The World This Week

The World This Week
US-EU Tariff tensions, Australian Prime Minister’s visit to China, and PM Modi’s visit to Brazil and Argentina

NIAS Global Politics Team
20 July 2025
Photo Source: REUTERS/Zorana Jevtic

US-EU Tariff tensions: From dialogue to a deadlock
Lekshmi MK and Swati Sood 

What happened?
On 12 July, President Donald Trump announced a 30 per cent tariff on most EU imports, applicable from 01 August. 

On 14 July, in response, EU leaders called the move “absolutely unacceptable” and pledged EUR 72 billion in counter-tariffs.

On 15 July, the EU postponed retaliation to allow talks. 

On 16 July, EU trade chief Maros Sefcovic visited Washington.

On 17 July, Trump hinted that a deal was “possible.” 

On 18 July, President Trump threatened to impose tariffs of 15-20 per cent on all goods imported from the EU.

What is the background?  
First, a brief note on President Trump’s reciprocal tariffs and the US-EU tariff negotiations. On 02 April 2025, President Trump launched Reciprocal Tariffs by invoking the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to impose a universal 10 per cent tariff on all imports. This added surcharges of up to 20 per cent on the EU. In response, the EU introduced 25 per cent counter-tariffs worth EUR 21 billion on targeted US products. Later, the EU proposed expansion of tariffs to EUR 95 billion if no deal was reached. Both sides agreed to a 90-day pause with baseline US tariffs at 10 per cent, but further negotiations stalled. 

Second, a brief note on US-EU trade relations. The European Union and the United States have the world's largest bilateral trade and investment relationship. The US-EU trade in goods and services reached EUR 1.6 trillion in 2023. The European Union is a source of critical supplies to the United States, including medicinal ingredients and pharmaceutical products. The EU exported EUR 503 billion goods to the US market, while importing goods worth EUR 347 billion. This resulted in a goods trade surplus of EUR 157 billion for the EU. At the same time, the European Union is the largest buyer of the US natural gas and oil. 

Third, an internal divide within the EU over its response to Trump’s tariffs. The European Union experienced internal differences among its member states over how to respond to the tariff measures announced by President Trump. While the European Commission coordinated discussions on countermeasures, national governments remained divided in terms of their support. Countries with higher export volumes to the US, such as Germany, urge a swift resolution. Others adopt a more cautious approach. The lack of immediate consensus delays a unified EU response to Trump’s tariffs.

Fourth, other US-EU differences. Both are increasingly competing to attract green technology investments through large-scale subsidy programs. The US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), with over USD 369 billion in clean energy incentives, offers generous tax credits to companies producing batteries, EVs, and renewable components within the US. In response, the EU launched its Green Deal Industrial Plan and the Net-Zero Industry Act. Also, the EU and several constituent countries, including France, Italy, and Spain, have targeted major US tech firms like Google, Amazon, Facebook, and Apple mainly through the EU Digital Markets Act (DMA), EU Digital Services Act (DSA), and national digital service taxes. The taxes were levied amid growing concerns that such firms were paying minimal taxes despite large profits in European markets. The United States viewed these national laws as unfair trade practices, which escalated tensions between the two sides.

What does it mean?
First, weaponisation of tariffs formulated into mistrust between US and the EU. The US kept using tariffs to protect its own economy, but this made Europe feel pressured. Instead of open talks, it felt more like a power move. Without clear plans, both sides couldn’t settle on common ground.

Second, deepening divides within the EU bloc. The lack of unity among EU member states weakens the bloc’s ability to respond decisively to external pressures like US tariffs. As a result, despite EU leaders’ willingness to negotiate, their fragmented stance limits progress toward a comprehensive trade deal with the US.

Third, green & digital policy clashes. The EU is committed to strict climate goals and digital regulations, which often conflict with US economic and corporate interests. Trump’s administration is more tilted more towards deregulation less towards EUs green priorities. These differences limit scope for deeper cooperation or compromise.

Australian PM Albanese’s visit to China: 
Balancing Economic Interests, Strategic Tensions and a Soft Power Recalibration

Kasvi Batra

What happened? 
On 12 July, Australian Prime Minister Antony Albanese reached China for a six-day visit at the invitation of Premier Li Qiang to participate in the Annual Leaders’ Meeting. 

On 13 July, the two countries signed a MoU between Tourism Australia and Trip.com Group. On the same day, PM Albanese attended a Steel Decarbonization Round Table, where it was agreed to establish a new policy dialogue on steel decarbonization.
 
On 15 July, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese guest-chaired the eighth Australia–China CEO Roundtable alongside Chinese Premier Li Qiang. PM Albanese and Premier Li Qiang also held the Annual Leaders Meeting, reaffirming their support for the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and the 1972 Joint Communiqué. Both sides emphasized the value of people-to-people exchanges in strengthening ties and reiterated Australia’s commitment to the One China Policy.

Also on the same day, both countries several key agreements including the following:the Memorandum of Understanding on the Implementation and Review of the China-Australia Free Trade Agreement in 2025–2026 and the Memorandum of Understanding on Tourism Cooperation. A Strategic Cooperation Agreement between China Media Group and Tourism Australia was also signed. Additionally, three MOUs were concluded between China's General Administration of Customs and Australia's Department of Agriculture on phytosanitary protocols.

