State of Peace and Conflict 2025

CWA # 1900
State of Peace and Conflict 2025
Pakistan: Continuing internal violence, Rise in fatalities, and State repression
Conflict Weekly #313, 31 December 2025, Vol. 6, No. 52

Akshath K
31 December 2025

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What happened?
In 2025, militant violence has been concentrated in the frontier provinces of Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The following were the major attacks carried out by three prominent militant groups in the provinces:

On 11 March, the Balochistan Liberation Army-Jeeyand (BLA-J) hijacked the Jaffer Express, which carried 440 passengers; 21 civilians and four soldiers were killed in the incident. On 12 March, security forces ended a 30-hour siege, killing 33 terrorists.

On 8 May,  the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) carried out IED attacks in Bolan and Kech, claiming 14 lives.

In July, the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) launched ‘Operation Baam’ with over 17 attacks in 48 hours across the southern part of Balochistan, across Panjgur, Surab, Kech, and Kharan. BLF spokesperson, Major Gwahram Baloch, described the attack as “a new dawn in the Baloch national liberation war.” He added: “Operation Baam is designed to demonstrate that Baloch fighters are capable of launching large-scale, synchronised operations across vast geography.”

On 8 October, the Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP) ambushed a military convoy in Orakzai district; 11 soldiers were killed in the attack. Pakistan’s Army said that the soldiers died in a military operation that killed 19 militants in Orakzai district.

Throughout the year, the government continued the counterinsurgency Operation Azm-e-Istehkam, which started in 2024.  It also launched a sub-operation in Bajaur district in July to attack TTP strongholds.

In June, the amendment to the Anti-Terrorism Act allowed law enforcement authorities to detain anyone without charges, further fueling resentment in Balochistan.

In November, the Centre for Research and Security Studies (CRSS) reported a 25 per cent increase in overall violence in Pakistan in 2025, compared to 2024.

What are the issues?
First, an increase in violence. According to the Centre for Research and Security Studies (CRSS), this year there were 3187 fatalities already recorded from 1188 incidents of violence, a steady increase from 2546 fatalities and 1166 violent incidents in 2024. The data also says that 96 per cent of all fatalities and 92 per cent of all incidents of violence were recorded in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Balochistan. The remaining regions reported 90 incidents and 126 lives lost, constituting four per cent of total fatalities. Security forces’ operations were particularly impactful this year, resulting in 1795 militant fatalities. This marks the fifth straight year of a rise in numbers.

Second, the situation in Balochistan and KP continues to be fragile. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa experienced the highest violence across the country, constituting 68 per cent of all fatalities, totalling 2165, and 62 per cent of all incidents of violence, amounting to 732. Meanwhile, 1370 fatalities of security forces were inflicted during security operations, exceeding the 795 fatalities from terrorist attacks. This shows that counter-terrorism operations were more aggressive this year in the province. KP also recorded the highest number of kidnappings at 42. Most violence took place in the tribal regions of Kurram, North Waziristan and Khyber. Balochistan was the second-worst hit region, after KP. 896 lives were lost in Balochistan in 2025, accounting for over 28 per cent of total fatalities from 366 violent incidents. Terrorist attacks were responsible for 517 fatalities among security personnel and civilians, which is higher than the 379 fatalities from security operations. This suggests that militant groups in the province have been more aggressive and offensive.

Third, a multiplicity of actors presents a complex situation. Several militant groups are operating in KP and Balochistan. The multiplicity of actors and their different objectives has made the security situation complex. Three of them stand out. The Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), formed in 2000, is an offshoot of previous Balochistan separatist movements and has blamed the Pakistan government for economic exploitation and political isolation. Following the killing of Baloch leader Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, the group became more violent, intensified attacks on security personnel and targeted economic infrastructure. The hijacking of the Jaffer Express by the BLA-J in March was the most prominent violent incident perpetrated by the group this year. The Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) has its roots in separatist movements in the 1960s and 70s. It emerged in the early 2000s and evolved into a rural insurgent force. This year, the BLF marked a shift in strategy with the introduction of “Operation Baam,” which resulted in 70 different attacks across the province in four days. Violence was also perpetrated by the Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP) or the Pakistani Taliban, which has been operating along the border with Afghanistan, primarily in KP. The tribal regions, including Bajaur, Khyber, Kurram and South Waziristan, are strongholds of the TTP. The group is one of the most active armed groups in KP. Other militant groups in KP include Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Hafiz Gul Bahadur (HGB) and the Islamic State - Khorasan Province (ISKP).

Fourth, a repressive and violent state response against the Baloch movements. The state’s response to the Baloch movements has been characterised by military deployment and intelligence operations. Enforced disappearances have also been at the core of the conflict between the people of Balochistan and the state. The passing of the Anti-Terrorism (Balochistan Amendment) Act 2025 has emboldened the state and military to continue detaining protestors without charge. According to the Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC), there have been 752 enforced disappearances in total up until June 2025, with 550 people still missing. Extrajudicial killings have also worsened Baloch resentment towards the government, with 117 instances being recorded by the committee. This reflects the continued crackdown on the movement by the government using violent and repressive means.

Fifth, increased momentum by civil society organisations countered by state repression. In Balochistan, the Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC) has emerged as the most prominent civil society actor, organising massive gatherings and protests demanding accountability for enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings. Groups such as the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) and the Balochistan Bar Council have formally rejected the 2025 amendment to the Anti-Terrorism Act, labelling it as a means to legalise enforced disappearances. The Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM) also played a vital role in protesting against the government’s plan to deport Afghan refugees. Despite the pushback, the state has responded by cracking down on dissent and censoring information, undermining peaceful and non-violent movements.

What does it mean for 2026?
First, continued state repression could breed more violence. The federal government’s actions in Balochistan and KP against insurgent and separatist movements could backfire if the root causes are unaddressed. Baloch militant groups have grown more sophisticated in their approach. State repression in the form of enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings and political isolation would only serve their interests and lead to further sophistication of insurgent attacks, potentially leading to a perpetual cycle of violence. There is also a likelihood for a non-violent movement gaining momentum in Balochistan.

Second, the geographical scope of violence could expand. While most violence in Pakistan has taken place in Balochistan and KP, the scope of violence expanding geographically beyond the two provinces is likely due to the country’s complex security landscape.

Third, violent incidents will continue to increase in 2026. Based on the last five years' records, it is likely that 2026 will see another increase in violent activity and fatalities. There has been a shift in strategy among several militant groups, with simultaneous, coordinated attacks. The TTP has emboldened since the Taliban’s return to Kabul in 2021, capitalising on the deteriorating bilateral ties. State forces are also expected to expand their operations, which will lead to more violence and fatalities. Expanded legal power this year, in the form of the Anti-Terrorism Act amendment and the 27th Amendment, gives the government and military more options in their response next year.

 

About the author Akshath K is a Research Intern at NIAS, Bengaluru. 

 

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