Hindu citizens, Dipu Chandra Das and Amrit Mandal and attacks on established media houses, including the Prothom Alo and Daily Star, for alleged links to India.
Issues at large
First, continuing violence against minority communities and the AL. According to the Bangladesh Hindu Buddhist Christian Unity Council (BHBCUC), a minority rights group, between 4 August and 20 August, there were 2,000 incidents of communal violence, including the death of nine Hindu’s and 69 attacks on worship places. The violence against minorities increased in the last quarter of 2025, especially after the killing of Osman Hadi. A report by the Rights and Risks Analysts group, titled “Bangladesh: Organised Murder for Membership to the Awami League and its Affiliate Organisations,” documented that as of June 2025, at least 123 AL members and associates had been targeted by anti-AL groups. These attacks not only sought to quell opposition to the interim government but also pushed an agenda of “de-Indianization.” Inquilab Moncha, in retaliation for the killing, has announced its intent to apprehend all alleged “terrorists” within the Awami League. Although the government has proposed the re-implementation of Operation Devil Hunt, there has been limited progress.
Second, unsettled political uncertainties. There has been persistent contention between the government and other political parties, from the delay in elections to the implementation of the July Charter. The BNP has repeatedly criticised Chief Advisor Yunus’ decision to stall the elections until the reforms are finalised. BNP claims that the move is to secure an easy win, as delayed elections will provide Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and National Citizen Party (NCP) time and space to strengthen their political base and compete with the BNP. The transitional government has attempted to legitimise itself through the Declaration, pushing the agenda that it will stay in office until its purposes of systemic reform and economic stabilisation are reached. Among the public, there is increasing frustration over a lack of clarity in the referendum and the reforms.
Third, growing rifts between India and Bangladesh. After the fall of the Hasina government, Bangladesh’s ties with India have been fracturing. The delay of the extradition of Sheikh Hasina, the visa centre closures and Osman Hadi’s death have turned public opinion against India, leading to anti-India sentiments, the “India Out” protests and more violence against Hindu minorities. There has been an active shift towards China and Pakistan to reduce economic dependence on India. Pakistan and Bangladesh have seen a warming of relations after the multinational Aman-25 naval exercise; visa procedures are being relaxed, direct flights have resumed, and a military deal is in talks. China and Bangladesh have also grown friendly through China’s investments into infrastructural rebuilding and the BRI initiative.
What does it mean for 2026?
Following the ban on AL and violent protests this year, there are growing domestic concerns about how free and fair the 2026 elections will be. According to a survey conducted by the International Republican Institute, 33 per cent of participants said they’d vote for the BNP, whilst 29 per cent said they would vote for the JL. The interim government has not addressed the continuous communal violence and attacks on the AL. Meanwhile, there is a push for the legitimisation of the interim government, along with the consistent emphasis on the implementation of the July Declaration. It points to increasing concerns regarding a peaceful democratic transition.
India-Bangladesh relations are at a crossroads. The BNP has claimed that it will be moving towards China in terms of the Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project, effectively snubbing India. This highlights a significant shift away from Hasina’s foreign policy and showcases a reduced dependency on India. This stance is also being echoed by the Bangladeshi youth and political parties.
In sum, 2026 will be a major litmus test for a free and fair democratic transition and India-Bangladesh relations.
About the author
Emma Rose is an independent scholar from Bengaluru.