On 15 July, PM met President Xi Jinping. Albanese reaffirmed Australia's commitment to the One China Policy while emphasizing support for maintaining the status quo in Taiwan. During his opening remarks Xi stated “seeking common ground while setting aside differences is in line with “the fundamental interests of our two countries and our two peoples no matter how the international landscape may evolve, we should uphold this overall direction unswervingly”

What is the background?
First, a brief overview of China and Australia’s trade relations. China is Australia’s largest trading partner, with nearly 25 per cent of Australian exports going to China. China also accounts for around 4 per cent of total FDI into Australia, investing in mining, healthcare, and infrastructure. The China-Australia Free Trade Agreement (ChAFTA), in effect since 2015, has improved agricultural market access, enhanced service access for Australian providers in China, raised investment thresholds for Chinese private companies in sensitive sectors, and enabled faster customs clearance. ChAFTA has significantly boosted Australian exports of iron ore, natural gas, and agricultural products

Second, the recent challenges in Australia and China relationship. During 2018 -24, Australia-China relations saw significant tensions. In 2018, Australia blacklisted Huawei and ZTE from 5G network rollout and passed a foreign interference law, widely viewed as targeting China. In 2020, Australia’s call for a COVID-19 origins inquiry led to a trade dispute, with China imposing tariffs and import bans on key Australian exports like barley, beef, wine, and coal. Australia responded with its own measures, including blocking Chinese acquisitions and launching anti-dumping probes. The trade war gradually eased through bilateral negotiations, with China lifting major restrictions between 2023 and 2024, and Australia dropping its WTO complaints. 

Third, the people to people ties. Australia remains a top destination for Chinese students. To strengthen ties, both countries established the Australia–China High Level Dialogue in 2014, fostering exchange across sectors. In 2020, the National Foundation for Australia–China Relations was set up to promote constructive engagement through programs, expertise, and grants supporting bilateral cooperation.

What does it mean?
First, the reopening of high-level dialogue between Australia and China. After years of tensions over foreign interference laws, COVID origins, AUKUS, and trade barriers, the resumption of key dialogue frameworks such as Annual leaders meet institutionalizes long term cooperation. The visit has also renewed economic ties between Australia and China, with most tariffs and informal bans lifted. The new policy dialogue on decarbonization also positions Australia as a key partner in China’s efforts to green its supply chain.

Second, the visit marks a strategic recalibration and could serve as a model for Pacific states with strong trade ties to China. Prime Minister Albanese secured broad trade agreements without offering concessions on Australia’s internal security, balancing economic engagement with national interests.

Indian PM Modi's visit to Brazil:
Deepening bilateral partnership

Swati Sood 

What happened? 
On 6 July, Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Brazil as part of his five-nation tour. PM Modi was received by Brazil’s President Lula da Silva and was accorded a ceremonial welcome with military honours. He also participated in the 17th BRICS Summit in Rio de Janeiro from 6 to 7 July. 

On 6 July, the Rio de Janeiro Declaration was adopted by member countries at the BRICS summit. 

On 8 July, PM Modi held meetings with Brazil’s President Lula da Silva at Alvorada Palace in Brasilia. In over 57 years, this was the first bilateral state visit of an Indian Prime Minister to Brazil. Both leaders discussed the entire spectrum of the relations between the countries. Additionally, both leaders affirmed to expand the India-MERCOSUR Preferential Trade Agreement and set a target to increase bilateral trade to USD 20 billion over the next five years.

On the same day, India and Brazil signed six MoUs and agreements including MoU on Cooperation for the sharing of Successful Large-scale Digital solutions for Digital Transformation, Agreement on Cooperation in Combating International Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime, MoU on Cooperation in Renewable Energy, MoU on Agricultural Research between EMBRAPA and the Indian Council of Agricultural Research, Agreement on the Exchange and Mutual Protection of Classified Information, and MoU on Cooperation in the field of Intellectual Property between DPIIT of India and Secretariat of Competitiveness and Regulatory Policy, MDIC of Brazil.

Also on the same day, a Joint Statement also was adopted, according to which India and Brazil have acknowledged the urgency of collaborating under five priority pillars: defense and security; food and nutritional security; energy transition and climate change; digital transformation and emerging technologies; and industrial partnerships in strategic areas such as pharmaceutical industry; defence equipment; mining & minerals; and oil & gas sector, including research, exploration, extraction, refining, and distribution. Brazil’s highest national honour was conferred upon PM Modi, the Grand Collar of the National Order of the Southern Cross.

What is the background?
First, a brief note on historical and cultural relations between India and Brazil. India and Brazil’s historical relations can be traced to the Portuguese imperialist empire. As outposts of the Portuguese empire, Brazil and Goa had linkages between the 16th and 18th centuries. These are reflected in the folkways and local traditions in the two countries

Second, India-Brazil partnership at multilateral forums. Diplomatic relations between the countries were established in 1948. India and Brazil have worked jointly in various multilateral bodies and forums such as the BRICS, United Nations, G20, World Trade Organisation, International Solar Alliance, Global Biofuel Alliance, and Coalition for Disaster Resilience Infrastructure. Further, India and Brazil have actively expressed shared ambitions for reforming and expanding the current UN Security Council. 

Third, economic ties between India and Brazil. India and Brazil enjoy strong trade relations.
In FY 2024-25, bilateral trade reached USD 12.2 billion. Major Indian exports to Brazil include processed petroleum products, agrochemicals, and engineering products. Major Brazilian exports to India include gold and crude oil. 

What does this mean?
First, deepening bilateral partnership under priority areas. Partnership under the five priority pillars demonstrates that both countries are determined to enhance industrial collaboration, which is pertinent to foster institutional cooperation that is unaffected by evolving partisan considerations. 

Second, BRICS is a binding factor. India and Brazil seek to achieve equitable global governance for a multipolar world order mainly through BRICS. India’s status as a rising, strategically autonomous power can help achieve this objective when it assumes the presidency of the grouping next year. Brazil’s prevalence in South America as a major power can also serve as a pathway for India to expand its footprint in the region. 

