GP Short Notes # 978, 5 September 2024
In the news
On 2 September, the Russian Ministry of Defence reported on targeting Ukraine’s defence industry enterprises using long-range and attack unmanned aerial vehicles in Kharkiv. The ministry stated: “The Sever Group of Forces in Volchansk and Liptsy directions hit formations of 71st Jaeger Brigade, 3rd Assault Brigade of the AFU, and 36th Marine Brigade near Kharkov and Volchansk (Kharkov region).”
On 1 September, Ukraine’s military claimed Russia’s ballistic missiles and power-guided bomb attack on Kharkiv city resulting in the death of 40. The attack comes as a counter to Ukraine’s drone attack on energy facilities including an oil refinery in Moscow. According to the report in The New York Times, nearly ten explosions were observed across Kharkiv city. Ukraine’s President, Volodymyr Zelenskyy said: “Every such strike on Kharkiv and our other cities and towns proves the correctness of our tactics, particularly in the Kursk region — we must push the war back to where it came from, into Russia.”
On 21 August, Russia’s Ministry of Defence claimed to have deterred the largest drone attack by Ukraine against its two energy facilities, Konakovo Power Station and an oil refinery in Moscow. The ministry stated: “Last night, while the Kiev regime was trying to carry out a terrorist attack using unmanned aerial vehicles on the territory of the Russian Federation, on duty air defence systems shot down and intercepted 158 fixed-wing UAVs.”
Issues at large
First, Russia’s retaliatory attacks using drones. Since the delivery of the West’s advanced air defence systems, the frequency of attacks in Russia has multiplied. This ranges from targeting the airfields, energy infrastructure and military brigades. The Kursk operation provided an additional advantage for the Ukrainian forces to launch deeper attacks into the Russian territory. This shows how Russian defence has lowered to prevent damage and how Ukrainian air defences have strengthened from Western support. Since 2023, the intensity of drone attacks in airfields (Ryazan and Saratov) and Belgorod has increased and has slowly expanded further into Russia.
Second, targeting the Kharkiv city. Kharkiv located 40 kilometres south of the Russian border is strategically important as it is home to the largest Ukrainian military brigades and functions as an intersection between Russia’s Rostov-on Don to Crimea. Earlier in 2023, Russian troops advanced from one settlement to another in the north of Kharkiv due to its strategic advantage to target. Since 2024, southern Ukraine has been the focus due to geographical proximity. It has also been easier for Russia to maintain its position in southern and eastern Ukraine due to its location and use it for quick retaliation against Ukraine’s incursive attacks.
Third, the West’s air-defence support. Compared to Ukraine’s November 2022 counteroffensive and the 2024 cross-border offensive into Kursk, the West’s support has upgraded from advanced military equipment and defence systems to advanced air defences. This includes “12 National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS) and munitions, more than 2,000 Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, Patriot air defense batteries, HAWK air defense systems, AIM-7, RIM-7, and AIM-9M missiles for air defense” and relevant equipment to integrate west’s launchers, missiles and existing air defence systems. The challenge faced by the Ukrainian military over the delayed US aid package no longer exists. It helped the Ukrainian military to defend its ground and expand its strikes into Russia.
In perspective
First, Ukraine’s cry to showcase its capability. Taking the ongoing Kursk operation and the recent drone attacks across Russia is rather political than strategic. Russia which was selectively attacking Ukrainian military brigades and energy infrastructure is now provoked by Ukraine to rethink its internal security. However, Russia has been projected among the West to have downplayed the Kursk incursion, it has been able to defend and counter the missile attacks targeted inside. From the overall war point, this can be seen as Ukraine’s act to showcase its improved aerial attacking capabilities and to deceive its previous territorial losses.
Second, the tacit West. Since the start of the war, the debate over the supply and usage of Western defence systems has transcended. From sending defence equipment and ground defence systems to advanced air defences the debates have always circled to prevent the escalation of the war. Continuing into the third year, the barricades to supply F-16s and usage of west-supplied defence systems into Russian territory no longer stand restricted. Militarily and politically the West has announced its support to Ukraine for the Kursk invasion and the missile launched into Russia. The implicitness of the West has given larger ground for Ukraine to further its attacks.