GP Short Notes

GP Short Notes # 961, 2 January 2025

Mozambique: Continuing post-election violence and refugee crisis
Ayan Datta

In the news
On 31 December, Venancio Mondlane, the exiled opposition leader of Mozambique’s Podemos party, announced a fresh phase of protests against the Presidential Election results, continuing for almost three months. Expressing dissatisfaction with the Constitutional Council’s decision to uphold Frelimo party candidate Daniel Chapo’s election victory, Mondlane accused the government of misrepresenting the people’s will by playing power politics. 

On 1 December, the BBC reported that the protests had resulted in 278 deaths since their onset in early October. 

On 30 December, multiple NGOs in the region noted that the worsening post-election violence was causing a mass emigration of Mozambicans to neighbouring countries, with 13,000 Mozambican refugees entering Malawi and 1,000 in Eswatini. 

On 28 December, South Africa diverted trade and travel from its Leebombo Border Post to Eswatini’s Managa Border Post in a bid to stem the arrival of Mozambican refugees. 

Issues at large
First, the political conflict between Frelimo and Mondlane. Despite Chapo securing a 71 per cent vote share in the October elections, Mondlane, backed by Mozambique’s young population and their anti-establishment sentiment, called the outcome “absurd” and led anti-government protests and strikes. The Podemos leader claimed that Frelimo-aligned election officials rigged the elections by engaging in fraudulent practices, including ballot stuffing. Despite foreign observers highlighting inconsistencies and malpractices in the counting and tabulation process, the CC, whose six out of seven judges had been nominated by Frelimo, upheld the outcome by declaring Chapo President by 65 per cent of the popular vote. For Chapo, the election results should be reversed in his favour, making him President and leading to what he calls “electoral justice.” Furthermore, he stressed that charges against peaceful protestors should be dropped, and the Frelimo should be investigated for its repression. 

Second, the changing nature of protests and state response. Despite being largely peaceful, the protests turned violent after the Council’s 23 November decision, with protesters using firebombs against the police and engaging in widespread theft and looting, resulting in trade disruptions, food insecurity, resource shortages, rising unemployment, and flight of refugees to neighbouring Malawi and South Africa. The crime and violence worsened following a massive prison break in Maputo on 25 December, where 6000 inmates, including 29 terror convicts escaped. However, Podemos supporters claimed that Frelimo orchestrated the jailbreak to delegitimise the protests. Although Mondlane urged his supporters to demonstrate peacefully, he justified the looting by framing it as an act of protest against businessmen and a natural consequence of the widespread poverty and impoverishment under Frelimo. Meanwhile, human rights groups have criticised the state’s response as disproportionate, with the police attempting to disperse protesters with tear gas, barricades and live rounds, leading to around 500 deaths so far. 

Third, the refugee crisis and its implications. The ongoing looting and violence have pushed the already impoverished population into neighbouring states, whose relative stability and openness (Malawi) and prosperity (South Africa) have acted as pull factors. South Africa, with its vast industrial base, has traditionally been the destination for Mozambican refugees during the civil war years (1977 to 1992), with over 300,000 crossing into that country at the time. However, this time, with Pretoria reluctant to accept more Mozambicans, the refugees have resorted to Malawi, where refugee camps are already operating at capacity. 
 
In perspective
Mondlane’s victory, the public’s support for him and the subsequent mobilisation around him have exposed the long-brewing frustration in Mozambique with entrenched elites and political options. However, the violent turn in the protests will prove counterproductive for Mozambican society by adding to the new government’s economic and law and order challenges. Additionally, the refugee crisis will put Mondlane at a disadvantage as Mozambique’s neighbours, eager to return the refugees, will cooperate with the Frelimo government. Moreover, recent evidence shows that although Africa has a long tradition of youth-led protests, such protests are seldom successful in their aims and fizzle out in the medium-to-long term because police brutality, applied with sufficient intensity and frequency on impoverished populations, can decisively end protest movements (not their underlying conflicts). Although the protests reflect the genuine aspirations of impoverished Mozambicans, if they continue, they are likely to join the ranks of Nigeria’s failed Anti-SARS protests and Kenya’s Anti-Finance Bill demonstrations, both of which were dispersed primarily by the strength of police and armed forces. 

Other GP Short Notes


Click below links for year wise archive
2022 | 2021 | 2020 | 2019 | 2018