Indian PM Modi’s Visit to Argentina:
Minerals, Markets, and Military

Naomi Miriam Mathew

What happened? 
On 4 July, PM Modi arrived in Buenos Aires, Argentina, for a two-day visit marking the third stop of the Five-Nation tour. It is the first bilateral visit to Argentina in 57 years, where the Prime Minister addressed Argentina as a key economic partner in Latin America and a close collaborator in the G20. Both countries signed a series of MOUs in different sectors, including defence cooperation, where India offered Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul services for Argentine helicopters through HAL and Bharath Dynamics Ltd, which would help Argentina to reduce dependence on Western defence logistics and also discussed joint production of certain defence mechanisms. In the agricultural sector, they signed an agreement to form a joint working group for easing regulatory barriers and exploring new trade routes. India opened its vast agro-markets to exporters of Argentina while aiming to get greater access to the dairy and meat products of Argentina. In the critical minerals and energy sector, India reiterated its partnership with Argentina for sourcing lithium, copper and rare earths.

Furthermore, Argentina opened investment opportunities for Indian companies in shale oil and gas in Vaca Muerta basin. In trade and investment, India proposed the expansion of India-MERCOSUR Preferential Trade Agreement to include pharmaceuticals, IT, and green technology, and further simplifying customs and reducing tariffs. For public health outreach and pandemic preparedness, Argentina expressed its interest in adopting India’s digital health infrastructure, like Cowin, e-Sanjeevani, and Ayushman Bharat Digital Mission.

What is the background?
First, a brief history of India-Argentina bilateral relations. India and Argentina established the foundation of bilateral relations in 1949. Argentina was among the few countries to recognise India’s sovereign status; since then, the relationship has grown steadily. Initially, the relationship was based on shared values in the Non-Aligned Movement and cooperation in culture, science and education. With the liberalisation of both economies, economic relations strengthened after the 1990s. The India-MERCOSUR preferential trade agreement was signed in 2004 to further strengthen the economic ties. The relationship was further strengthened through 2010 collaborations in space and Argentina’s entry to International Solar Alliance in 2018.

Second, trade and investment between India and Argentina. In 2022-23, bilateral trade between India and Argentina reached around USD 6.4 billion, where India exported pharmaceuticals, automobiles, and chemicals and imported soybeans, oil, minerals and leather. Indian companies like TCS, Tech Mahindra, and Sun Pharma have had a presence in Argentina since the mid-2000s. Trade relations are further strengthened by 2004 India-MERCOSUR Preferential Trade Agreement, which provides easy market access in Latin America and trade concessions in the region.

Third, India and Argentina’s trade in the agricultural sector. Argentina is India’s top supplier of Soybean oil and the third-largest supplier of sunflower oil. India imports about 542,000 tonnes of sunflower oil from Argentina. Other than oil, India also imports pulses, cereals, and finished leather from Argentina. Due to India’s limited production of sunflower oil, Argentina’s edible oil plays an important role in ensuring India’s food security.

Fourth, critical minerals and energy cooperation between India and Argentina. Argentina holds world’s second-largest lithium reserves and is part of the lithium triangle along with Bolivia and Chile, and serves as an important partner for India’s ambitious electric vehicle and battery storage goals. These long-term energy transition goals have increased India’s interest in sourcing lithium, copper, and rare earth elements from Argentina. In Catamarca province of Argentina, Mineral Exploration and Consultancy Limited, in collaboration with Khanij Bidesh India Ltd and Hindustan Computers Limited, is conducting a brine-based lithium exploration of over 15,000 hectares. To get LNG from Argentina’s Vaca Muerta reserves, India has signed a parallel MOU. Though Argentina is home to vast energy reserves, it does not have the fiscal or infrastructure prowess for energy production and is heavily dependent on global actors like India for energy collaborations. 

Fifth, India and Argentina’s defence cooperation. India’s emergence as a defence exporter has led to stronger military dialogues, such as training and naval cooperation. In the murky water of geopolitics, Argentina is considering India as an alternative to traditional arms suppliers like Russia and the West.

What does it mean? 
First, Argentina’s importance to India. Argentina, as the regional entry point to Latin America and as part of lithium triangle, plays an important role in India’s energy transition goals. Argentina is a key partner in India’s mineral diplomacy to reduce dependence on China.

Second, Latin America as a strategic frontier for India’s global outreach. In resource resource-rich Latin American region, India’s partnership would be a strategic alternative to traditional partners. For India, a Latin American partnership would help to diversify its economic ties and open South-South cooperation. 

TWTW Regional Roundups

News from around the world
Padmashree Anandhan, Rizwana Banu S, Merin Treesa Alex, Rohini Reenum, Femy Francis, Anu Maria Joseph, Kasvi Batra and Swati Sood. 

CHINA THIS WEEK
China: Launches its first intelligent Oceanographic vessel “Tongji”
On 13 July, SCMP reported that China marked a major advancement in maritime science and education by officially delivering China’s first intelligent oceanographic research vessel, Tongji, in Shanghai. The vessel, designed and constructed in China, is 82 meters long and 15 meters wide and can accommodate 15 crew and 30 researchers with a range of 8000 nautical miles. The vessel was built by CSSC Huangpu Wenchang for Tongji University; the 2,000-ton vessel integrates marine geology, chemistry, biology, education, and engineering functions. For real-time coordination across sea, air, and underwater domains, the vessel has features like autonomous navigation, modular labs, and an integrated communication system. The vessel is expected to be optimized for space and energy efficiency with a 460-metre square deck, 320-metre square lab space, and facilities for living, fitness, and meetings. Tongji serves as a floating offshore campus, which highlights China’s capabilities in the Marine arena.
 
