State of Peace and Conflict 2025

CWA # 1898
State of Peace and Conflict 2025
Pakistan and Afghanistan: A Disputed border, TTP attacks and heightened tensions
Conflict Weekly #313, 31 December 2025, Vol. 6, No. 52

Akshath K
31 December 2025

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What happened?
In March, Pakistan announced the resumption of the Illegal Foreigners Repatriation Plan (IFRP), saying that it would include all Afghan Citizenship Card (ACC) holders. The move came after an increase in Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) attacks, which Pakistan accuses Afghanistan of supporting. However, Afghanistan denies the claim.

In August, the government ordered 1.3 million Proof of Registration (PoR) cardholders from Afghanistan to leave the country.

In September, Pakistan suffered a suicide bombing near the Frontier Corps (FC) headquarters in Quetta, killing ten personnel; Pakistan blamed the TTP “sanctuaries across the border.”

On 8 October, TTP carried out another attack in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province, killing 25 Pakistani soldiers. The Pakistan Air Force (PAF) responded by striking targets in Kabul, Jalalabad and Paktika, marking a significant escalation in hostilities between the two countries. Between 11 and 12 October, skirmishes continued.

On 19 October, a ceasefire was mediated by Qatar and Turkey. In November, following the ceasefire in Doha, both parties met in Istanbul to discuss a permanent ceasefire. However, the talks resulted in no breakthroughs.

In December, the parties met in Saudi Arabia, but once again, there was no breakthrough.

What are the issues?
First, the disputed border. The border rift between Pakistan and Afghanistan relates to the 2,640-kilometre border called the Durand Line. The border was drawn by British colonial authorities in 1893 to demarcate the boundary between British India and Afghanistan. It was drawn without consent from the local Pashtun tribes. Afghanistan has refused to recognise the boundary to this day, although recognised by Pakistan. Low-intensity intermittent clashes have taken place between the two countries following Pakistan’s independence. Meanwhile, Pakistan’s support for Afghanistan during the 1979 Soviet invasion and its involvement in the War on Terror resulted in the buildup of militancy and militant activity around the border, including the Pashtun-majority TTP. The disputed boundary has once again created animosity between the two countries. The TTP has historically pledged allegiance to the Taliban. Although Kabul denies any collaboration, the stance complicates the TTP’s relationship with Pakistan, especially because of their activity near the border and witnessing Pakistan siding with the US in the war with Afghanistan.

Second, escalating bilateral tensions. Pakistan’s objective has been to prevent Afghan territory from being used by anti-Pakistan militants, including the TTP, and to enforce the Durand Line as the sovereign international border. The country has relied on military and intelligence operations to address militancy spilling across the border. Afghanistan seeks political stability, internal unity among militant factions, resistance to external pressure and rejection of the Durand Line. Pakistan claims Afghanistan is tolerant towards the TTP and shelters its leaders, which Afghanistan denies. Pakistan’s approach towards Afghanistan this year was built on incidents since 2024; the border between the two countries was frequently closed, and Pakistan repeatedly asked Kabul to condemn and sanction TTP, which Afghanistan refused to do. Things reached a tipping point when the TTP launched an attack in Orakzai on 8 October, prompting a five-day war between the two neighbours. The conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan also prompted the former to significantly expand the forced repatriation of Afghan nationals. In 2025, according to the UN, over 850,000 Afghan nationals have been forced out of Pakistan.

Third, the TTP as the main trigger. The TTP emerged during the 2001 US-led war in Afghanistan when tribal groups, including the Mehsud Group and the Muqami Taliban, joined together to formally become the TTP in 2007. It ideologically rejects Pakistan, seeks autonomy, and was especially opposed to the 2018 merger of the tribal areas with KP. The group has since carried out attacks, including suicide bombings, across the region. Afghanistan has historically been seen as a supporter of the TTP, and this has increased tensions between Pakistan and its neighbour since 2021, after the Taliban returned to power in Kabul. Pakistan expanded its counterinsurgency operations against the TTP primarily through Operation Sarbakaf in Bajaur in July. However, the group continued frequent attacks across KP and Kabul repeatedly refused to condemn the TTP, which led to increased tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Fourth, the limited role of external actors. Qatar and Turkey were instrumental in the ceasefire agreement reached between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Qatar is a political ally of the Taliban and has consistently engaged in diplomacy with the Afghan government. Qatar also provides a venue for indirect communication when Pakistan-Afghanistan ties deteriorate. Turkey is more of a secondary player in this conflict. It has presented itself as a Muslim-majority country capable of mediating and engaging the Taliban without Western interference. Additionally, its close political and defence ties with Pakistan help increase its credibility as a reliable partner. Despite their effort, Pakistan and Afghanistan could only reach a fragile ceasefire. Even with Saudi Arabia’s effort in early December, the South Asian neighbours continued to disagree on factors core to the issue.

What does it mean for 2026?
First, the border issue remains unresolved. Although both countries reached a ceasefire, the deal only put a halt to hostilities and did not address the core factor at the heart of the conflict, the disputed border. Afghanistan's rejection of the Durand Line will likely intensify tensions while Pakistan plans to erect border fences in 2026. This standoff is likely to worsen tensions next year, especially when external actors like Turkey and Qatar have limited influence over core issues.

Second, the economic and humanitarian fallout will continue. A closed border between the two countries means communities in regions around the border continue to face issues. The economic impact primarily hit communities in the border region, but the impact was also felt nationwide. Formal trade between the two countries fell to USD 800 million from a peak of USD 2.5 billion. Additionally, Afghan deportations from Pakistan will likely continue into next year, potentially worsening the fragile humanitarian situation at the border.

Third, violence will likely continue in 2026. Despite a ceasefire deal between Pakistan and Afghanistan, the TTP is likely to continue violent attacks across the region. With Pakistan continuing to blame Afghanistan for the proliferation of the TTP, and the Taliban regime denying any involvement, the TTP is likely to capitalise on the conflict between the two countries. Additionally, with no permanent ceasefire deal between the neighbours, it is also likely that 2026 would see another round of military standoff between the two.

About the author 
Akshath K is a Research Intern at NIAS, Bengaluru.

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