China: India to resume direct flights, informs India’s Ministry of External Affairs  
On 14 July, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi and India’s External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar agreed to restart mutual personnel travel of direct flights after a suspension of five years. India’s Ministry of External Affairs said: “The two sides agreed to take additional practical steps, including travel to each other’s country and direct flight connectivity, for facilitating people-to-people exchange.” However, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has made no statement on the same. The flight transfer between the two countries was stopped in 2020, after the border clash of Doklam and the COVID-19 scare.
 
China: Australia sign MoU to review the Free Trade Agreement
On 16 July, China’s Ministry of Commerce and Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade signed an MoU to review the China-Australia Free Trade Agreement (FTA). The agreement was first signed in 2015 and has been responsible for the development of their bilateral economy and trade relations. The year 2025 marks the 10th anniversary of the FTA implementation where “both sides will maintain close cooperation, continue high-quality implementation of the agreement, jointly conduct a review to identify areas for further improvement or expansion, enhance the liberalization and facilitation of trade and investment, and provide higher-level institutional guarantees for bilateral economic and trade cooperation,” said China’s Commerce Ministry. China has been Australia's largest trading partner and export destination and source of imports for 16 years. Since the agreement of 2015, the trade has increased, estimated to USD 210 billion in 2024.Australia China Business Council and the Bankwest Curtin Economics Center reported that trade with China has increased Australia's household income by USD 1709 and even supported 595,600 jobs, showcasing a 4.2 percent increase.

China: Nvidia to resume the sale of US H20 AI chips to China
On 15 July, Nvidia announced that it will resume the sale of H20 AI chips to China. This is the reversal of the export restriction imposed by the US on AI chips over national security concerns, which garnered the rare bipartisan support. Some are unhappy about it, where Democratic Representative Raja Krishnamoorthi said: “would not only hand our foreign adversaries our most advanced technologies, but is also dangerously inconsistent with this Administration's previously-stated position on export controls for China.” Additionally, similar concerns were expressed by Republican John Moolenaar who said: “The H20 is a powerful chip that, according to our bipartisan investigation, played a significant role in the rise of PRC AI companies like DeepSeek,” and that “it is crucial that the U.S. maintain its lead and keep advanced AI out of the hands of the CCP.” Nvidia’s CEO, Jensen Huang, expressed that the leadership of the firm can slip away if they do not sell to Chinese developers. He said: “The Chinese market is massive, dynamic, and highly innovative, and it's also home to many AI researchers.”  

EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC THIS WEEK
Japan: Japan Sets up a government body to mitigate citizen’s concerns over sharp rise in number of foreign nationals in the country
On 15 July, Japan set up an administrative body to ease public concern over the growing number of foreign residents, visitors as well as overtourism in the country. This government body will serve as a ‘control tower’ to tackle issues such as crime and disorderly conduct pertaining to foreigners. The genesis of this body comes after a group of legislators from Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) who proposed various courses of actions to achieve a "society of orderly and harmonious coexistence with foreign nationals". Some of these measures include stricter requirements for purchasing real estate properties and obtaining drivers licenses. The demographic changes caused by the arrival of foreign nationals is one of the major issues of concern for voters in the coming election to be held on 20 July 2025 in which the ruling LDP and its junior partner Komeito are predicted to lose majority. 

Japan: Fears of foreign interference in upper house elections surges
On July 17, The Japan Times reported on rising concerns about possible foreign interference particularly from Russia in Japan’s upper house elections set for July 20. Allegations emerged after one of its candidates, right-wing Sanseito party’s Saya, appeared in a Russian state media (Sputnik) interview. Party official Sohei Kamiya denied prior knowledge of the interview and said staff involved would be removed. Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Kazuhiko Aoki warned that Japan is increasingly targeted by disinformation campaigns, including fake accounts and manipulated online content. The government is ramping up fact-checking and public awareness efforts to protect the electoral process.

SOUTHEAST AND SOUTH ASIA
Indonesia: Trade deal with US results in reduction in tariffs for exports from 32 per cent to 19 per cent
On 16 July, Jakarta Post reported that Indonesia had struck a trade deal with the United States. Under this deal, tariffs on Indonesia’s exports to the USA have been reduced from 32 percent to 19 percent. As a part of its agreement Indonesia also committed to purchasing 50 Boeing Jets, US energy exports worth 15 billion USD and American agricultural products amounting to five billion USD. Hasan Nasbi who is the spokesperson of the Indonesian president called the agreement a “meeting point” between the two nations. After the deal Indonesia’s stock exchange rose by 0.7 percent.

Bangladesh: Martyrs’ Day celebrations takes place to commemorate the July Uprisings
On 16 July, Martyrs’ Day celebrations took place across Bangladesh to commemorate the memory of six people who died in Chittagong, Rangpur, and Dhaka due to police firing during the July 2024 Uprisings. Previously, Cultural Affairs Adviser to the Interim government, Mostofa Farooki, announced that the government launched a countrywide campaign to commemorate the martyrs of the uprisings by constructing their memorials across all 64 districts of the country.

Nepal: Janata Samajbadi Party withdraws support from ruling coalition
On 16 July, Nepal’s Janata Samajbadi Party withdrew its support from Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli’s government. The ruling alliance is now in a minority in the National Assembly. With only 28 parliamentarians in a 59-member assembly, passing legislation will become more difficult. JSP leader Prakash Adhikari said that the key reasons for the withdrawal are: “the government’s continued neglect of party concerns, lack of response to policy proposals, and failure to uphold prior commitments, particularly on the matter of constitutional amendments.”

Sri Lanka: Seventh Regional Committee Meeting of the International Solar Alliance commences in Colombo
On 15 July, the Seventh Regional Committee Meeting (RCM) of the International Solar Alliance for the Asia and the Pacific region began in Colombo. The meeting focuses on expanding regional platforms, de-risking solar investments, and adoption of technologies like green hydrogen and energy storage. Sessions will also delve into the development of cross-border solar trade and regional STAR centres, and the operationalisation of a solar marketplace for Small Island Developing States.

Pakistan: Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Uzbekistan sign trilateral agreement on Railway Project
On 17 July, Pakistan, along with Uzbekistan and Afghanistan, inked a “trilateral agreement” for working on a “railway project” which will link all three countries in Kabul. The agreement is known by the name of “Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (UAP) Railway Project.” The signing formalities saw the presence of Deputy PM and FM Ishaq Dar, Acting Foreign Minister of Afghanistan Amir Khan Muttaqi, and Foreign Minister of Uzbekistan Baxtiyor Saidov. The project entails the construction of a railway line linking Uzbekistan with Pakistan through Afghanistan and would give Central Asian countries “access” to Pakistan’s warm waters. The railway line is anticipated to be 640 km long, which would connect Termez in Uzbekistan, Hairatan in Afghanistan, and Kurram in Pakistan.

Separately, FM Dar convened discussions with the interim PM of Afghanistan, Mullah Hassan Akhund, acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi, and Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani. FM Dar emphasized “security and border management” so that the two countries can increase “economic cooperation” and work towards enhancing “regional connectivity.”

JUI-F becomes the largest opposition party in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provincial assembly
On 17 July, JUI-F increased its number in the KP provincial assembly to 18 after PML-N forfeited its claim for a “non-Muslim” seat, for JUI-F’s Gorpal Singh to occupy. Currently, there are 52 members who belong to the opposition party in the KP provincial assembly. 18 of them belong to JUI-F, whereas 17 belong to PML-N. 10 members in the provincial assembly belong to PPP, four belong to ANP, and three belong to PTI-Parliamentarians. PML-N's Dr. Ibadullah holds the position of leader of the opposition in the provincial assembly. PTI continues to hold the majority in the assembly with 92 members.

Pakistan: Foreign Minister Dar advocates for dialogue to resolve disputes at SCO Foreign Ministers Meeting
On 15 July, Deputy PM and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar addressed the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Council of Foreign Ministers meeting being held in Tianjin, China. Dar emphasized the importance of SCO in playing a “stabilizing force” and appreciated China's leadership in promoting the SCO’s agenda. He denounced the attacks carried out by Israel in Gaza and termed them “reckless disregard for international norms.” He also called for an “immediate ceasefire” and reaffirmed Islamabad’s backing for the “two-state solution.” Further, he criticized the recent US attacks on the nuclear sites in Iran, terming them “unacceptable.” On the Pahalgam terrorist attack, he claimed that accusations against Pakistan could have likely escalated into a bigger conflict with India. He reiterated Pakistan’s stance on resolving disputes via “dialogue.” On the ceasefire with India after the military confrontation, he said, “Pakistan remains committed to ceasefire agreements and regional stability, but we cannot accept the normalization of arbitrary force.”

Pakistan: Federal Minister for Climate Change and SPAR6C discuss steps to increase Pakistan’s capability to take part in “international carbon markets”
On 15 July, Musadik Malik, who is the federal minister for climate change, met a team of Supporting Preparedness for Article 6 Cooperation (SPAR6C). SPAR6C is a “five-year programme” that began in 2022 to assist Pakistan, Colombia, Thailand, and Zambia in increasing their capacity to take part in “international carbon markets” under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement. As per a communique released after the discussions were concluded, the two sides delved into measures for enhancing Pakistan’s capability to cooperate under Article 6. The two sides also examined the support given to the students of Pakistan who are being provided training and would carry out research in accordance with Article 6.

Pakistan: Pakistan, UK formulate Business Advisory Council to enhance economic collaboration
On 14 July, Pakistan and the UK inked the Trade Dialogue Mechanism Agreement and formulated the UK-Pakistan Business Advisory Council. The council will enable businessmen and government officials to work together to achieve “high value trade and investment.” Further, it will also provide recommendations for reforms in policies and enhance business opportunities. This is a step in the direction of institutionalizing “bilateral economic cooperation.” From the Pakistani side, Minister of Commerce Jam Kamal Khan, and from the UK side, Minister of State for Trade Policy and Economic Security Douglas Alexander signed the accord. This accord is expected to lead to the formulation of “joint working groups” and promote collaboration in “digital trade, renewable energy, agriculture, and pharmaceuticals.” The UK would also furnish GBP 200,000 to encourage its people to invest in Pakistan.

Iran: European Councils sanctions those responsible for targeting Iranian dissidents
On 15 July, Reuters reported that the European Council has sanctioned ‘eight people and one entity’ that it has claimed carried out assassinations at the behest of the Iranian government targeting Iranian dissidents. In a statement, the Council termed the sanctions as directed against ‘serious human rights violations’ and ‘transnational repression’and includes ban on travel and freezing of assets. Among those sanctioned are: the Zindashti Network, which is a ‘criminal group’ linked to the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security and Mohammed Ansari, who leads the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force Unit 840. The latter has been responsible for directing targeted assassinations of journalists critical of the Iran.

Iran: Iranian Parliament makes resumption of nuclear talks with the US, subject to US meeting preconditions
On 16 July, the Iranian parliament stated that the resumption of nuclear talks with the US was contingent on the latter meeting some ‘preconditions’. The statement, however, did not clarify what these preconditions are. Previous statements from Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi indicate that some of the preconditions include the following- that the US must render assurances that it will not attack Iran again; that Iran will not give up nuclear enrichment and that other issues like the Iranian ballistic missile programme would not be up for discussion as part of the negotiations. It is to be noted that so far around five rounds of “indirect negotiations” have taken place between the two sides with no conclusive consensus or deal in sight.

In a separate development, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and the foreign ministers of France, Germany and the UK have decided on a deadline for reaching a nuclear deal with Iran which is by end of August. If no deal is achieved by the set deadline, the “snapback” mechanism under the 2015 nuclear deal will be activated and all sanctions that had been lifted as part of the deal will automatically be re-imposed on Iran.

AFRICA THIS WEEK
Senegal: France ends its military presence in Senegal
On 18 July, France officially ended its military presence and handed over its last two bases in Senegal. Over 350 troops left the bases bringing an end to a 65-year French military presence in Senegal. This withdrawal follows similar moves across West and Central Africa, including Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso. General Pascal Ianni, the head of French forces in Africa stated: “France is reinventing partnerships in a dynamic Africa. We are turning a page in the military history of our two countries” Senegalese President Diomaye Faye demanded French withdrawal, but unlike Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, Faye has insisted cooperation with France should continue.

Gabon: Gabon regains full membership in the Commonwealth
On 17 July, Gabon regained full membership in the Commonwealth following the results of its April 2025 presidential election. Gabon was partially suspended from the Commonwealth in September 2023 after the military leader Brice Oligui Nguema carried out a coup, ending President Ali Bongo’s rule. In April, the coup leader Nguema won the presidential election with 95 per cent of the vote. The Commonwealth found the election to be credible and decided to lift the suspension.

EUROPE THIS WEEK
The long-term EU budget 2028-2034: Marks a shift from traditional areas of farming and regional development to migration, competition, digital regulation, and Russian aggression
On 16 July, Deutsche Welle reported that the European Commission proposed a EUR two trillion European Union (EU) budget for the next seven years, an increase of EUR 800 billion from the existing EUR 1.2 trillion. The EU budget was described as the “most ambitious EU budget ever,” and it would address issues like migration, global competition, digital regulation, and Russian aggression. With this new budget, the EU aimed for strategic flexibility. The multi-annual financial framework outlined the bloc’s spending priorities allocated for different areas. The EU budget allocated EUR 865 billion for a regional and national partnership fund, EUR 451 billion for clean tech, digital, biotech, defence, space, and food, EUR 300 billion to support farmers, and EUR 100 billion for Ukraine’s recovery from Russia’s invasion. The budget is financed by member states. In the EU budget, Germany contributes almost a quarter of the funds as it is the largest economy among EU nations. The draft faced contentious negotiations, needing unanimous member state approval and European Parliament consent by 2028.

Denmark: Government adopts new law to limit and protect citizens from misuse of AI
On 14 July, Denmark is set to become the first country to pass a law protecting its citizens from unauthorised AI-generated fake videos, photos, or voices. The legislation aims to prevent the misuse of a person’s face or voice without their consent. However, videos created for parody, art, and humour will still be permitted, as long as they are explicitly labelled as fake. The bill is expected to pass with almost 90 percent support. It will allow the victims of fake AI generated media to have the content removed and to seek compensation. Denmark stated that the law is also intended to protect democracy, as deepfakes can be used to deceive voters and manipulate elections.

About the Authors
Lekshmi MK is a postgraduate student at the Department of Political Science, Madras Christian College. Swati Sood is an undergraduate student in Political Science at the University of Delhi. Naomi Miriam Mathew is a postgraduate student of International Studies at the Symbiosis School of International Studies, Pune. Kasvi Batra is a Research intern at National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS). Femy Francis, Anu Maria Joseph, and Padmashree Anandhan are Project Associates at NIAS. Rohini Reenum is a Doctoral Student at NIAS. is Project Associates at NIAS. Rizwana Banu S is an undergraduate student at the Department of Political Science, Madras Christian College. Merin Treesa Alex is a postgraduate student at the Department of International Studies, Stella Maris College, Chennai.


 


PREVIOUS COMMENTS

April 2026 | CWA # 2065

Lakshmi Venugopal Menon

The Middle East (Jan–Mar 2026):
The US-Iran War, Israel-Hamas Conflict and their interconnected fallouts
April 2026 | CWA # 2064

Anwesha Ghosh

Afghanistan (Jan–Mar 2026):
Gender Repression, Leadership Rifts, Regional Realignments and Clashes with Pakistan
April 2026 | CWA # 2063

Ramya B

Russia (Jan-Mar 2026)
Assertive Military Posture, Attempts for an Economic Turnaround and Search for Partners
April 2026 | CWA # 2062

Himani Pant

Europe (Jan-Mar 2026)
Trade diversification & FTAs, Increased defence spending, Tightening irregular migration and Economic slowdown
April 2026 | CWA # 2061

S Shaji

Africa (Jan-Mar 2026)
Elections, Civil Wars, Militancy and Peace Initiatives
April 2026 | CWA # 2059

Adarsh Vijay

India and the World (Jan-Mar 2026)
Maintaining Strategic Autonomy, Balancing the US relations and Resetting the China ties 
April 2026 | CWA # 2058

Nishchal N Pandey  & Mahesh Raj Bhatta

Nepal (Jan-Mar 2026)
Political Upheaval, Generational Change and Economic Uncertainty
April 2026 | CWA # 2057

Bibhu Prasad Routray

Myanmar (Jan-Mar 2026)
An Illegitimate Regime’s Consolidation Game
April 2026 | CWA # 2056

Ashik J Bonofer

Southeast Asia (Jan-Mar 2026)
Deteriorating situation in Myanmar, Philippines as the ASEAN Chair, New government in Thailand, and Economic & Environmental challenges
April 2026 | CWA # 2055

Haans J Freddy

East Asia (Jan-Mar 2026)
China’s military operations near Taiwan, Japan-China tensions and South Korea’s security challenges
April 2026 | CWA # 2052

Shreya Upadhyay

The United States (Jan-Mar 2026)
Tariffs, Ukraine, Iran and Operationalization of Trump’s World Order
March 2026 | CWA # 2039

Femy Francis

Trump-Xi Meeting
Why did Trump reschedule it? What does that mean?
March 2026 | CWA # 2035

Akshath Kaimal

Pakistan-Afghanistan Conflict
Broken ceasefire, Expanding military strikes and Worsening humanitarian situation
March 2026 | CWA # 2033

Mahesh Bhatta

Nepal after elections:
Five major challenges for the new government
March 2026 | CWA # 2024

Lekshmi MK

The UN and the Iran-US War
UNSC Resolution 2817 between “Clear and Unified Message” and “Manifest Injustice”
March 2026 | CWA # 2023

Femy Francis

China’s Two Sessions 2026
New Five-Year Plan, Ethnic Unity Law, and an Enhanced Defence Budget
March 2026 | CWA # 2019

Akshath Kaimal

Rising Violence in Nigeria
Limited State Capacity, Multiple Actors, and a Complex Security Environment
March 2026 | CWA # 2012

Padmashree Anandhan

The War in Ukraine
Long-range strikes, Defence adaptation and the EU’s energy dependence
March 2026 | CWA # 2010

Mahesh Bhatta

Nepal Elections 2026
The Rise of the “New” and the Fall of the “Old”
March 2026 | CWA # 2009

Sreemaya Nair

Nepal Elections 2026
Rise of a new leadership and Reset in political landscape
February 2026 | CWA # 1998

Anu Maria Joseph

Instability in Sudan
Response to the genocide call and the threats of a regional spillover
February 2026 | CWA # 1985

Abhimanyu Solanki

Basant in Pakistan
The return of Basant, and what it signifies
February 2026 | CWA # 1977

Anu Maria Joseph

Violence in Nigeria
US military deployment amidst worsening insurgency
February 2026 | CWA # 1976

Lekshmi MK

The War in Ukraine
The Geneva Talks and Growing Negotiation Asymmetry
December 2025 | CWA # 1971

Vani Vyshnavi Jupudi

Pakistan Budget 2025-26
Legislating stabilisation under IMF discipline and coalition constraints
December 2025 | CWA # 1970

Aparna A Nair

Pakistan & China
Ten Years of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)
November 2025 | CWA # 1968

Vani Vyshnavi Jupudi

Pakistan and the US
A New opening, or another cycle?
February 2026 | CWA # 1959

Yesasvi Koganti

UK and China
PM Keir Starmer’s visit and the Recalibration of Economic, Strategic, and Domestic ties
January 2026 | CWA # 1946

R Preetha

The Davos Summit 2026
Five Major Takeaways from The World Economic Forum
December 2025 | CWA # 1931

Padmashree Anandhan

NATO Summit 2025
December 2025 | CWA # 1924

Padmashree Anandhan

NATO Summit 2025
August 2025 | CWA # 1801

R Preetha

28 August 1963
Martin Luther King's "I Have a Dream" speech and the Civil Rights Movement in the US
August 2025 | CWA # 1790

GP Team

The World This Week#323-324
The Trump-Putin meeting & the US-China tariff extension
August 2025 | CWA # 1780

Abhiruchi Chowdhury

Trump tariffs:
Weaponization of access to the US economy
August 2025 | CWA # 1779

GP Team

The World This Week#322
US tariffs on India, Brazil and Canada & the EU-US trade deal
August 2025 | CWA # 1778

Lekshmi MK

28 July 1914
Austria-Hungary declares war on Serbia, starting the First World War
July 2025 | CWA # 1770

Abhiruchi Chowdhury

Pakistan-Afghanistan relations:
Why the focus on terrorism, refugees, and Uzbekistan as the third partner?
July 2025 | CWA # 1769

GP Team

The World This Week#321
Indian PM Modi's visit to the Maldives I Elections to the Upper House in Japan
July 2025 | CWA # 1762

Lekshmi MK

Ocean Darkening: 
What is the phenomenon? What are its effects? And who are more vulnerable?
July 2025 | CWA # 1749

R Preetha

Africa as the Hunger Epicenter
Of the 13 Global Hunger Hotspots, 8 are in Africa: Five reasons why
July 2025 | CWA # 1748

GP Team

The World This Week #318
PM Modi’s Visit to Trinidad and Tobago & Ghana, One big beautiful bill, and Quad Foreign Ministers Meeting
July 2025 | CWA # 1744

Chittrothu Vaihali

EU-Canada Summit 2025
What is security and defence partnership all about?
July 2025 | CWA # 1742

IPRI Team

Conflict Weekly # 287-88
The 12 Day War and the Congo-Rwanda Peace Deal
July 2025 | CWA # 1738

Fleur Elizabeth Philip

Thailand and Cambodia
What was the phone call between PM Shinawatra and President of Senate Hun Sen? What is the border dispute between the two? Why has this become an issue?
June 2025 | CWA # 1735

Padmashree Anandhan

NATO Summit 2025:
Trump making Europe great again
June 2025 | CWA # 1734

GP Team

The World This Week #317
NATO Summit 2025 and Russia-Mali bilateral agreements
June 2025 | CWA # 1733

Ananya Dinesh

China and the Pacific Islands 
What was the recent China-PIC joint statement about? What it says, and what it means?
June 2025 | CWA # 1728

M Kejia

G7 Summit 2025:
The Focus on the Middle East and Trade negotiations
June 2025 | CWA # 1727

Aparna A Nair

Second China-Central Asia Summit:
China’s continuing search for regional partners, and the emphasis on the BRI
June 2025 | CWA # 1726

GP Team

The World This Week #316
China-Central Asia Summit in Kazakhstan, and the G7 Summit in Canada
June 2025 | CWA # 1725

Brighty Ann Sarah, R Preetha, Santhiya M, Aparna A Nair & M Kejia

Operation Midnight Hammer: US bombs three nuclear sites in Iran
What were the three Iranian nuclear sites that were targeted? What are the B2 Bombers and Bunker Buster Bombs? What do these attacks mean? What Next?
June 2025 | CWA # 1724

IPRI Team

Conflict Weekly #286
The Spiralling Israel-Iran Crisis, and the Dangerous Hunger Hotspots
June 2025 | CWA # 1721

Rizwana Banu S and Santhiya M

Who are the Afrikaners?
Why is Trump interested in the Afrikaner question in South Africa?
June 2025 | CWA # 1720

Lekshmi MK

New WMO Report on Arctic Warming
What are the social, economic and environmental implications of Arctic warming
June 2025 | CWA # 1719

J Yamini  

China’s EV Surge
What contributes to the rise of BYD
June 2025 | CWA # 1717

J Yamini

Gender Violence in Pakistan:
What are the larger issues in the Noor Mukadam case?
June 2025 | CWA # 1715

Femy Francis

The US-China:
On Tariffs, Rare Earths and Visas
June 2025 | CWA # 1713

GP Team

The World This Week #315
The UN Ocean Conference in France and the US-China Meeting in London
June 2025 | CWA # 1709

IPRI Team

Conflict Weekly #284-285
Cambodia-Thailand Border Tensions, Protests in the US, and the Indigenous Māori question in New Zealand
June 2025 | CWA # 1705

GP Team

The World This Week #314
Elections in South Korea and Poland I China and the Pacific Island Countries I Bangladesh Election Announcement 2026
June 2025 | CWA # 1703

M Kejia 

Sagarmatha Sambaad in Nepal
Kathmandu’s Global Agenda for the Himalayas
June 2025 | CWA # 1700

R Preetha

Ethiopia bans the TPLF
What does the TPLF ban mean for the Pretoria agreement? What next for Ethiopia?
June 2025 | CWA # 1694

Aashish Ganeshan

The US:
Harvard vs Trump Administration
June 2025 | CWA # 1691

GP Team

The World This Week #313
China-ASEAN-GCC Summit I President Macron's visit to South East Asia I Trump Vs Harvard
May 2025 | CWA # 1690

GP Team

The World This Week #312
Elections in Romania, Portugal & Poland I UK-EU Summit
May 2025 | CWA # 1689

Padmashree Anandhan

Ukraine
Continuing Russia’s Aerial Attacks, despite exchange of prisoners
May 2025 | CWA # 1688

Ayan Datta

Gaza
The Humanitarian Crisis and Israel’s Renewed Offensive
May 2025 | CWA # 1685

Aparna A Nair

UK-EU Summit:
First step towards a reset
May 2025 | CWA # 1683

Aashish Ganeshan

Elections in Portugal:
The Rise of Chega Party and the Search for Political Stability
May 2025 | CWA # 1679

Aashish Ganeshan

US in the Middle Easr
Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia, Qatar and UAE
May 2025 | CWA # 1678

Gauri Gupta

China in Latin America
China-CELAC forum: Strengthening ties with Latin America and Caribbean
May 2025 | CWA # 1677

GP Team

The World This Week #310-311
China in Latin America and the Carribbean I Trump's Middle East Visit I Denmark as the new Arctic Chair
May 2025 | CWA # 1675

Lekshmi MK

Turkey:
PKK disbands after 40 years of armed insurgency
May 2025 | CWA # 1673

Padmashree Anandhan

Ukraine:
The Discussion in Turkiye and the Elusive Ceasefire
May 2025 | CWA # 1672

D Suba Chandran

India and Pakistan:
De-escalation and the “New Normal”
May 2025 | CWA # 1671

Abhiruchi Chowdhury

US, Ukraine and Russia:
Air attacks amidst a Minerals deal and Ceasefire Proposals
May 2025 | CWA # 1670

Fleur Elizabeth Philip

Singapore Elections in 2025:
People’s Action Party (PAP) Wins, Again
May 2025 | CWA # 1667

R Preetha and Brighty Ann Sarah

East Asia:
Tough Tariff Negotiations with the US
May 2025 | CWA # 1666

Padmashree Anandhan

The US-Ukraine
The mineral deal with the US
May 2025 | CWA # 1665
Conflict Weekly # 280-81
India-Pakistan De-escalation I Ukraine Discussion in Istanbul I The Battle over Port Sudan I Disbanding of PKK in Turkiye I France-Algeria Diplomatic Tensions
May 2025 | CWA # 1663

R Preetha

Canada Elections 2025:
What do the results convey? What next for Mark Carney?
March 2024 | CWA # 1251

NIAS Africa Team

Africa This Week
February 2024 | CWA # 1226

NIAS Africa Team

Africa This Week
October 2023 | CWA # 1091

Annem Naga Bindhu Madhuri

Issues for Europe
July 2023 | CWA # 1012

Bibhu Prasad Routray

Myanmar continues to burn
December 2022 | CWA # 879

Padmashree Anandhan

The Ukraine War
November 2022 | CWA # 838

Rishma Banerjee

Tracing Europe's droughts
March 2022 | CWA # 705

NIAS Africa Team

In Focus: Libya
December 2021 | CWA # 630

GP Team

Europe in 2021
October 2021 | CWA # 588

Abigail Miriam Fernandez

TLP is back again
August 2021 | CWA # 528

STIR Team

Space Tourism
September 2019 | CWA # 162

Lakshman Chakravarthy N

5G: A Primer
December 2018 | CWA # 71

Mahesh Bhatta

Nepal
December 2018 | CWA # 70

Nasima Khatoon

The Maldives
December 2018 | CWA # 69

Harini Madhusudan

India
December 2018 | CWA # 68

Sourina Bej

Bangladesh
December 2018 | CWA # 67

Seetha Lakshmi Dinesh Iyer

Afghanistan